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Significance of Post-Cold War Deterrence Concepts for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps

INTRODUCTION

The first two chapters of this report discuss the meaning of deterrence in the post-Cold War period, the key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy, and critical issues in devising such a strategy. This chapter examines the significance of these observations for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. It first identifies the demands of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and provides a short list of objectives for such a strategy. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are then outlined. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the objectives of deterrence. This chapter then examines capabilities of the U.S. naval forces that can especially contribute to fulfilling deterrence objectives. The final section examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations calling for deterrence, and in improving the potential for deterrent actions to be successful.

The terms of reference for this study inquire about the "strengths and weaknesses of existing and emerging technologies and systems" to contribute to the naval forces' part in carrying out deterrence strategies. As discussed in this chapter, technology is considered to be a technical means of achieving a practical purpose. In recent years, amidst great concern about U.S. retention of its military technical superiority, certain underlying technical capabilities that enable the construction of the military systems discussed in this report have come to be termed "critical technologies." However, as indicated by much of the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, the technologies as such can have no intrinsic deterrence value independent of their articulation in military systems and the application of those systems to solving real-world problems (whether the systems are a class of weapons such as nuclear weapons or an entire force such as the strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force). Such use is described by enumeration of capabilities that the systems confer on their users. Thus this chapter concentrates on capabilities needed by the naval forces to help carry out those deterrence strategies.

The capabilities needed include military systems as well as qualitative proficiency in intelligence, training, organization, and implementation of innovative concepts of operation. The technologies needed both to provide the systems and to support the qualitative proficiency exist today, either embedded in current systems and the activities using them or being applied to the development of advanced systems and activities. It is the judgment of the Naval Studies Board in carrying out this review that appropriate application of diverse known technologies and the existing or developmental capabilities they support (which are described in connection with the discussion of specific force capabilities needed), rather than pursuit of new technologies, is the most important current need in advancing the naval forces' contribution to a national deterrence strategy.

OBJECTIVES AND METRICS IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY

Objectives of Deterrence

The basic objective of deterrence remains what it has been since the origin of the strategic concept of deterrence during the Cold War: to influence the behavior of nations so that they do not undertake aggression against the United States and U.S. interests across the world. During the Cold War, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression by the hostile Communist power centers—the USSR and its allies, Communist China, and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent a nuclear attack by the USSR or China.

The range of nations and other groups and the types of behavior we seek to deter have expanded enormously since the Cold War. Current U.S. security concerns must still include defense of the U.S. homeland and protection of allies with whom we have treaty obligations guaranteeing our mutual security. But they also extend to guarding a broad range of interests that directly and indirectly affect our national security. While these broader concerns have always been apparent, they are now articulated more explicitly as part of our need to deter actions inimical to our national security. The concerns range from free use of the seas, the airways, and space for international commerce and security-related activities, through protection of sources of key resources and the friendly nations that control and furnish them, to encouraging the growth of a community of democratic nations in a peacefully evolving world through which our own security will be enhanced. The U.S.-furnished security umbrella may thus be extended by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and Congress to include other nations or regions with which we do not have explicit mutual defense agreements.

The nature of the aggression with which we are now concerned also includes many kinds of activities different from military attack. International terrorism, whether sponsored by rogue nations or undertaken by transnational groups in furtherance of broad agendas that hostile nations may share, has become a threat and therefore an object of deterrence policy. The spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is now a top-priority national security concern. Economic warfare, political subversion, and even humanitarian concerns engendered by widespread human suffering attending ethnic conflict, by the breakdown of nations' internal order, and by regional conflict have all come to the fore as affecting U.S. security directly or indirectly in many ways.

The task of deterring activities that are inimical to our interests has become equally broad. We must detect the potential onset of a hostile action and then dissuade or otherwise deter the would-be aggressor from undertaking it by posing a credible threat of punishment that the aggressor would find unacceptable and, especially, a clear plan convincing enough to show that success of the aggressive action will be denied. Sometimes the dissuasion will involve positive inducements to change behavior and reassurance that the "deterree" will not be attacked. The approach taken to accomplish deterrence will involve a range of activities on our part, in the political, diplomatic, economic, and military spheres.

