|
Items in cart [0] |
Questions? Call 888-624-8373 |
PAPERBACK PDF BOOK Free Resources |
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Copyright © 2009. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Terms of Use and Privacy Statement |
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page R1
IMPROVI NG
Al RCRAFT
SAF ETY
FAA Certification of Commercial Passenger Aircraft
Committee on FAA Airworthiness
Certification Procedures
Assembly of Engineering
National Research Council
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 1980
OCR for page R2
The National Research Council was established by the
National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the
broad community of science and technology with the
Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and of advis-
ing the federal government. The Council operates in
accordance with general policies determined by the
Academy under the authority of its Congressional charter
of 1863, which established the Academy as a private, non-
profit, self-governing membership corporation. The Coun-
cil has become the principal operating agency of both
the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy
of Engineering in the conduct of their services to the
government, the public, and the scientific and engineer-
ing communities. It is administered jointly by both
Academies and the Institute of Medicine. The Academy of
Engineering and the Institute of Medicine were estab-
lished in 1964 and 1970, respectively, under the charter
of the National Academy of Sciences.
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report
was approved by the Governing Board of the National
Research Council, whose members are drawn from the
Councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the
National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of
Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for
the report were chosen for their special competencies
and with regard for appropriate balance.
This report has been reviewed by a group other than
the authors according to procedures approved by a Report
Review Committee consisting of members of the National
Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of
Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 80-82605
International Standard Book Number 0-309-03091-9
Available from:
Office of Publications
National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20418
Printed in the United States of America
OCR for page R3
OCR for page R4
OCR for page R5
NATIONAL RESEARCH COU NCIL
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
2101 CONSTITUTION AVENUE
WAS H I N GTO N1, D. C . 2 0418
The Honorable Neil Goldschmidt
Secretary of Transportation
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
June 24, 1980
I have the honor to transmit the report entitled
Improving Aircraft Safety: FAA Certification of Com-
mercial Passenger Aircraft, prepared by the Committee
on FAA Airworthiness Certification Procedures of the
National Research Council's Assembly of Engineering
and supported by Contract DTOS59-80-C-00028 with the
Department.
The report deals with one example of a genre of
problems new to our age, i.e., the ability of govern-
ment to minimize the risk to the public from a large,
complex, sophisticated technological enterprise that
contributes great public benefit attended by a very
low probability of a major accident--in this case, the
policies and procedures of the FAA for assuring the
airworthiness of jet transport aircraft.
Early in its report, the committee makes the
following observation: "Aircraft safety demands a
'forgiving' design that is tolerant of failure, care-
ful production that is of the highest quality, and
excellent maintenance that gives painstaking attention
to detail throughout the life of the airplane. The
OCR for page R6
The Honorable Neil Goldschmidt
June 24, 1980
Page 2
rare fatal accident that involves airframe or equipment
is almost without exception the result of a failure of
at least two, and occasionally all three, of these
factors. n How to establish a reliable system of scien-
tific and technological vigilance that polices without
a garrison, that establishes technical standards while
respecting creativity, innovations, and competition,
that protects human life and the environment at costs
that do not bar public enjoyment of the benefits is
the challenge to FAA as it is to several other regula-
tory agencies.
The committee's task was complicated by the finding
of significant deficiencies in a system that, never-
theless, has operated with a good safety record. In-
deed, it may not be overstatement to suggest that, had
we been evaluating the regulation of a different tech-
nology, aircraft safety could appropriately have been
employed as a standard of excellence for comparison.
How, then, can we impress a sense of urgency on recom-
mendations for improving a good system, yet avoid
alarming needlessly both passengers and purchasers of
airplanes? One conclusion is evident: the technical
sophistication of the responsible organization must
not merely stand pat; it must keep pace with the ad-
vancing state of the art, or risk falling dangerously
behind and, hence, insufficient to its task. Concern
for the latter eventuality is a major message of this
report.
The past safety record of the domestic airlines,
(35 deaths per million landings in 1979), and the
worldwide acceptance of U.S.-built airplanes, confirm
that our nation's system for assurance of airworthi-
ness has operated quite well. The committee finds,
OCR for page R7
The Honorable Neil Goldschmidt
June 24, 1980
Page 3
however, that this system can and should be better
still, and warns against the perils of a complacency
that it has detected. Noting that the past safety
record is not necessarily a good predictor of future
success, the committee calls into question the in-
creasing technical domination of the agency by the
industry it regulates and urges the FAA, as soon as
possible, to centralize and upgrade the technical
proficiency of its staff into a corps of rule-making
and design certification engineers, and also to
upgrade the skills and techniques of its force of
production and maintenance inspectors.
