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OCR for page 15
Processing of M55 Rockets at JACADS and TOCDF
PROCESS DESIGN FOR JACADS AND TOCDF
The baseline incineration system was first operated
at the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System
(JACADS) on Johnston Island in 1990. A series of four
operational verification testing (OVTs) campaigns was
conducted from 1990 to 1993 using various agents in
munitions and containers to make certain the baseline
incineration system was safe and effective. After the
OVT program was completed, MITRE Corporation, an
Army contractor, and the National Research Council
(NRC) concluded that the system could operate safely
and effectively (MITRE, 1991; NRC, 1994b). The
baseline incineration system at JACADS was conse-
quently authorized to complete the destruction of
chemical agent and munitions stockpiles at Johnston
Island. Subsequently, a second-generation facility at
Tooele, Utah, began agent disposal operations in 1996,
following a period of systemization (preoperational
testing).
More than 7,500 GB M55 rockets on Johnston Is-
land were processed during the first OVT campaign,
OVT 1. All of the M55 rockets on Johnston Island con-
taining VX were processed in the second campaign,
OVT 2. The first disposal campaign at TOCDF was
also directed at the destruction of the entire GB-filled
rocket stockpile at Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah.
As noted in previous chapters, some of these rockets
contained gelled GB and required special processing.
This chapter describes how rockets are processed in
the baseline incineration system. It also reviews the
results of processing rockets and lessons learned dur-
15
ing OVT 1 and OVT 2 at JACADS and discusses the
TOCDF operations with both gelled and ungelled GB
rockets.
loading, Transport, and Unpacking
The delivery of rockets from the storage areas to the
disposal facility is the first step in the disposal process.
Pallets, each containing 15 rockets in individual ship-
ping tubes secured by steel bands, are removed from
storage igloos by forklifts and loaded into a transport
container that is delivered by truck or tractor trailer to
the disposal facility. At JACADS, each pallet was
loaded into a sealed, metal vacuum box for transport
(two at a time) on a flatbed truck to the facility
(MITRE, 1991~. At TOCDF, where the transport dis-
tance was much longer (almost 2 miles), a larger cylin-
drical vacuum container (8.5 ft diameter by 11 ft long),
termed an on-site container (ONC), was developed
and used for transport of multiple pallets towed by a
tractor-trailer (U.S. Army, 1996b).
The transport containers are unloaded at the muni-
tions demilitarization building (MDB) dock. The at-
mosphere of each container, maintained at subatmo-
spheric pressure to prevent leakage to the environs, is
checked for the presence of agent leaking from the
rockets. Those containers in which no leaking rockets
are detected are elevated to the unpack area on the sec-
ond floor of the MDB. The pallets are removed from
the container and the rockets are manually loaded into
the rocket handling system (RHS), whose main com-
ponent is the rocket shear machine (RSM). Empty con-
OCR for page 16
16
tainers are returned to a second dock of the MDB for
return to the storage area. A limit is placed on the num-
ber of containers in the unpack area. Transport contain-
ers stored there are periodically checked to ascertain
that no agent has leaked into them from the rockets or
their shipping tubes.
Containers in which leaking agent is detected are
directed to the explosion containment vestibule of the
MDB for special handling by personnel in demilitari-
zation protective ensemble (DPE) suits. Leaking rock-
ets that have been overpacked are delivered to this same
area for special handling and feeding into the RSM. At
JACADS and TOCDF, no safety or environmental
problems and no rate limitations in processing were
attributable to GB M55 rocket loading, transport, or
unpacking systems and operations.
Rocket Handling System
The RHSs that are installed at JACADS, TOCDF,
and the other baseline facilities are virtually identical
and are as shown in Figure 3-1. As noted in the figure,
the first part of the RHS comprises the following:
· The rocket metering table.
- The conveyor system that carries the rocket from
the metering table through gates into and out of
Explosive Containment
Vestibule Explosion
Containment Room
1/~
Rocket Shear
Pallet of IS M55
Rockets in
Firing Tubes
Rotary
Kiln
Heated
Discharge
Conveyor
FIGURE 3-1 Rocket handling system. Source: SAIC (2002b).
ASSESSMENT OF PROCESSING GELLED GB M55 ROCKETS AT ANNISTON
the explosion containment vestibule, into the ex-
plosion containment room (ECR), to the RSM.
- The RSM punch-and-drain station for removing
agent from the rocket, where agent is drained
from the rocket into the agent quantification sys-
tem a pump, filter, measuring station, and stor-
age vessel that allows process operators to deter-
mine how much of the original 10.7 lb of GB has
been drained. Agent from the storage vessel is
subsequently metered to the liquid incinerator
(LIC) for disposal processing.
· The RSM shear station in which a single blade,
cooled and cleaned by a flow of decontamination
solution, sequentially shears the rocket into eight
segments: the fuze section; the agent section and
its burster into three segments; the rocket propel-
lant into three segments; and the rocket nozzle
and tail fin section.