Thus, a strategy of deterrence must now address much of the threatening or violent activity on the international scene that can affect the United States, and deterring such activity can encompass almost all U.S. foreign policy actions. However, it is apparent that the potential or actual use of effective military force will underlie all deterrence efforts, perhaps including those that respond to economic or political actions that appear sufficiently threatening to our security. The "use" of military force may involve as little as moving forces into position to act rapidly, or selected military actions involving armed conflict. Moreover, deterrence may fail, especially in cases where communications may be misunderstood or where, as in terrorism, the aggressor believes a strategy has been devised that can deny the opportunity for reprisal. If deterrence fails, a military response must deny success to the aggressor, and this may involve rendering the aggressor incapable of further aggression for the immediate or for the long-term future, as circumstances dictate.

Based on the broad national security considerations sketched above, U.S. military forces must be able to meet the following deterrence objectives:

• To deter attack on the United States and its allies by external forces ranging from the armed forces of hostile nations to national or multinational terrorist groups;
• To deter similar attacks on allies with whom we have mutual security treaties;
• To deter aggression against our own and our allies' vital interests and security in areas when we agree those interests and security are at stake;
• To deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; and
• To deter the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in military conflict, especially when our own and our allies' national security interests are at stake.

How to Measure the Chances for Success

Before proceeding to a discussion of Navy and Marine Corps military capabilities required to enhance the success of deterrent strategy, it is useful to review the criteria by which various deterrence alternatives can be compared, how it might be judged whether any particular act of deterrence might work, and how that would be demonstrated.

Deterrence capacity or potential of deterrence cannot be measured quantitatively. The motivation for aggressive acts, the planning, and the perception of advantage or disadvantage in possible responses to those acts, or even of the likelihood of various levels of response, all reside within the minds of the leaders and members of the nations or groups involved. However well we believe we understand the driving factors, that comprehension can never be perfect. Indeed, in many cases we may not know whether "deterrence" worked, even after the fact. For example, the U.S. deployment of forces to the Persian Gulf in October 1994 was intended to discourage amassing Iraqi forces from crossing into Kuwait again. Although those Iraqi forces stood down, it is not known whether their initial intent was to invade Kuwait, whether there was some other objective in amassing those forces, or what they might have done to exploit a target of opportunity if we had not reacted.

Thus, in the final analysis, assessment of the potential effectiveness of a deterrence policy or action is highly subjective. Nevertheless, certain metrics can play a role in guiding and refining such judgments. The key measures for gauging how successful deterrence might be in protecting the interests of the United States and its allies are summarized below. In this formulation it should be understood that the term "metrics" refers to qualitative as well as quantitative measures.

• Detection. To what extent can we determine whether a hostile or threatening action in some part of the world is possible, potentially invited by circumstances, or actually in the making? Is our intelligence, and especially our intelligence analysis, sufficiently on the alert and effective enough to keep us from being surprised by a fait accompli?
• Evaluation. How serious is the threat to U.S. interests and those of our allies? What are the consequences for those interests, and for U.S. security, if the threatened action is successful? What steps are likely to counter the threat effectively? In particular, is a military response in order, or required? How much are we willing to risk—in treasure, casualties, impact on our international position—by responding, or by not responding, especially militarily? Have we begun to plan for an action? Can plans be completed in time?
• Coalition building. Is an alliance in place that can help? Must it be alerted? Must a coalition be built to meet unique circumstances? Are the elements of a new coalition in place, or must we start from scratch? Have we started, given that a risk of aggression is detected? What actions must be taken to ensure the coalition's effectiveness—e.g., interoperable communications, commonly understood command-and-control doctrines, and so on. What deterrence actions could be undertaken to enlarge or solidify the coalition? What modifications to original plans would they entail?
• Level of confidence in our understanding of the key participants. How well do we understand what motivates the adversary and the risks the adversary might be willing to take, within the opponent's own value system? Do we understand how the opponent would view any deterrent actions we might take, and what the response might be? What does the adversary hold dear, so that the threat of its loss or failure will discourage the anticipated hostile action (noting, for example, that, as with Egypt in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, a loss might matter less than simply undertaking the conflict)? What inducements might elicit a positive response to attempts at dissuasion? The most important aspect of these judgments is that they be free of preconceptions arising from our own value system, and that they account for the unexpected and what may in our view be irrational. Similar considerations will apply to actual or potential coalition partners, including, at times, our closest allies. All the metrics described here must be viewed in the context of this understanding of the opponent and the other participants in an action.
• Appropriateness of the planned action. Will a military response—e.g., movement of forces to an area or a heightening of the alert status of forces—have the desired effect or will it be counterproductive, or possibly stimulate a preemptive attack? Will positive inducements or "reassurance" be more suited to the situation? Or is a combination of such measures called for?
• Appropriateness of the military response. Are the forces to be brought to bear the appropriate ones for the situation? Are they the right size, and do they have the right capability, to meet and defeat the anticipated hostile move? This issue must be judged with respect to three aspects: our own understanding of the forces needed to respond to the anticipated aggression, the opponent's perception of the forces' capability, and our allies' or coalition partners' perception of the forces' appropriateness in view of their own obligation to commit forces. It may not be appropriate or necessary to deploy instantly the full force that may ultimately be involved, but we should be convinced that we can build up to that capability when we need to, and the ability to do so should be visible as a latent promise to the others involved.
• Timing. The response must be appropriately timed to anticipate, and therefore forestall, any hostile moves on the adversary's part; it must be rapid enough to bring the requisite military force to bear when it is needed at the place where it is needed; and it must be appropriately timed to communicate intent and capability, consistent with the adversary's planning cycle.
• Communication and credibility. We must judge whether we have adequately communicated—by message, movement of forces, or other means, or several means together—our intended response in the event that an action we wish to deter is taken, and we must judge the credibility of the communication in light of both present and prior circumstances. Any communication must convey the national will to undertake the action, despite our transparent and often argumentative public decision process. If circumstances suggest that communications have an element of ambiguity (in order not to be provocative at the moment), then we should judge whether we have made clear what the alternatives and their respective consequences are; vague statements subject to misinterpretation should be avoided. And, we must be clear about what prior events may indicate about the credibility of the currently promised response.

