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Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options
Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium
Reactor-Related Options
Panel on Reactor-Related Options for the Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium
Committee on International Security and Arms Control
National Academy of Sciences
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C.
1995
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Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options
NOTICE: This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by the President of the National Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievement of engineers. Dr. Harold Liebowitz is president of the National Academy of Engineering.
The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine.
The Committee on International Security and Arms Control is a standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences. Its membership includes members of all three bodies.
The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. Harold Liebowitz are chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.
This project was made possible with funding support from the Department of Energy, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and National Research Council funds. The MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York provide core support for the work of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, including projects such as this.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 95-78572
International Standard Book Number 0-309-05145-2
Copies of this report and its companion, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, are available for sale from the
National Academy Press,
2101 Constitution Avenue N.W., Box 285, Washington, DC 20055. 800-624-6242 or 202-334-3313 (in the Washington Metropolitan Area).
The Executive Summary of Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium is available in limited quantities from the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, 2101 Constitution Avenue N.W., Washington, DC 20418.
Copyright © 1995 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
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Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options
PANEL ON REACTOR-RELATED OPTIONS FOR THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS WEAPONS PLUTONIUM
JOHN P. HOLDREN (Chair), Class of 1935 Professor of Energy,
University of California-Berkeley
JOHN F. AHEARNE, Executive Director,
Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society
ROBERT J. BUDNITZ, President,
Future Resources Associates
RICHARD L. GARWIN, IBM Fellow Emeritus,
Thomas J. Watson Research Center, IBM Corporation
MICHAEL M. MAY, Director Emeritus,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
THOMAS H. PIGFORD, Professor of Nuclear Engineering,
University of California-Berkeley
JOHN J. TAYLOR, Vice President,
Nuclear Power Division, Electric Power Research Institute
Staff
MATTHEW BUNN, Plutonium Study Director
LOIS E. PETERSON, Research Associate
LA'FAYE LEWIS-OLIVER, Administrative Assistant
MONICA OLIVA, Research Assistant
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Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL
JOHN P. HOLDREN (Chair), Class of 1935 Professor of Energy,
University of California-Berkeley
WOLFGANG K.H. PANOFSKY (Plutonium Study Chair), Professor and Director Emeritus,
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University
JOHN D. BALDESCHWIELER,
Division of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, California Institute of Technology
WILLIAM F. BURNS, Major General (retired),
U.S. Army
GEORGE LEE BUTLER, Vice President,
Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc.
PAUL M. DOTY,
Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology; and
Director Emeritus,
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
STEVE FETTER,
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland
ALEXANDER H. FLAX, President Emeritus,
Institute for Defense Analyses
RICHARD L. GARWIN, IBM Fellow Emeritus,
Thomas J. Watson Research Center, IBM Corporation
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, Deputy Director,
International Institute for Strategic Studies
SPURGEON M. KEENY, JR., President,
Arms Control Association
JOSHUA LEDERBERG, University Professor,
The Rockefeller University
MICHAEL M. MAY, Director Emeritus,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
MATTHEW MESELSON,
Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Harvard University
C. KUMAR N. PATEL, Vice Chancellor,
Research, University of California, Los Angeles
JONATHAN D. POLLACK, Senior Advisor for International Policy,
The RAND Corporation
NEIL J. SMELSER, Director,
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, Director,
Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution
ROBERT H. WERTHEIM, Rear Admiral (retired),
U.S. Navy
F. SHERWOOD ROWLAND, ex officio,
Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Sciences
Staff
JO L. HUSBANDS, Director
MATTHEW BUNN, Plutonium Study Director
LOIS E. PETERSON, Research Associate
LA'FAYE LEWIS-OLIVER, Administrative Assistant
MONICA OLIVA, Research Assistant
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Preface
With the end of the Cold War, the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union have undertaken arms control on an unprecedented scale. What to do with the fissile materials from the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons to be dismantled has become a pressing problem for international security. Limits on access to these materials are the primary technical barrier to acquisition of nuclear weapons in the world today.
In 1992 the U.S. government asked the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to study alternative approaches for dismantling nuclear weapons, and for storing and eventually using or disposing of the plutonium they contain. To support CISAC's work, the NAS formed the Panel on Reactor-Related Options for the Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium in November 1992. The panel consists of three members of CISAC and four additional members selected for their relevant expertise on issues related to reactors and reactor wastes (see list of panel members on p. iii).
The official U.S. government sponsor of the project is the Office of Nuclear Energy of the U.S. Department of Energy. Additional support was provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and National Research Council funds. The Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation provide core support for CISAC, including its policy reports.
The panel's report served as input to the deliberations of CISAC in its broader charge, which included consideration of disposition options not related to nuclear reactors, as well as issues of preliminary storage and management of
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the weapons plutonium.1 The responsibility for the content of the panel's report, which has been subjected separately to the Academy's review process, rests solely with the members of the panel; similarly, the non-CISAC members of the panel bear no responsibility for the conclusions that CISAC drew, in its 1994 report, from this and other inputs.
Like the main committee study, the panel report proved to be an immense undertaking, requiring hundreds of hours of research, drafting, and discussion by the panel members. The panel's basic analysis and conclusions were completed in late 1993, in time to be an essential ingredient of the full CISAC report. It required an additional 18 months, however, to complete the drafting, editing, and review of the panel's report to its satisfaction. The consensus achieved in the fall of 1993 has not changed over that time, but the analysis is now laid out in full detail and documented. It provides substantial additional information and analysis on various reactor-related options beyond that contained in the committee report.
Every member of the panel contributed to the work of the group, with each person responsible for drafting the description and assessment of particular options. Panel chair John P. Holdren, who is also the chair of CISAC, wrote major sections of the report and undertook the formidable task of comparing the various options. The depth and richness of the report reflects his prodigious efforts.