Figure 3-2 shows the location of the cuts made in the
RSM to shear the rocket into eight segments. The fig-
ure also presents information on the process in which
the segments are dropped from the RSM through an
angled chute into the deactivation furnace system
(DFS). This process occurs in a sequence of three
dumps. The volume in the chute between the two gates
is water-spray cooled to minimize premature vaporiza-
To
. . Pollution
Liquid it /1 Abatement
Inc ner ~ ~ System
Chamber
AL ~' ~ Abatement
Allerburner
/scrap Bin Blast
, / Attenuation
Duct
OCR for page 17
PROCESSING OF M55 ROCKETS AT JACADS AND TOCDF
~ ~ o
cn Z o
o
o
I
I
o
#2 DUMP
#3 DUMP
CURRENT ROCKET SHEAR SEQUENCE
9) PUSH ROCKET & 4th CHOP
10) PUSH ROCKET & 5th CHOP
11) 2nd DUMP (4 PIECES)
12) PUSH ROCKET & 6th CHOP
13) PUSH ROCKET & 7th CHOP
14) 3rd DUMP (2 PIECES)
15) PUSH TAILPIECE
16) REPEAT STARTING AT (1)
1) ADVANCE ROCKET TO RSM FROM RDS
2) RAISE ROCKET ENTRY BLAST GATE
3) ADVANCE NEXT ROCKET TO RDS
4) LOWER ROCKET ENTRY BLAST GATE
5) 1st CHOP (FUSE)
6) 1st DUMP (FUSE & TAILPIECE IF PRESENT)
7) PUSH ROCKET AND 2nd CHOP
8) PUSH ROCKET & 3rd CHOP
17
CN Cal ~ UP
o g o g
In
o
I
4.69
8.80
, ,
INFUSE ~M36 BURSTER
4.69
#1 DUMP
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/ ~ [AGENT ~ IGNITER
/ M34 BURSTER
BURSTER WELL
39.67
~7
to
o
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cn
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In
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cn on co cn On u' Cal
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11.88 11.88 9.57 16.20 ~
~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
10.04 11.88 11.88 9.57
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
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U~ ~ -- ~ ,] ma- at-. ~.~ - ~[~ ~ -, _ 1
=_= ~ . _
PROPELLANT
. ~ ELFIN ASSEMBLY
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DUMP WITH FUSE
FROM NEXT ROCKET
5 _ ~
FIGURE 3-2 Chopping sequence for 115-mm M55 rocket. Source: General Physics Corporation (20001. Note: The numbers
above the doubleheaded arrows are the length of the rocket sections in inches.
tion of the agent and ignition of the energetic fuze,
burster, and propellant components of the rocket.
In the first dump, the fuze is admitted into the DFS
through the gates of the chute along with the tail fin sec-
tion of the previously processed rocket. In the second
dump, the four sheared rocket segments comprising the
burster, the agent cavity, and a portion of the propellant
are dropped into the DFS. In the third dump, the two re-
maining sheared rocket segments containing the rest of
the propellant are dropped. Separating the energetics into
three separate dumps or drops avoids detonating the
burster and propellant by the fuze and avoids the simulta-
neous heat release and pressure rise that would result from
the combustion of the burster with all of the propellant.
Not considered in the testing described above (and the
modeling discussed in Chapter 4) is the possibility of
dumping a rocket's parts into the DFS in as many as seven
separate dumps. Reducing the size and Btu content of the
feed packages could result in more uniform combustion
within the kiln. Doing so might produce more uniform
control and reduce or eliminate automatic waste feed cut-
offs, but this would have to be demonstrated during the
agent trial burn (ATE), when the effect of more cycling of
the chute gates would also be evaluated.
Two identical, independent, parallel RSMs are in-
stalled in each of the facilities, although for simplifica-
tion only one is shown in Figure 3-1. They discharge
through separate chutes into a common DFS. For the
most part, rocket processing at JACADS and TOCDF
made use of only one of the installed RSMs at any given
time (EG&G, 2002a). The operator can set the RSMs
to operate between 10 and 50 rockets per hour. The
original RSM design was based on an average process-
ing rate of 32 rockets per hour, with a peak capacity of
60 per hour. Punch-and-drain time was intended to be
50 to 75 s under normal conditions.
Agent Disposal, Decontamination of Metal Paris,
and Destruction of Energetics and Shipping Tubes
The original designs for the JACADS and TODCF
baseline incineration system facilities were based on the
OCR for page 18
18
assumption that 95 percent or more of the GB agent in
the M55 rockets would be drained during RSM opera-
tions, stored, and subsequently processed in the LIC. The
agent heel of 5 percent or less would be destroyed in the
DFS along with the energetics, metal parts, and shipping
tube fragments produced in the RSM operation.
The LIC has two combustion chambers. In the pri-
mary chamber, liquid agent is atomized with air and
burned at 2700°F. The secondary chamber is provided
with a separate burner system set for a chamber tem-
perature of 2000°F to ensure complete combustion and
agent destruction (U.S. Army, 1999a).