These metrics can form a checklist against which the potential utility and effectiveness of planned deterrence policies, strategies, and actions, in both general and specific circumstances, may be tested. They are also the metrics involved in judgments about the force requirements and the decision aids that are reviewed below.

ENSURING U.S. NAVAL FORCES' CAPABILITY FOR DETERRENCE

U.S. naval forces include the Navy and the Marine Corps and all auxiliary elements needed to operate them, and in time of war, the U.S. Coast Guard. Every element of the naval force structure contributes to naval forces' operations in peace, deterrence, and war. Nevertheless, special aspects of naval force structure and operation have an immediate and direct bearing on deterrence policy and strategy. These aspects range from essential combat capabilities to matters of support and preparation that are equally important and even more complex to implement.

Sustain the Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine Force

It is likely that nuclear weapons held by the United States and its allies will in the future be used only to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. This will include deterrence of nuclear attacks on the United States and attacks on allied countries, including those, like Germany and Japan, that have renounced acquisition of nuclear weapons in favor of reliance on U.S. extended deterrence. As pointed out in Chapters 1 and 2, however, the threat to use nuclear weapons in retaliation may be important in particular circumstances to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons and even to deter overwhelming conventional attacks on close allies. These latter applications, beyond the use of nuclear weapons to deter the use of nuclear weapons, will likely not be decided upon until specific circumstances present the need for decision. Whatever the ultimate policy decisions may be, the weapons and the capability to use them must be available, even for the most restrictive policy.

Moreover, with the uncertainties of nuclear weapons holdings by other, possibly hostile nations, and the risk of spreading nuclear weapons capability either through leakage from former Soviet stockpiles or by the failure of restraints on nuclear proliferation, the nuclear forces we retain "must be sufficient to deter any combination of attackers who may have such weapons from using them against us or our closest allies" (Chapter 1, p. 20). The START treaties limit the numbers and types of strategic delivery systems, but there is still room within those limits for an adequate, devastating response to a nuclear attack and for other uses should the NCA so decide.

The SSBN force accounts for a large share of the U.S. strategic force posture under current provisions of the START treaties. The qualities that have made it especially valuable—its essential invulnerability, its stealth, its flexibility and ability to change operating areas, its long time on station—commend it as a continuing key element of future deterrence strategy. Indeed, these qualities will be even more valuable as the world becomes more complex and as potential sources of attack, and uncertainty about the source of any particular attack, increase. These qualities of the SSBN force, in conjunction with the needs expressed above, argue for its retention, and for its continuing modernization and ongoing readiness for action, into the indefinite future. Since adversaries in a prospective action may not be known until shortly before a conflict begins, and since the kinds of targets may depend on ad hoc decisions about the circumstances in which nuclear weapons may be used, part of the readiness for action must include the ability to change targeting and warhead mixes rapidly. Clearly, such readiness would require receipt of a broad range of intelligence inputs to an intelligence database that is routinely updated with minimum time lag, in addition to a system that would allow those inputs to be applied on short notice.