The committee's view of its findings as well as
its recommendations will, perhaps, best be appreciated
as a struggle toward an ideal. The barriers to attain-
ment are, however, generic to government, particularly
to regulatory agencies, rather than unique to the FAA,
e.g., the conditions and rewards of government service
as compared to those in the private sector. To achieve
the recommended staffing quality and pattern and to
maintain high morale and a sense of creative accost
plishment in a well-established regulatory agency will
require a substantial effort to those ends. But, only
thus can the FAA be expected to maintain an appropriate
relationship to the regulated industry, to assure a
future safety record at least as good as that of the
last decade, and thus to warrant some measure of
shielding from the winds of political change.
It should be appreciated that this report presents
a limited approach to the entire scope of considera-
tions relative to the FAA. By agreement, for example,
aircraft engines, aircraft of foreign manufacture, and
OCR for page R8
The Honorable Neil Goldschmidt
June 24, 1980
Page 4
the consequences of the dual responsibility of the
agency--to promote civil aviation as well as to assure
its safety--were all outside the scope of this study
and may warrant equivalent attention in the near
future.
Allow me to take this opportunity to convey the
great appreciation of our institution to George Low
for his incisive leadership of this difficult and sen-
sitive task, to the entire committee for their dili-
gence, zeal, high competence, and spirited public ser-
vice, and to our staff for their valiant efforts to
assure that the committee would complete its assign-
ment on schedule yet in good conscience that all
aspects of the airworthiness system relevant to their
limited charge had been adequately appraised.
Mr. Secretary, the National Research Council is
pleased to make this report available to the Depart-
ment of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, the Congress, and to all Americans who share
pride in and concern for aviation, a distinctively
American enterprise.
So
Philip Handler
Chairman, National Research Council
President, National Academy of Sciences
OCR for page R9
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
ASSEMBLY OF ENGINEERING
2101 Constitution Avenue Washington, D. C. 20418
COMMITTEE ON FAA AIRWORTHINESS
CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Dr. Philip Handler
Chairman
National Research Council
Washington, D.C.
Dear Dr. Handler:
June 24, 1980
202/389-6677
It is my privilege to submit for transmittal to the
Secretary of Transportation the report of the Committee
on FAA Airworthiness Certification Procedures.
Our assignment, at the request of the Secretary,
was to undertake a six-month assessment of the adequacy
of the Federal Aviation Administration's policies and
procedures for certifying the airworthiness of commer-
cial transport aircraft. Airworthiness is the aspect
of air safety related to the design, manufacture, and
maintenance of airplanes and does not embrace such other
key safety matters as airlines and flight crew opera-
tions or air traffic control, which are also within the
province of the FAA.
Public and official concern following the fatal
accident of an American Airlines' DC-10 at Chicago's
O'Hare Airport on May 25, 1979, surely precipitated the
Secretary's call for our study. But it should be
stressed that our charge was to review the overall cer-
tification activity of the agency and not at all to
review either the details of that or any other specific
accident or the several reports of groups that examined
in great detail the causes and circumstances of the
Chicago crash.
Our study involved questions about the efficacy of
the nation's system for assuring both the traveling pub-
lic and domestic and foreign purchasers that American-
built aircraft continue to warrant their world-wide
OCR for page R10
Dr. Philip Handler
June 24, 1980
Page 2
reputation for safety, durability, and reliability.
Since many of the committee's recommendations address
what we find to be shortcomings in FAA practices and
capabilities, it is important to remind the reader that
this report is intended to help make a very good system
even better. Indeed, the nation's commercial air
travel system is the standard of the world for safety,
dependability, and comfort.
Throughout our deliberations, each member of the
committee has been impressed by the scope and complexity
of the activities under its review, the importance of a
safe aviation system to our nation's economy and life
style, and the enormous burden of responsibility placed
on the FAA to regulate the aviation industry in the
public interest.