The principal component of the DFS is a rotating
kiln about 33 ft long and 5 ft in diameter. Internal
flights ensure the movement of the metal parts and ash
residues through the kiln. At a planned kiln rotation of
~1.85 rpm, the solids residence time is 6.5 min. The
rocket and shipping tube segments produced in the
RSM operation are dumped into a feed chute and slide
through two blast gates into the DFS. The interlocked
gates prevent the injection of rocket segments until the
materials currently being processed in the DFS have
moved out of the way. The gates are interlocked so that
one is always closed when the other is open. This ar-
rangement minimizes the possibility of a backflow of
gases into the ECRs containing the conveyor and the
RSM equipment as a result of overpressurization in the
DFS. The DFS is designed to operate at between 1000
and 1500°F and processed up to 38 drained rockets per
hour at JACADS (U.S. Army, 1993~. Water sprays in
the gas exhaust piping and the feed chute prevent ex-
cessive temperatures. The DFS kiln has an outer shroud
through which the combustion air is drawn to lower the
temperature of the kiln shell. Noncombustible solids
pass out of the DFS kiln onto a heated discharge con-
veyer (HDC) that is designed to complete the decon-
tamination of the solids to a 5X level.2 This conveyer
lifts the residues to another chute, from which they drop
through gates into a residue collection bin. Drums of
cooled residue decontaminated to a 5X condition are
shipped off-site.
iThe term "flight" refers to helical plates attached to the kiln
shell to convey the feed materials horizontally through the rotating
kiln.
2Solids are treated to a SX decontamination level by holding the
material at 1000°F for 15 min. This treatment results in completely
decontaminated materials that can be released for general use or
sold to the public in accordance with applicable federal, state, and
local regulations.
ASSESSMENT OF PROCESSING GELLED GB M55 ROCKETS AT ANNISTON
Exhaust gas from the DFS kiln goes first to a blast
attenuation duct, then to a cyclone in which larger particu-
lates are separated from the gas stream, and then to an
afterburner operating at 2200°F for a residence time of at
least 2 s. The afterburner and pollution abatement system
ensure that agent destruction meets the required 99.9999
percent destruction and removal efficiency (DRE).
The combustion flue gases from both the LIC and
DFS go to identical, parallel pollution abatement sys-
tems (PAS ), in which the flue gas is first quenched with
process water via a spray system that reduces the gas
temperature. The gas then passes through a venturi
scrubber, where 18 percent caustic solution is injected,
and combines with the acid components of the gas,
forming sodium salts. The salts are removed as brine in
a downstream water scrubber tower and either stored
for subsequent processing on-site in a brine reduction
area (BRA) or shipped off-site for processing. The
BRA is a set of evaporators to crystallize the brine.
Although both JACADS and TOCDF had BRAs, the
off-site shipping approach proved cheaper and was
used at both sites.
At JACADS and TOCDF, after passing through the
water scrubber tower of the PAS, the flue gas went to
the stack, where it was discharged to the atmosphere.
In the newer designs for other baseline incineration
systems employed at Anniston, Umatilla, and Pine
Bluff, the flue gas, after passing through the PAS
scrubber tower, goes to a series of high-efficiency par-
ticulate (HEPA) and carbon filters, known as the PAS
filter system (PFS), before going to the stack. The
PFS acts as an additional safeguard by removing any
remaining traces of agent and products of incomplete
combustion, giving the surrounding community addi-
tional assurance that harmful emissions have been
suitably controlled in a manner that protects public
health.
GB M55 ROCKET DISPOSAL: ACTUAL
VERSUS DESIGN RATE
JACADS Rocke! Disposal Operations During OVT ~
In 1990 and 1991, the entire Johnston Island stock-
pile of 7,490 GB M55 rockets was processed at the
newly commissioned JACADS facility over a 7-month
period in its very first operation, OVT 1 (MITRE,
1991~. The destruction of GB M55 rockets at JACADS
took longer than originally planned (MITRE, 1991;
NRC, 1994b). The RSM performed fairly well, with
OCR for page 19
PROCESSING OF M55 ROCKETS AT JACADS AND TOCDF
about 94 percent availability. A peak rate of 32 rockets
per hour was demonstrated, although the average rate
of 7 per hour over the campaign was well below the
design rate of 32 per hour for the baseline incineration
system. The lower rate was primarily due to problems
with the DFS/HDC (MITRE, 1991~. The "best shift"
goal is the process designer's average intended (design)
throughput rate. "Full rate" goals and results are com-
puted as about two-thirds of the design throughput rate.
At JACADS, the single best shift rate achieved for GB
M55 rockets was 27 rockets per hour, achieved over a
4-hour period in OVT 1 (NRC, 1994b). The full rate
goal for extended periods of operation was 24 rockets
per hour. Actual results over an extended period came
to 15.3 drained rockets per hour, or less than half of the
designer's intended rate.
The disposal rate shortfall at JACADS was attrib-
uted in general to problems associated with the start-
up and shakedown of a complex, new industrial pro-
totype facility whose associated processes had never
before been operated together as a system. The goals
may have been set too high (MITRE, 1991~. The lim-
ited number of rockets in the GB campaign at
JACADS allowed too little time to correct initial pro-
cess problems and to achieve an improved, steady-
state production rate. Numerous short-duration, un-
documented interruptions and downtime significantly
degraded the processing rate.
System component failures are to be expected dur-
ing any start-up operation. Lessons learned from
JACADS were used to improve the performance at
baseline facilities (MITRE, 1992; NRC, 1994b).