Increase the Ratio of Offensive to Defensive Capability

During the Cold War era, the ratio of offensive to defensive systems and investment was conditioned by preparation for possible conflict with the USSR and its allies. U.S. naval forces were confronted with the need to be able to counter a highly organized opponent possessing effective weapons, a highly integrated command-and-control system, and a worldwide reach. During the 45 years of preparation and readiness to meet such a contingency, U.S. naval forces built a formidable defensive and offensive capability. However, the nature of anticipated opposition has now changed, while new kinds of weapons and, especially, information technology, now enable us to better focus our deterrent capabilities, including offensive forces.

While the military capability of some regional powers will continue to be formidable, it will at least for the foreseeable future lack the degree of integration and the geographic scope that characterized Soviet forces. Thus the defenses built into our naval forces should, if they continue to evolve and incorporate new technology, enable the United States to overcome attacks by opposing regional powers for a long time to come. It is essential that military commanders and leaders fully understand the significance of the new naval force technology and manage its introduction and use so as to gain its full capability for helping to achieve deterrence. Moreover, the military capacity provided by the modern and improving naval force defenses, the greater mobility and speed of the Marine Corps in amphibious operations, and the advancing weaponry and command, control, communications, computing, and intelligence (C4I) systems will allow even defensive capability to be used in ways that advance military offensive strength. Moreover, the nature of the potential opposition has changed, requiring a more shoreward orientation of the fleet now that the midocean threat of Soviet naval forces has declined. The time thus appears appropriate to think about changing the relative offensive and defensive orientations of naval forces' capability and of investment in the naval forces, especially in the areas outlined below. In doing this it should be borne in mind that the division between "offense" and "defense" in naval systems is not hard and fast. Defensive capabilities that allow naval forces to carry their offensive combat power closer to the enemy, and to protect areas and installations outside the naval force itself, can be considered as contributing to the force's offensive capability.

Although the following key areas are discussed separately, they form a continuum of mutually reinforcing capabilities.

