Contents

PREFACE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 WHAT IS DETERRENCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD?
 ENDURING PRINCIPLES IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY
 DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES
 SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
 METRICS AND DECISION AIDS

1 DETERRENCE: AN OVERVIEW
GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired) and C. Richard Nelson, The Atlantic Council
Seymour J. Deitchman, Institute for Defense Analyses (retired)

 INTRODUCTION
 THE MEANING OF DETERRENCE
 THE NEW CONTEXT
 ENDURING PRINCIPLES
 DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES
 ANALYSIS, MODELING, AND PLANNING

2 IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE POLICY: TASKS FOR POLICY MAKERS
GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired), The Atlantic Council

 THE NEW DETERRENCE ENVIRONMENT
 CREATING A FABRIC OF DETERRENCE
 SOME DIFFICULT CHOICES
 CONCLUDING REMARKS

3 SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

 INTRODUCTION
 OBJECTIVES AND METRICS IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY
 ENSURING U.S. NAVAL FORCES' CAPABILITY FOR DETERRENCE
 DECISION AIDS: INTELLIGENCE, GAMES, MODELING, AND SIMULATION

APPENDIX A: REVISING THE PRACTICE OF DETERRENCE
John D. Steinbruner, Brookings Institution

 CHANGING CONTEXT
 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
 THE RUSSIAN CASE
 THE SUBORDINATION AND REVISION OF DETERRENCE
 CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE

APPENDIX B: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS
Paul H. Nitze and J.H. McCall, Johns Hopkins University

WHAT IS DETERRENCE? WHY AND HOW?
COLD WAR DETERRENCE AND THE LIMITS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
CURRENT CHALLENGES

APPENDIX C: EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND COALITIONS FOR DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL CHALLENGERS ARMED WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Victor Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analyses

 INTRODUCTION
 POTENTIAL FOR CHALLENGES TO A VITAL U.S. REGIONAL INTEREST
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH REGIONAL PROLIFERATORS
 CHANGED ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE UNILATERALLY
 IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THROUGH A COALITION
 INCENTIVES TO JOIN THE COALITION AND SUPPORT ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY
 ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR COALITION INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX D: THE REMAINING UNIQUE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE
Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (Emeritus)

 BACKGROUND
 THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MISSION
 CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX E: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE
John C. Hopkins (retired) and Steven A. Maaranen, Los Alamos National Laboratory

 INTRODUCTION: A DEFINITION OF DETERRENCE
 NUCLEAR VS. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
 DETERRENCE VIA NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FUTURE
 REQUIREMENTS FOR MAINTAINING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

APPENDIX F: NOTES ON THE "BAND" BETWEEN "EXISTENTIAL DETERRENCE" AND THE ACTUAL USE OF FORCE
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brookings Institution

APPENDIX G.1: SPECIAL CHALLENGES IN EXTENDING DETERRENCE IN THE NEW ERA
Paul K. Davis, Rand

 A PROVOCATIVE PREMISE
 TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR DETERRING THREATS TO NONVITAL INTERESTS
 POTENTIAL ACTIONS

APPENDIX G.2: DECISION MODELING AS AN AID TO STRATEGIC PLANNING AND CRISIS ACTION
Paul K. Davis, Rand

 ABSTRACT
 INTRODUCTION
 MODELING OPPONENTS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS
 FACTORS TENDING TO INCREASE RISK TAKING
 A GENERIC SITUATION ENCOURAGING AGGRESSION
 CONCLUSIONS
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX G.3: PROTECTING WEAK AND MEDIUM-STRENGTH STATES: ISSUES OF DETERRENCE, STABILITY, AND DECISION MAKING
Paul K. Davis, Rand