TOCDF Rocket Disposal Operations
Although TOCDF benefited from lessons learned at
JACADS and its throughput of rockets containing liq-
uid GB was marginally better than that of JACADS, it
still fell short of the design rate. The GB rocket cam-
paign at the TOCDF processed 28,945 M55 rockets
(EG&G, 2002a) and 1,057 M56 (EG&G, 2002b) war-
heads from August 22, 1996, through March 24, 1997,
and from October 26, 1998, through August 14, 2001.
Processing at TOCDF was subject to interruptions
from the gelled (thickened and crystallized) agent that
was encountered in approximately one-sixth of the GB-
filled rockets processed. The gelled agent clogged the
agent handling system. Removal of gelled agent at the
punch-and-drain station was slowed, the removal of 95
percent called for by the design and specified in the
19
original TOCDF (and JACADS) Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) operating permits-
was never achieved, and attempts at agent removal
were continually frustrated.
Also interrupting processing were occasional DFS
feed chute jams, which required removal by personnel
in DPE suits, reducing the availability of the DFS.
Thermal stressing of the DFS kiln led to cracks that
were observed during maintenance and then repaired
(Vaughn, 2002~.
The HDC was another source of system downtime.
Conveyor link deformation associated with high-tem-
perature operation allowed extra slack in the system,
causing rollers to disengage from the track. Molten alu-
minum from the rocket bodies exiting the DFS spilled
and caused additional jams. Solid debris sometimes
failed to dump as intended, choking the conveyor.
Processing was also slowed somewhat by the need
to handle the 419 overpacked (leaking) rockets stored
at TOCDF (EG&G, 2002a).
The RSMs enjoyed a very high availability rate, bet-
ter than 95 percent (EG&G, 2002a). However, average
production rates were restrained by other system and
regulatory limitations, so that the two RSMs had mean
production rates over the entire campaign of only 2.28
and 1.38 rockets per hour, respectively. The maximum
daily production rates for RSM 1, RSM 2, and the two
RSMs combined were 312 (13.0 rockets per hour), 334
(13.9 rockets per hour), and 448 (18.7 rockets per hour),
respectively (EG&G, 2002a).
Gelled rockets numbering 5,287 from three specific
munition lots were processed without draining. The
permitted rate of only 1.0 rocket per hour delayed
campaign completion, but a decision to coprocess
multiple types of GB-filled munitions shortened the
time that would have been needed for overall destruc-
tion of GB munitions if processing had been accom-
plished sequentially.
Factors Affecting Operational Experience
The very substantial difference between design and
experienced disposal production rates for GB-filled
M55 rockets at both JACADS and TOCDF suggests a
need for careful analysis of cause and effect, including
the possibility that the design production rate was set
unreasonably high. The multiple causes of delay were
unexpected, such as the discovery of gelled and leak-
ing agent, equipment failures, faulty operations, and
stringent regulatory limitations. The reaction of opera-
OCR for page 20
20
tions management personnel to each of these circum-
stances deserves review in light of subsequent events.
This is especially true regarding regulatory limitations.
Since interruption and delay at any step in a sequential
process necessarily affect throughput, an analysis of
the total system is required in addition to analyses of
individual components.
Regu/atory Limitations
DFS operation is subject to compliance with both
RCRA and Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) regu-
lations. TOCDF had a RCRA permit to process 33 liquid-
filled rockets per hour (EG&G, 2002a). A 5 percent heel
of the original 10.7 lb of GB agent was assumed to be
present in each of the drained M55 rockets fed to the DFS;
the corresponding flow of agent to the DFS is 17.66 lb/in
(10.7 lb per rocket x 0.05 x 33 rockets per hour). While
there is no indication that the agent feed rate to the DFS is
limiting in terms of the 99.9999 percent DRE require-
ment, the emission of products of incomplete combus-
tion, or the thermal input to the DFS, the revised RCRA
permit limited the processing of gelled (undrained) GB
M55 rockets to 1.6 per hour to avoid agent flows to the
DFS higher than 17.66 lb/h.3 The processing rate was fur-
ther reduced to 1.0 rocket per hour when coprocessing
was undertaken. Such slow processing of gelled GB M55
rockets at TOCDF significantly extended the operating
schedule and slowed the reduction in storage risk.
The TSCA permit was required because a polychlori-
nated biphenyl (PCB) material had been used as a lubricant
when some of the rockets were inserted into their firing
tubes, although the quantity was very small.4 During trial
burns at JACADS, when the plant was operated at the pro-
posed throughput rate, PCBs and controlled PCB products
of combustion were found to be below permissible emis-
sion limits (NRC, 1994b). The allowable TSCA through-
put for JACADS was set at 40 rockets per hour and for
TOCDF at 36 per hour. The planned rate for JACADS (32)
and the RCRA-established rate for TOCDF (33), which
were lower, were the controlling rates (MITRE, 1993~.
impact of Leaker Processing
While the special handling required for overpacked
leaking rockets is no doubt burdensome, there is no
3From the notes of a meeting between a fact-finding group from
the Stockpile Committee and the Army, September 25, 2002.
4Ibid.