• Precision attack. The importance of responding rapidly to aggression and minimizing collateral damage and civilian casualties, as well as U.S. casualties, is emphasized in Chapters 1 and 2. The capability now exists to locate targets and attack them precisely from long distances, using either attack airplanes with guided weapons or long-range guided missiles launched from fleet combatants or attack submarines. This capability may also be appropriate for responding to the threatened or hostile use of weapons of mass destruction, and it has become an essential element of a conventional-weapons military response that can rapidly deny success to an aggressor's attack. Much remains to be done, and should be done, to ensure the full development of the precision attack capability of the naval forces. Especially worthy of note is the need to provide, in the joint operational environment and using all-source data, full situational awareness, accurate targeting, and effective joint and combined command and control of the precision attack systems and forces, in addition to accurate guided weapons suitable to the problem.
• Theater missile defense. Ballistic missiles with ranges from 200 to over 1,000 miles are proliferating among large and small nations around the world. Even if they do not deliver the weapons of mass destruction that they are capable of delivering, their use with conventional warheads—and often even their presence alone—can have a profound political as well as military impact on regional conflict. As evidenced during the Gulf War, the application of even a limited defense against such attacks can also have important political and military significance. Defenses against ballistic missile attack will, in the future, be an even more important part of our developing, joint military capability. The theater missile defense (TMD) systems will ultimately cover the gamut of defense possibilities, from finding and destroying command centers and launchers, through destruction of missiles in boost and ascent phase to prevent dispersal of chemical and bacteriological submunitions and to prevent damage by nuclear warheads either detonating within damage range or following purely ballistic trajectories to their targets after intercept, to terminal defense against weapons that leak through. The imperative of preventing effective attacks by ballistic missiles that may carry warheads of mass destruction leads to the concept of placing a "cap" over an aggressor state to prevent such attacks from reaching beyond the aggressor's borders, with terminal defense as final "insurance." In this sense, TMD enhances overall offensive capability.
  Naval TMD will have the value of mobility—the ability to move into place with high readiness on short notice—on ships (ranging from carriers with attack aviation to surface combatants with vertical launch bays) configured to use the defenses, usually in conjunction with joint surveillance, warning, and targeting capabilities furnished by other forces available to the regional commander in chief (CINC). Naval TMD can thus provide "offensive defense" rapidly, from the open ocean or from positions near the coast or even in a port. Because of its mobility, naval TMD may be difficult for an aggressor's forces to target. In transmitting signals of resolve and in demonstrating quickly available capability, movement of naval TMD forces would have high deterrence value in brewing crises. For all these reasons, fleet TMD will be an important tool in implementing national deterrence strategy, and it must be part of the naval forces.
• Undersea warfare—conventional attack submarines and mines. The undersea environment that made possible the nuclear deterrence achieved through the SSBN force offers similar possibilities for deterrence of potential regional conflicts along the littoral. U.S. conventional attack submarines such as the improved Los Angeles class (SSN 688I) and the new nuclear attack submarine that is being designed at the time of this writing can launch highly accurate land attack missiles with conventional warheads, capable of deep penetration of an opponent's territory to strike against critical elements of the opponent's war-making potential and national command structure, with devastating effect. The power of such missile attacks was demonstarted during the Gulf War and in the 1993 raid against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters.
  As in the strategic deterrence case, the existence of this force guarantees the U.S. ability to punish an aggressor while the force itself remains essentially invulnerable to an opponent's anticipatory or retaliatory actions. While it may be argued that this part of the deterrent force is invisible and therefore would have uncertain value for deterrence during the acute phase of a crisis, appropriate public discussion can make clear the existence of the force and the damage that it can do (as was the case with the strategic SSBN force). It could also be indicated to a would-be aggressor at a critical time that the force is in place and ready for action. The "deterree" would not be safe in assuming that such an indication is false, thereby adding to its deterrent value.
  Finally, the submarine force is in a position to carry out surveillance and other useful military operations as enhancements to the capability of the remaining naval force deterrent. This capability includes offensive mine warfare to deny an opponent the use of certain seas or even the opponent's own harbors, should a potential or actual trangression be serious enough to warrant offensive mine deployments. Thus, supporting and improving all aspects of the deterrent value of the conventional undersea force in national policy and force planning activities deserve serious attention at all levels of Navy and national security planning.
  Quiet, modern submarines and the ability to use mine warfare are also among the capabilities accruing to many regional powers. Antisubmarine warfare during the Cold War was viewed to a great extent as a means of protecting the U.S. fleet from submarine attack and as a means for preventing enemy SSBNs from launching their ballistic missiles against the United States and our allies. While these missions continue, they are overshadowed in potential regional conflicts by the need to keep submarines—which may be conventionally powered or nuclear powered—from interfering with fleet movements and shipping in littoral waters where we may be responding to the threat of an attack. Those that have the capacity to do so must also be prevented from launching cruise missiles against friendly installations on shore. As in TMD, defending against such submarines will run the gamut from attacking their bases and support facilities to finding and sinking them, as well as ensuring effective terminal defense against torpedos and cruise missiles. Having a demonstrable capability to clear coastal waters of hostile submarines is a way of showing that we can carry the war to the opponent by denying the use of a key military system and destroying that system, and is therefore an essential contributor to the naval forces' deterrent value.
  Similarly, mine warfare in the ocean and along the littoral, even the use of mines of antique vintage, is a widely available capability. It can deny ships' movement and the ability to land Marine Corps forces in crisis zones. The ability to neutralize, clear, or avoid mine fields is crucial to U.S. naval forces' successful response to crises and military action in crises. Part of this ability will be to track, via the naval and national intelligence systems, a potential aggressor's mining capability from manufacture to storage to deployment and then to counter it, either by destroying the mines ashore or by otherwise denying the emplacement of minefields or by being able to clear such fields from international or coastal waters with relative impunity after they have been emplaced. Knowledge that the United States has invested in this capability, demonstration (through exercises or actual operations) that it is effective, and movement of the appropriate forces into place in time of crisis must be part of the naval forces' contribution to deterrence. In a recent white paper the chief of naval operations emphasized the importance of countermine warfare. Greatly expanded efforts, with high priority, are planned for this area by the naval forces; they should be continued and encouraged as part of the national deterrence strategy.
• Effective blockade. Naval forces must be able to establish an effective blockade when called upon. One of the means available to the United States and its allies to combat aggression is denial of movement of supplies, people, and materiel into or out of an aggressor's country. Without arguing the relative merits of sanctions—a diplomatic term that covers forms of blockade—as a tool of foreign policy, it can be observed that the United States, acting with its allies and often through the United Nations, has invoked sanctions as either punishment or threat, as a part of coercive diplomacy intended to deter the onset or continuation of aggressive acts that would be harmful to U.S. interests. In many cases the sanctions have had only limited success in achieving the objectives for which they were invoked. One reason for only partial success has been the ability of the object of the sanctions to avoid their full effect by evading the blockade through smuggling. Naval forces are the chosen instrument to enforce blockades against any entity with a coastline and waterways. To be effective, a blockade needs the ability to detect smugglers, who will operate at odd times, in relatively inaccessible areas, and disguised to appear as part of permitted commerce. U.S. naval forces must be able to intercept them and to confiscate their goods or to turn them back to their sources. All this must be done in a way that does not inflict casualties on permitted commerce and on those engaged in such commerce, even while allowing the forces to overcome military or paramilitary resistance.
  Although the effective enforcement of a blockade may appear inherent in naval forces' combat capabilities, to be fully effective those capabilities must be explicitly trained for and designed to operate well in the special circumstances that blockades require—operations against clandestine forces in difficult environments. Preparing for such operations in the interest of deterring larger conflicts is a capability that the Navy Department must consciously cultivate.