The CISAC staff provided invaluable assistance throughout the course of the panel's work. Study Director Matthew Bunn somehow managed to oversee the work of both the main committee and the panel. He was an essential liaison between the two groups and provided significant intellectual input to the work of both. He drafted major portions of the CISAC report and edited the panel report to harmonize the work of the individual panel members. The project could not have been completed without him.
CISAC's research associate, Lois Peterson, and research assistant, Monica Oliva, provided crucial substantive and administrative support, including the preparation of the manuscript for publication as part of the new National Academy Press program in desktop publishing. Ms. Peterson also served as an additional staff liaison for the panel once Mr. Bunn was burdened with a new assignment. The entire CISAC staff received a group staff award in recognition of its exceptional efforts on this project.
The issue of management and disposition of plutonium from arms reductions has a long history and a voluminous literature, stretching back almost to the beginning of the nuclear age. In recent years these issues have been studied by a wide variety of groups and individuals in the United States, including those associated with the U.S. Department of Energy and other agencies of the U.S.
1
The CISAC report (National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. Washington, D.C., National Academy Press, 1994) was released prior to the report of this panel.
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government, the Office of Technology Assessment, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Federation of American Scientists, the Center for Energy and Environment Studies at Princeton University, the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, several Department of Energy laboratories, and a variety of private companies. Groups and individuals in Russia, Europe, Japan, and elsewhere have also examined the problem. In carrying out their studies, CISAC and the panel benefited greatly from this substantial body of prior work, and extensive communications with many of those involved in it, for which the committee and the panel are profoundly grateful.
In addition, the panel was fortunate to receive help from many parts of the Department of Energy. Staff members from the Department of Energy headquarters and facilities, including Hanford, Savannah River, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore generously gave time to help clarify and resolve technical issues, as well as providing access to relevant experts and materials. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory merits particular recognition for its significant effort to analyze several aspects of the reactor disposition options, such as non-fertile reactor fuels, carried out without charge to the Academy. Without this assistance, it would have been impossible for the panel to examine the issues in the depth required with the time and personnel it had at its disposal.
As the main CISAC report concludes, there are no easy answers to the problems posed by the fissile materials that are part of the legacy of the Cold War arms competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The issues addressed and the options outlined and evaluated will be of critical importance for the future prospects for nonproliferation and arms reduction. Action is urgently needed; in CISAC's words, "The existence of this surplus material constitutes a clear and present danger to national and international security. None of the options yet identified for managing this material can eliminate this danger; all they can do is to reduce the risks."
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Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
1
Chapter 1:
Introduction
17
Road Map of the Report
20
Uncertainties
20
Goals, Timing, and Related Factors
21
U.S. and Russian Plutonium Disposition: Differences and Linkages
24
References
25
Chapter 2:
Background
26
Physics and Technology of Nuclear Fission
27
Classes of Disposition Options
46
Present and Future Fissile Material Stockpiles
49
World Nuclear-Energy Systems Relevant to Plutonium Disposition
53
References
57
Chapter 3:
Criteria for Comparing Disposition Options
59
Criteria Related to Security and Timing
61
Issues and Criteria in Economic Evaluation of Alternatives
74
Issues and Criteria Relating to Environment, Safety, and Health
90
Other Considerations
97
Appendix A: Integrated Inventory
99
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Appendix B: Levelized Annual Costs and Net Discounted Present Value
102
Appendix C: Avoided Cost and Associated Pitfalls
105
Appendix D: Predicted Damages From the Doses Permitted by Standards
109
References
112
Chapter 4:
Reactor Options
116
U.S. Plutonium in Current-Generation U.S. Light-Water Reactors
117
Russian Plutonium in Current-Generation Russian Thermal Reactors
136
Current-Generation CANDU Reactors
144
Potential Involvement of West European and Japanese Facilities
155
Current-Generation Liquid-Metal Reactors
161
Current Naval and Research Reactors
165
Advanced Light-Water Reactors
166
Advanced Liquid-Metal Reactors
171
Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors
181
Molten-Salt Reactor
189
Particle-Bed Reactors
192
A Dedicated Plutonium-Burner Reactor
195
Accelerator-Based Conversion of Plutonium
196
References
206
Chapter 5:
Disposal of Plutonium Without Irradiation
214
Introduction
214
Overview of the Technology
216
The Choice of Waste Form
218
Technical Issues Facing Vitrification
222
Assessment by Key Criteria
234
References
247
Chapter 6:
Comparing the Options
250
Security Comparisons
251
General Considerations
254
Timing
256
Other Indices, Barriers, and Threat-Barrier Interactions
269
Economic Comparisons
280
Weapons Plutonium Versus Uranium as Power Reactor Fuel
280
Completing Existing LWRs
306
Building New Reactors for Plutonium Disposition
312
Economics of Vitrification
327
Economics of Russian Disposition Options
327
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Environment, Safety, and Health
330
Relevant Characteristics of Plutonium
330
Hazards in Interim Storage of Plutonium
335
Hazards in Plutonium Transport
338
Hazards in Plutonium Processing
343
Reactor Safety Issues
349
Radioactive Waste Issues
356
The Comparisons in Summary
373
Security
374
Economics
376
Environment, Safety, and Health
379
Appendix: Approval and Licensing Issues in Weapons Plutonium Disposition
382
References
390
Chapter 7:
Conclusions and Recommendations
397
Disposition Options and End-Points
398
Narrowing the Range of Options
399
Current-Reactor Options for Meeting the Spent Fuel Standard
401
Advanced Reactors and Specialty Fuels
407
Immobilization Options
410
Comparison of the Current-Reactor/Spent-Fuel and Vitrification Options
413
Recommendations
416
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Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium
Reactor-Related Oprions
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