ASSESSMENT OF PROCESSING GELLED GB M55 ROCKETS AT ANNISTON
indication in the end-of-campaign reports for JACADS
or TOCDF that processing leakers slowed the overall
processing throughput appreciably (MITRE, 1991;
EG&G, 2002a; U.S. Army, 2002~. A key reason for
this view is that the number of leaking rockets was rela-
tively small, a total of about 800 at both sites (out of
more than 60,000 GB M55 rockets processed).
impact of Ge//ed Agent Processing
Gelled rockets were not in evidence at JACADS so
there was no impact during disposal processing op-
erations there. At TOCDF, the story was different
(EG&G, 2002a). Three munition lots (1033-55-1076,
1033-55-1077, and 1033-51-1086) totaling 5,287
M55 rockets or 18 percent of the Deseret Chemical
Depot stockpile were identified as likely to contain
gelled GB material. These munition lots were all pro-
cessed through the DFS at 1.0 rocket per hour, as de-
scribed earlier in this chapter. The average produc-
tion rates for the three lots were 0.5, 0.5, and 0.7 per
hour, respectively, for a 24-hour period (U.S. Army,
2002e). These are very much less than the "full rate"
of 15.3 per hour achieved at JACADS for processing
ungelled rockets. The full rate was developed by tak-
ing the total number of rockets processed during the
five best production weeks and dropping the highest
and lowest weeks.5 At this rate, it would take about
367 full days of operation to process the gelled rock-
ets 5,287/0.6 x 24) = 3671 and 67 full days of opera-
tion to process the nongelled rockets t(30,000 -
5,287~/~15.3 x 24) = 671. Processing large numbers of
gelled rockets is a much more serious impediment to
production than processing large numbers of liquid-
filled rockets a few of which are leakers.
COPROCESSING
In an effort to mitigate the impact of slowdowns
experienced during the processing of gelled rockets,
TOCDF managers conceived techniques for
coprocessing munitions. Coprocessing and comple-
mentary processing have been defined for planning
purposes as follows:6
sInformation from Armv answers to Questions from the Stock-
pile Committee as a follow-up to the September 25, 2002, fact-
finding meeting with the Army.
6Ibid.
~ 1
OCR for page 21
PROCESSING OF M55 ROCKETS AT JACADS AND TOCDF
Co-Processing. Co-processing refers to the concurrent processing of
two munition types that use different footprints of the facility and
different equipment. For example, bulk items and rockets can be co-
processed since they do not utilize the same handling or dem~litari-
zation processing equipment. In addition, rockets can be co-pro-
cessed with non-explosively configured projectiles.
Complementary Processing. Complementary processing involves
the processing of two munition/bulk types that utilize a common
footprint of the facility or the same equipment. For example, [the
Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility] ANCDF is consider-
ing complementary processing of explosively configured projectiles
with gelled rockets. One ECR will be configured for projectiles, and
the second one for rockets. Only one type of munition will be pro-
cessed at a given time arid processing of rockets and projectiles will
alternate. Also, projectiles would be processed during down periods
of the rocket line and vice versa.
Thus, gelled rockets could be processed through the
RSM and the DFS concurrently with non-explosively-
configured projectiles being processed through projec-
tile/mortar disassembly machines, multipurpose de-
militarization machines, the metal parts furnace (MPF),
and the other LIC.
A safety-driven operational limitation is that the
quantity of munitions in the unpack area must be con-
trolled to limit the total energetics load in that space at
any given time.7 This was achieved by processing pro-
jectiles through the area while rocket processing was
suspended for maintenance. Utah regulators granted a
Class 1 RCRA permit modification to permit
coprocessing, but in so doing, they limited rocket
throughput to the DFS to 1.0 rocket per hour while al-
lowing the coprocessing of 88 non-explosively-config-
ured M360 105-mm projectiles per hour (U.S. Army,
2002f). The time required for rocket destruction was
extended as a result of a cut in the disposal processing
rate from 1.6 rockets per hour to 1.0 per hour, but the
duration of the overall GB disposal campaign schedule
was reduced as a result of coprocessing (EG&G,
2002a).
PROCESS CHANGES FROM LESSONS LEARNED
The lessons learned from the pioneering experience
in processing M55 rockets at JACADS (NRC, 1994b)
were adopted and built upon at TOCDF (EG&G,
2002a), which contributed uniquely because gelled
rockets had not been encountered at JACADS. Lessons
7From the notes of a meeting between a fact-finding group from
the Stockpile Committee and the Army, September 25, 2002.
21
learned at the two facilities and applied, later on, to
processing or to facility design are discussed next.
Lessons from JACADS
· The DFS kiln wall must be able to withstand po-
tential detonation of energetics. It was redesigned
and increased in thickness from 0.5 in. to 2 in. for
TOCDF and facilities at other sites.
The DFS kiln flange bolts failed. The DFS kiln
is constructed in five sections that are bolted to-
gether to form a single continuous shell. During
the GB M55 rocket testing, the bolts holding the
kiln sections failed on three occasions. The fail-
ures of kiln bolts accounted for 120 hours (or 18
percent) of DFS downtime, the second largest
contributor to total downtime. The DFS kiln
bolts were replaced with bolts of improved de-
sign and different materials of construction. The
replacement bolts were larger in diameter, stron-
ger, and had a coefficient of thermal expansion
that was similar to that of the kiln flanges. There
were no failures of these bolts during the VX
rocket campaign.
The HDC was jammed by slag, pieces of the
rocket body, and molten aluminum. The HDC
was the largest contributor to JACADS down-
time during GB rocket testing, accounting for
248 hours of the 929 hours total downtime. This
was 27 percent of the downtime for JACADS
and 38 percent of the downtime for the DFS.