Sustain the Naval Forces' Forward Presence

One of the elements of deterrence is the "existential deterrent": the visible existence of military forces that can be called upon to carry out the military actions of a deterrence strategy. However, as noted in Chapter 1 and in several of the appendixes of this report, there is room for a potential aggressor to doubt whether the forces in existence will be used without some appropriately timed signal affirming the will to use them. Thus, movement of appropriate forces when some undesired international action is a prospect is an important part of a deterrence strategy. Such "movement" can take many forms: heightened alert of intercontinental missile forces; movement of especially vulnerable force elements out of harm's way, for example, moving ships out of a harbor or aircraft off an airfield, or moving potential hostages away from the risk of capture before a military attack; visible attention to minefields, both offensive and defensive; or movement of powerful combat forces into position for a rapid response. In connection with the last item, the amount of force moved, in relation to the amount of force initially in place, is also a relevant parameter—moving a large force to augment a small force in place may send a stronger signal than the one sent by making a small addition to a large force in place.

The continuum of activity across which deterrence must be effective ranges from small aggressive acts that are threatening in the long run to major military attacks. The "low end" tends to be the most "fuzzy," presenting the greatest likelihood of some needed activity by the U.S. military, as well as the greatest uncertainty about whether deterrence will work; offering the greatest scope for action by non-national groups; and increasing the likelihood of national debate about potential U.S. involvement. In response to low-end activity, timely actions suited to the environment and the situation, carried out by forward forces able to demonstrate a capability for rapid follow-up by major force, may have a better chance of deterring undesirable developments than would forces brought in after the initiation of an incident. The forward posture of these forces would also enable a more rapid response should initial deterrence fail, and such forces would be better positioned to help deter escalation. Included in the scope of action for such forward forces are operations other than war, heightened surveillance, and force augmentation in response to "testing" by a potential opponent.

No matter what particular maneuvers are needed to deter an impending crisis, the force to be moved must be flexible and as nearly in place as possible to enable a timely and appropriate response or anticipatory move. Naval forces in forward posture are ideally suited to these requirements. They can be kept on station, visible, for extended periods while preparing for conflict or engaging peacefully with potential coalition partners, or even opponents, in acts intended either to make crisis response more effective or to avert crises. They can undertake preparatory maneuvers without infringing any nation's sovereignty and without placing pressure on a country to accept U.S. forces on its soil at especially sensitive times, and they can apply military power rapidly from the sea in locations where there are no bases into which land-based combat forces can deploy.

Another aspect of a forward posture is the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), maintained by the Army and the Marine Corps on ships in safe harbors closer to expected theaters of operation than the continental United States. The MFP enables rapid deployment of combat personnel by air and rapid "marrying up" of personnel and equipment in or near the theater of operations. A key element of the naval forces' mission in the forward area is protecting MPF ships and ensuring their safe transit to an operational area, thus contributing essential strength to the forward posture of those forces.

Incorporate Deterrence in the Overall Naval Forces' Planning Process

It is clear that all aspects of naval force structure can at one time or another be involved in deterrence actions as well as in military action that may result if deterrence fails. Although some especially important aspects of the naval force structure bearing on deterrence are clearly not separable from the force structure and operational capability as a whole, they nevertheless require emphasis in preparing U.S. naval forces to participate in a national deterrence strategy. Thus, the explicit concept of deterrence must be incorporated into the overall naval forces' planning process. This is of critical importance in three areas: intelligence, training, and budgeting.