 ABSTRACT
 INTRODUCTION
 DETERRENCE AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW CENTURY
 AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF DETERRENCE
 DETERRING STRONG NEIGHBORS: STRATEGIES FOR WEAK OR MEDIUM-STRONG STATES
 EXTENDING DETERRENCE IN DEFENSE OF WEAK OR MEDIUM-STRONG STATES
 RECOGNIZING THAT IMMEDIATE EXTENDED DETERRENCE MAY FAIL
 CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY STRATEGY, DEFENSE PLANNING, AND CRISIS DECISION  MAKING
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX H: THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE, NATIONAL ABM SYSTEMS, AND THE FUTURE OF DETERRENCE
Richard L. Garwin, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center

 CONTEXT
 BACKGROUND
 THE PROBLEM
 NEAR-TERM OPTIONS FOR U.S. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE
 WHAT IS THE THREAT?
 THE BIG PROBLEM FOR CITY DEFENSE
 REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE IN RELATION TO THE ABM TREATY
 CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX I: DETERRENCE: CLASH AND UTILIZATION OF VALUE SYSTEMS
Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University

 INTRODUCTION
 BACKGROUND
 VALUE SYSTEMS IN THE CURRENT WORLD
 CASE STUDIES
 CONCLUSION
 NAVY-AND MARINE CORPS-SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS

APPENDIX J: CONTROLLING INSTABILITIES CAUSED BY ROGUE GOVERNMENTS
Glenn A. Kent, Rand

 THE EMERGING THREAT
 IMPLICATIONS OF THIS THREAT
 A DEFENSE IN DEPTH
 AN APPROACH TO INTERCEPTING BALLISTIC MISSILES AFTER LAUNCH
 SUGGESTED ACTIONS

APPENDIX K: DETERRENCE—QUO VADIS?
David L. Stanford, Science Applications International Corporation

PARTICIPANTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR CONFLICT DETERRENCE STUDY

Andrew J. Goodpaster, The Atlantic Council, Chair
Seymour J. Deitchman, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Vice Chair
David S.C. Chu, Rand
Paul K. Davis, Rand
Richard L. Garwin, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
John C. Hopkins, Los Alamos, New Mexico
Benjamin Huberman, Huberman Consulting Group
Glenn A. Kent, Rand
Robert L.J. Long, Annapolis, Maryland
C. Richard Nelson, The Atlantic Council
Paul H. Nitze, Johns Hopkins University
Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University
W.K.H. Panofsky, Stanford, California
Thomas C. Schelling, University of Maryland
Brent Scowcroft, Scowcroft Group
William Y. Smith, Falls Church, Virginia
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brookings Institution
David L. Stanford, Science Applications International Corporation
John D. Steinbruner, Brookings Institution
Victor A. Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analyses
Paul Wolfowitz, Johns Hopkins University

NAVAL STUDIES BOARD

* David R. Heebner, Science Applications International Corporation (ret.), Chair
George M. Whitesides, Harvard University, Vice Chair
* Albert J. Baciocco, Jr., The Baciocco Group, Inc.
* Alan Berman, Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University
Norman E. Betaque, Logistics Management Institute
Norval L. Broome, Mitre Corporation
* Gerald A. Cann, Raytheon Company
* Seymour J. Deitchman, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Special Advisor
Anthony J. DeMaria, DeMaria ElectroOptics Systems, Inc.
John F. Egan, Lockheed Martin Corporation
* Andrew J. Goodpaster, The Atlantic Council, Special Advisor
Robert Hummel, Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University
David W. McCall, AT&T Bell Laboratories (ret.)
Robert J. Murray, Center for Naval Analyses
* Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University
William J. Phillips, Northstar Associates, Inc.
Mara G. Prentiss, Jefferson Laboratory, Harvard University
* Herbert Rabin, University of Maryland
Julie JCH Ryan, Booz, Allen and Hamilton
Harrison Shull, Naval Postgraduate School (ret.)
* Keith A. Smith, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.)
Robert C. Spindel, Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington
* David L. Stanford, Science Applications International Corporation
H. Gregory Tornatore, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University
J. Pace VanDevender, Prosperity Institute
Vincent Vitto, Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
* Bruce Wald, Arlington Education Consultants