The HDC mesh conveyor was replaced by a
bucket conveyor. The initial testing of the bucket
conveyor indicated the drive chain assembly was
inadequate for the HDC operating temperature.
The chain design was then modified and the con-
veyor reassembled with a drive chain assembly
that was identical to the one on the mesh con-
veyor. This modification was successful, and the
only downtime associated with the HDC con-
veyor during the OVT 2 VX rocket testing oc-
curred when a rocket piece jammed between the
conveyor and the HDC housing. All other down-
time attributed to the HDC was caused by the
heater elements. The system was redesigned and
additional preventive maintenance undertaken to
avoid breakdown maintenance.
· The LIC flame detector malfunctioned at high
feed rates. First, the feed rate was reduced, and
then the flame scanner was properly adjusted.
OCR for page 22
22
ASSESSMENT OF PROCESSING GELLED GB M55 ROCKETS AT ANNISTON
.
.
.
.
.
Glassiiced salt and slag accumulated in the sec-
ondary chamber of the LIC. The refractory brick
in the secondary chamber of the LIC was replaced
with a spell-resistant brick. This brick was more
resistant to the corrosive conditions in the sec-
ondary chamber. The original bricks were com-
posed of alumina and silica, which reacted at high
temperature with sodium from the decontamina-
tion solutions and with phosphorus from the agent
to form slag, which degraded the brick. The sys-
tem was redesigned to provide combustion air for
each LIC to allow independent operation during
slag removal. A hot tap withdrawal system was
installed to drain slag from the secondary com-
bustion chamber.
The DFS feed chute experienced material crack-
ing. The chute failed on four separate occasions,
accounting for 39 hours of the downtime (6 per-
cent of the total) for the DFS. The feed chute was
replaced with one of a different design. The rede-
sign proved to be inadequate and the chute was
replaced by one of a still different design follow-
ing the fourth (last) OVT test.
Problems with the HDC discharge gates stopped
rocket processing on 1I separate occasions. A
blast enclosure was installed at the discharge end
of the HDC, and the HDC discharge gates were
replaced with thicker, ceramic-coated units. This
reduced the number of times the gates jammed
and reduced the amount of gate warping.
Thrust bearings on the DFS failed. The bearings
were replaced and relocated to enhance cooling
and to facilitate future replacement.
The fuse segregator conveyor system malfunc-
tioned. It was removed and the rocket cutting se-
quence was revised to ensure separation of the
fuze from other energetic components.
· The JA CADS facility was shut down by order of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for
1I days during OVT I after the Army informed
the EPA that record-keeping practices at
JA CADS were inadequate (NRC, 1994b). During
the downtime, better systems were installed. For
this reason, and to ensure compliance with all
environmental requirements, environmental de-
partment staffing was increased.
· The BRA as originally built at JACADS did not
have a PAS associated with it because it was
assumed that any emissions would contain only
small amounts of nontoxic salts. However, dur-
ing OVT 1, particulate emissions exceeded the
30 mg/dscm regulatory limit, and the BRA was
shut down (MITRE, 1991~. While OVT 1 was
proceeding, a PAS was constructed for the BRA.
In October 1991 it was tested with brine from
OVT 1 operations spiked with heavy metals.
Although the emissions were within regulatory
limits, the test was not successful. The tempera-
ture of the gas stream into the PAS for the BRA
was below the dew point, which caused conden-
sation of entrained moisture in the inlet duct.
This moisture saturated the salt particulates and
caused them to be deposited in the duct instead
of entering the baghouse for collection (MITRE,
1993~. This situation was corrected by additional
heating of the gas stream. Brine produced dur-
ing OVT 1 and OVT 2 was shipped off-island
for disposal. During most of the OVT programs,
the BRA did not operate satisfactorily. However,
after modifications, the BRA did process the
brines generated during OVT 3 and OVT 4, al-
though some operating problems remained and
the required BRA PAS compliance test had not
yet been performed. After the OVT program had
concluded, the PAS passed the test and the BRA
operated satisfactorily until the closure of
JACADS. At TOCDF, the BRA was installed
but never used because it was cheaper to send
brine off-site for processing.
Lessons from TOCDF
· Gelled GB rockets were encountered that could
not be drained of agent in the RSM as intended.
Thickened or crystallized agent plugged filters,
agent collection system components, and the
agent quantification system. A modification to
the RCRA permit was obtained to allow rockets
with a full agent fill to be processed through the
DFS at a rate of 1.6 rockets per hour. Addition-
ally, coprocessing of GB-filled munitions was
undertaken. Although this reduced the allowable
processing rate for gelled GB rockets to 1.0 per
hour, it improved a disposal schedule that had
been adversely affected by munitions contain-
ing gelled agent.
Overpacked leaking rockets required special
handling and delayed the processing rate. For-
tunately, there were not very many of them, as
noted earlier.
OCR for page 23
PROCESSING OF M55 ROCKETS AT JACADS AND TOCDF
VX M55 ROCKET DISPOSAL AT JACADS:
ACTUAL VERSUS DESIGN RATE
In addition to meeting the DRE for agent destruc-
tion and other requirements of the RCRA and TSCA
permits, there were two additional process objectives
during the OVT 2 with VX M55 rockets (MITRE,
1992):
· Destroy all 13,889 VX rockets stored on Johnston
.