• Intelligence. The need for intelligence to inform deterrence actions goes beyond the usual description of a threat that includes order of battle, force size, and questions of technical capability with which military forces—as distinct from national intelligence agencies—tend to be concerned in their peacetime planning. Since naval forces in a forward posture during peacetime are in close contact with both friends and potential foes as a routine matter, they may be positioned so as to gain understanding of those external forces that bears on adversaries' values, intentions, and plans for diverse contingencies. This knowledge may come about by purposeful intelligence activity, including human intelligence gathering and surveillance leading to detection and interpretation of significant force movements and related matters, or by simple observation and growing knowledge of indigenous forces and actors through day-to-day contact. In any case, the relevance of such matters and therefore the need to gather data in these areas must be emphasized in naval forces' intelligence activity and in the naval forces' contributions to and acceptance of inputs from joint intelligence activities.
• Training. Naval forces' training for actual combat is a usual matter of concern in force planning and needs no additional comment in the current context. Training for effective implementation of low-end deterrence strategy places added requirements on the training process. It must include attention to operations other than war, since it is in these operations that much of the interplay of forces that will enable or inhibit deterrence will take place. In addition, it must be recognized as a factor in the use of military force today that the news media will be present, and that their reports from the scene will have an important impact on public opinion and on national views of the nature and appropriateness of responses in a developing crisis. Finally, military forces and commanders must recognize that there may well be imperatives for the national civilian leadership that dictate the application of military force under conditions of force level, environment, and timing that are less than desirable by strictly military criteria. All this argues strongly for an emphasis on operations other than war and, in addition, for awareness of the potentially powerful influence of factors extraneous to military operations per se, in training naval forces for participation in a deterrence strategy.
• Budgeting. It was not an objective of this analysis to ascertain whether the budget levels or the budgeting process for the naval forces are adequate to meet national deterrence objectives. However, the importance of including the qualities of the forces that especially contribute to deterrence merits comment with regard to budgeting considerations. It is apparent that the kind of force planning that will especially contribute to successful deterrence involves a seamless progression from designating the appropriate forces, through integrating their various capabilities, to ensuring that the parts of the forces especially relevant to a deterrence strategy (such as the ability to move forces into place rapidly) are not neglected. The budgeting process that was in effect during the Cold War tended to separate interrelated force elements into different categories, so that specific systems, training, and supporting infrastructure were all considered separately from each other. In such a process, the funding levels and objectives can easily assume unbalanced and inappropriate relationships with each other. The most effective allocation of resources, for deterrence as well as for combat missions, could not be guaranteed under such circumstances.
  The older system is gradually being supplanted by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process, being instituted through the Joint Staff as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In the new process, field commanders have a greater voice in setting operational requirements. This new approach will provide more opportunity to review military force needs in an integrated manner that will mitigate the inefficiencies and avoid the capability gaps inherent in the earlier compartmented budgeting process. The Naval Studies Board, in connection with this review of deterrence, urges the acceleration of this change in the budgeting process, believing that it will lead to more effective naval forces within the available budgets, and to forces better suited to deterrence missions, with relevant technological advances available in a shorter time, than the earlier process produced.
• Arms control. The naval forces should have an important role in future arms control negotiations, since naval forces' elements germane to deterrence are likely to be affected by any resulting agreements. Taking on such a role also requires advanced preparation by the naval forces to maintain credibility on the subject and to ensure that Service positions bearing the authority of Service leadership are advanced and addressed.

DECISION AIDS: INTELLIGENCE, GAMES, MODELING, AND SIMULATION

The key decision aids for an effective deterrence strategy are accurate information about and understanding of a particular situation, the context, and the issues and the participants in any events of concern, as well as understanding of the relative merits of various approaches to the situation based on having thought through similar situations and experimented with ideas about how to treat them.

The key elements of information—i.e., intelligence and understanding—are highlighted throughout this report. They include a thorough understanding of the issues, nations, and individuals involved in eventsincluding an objective view of actual or potential opponents' objectives, values, strengths, and weaknesses, as well as a thorough understanding of actual or potential allies' values, strengths, weaknesses, and motivations. We must also have a clear view of our own objectives, values, resolve, and capabilities to influence any situation. Included in understanding of the opposition is an accurate view of what that nation or group holds dear that can be threatened or used as an inducement to acceptable behavior in a crisis. Current intelligence must find indicators of impending actions that the United States would wish to deter, in time to allow assessment, decision, and anticipatory deterrent action.