Navy Liaison Representatives

RADM John W. Craine, Jr., USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N81)
RADM Richard A. Riddell, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N91)
Paul G. Blatch, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N911T1)
Ronald N. Kostoff, Office of Naval Research

Staff

Ronald D. Taylor, Director (as of October 2, 1995)
     Associate Director (July 1, 1994, through September 29, 1995)
Lee M. Hunt, Director (through September 29, 1995)
Susan G. Campbell, Administrative Assistant
Mary (Dixie) Gordon, Information Officer
Christopher Hanna, Project Assistant

__________________________

* Members who also participated in the post-Cold War conflict deterrence study.

COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS

Robert J. Hermann, United Technologies Corporation, Co-chair
W. Carl Lineberger, University of Colorado, Co-chair
Peter M. Banks, Environmental Research Institute of Michigan
Lawrence D. Brown, University of Pennsylvania
Ronald G. Douglas, Texas A&M University
John E. Estes, University of California at Santa Barbara
L. Louis Hegedus, Elf Atochem North America, Inc.
John E. Hopcroft, Cornell University
Rhonda J. Hughes, Bryn Mawr College
Shirley A. Jackson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Kenneth H. Keller, University of Minnesota
Kenneth I. Kellermann, National Radio Astronomy Observatory
Margaret G. Kivelson, University of California at Los Angeles
Daniel Kleppner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
John Kreick, Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company
Marsha I. Lester, University of Pennsylvania
Thomas A. Prince, California Institute of Technology
Nicholas P. Samios, Brookhaven National Laboratory
L.E. Scriven, University of Minnesota
Shmuel Winograd, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Charles A. Zraket, Mitre Corporation (ret.)

Norman Metzger, Executive Director

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman and interim vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.

Preface

This report responds to a request made by RADM T.D. Ryan, USN, Director, Submarine Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in a letter sent on January 6, 1994. The letter asked the Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, to conduct a study of deterrence in the emerging post-Cold War environment, including attention to nuclear, conventional, economic, diplomatic, and other means of deterring potential adversaries in the acquisition and utilization of military capabilities, state-sponsored terrorism, and interference with international commerce and rights of free passage. The terms of reference for the study resulting from Admiral Ryan's request called for efforts in the following three areas:

• Based on the experience of the past 45 years, and with due attention to the altered environment of international security and the emerging characteristics of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, what constitutes a reasonable set of deterrence objectives and what metrics are available for their quantitative assessment?

• From a comprehensive evaluation of existing deterrence decision aids and simulations, as well as those adaptable to such purposes, and utilizing a definition of the appropriate elements of a deterrence decision aid, determine their adequacy as a tool for shaping the Navy's deterrence posture, and recommend means for their improvement.

• Utilizing the results of the first bulleted item above, and drawing on the results of past Naval Studies Board and related studies, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of existing and emerging technologies and systems to carry out the various elements of the deterrence mission of the Navy and Marine Corps.

As the Board began its work on the problem, extensive preliminary effort was devoted to devising an approach that would yield credible and useful results for the highest levels of government and the Navy Department. It became clear that the Cold War concept of deterrence had become so imbedded in all aspects of the thinking of the national security community, and therefore the Navy—in terms of Cold War conditions and relationships in the international environment, U.S. understanding of the kinds of threatening activities to be deterred, and U.S. military force structure and force posture—that a study of the subject under the new post-Cold War conditions would have to go back to first principles. This meant that before starting to examine Navy and Marine Corps technology and decision aids relating to deterrence, it would be necessary to explore the meaning and the viability of the deterrence concept itself in the new environment. Only then could the subordinate technical questions posed in the terms of reference be taken up. It was therefore decided to divide the study into two phases along these lines: first, an effort to define the meaning and the elements of deterrence under the new world conditions, and then, an examination of the significance of this new understanding of the concept of deterrence for the Navy and Marine Corps, including the technical issues raised in the terms of reference.