Island safely and expeditiously.
Determine the effectiveness of the equipment
modifications made following the GB rocket
OVT 1 testing.
Three of the four TSCA DFS trial burns in OVT 2
met the 99.9999 percent DRE requirement for PCBs.
The fourth just missed (99.999896 percent) (NRC,
1994b). EPA accepted this result, and nothing was done
to remedy it in OVT 2. However, the trial burn results
led to a rethinking of the design and operation of the
DFS afterburner. In TOCDF and the other mainland
baseline facilities, the residence time in the afterburner
has been increased from 1 s to 2 s and the temperature
has been increased from 2000°F to 2200°F.
The JACADS throughput rate and availability ex-
ceeded the goals established for the total duration of
the VX M55 rocket testing during OVT 2. All of the
13,889 VX rockets were destroyed during 19 weeks
of operation, which commenced on November 15,
1991, and terminated on March 31, 1992 (MITRE,
1992~.
The JACADS daily average rocket throughput rate
during the full rate part of OVT 2 was 20.6 rockets per
hour, which was below the goal of 24.0 rockets per
hour. The average throughput rate for the entire test
period was 19.6 rockets per hour, which exceeded the
throughput goal of 14.7 rockets per hour for the full
OVT 2. JACADS was able to maintain a throughput
rate of 25.3 rockets per hour for the last 10 days of
OVT 2. The throughput rate was 32.0 rockets per hour
during the first 10 hours of operation on March 23,
1992, which met the single shift throughput goal of 32
rockets per hour for a 10-hour shift.
The integrated system availability for JACADS was
43.4 percent for the duration of VX rocket testing in
OVT 2. The integrated system availability for JACADS
was 55.4 percent during the full rate portion of the test
and 68.9 percent during the last 10 days (MITRE,
1992~.
23
COMPARISON OF GB AND VX M55 ROCKET
DISPOSAL CAMPAIGNS
Stack Emissions
In 1988, Congress mandated that an OVT program be
undertaken at JACADS to assess the readiness of the
baseline incineration system to process agent safely and
effectively. The ability of the technology to meet the
emission standards required under TSCA and RCRA
was an important criterion in this assessment. One of the
four OVT campaigns (OVT 1) destroyed GB M55 rock-
ets, and the second (OVT 2) processed VX M55 rockets.
The air emissions for all metals and organic compounds
from trial burns conducted in these OVT operations met
the then-current RCRA requirements with one excep-
tion (U.S. Army, 1998a): The mercury level in the MPF
stack gas from GB operations was 66 ,ug/m3, somewhat
higher than the standard of 50 ,ug/m3. Of particular note
is the very low concentration of dioxin and furan in emis-
sions from the OVT trial burns at JACADS. The mea-
sured result was 0 to 0.16 ng/m3, which is well below the
standard of 30 ng/m3 (NRC, 1994b).
Trial burns were also conducted at TOCDF during
the systemization (preoperational testing) of the facil-
ity. Lead levels in the DFS emissions from the GB M55
rocket trial burn were extremely high, 1,101 ,ug/m3,
well over the standard of 270 ,ug/m3 (U.S. Army,
1998a). The propellant in each rocket contains 0.4 lb of
lead stearate. The fuze has a lead rotor, and the detona-
tor contains lead styphnate and lead azide. These are
likely contributors to the high lead emissions, but the
Army has not developed a precise rationale for why
lead emissions were so much higher at TOCDF than at
JACADS. As in the JACADS tests, dioxin and furan
emissions in the TOCDF tests were extremely low and
well below the 30 ng/m3 standard.
Two final points are important. First, the HEPA and
carbon filters that make up the PFS being incorporated
into the PAS in baseline facility designs for the
Anniston, Umatilla, and Pine Bluff sites should reduce
emissions at these facilities below those reported for
JACADS and TOCDF. Second, none of the agent trial
burns conducted to date at JACADS and TOCDF have
included destruction of gelled GB.
Throughput Rates
A comparison of throughput rates for the OVT tests
with GB and VX rockets at JACADS reveals that the
OCR for page 24
24
average full rate throughput increased from 15.3 rock-
ets per hour during OVT 1 (GB rockets) to 20.6 rockets
per hour during OVT 2 (VX rockets), a 42 percent in-
crease. The maximum throughput rate demonstrated
during the GB rocket testing was 27 rockets per hour
for 4 hours. During VX rocket testing, the maximum
throughput rate was 32 rockets per hour. This rate
matched the design throughput rate and was sustained
for one complete 10-hour shift (MITRE, 1992~.
The integrated system availability of JACADS to
process rockets increased from 33 percent during OVT
1 to 46.8 percent during OVT 2, after adjusting for the
downtimes caused by the weather and the fuze
segregator conveyor of the RSM (MITRE, 1992~. This
reflected the benefits of a more experienced workforce
and learning experiences during OVT 1 that resulted in
major process improvements.