Aside from actual experience, practice in managing situations involving deterrence can be gained through the use of models, simulations, and games involving representation of the participants in an action, including the U.S. officials who would play a part in such activities. The models, simulations, and games providing opportunities for such experimentation are legion. Most have been devised to study the interplay of forces in warfare and to evaluate military system and force performance. Those applicable to deterrence must also include qualities bearing on deterrence action, such as the capacity for decision making relevant to such action. The needed qualities are reviewed briefly in Chapter 1; some essential elements of such decision aids are examined in detail in the three papers included in Appendix G.

A review of the uses of models, simulations, and games as decision aids to deterrence suggests the conclusion that the choice of specific decision aids is not a critical decision in itself; many of the existing decision tools can be applied to good advantage. Their chief value is in requiring disciplined thinking about a problem through ordering of the problem's elements and enabling evaluation of its critical parameters. The key criteria in selecting any tool to aid decision making, and especially models and simulations used to support games that apply to specific situations, should be the following:

• The ability to evaluate the metrics of deterrence, outlined above, in specific situations; and
• The ability to take the users out of their own frame of reference so that they can view a situation from the points of view of all the participants in the action.

Except for enhancing their ability to meet these criteria, it is more important to invest in utilization of existing models, games, and simulations for learning than to expend resources in seeking their continuous improvement.

Principles to follow in selecting and applying such decision aids include the following:

• Decision aids should incorporate the capacity for decision making and for representation of values and patterns of influence among all the participants; subordinate models and simulations designed for specific purposes, such as evaluating duels between military forces, can be used to supplement decision aids that have the requisite qualitative characteristics.
• Decision aids should not be expected to foretell with confidence the outcomes of ongoing or contemplated deterrence actions, because the precise unfolding of events depends on many elements of chance and many unknowns, so that the resulting predictions could easily lead to faulty conclusions and policies.
• Decision aids should be used for training, learning, and practice.
• Decision aids should be used for analysis, to help identify gaps and uncertainties in our understanding of situations and of participants in events—the analyses can be applicable to hypothetical situations, as devices for practice and learning, or to real situations, to help assess the consequences of different courses of action. In addition they should be "competitive," to help the decision makers using them to view situations from outside their own frames of reference.
• Decision aids should explicitly state for their users the levels of confidence in the information and in the representation of the values of the "players" and other characteristics on which the decision aids are based.

The value of deterrence decision aids available to U.S. decision makers can be enhanced by a number of steps. These include:

• Enhancing the ability to represent decision processes of U.S., adversary, and coalition participants, all within their own value systems and with attention to the specifics of the participants' leadership and their circumstances;
• Calibrating decision aids against real experience, to "bench mark" them and understand their strengths and weaknesses;
• Making deterrence an explicit part of ongoing gaming exercises used for diverse planning and training purposes, such as the Navy's annual "global war game" at the Naval War College and strategic war games run from time to time under Joint Staff and Service auspices, and especially games involving members of the National Command Authorities (NCA), with concentration on the activities preliminary to war rather than on the playout of war;
• Periodically undertaking political and military war games of deterrence per se, in which the beginning of warfare among the opponents represents a "loss" and the end of the game;
• Learning how other countries use models and games in situations applicable to deterrence—the issues they examine, the opponents they consider, the outcomes they seek;
• Learning about and keeping abreast of activities in the various institutes for conflict resolution supported by U.S. universities, foundations, and corporations, as a source of input for the Navy Department's models, simulations, and games relevant to deterrence; and
• Incorporating post-Cold War deterrence explicitly into Naval War College curricula, to gain the benefit of the students' thinking and theses on the subject and to heighten students' awareness of the special problems associated with deterrence to help them in their future assignments. This step must include conveying a sense of judgment regarding the circumstances that affect the national will to undertake deterrent actions that may entail significant human, economic, and political costs. It also includes cultivation of the political skills that will be needed by naval forces' commanders in the complex deterrence situations they may face. Assignments such as National War College studies, where such matters are considered on a joint Service basis, should be encouraged.

The kinds of preparation inherent in the uses and enhancement of decision aids that are described above should strongly reinforce the ability of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to contribute to U.S. deterrence policy and strategy. Just as the evolution of Cold War deterrence strategy took place as events unfolded and analysts and policy makers both anticipated and reviewed them over a long period of years, so also will the appropriate application of available decision aids contribute to the development of deterrence policy and strategy in the current post-Cold War period.