To carry out the first phase of the study, a special group of participants was convened under the chairmanship of GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired), who prepared a detailed outline to guide that part of the study. The group consisted of individuals who could bring to bear from their own experience the knowledge and understanding that had accumulated over the five decades since World War II, in both the practice of deterrence and in the measurement of its effectiveness. The group explored the meaning of deterrence in the post-Cold War world, identified enduring principles for the practice of deterrence, and developed insights for new approaches to the practice of deterrence and to associated analysis, modeling, and planning.

The special group of participants met only twice and received and discussed the inputs reflected in the individual essays presented in the appendixes. They made no attempt to reach consensus on the wide variety of issues introduced. In this respect this study and report differ from what is customary in studies carried out under the aegis of the National Research Council. The study participants' discussions served the valuable purpose of clarifying the various ideas of individuals irrespective of the different views introduced and still remaining after the discussions.

The second phase of the study was carried out under the leadership of David Heebner, the Naval Studies Board's chairman, by Board members with extensive experience in evaluating, inserting, and using technology in the armed forces, especially in the Navy and Marine Corps. This group also included experts in modeling and simulation and their application to problems arising in evaluation of systems and operations. The group was knowledgeable about instances in the nation's history where actions of military forces and deterrence policy interacted, and about elements of prior Board studies that could contribute to consideration of the subject at hand.

The two groups interacted to ensure a seamless connection in the results of the two phases of the study. GEN Goodpaster was appointed a special advisor to the Naval Studies Board for the duration of the study. Several members of the Board participated in the discussions by the special group of study participants, with one Board member, Seymour Deitchman, serving as GEN Goodpaster's vice chairman for that group. Richard Nelson, a member of the special group of participants, contributed to the Board's deliberations in the second phase of the study.

The chairman and the vice chairman of the special group of study participants, together with Dr. Nelson, prepared this report's first chapter, entitled "Deterrence: An Overview." The chapter represents the authors' summary and interpretation of the key points that emerged from the special group of participants' examination of the meaning of deterrence in the post-Cold War world. In addition, several of these participants prepared papers on different aspects of the problem of deterrence. These papers, signed by and the sole responsibility of their authors, are provided in the appendixes to this report. As a source of the richness of the ideas summarized in Chapter 1's new look at the subject of deterrence, these papers offer an opportunity for deeper understanding, and the reader is therefore urged to explore them.

It is also the case that a subject of this complexity is not easily assimilated during the conduct of urgent business in the policy-making environment. To assist in this process, GEN Goodpaster prepared a "bridging" chapter, Chapter 2, "Implications for Deterrence Policy: Tasks for Policy Makers." This chapter outlines in concrete terms the key changes from the old to the new international environment, the major challenges presented to policy makers by those changes, and the main areas in which important unresolved issues remain.

The Naval Studies Board prepared Chapter 3, "Significance of Post-Cold War Deterrence Concepts for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps." This chapter takes up the specific questions posed in the terms of reference, listing objectives of deterrence as well as qualitative and quantitative measures by which the potential success of any deterrent action might be judged. Specific emphases in naval forces' capabilities that appear to be called for by the review of deterrence policy needs are also presented and discussed, and decision aids and their application in the deterrence context are examined.

It should not be surprising that a subject as broad and fundamental to U.S. national security posture as deterrence should call forth diverse and often contradictory views of both the concept and its implications for policy. As is pointed out in Chapter 1, many such differences remain to be resolved through experience in the international context, and in many cases resolution will await the advent of specific circumstances and the consequent need for decisions in matters of policy and application. Areas of policy requiring continuing attention are highlighted in context throughout the report. Many of the unresolved differences regarding policy were also reflected as differences of view among the study group participants. Every attempt has been made, in Chapter 1, to acknowledge such differences. Special comments made by study group participants in connection with statements in Chapter 1 are included as footnotes at the appropriate points. These views are enlarged on in the papers in the appendixes. All special study group participants and participating Board members also had the opportunity to review, comment on, and influence this, the overall report of the study.