Some of the improvements created another set of
problems. For example, because JACADS processed
rockets more rapidly during OVT 2, the DFS furnace
room operated at a higher temperature. This caused the
HDC heater element fuses to blow, resulting in ap-
proximately 200 h JACADS downtime. After OVT 2,
the heater fuse box was relocated to a cooler location,
outside the DFS furnace room.
Safely Performance
The safety performance of JACADS personnel was
better in both OVT 1 and OVT 2 than the program
goal. The Army elected to use the metric "cases with
days away" (CWDA) per 200,000 hours worked to
monitor safety performance (NRC, 1994b). The
CWDA rates realized in OVT 1 and OVT 2 were 1.2
and 2.9, respectively better than the goals of 4.1 and
3.3 that were predetermined for the operations.
A metric more often used in industry is the record-
able injury rate per 200,000 hours worked (RIR). The
RIR covers the CWDA cases but also includes injuries
where the worker goes back to work after medical treat-
ment. The RIR for OVT 1 was 5.8 and for OVT 2 was
5.7. These values were very high by industrial stan-
dards for ongoing operations. Army contractors subse-
quently improved worker safety programs and the RIRs
for JACADS.
Environmental Performance
The environmental performance of JACADS con-
tinued to be a high priority during OVT 2. There were
ASSESSMENT OF PROCESSING GELLED GB M55 ROCKETS AT ANNISTON
more reported instances of environmental noncompli-
ance at JACADS during OVT 2 than during OVT 1.
This was primarily due to the aggressive efforts of plant
personnel to identify and correct any area that was not
in strict compliance with the appropriate permit or
regulation. A self-audit program was implemented to
identify activities that were not performed in accor-
dance with permit requirements. A training program
was implemented to inform the JACADS workforce of
the applicable permit requirements. Whenever an ac-
tivity was identified as not being in compliance with
the permit, the noncompliance was documented and a
corrective action program was initiated. While some of
the noncompliances could not be corrected during
OVT 2 because long-term solutions or permit modifi-
cations were required, all instances of noncompliance
were addressed. All RCRA emission limits were met.
No releases of VX agent to the environment have been
documented. The seawater discharge quantity and tem-
perature were maintained within National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System permit limits. All solid
hazardous wastes were properly disposed of in an EPA-
approved landfill (MITRE, 1992). The operation of
JACADS during OVT 2 proved that the baseline sys-
tem technology could be operated safely and in an en-
vironmentally sound manner. The safety pro cram con-
tinued to function adequately.
SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS ON M55 ROCKET
DISPOSAL EXPERIENCE
The following major modifications were imple-
mented after encountering problems at JACADS:
· The DFS kiln wall thickness was increased from
0.5 in. to 2 in.
The furnace bearings were relocated to prevent
overheating.
The HDC was redesigned to avoid downtime as-
sociated with molten aluminum problems en-
countered in the original design.
Notwithstanding that each site is unique with respect
to the number and type of munitions stored, lot num-
bers represented, regulatory climate, public affairs cli-
mate, numbers and types of anomalous munitions, and
to some extent, system design, a number of issues com-
mon to baseline facilities are apparent from a review of
the experience in processing M55 rockets at JACADS
and TOCDF:
OCR for page 25
PROCESSING OF M55 ROCKETS AT JACADS AND TOCDF
.
At JACADS and TOCDF, processing rates for the
M55 rockets in the DFS were established and sub-
sequently demonstrated in trial burns based on
their handling in the RSM and on the thermal
loading of drained rockets containing 5 percent
or less of their original agent charge. Since gelled
GB could not be drained from the rockets, the
processing rate was arbitrarily reduced by a fac-
tor of 20, because a gelled rocket contained about
20 times as much agent as a drained ungelled
rocket.
· Gelled GB agent will not drain as intended, ne-
cessitating identification of the anomalous rock-
ets and the lot number of their contents and forc-
ing the modification of some process steps.
RCRA permits must acknowledge the process
modifications, and programmable logic control-
lers must be adjusted to achieve the necessary
changes in process control.
· Rocket handling and transportation to and
through the unpack area are identical for gelled
and liquid-filled rockets. The RSM must be re-
programmed for gelled rockets to skip the drain
station and, accordingly, the agent quantification
system.
Coprocessing is a proven option for expediting
the completion of a disposal campaign for GB
.
25
when the need to process rockets containing
gelled agent reduces throughput rates.
The control and sensing of internal DFS kiln tem-
perature and pressure remain challenging issues.
Energetics burn quickly, producing temperature
and pressure spikes. Exceedance of set tempera-
ture and pressure limits can cause thermal stress
in the kiln wall and feed chute. Cracks that re-
quired repair were found in the furnace wall dur-
ing inspections. Although these are not unusual
in furnace operations, they are an indicator of
thermal stress.
A majority of DFS operational downtime can be
attributed to three causes: HDC jams (27 percent),
DFS bolt failures (18 percent), and DFS feed
chute jams (6 percent). Equipment has been modi-
fied to address these causes, including a modified
DFS feed chute design at ANCDF that is expected
to mitigate jamming.
· Overpacked leaking rockets must be handled
separately and at a somewhat slower throughput
rate.
PCBs do not present a problem in achieving ap-
propriate DRE levels when processing M55 rock-
ets.
· VX rockets have not shown agent gelling, and
there is nothing currently known to suggest that
they might.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
dfs kiln