The elements comprising airworthiness are strongly
interdependent, and our recommendations reflect this
interdependence. Good people are needed, and they
require workable regulations and current information,
continued education and motivation, effective organiza-
tion and leadership. Only when all of these are in
Place can the FAA be most effective. Therefore, we hope
that the Secretary of Transportation and the Adminis-
trator of the FAA will implement our recommendations
together as a package and not select one area over
another for change.
The issues addressed in our study are related to
other aspects of air transportation safety that remained
outside the scope of our examination or that we could
not examine in the time available. Both Secretary Neil
Goldschmidt and Deputy Secretary William J. Beckham
invited us to identify additional issues worthy of more
extensive and detailed examination. As it happens, a
number of issues at the periphery of our review
did arise with sufficient repetitiveness to suggest that
they may indeed warrant closer scrutiny--namely:
_ . . . . , . . ~
· While our study was limited to what some have
called the safest component of the aviation
triad, the airplane itself, the other two
elements--the national aviation system (air-
ports, airways, and air traffic control) and
.
-
OCR for page R11
Dr. Philip Handler
June 24, 1980
Page 3
airline flight operations (flight crews,
dispatchers, and meteorological services)--may
need to be subjected to similar examination.
.
Aircraft engines, which were specifically
excluded from the committee's charter, are cer-
tificated in a manner similar to aircraft. The
recommendations of our report should be evalu-
ated for their applicability to engines.
· Deregulation has led to an increase in the number
of airports where many airlines operate, placing
an added burden on FAA inspectors. Another
effect of deregulation is that commuter airlines
are carrying more passengers at additional loca-
tions. The general implications of airline
deregulation for safety need to be examined. In
addition, the emerging problems of commuter air-
lines and their implications for FAA policies
and procedures require study.
· In connection with the certification of commer-
cial transport aircraft, our committee did not
have time to conduct a detailed examination of
three critical matters: the potential problems
of an aging airplane fleet, the adequacy of the
FAA's surveillance of subcontractors and sup-
pliers, and the FAA certification of aircraft
produced outside the United States and used by
American carriers. None of these has been
assessed adequately; each would benefit from
careful and objective study.
As a personal note, may I say that this study could
not have been undertaken and completed by volunteers
within six months without a well-balanced and hard-
working committee of experts and a highly skilled and
dedicated staff. I am grateful that you have provided
me with both.
Sincerely,
'~,6C,~ ~ ~:
George M. Low
Chairman
OCR for page R12
OCR for page R13
COMMITTEE ON FAA AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES
GEORGE M. LOW, President, Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute, Troy, New York, Chairman
RICHARD B. AULT, Former Vice President, Engineering,
Western Airlines, Encino, California
EUGENE E. COVERT, Professor of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
BERNARD C. DOYLE, Former Chief, Investigations Division,
National Transportation Safety Board, Bethesda,
Maryland
LLOYD E. FRISBEE, Former Vice President and General
Manager, Engineering and Operations,
Lockheed-California Company, Carson City, Nevada
AARON J. GELLMAN, President, Gellman Research Associates,
Inc., Jenkintown, Pennsylvania
RAYMOND C. GERBER, Retired Captain, Pan American
Airways, Amityville, New York
DAVID C. HAZEN, Professor of Aeronautical Engineering,
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey
DONALD W. MADOLE, Partner, Speiser, Krause and Madole,
Attorneys at Law, Washington, D.C.
JAMES W. MAR, Hunsaker Professor of Aerospace Education,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
JOHN L. McLUCAS, Executive Vice President, Communica-
tions Satellite Corporation, Washington, D.C.
MAYNARD L. PENNELL, Former Vice President, Product
Development, The Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington
ALBERT L. UELTSCHI, President and Chairman, Flight
Safety International, Inc., Flushing, New York
SUSAN C. PERRY, Executive Secretary
MICAH H. NAFTALIN, Special Assistant to the Chairman
WILLIAM M. BLAND, Jr., Consultant
JOHN H. ENDERS, Consultant
ROBERT G. LOEWY, Consultant
LAUREEN DALY, Secretary
BARBARA DARR, Secretary
DELPHINE D. GLAZE, Secretary
FRANCES SHAW, Project Assistant
xiii
OCR for page R14
OCR for page R15
Preface
In December 1979 the National Research Council was
requested by the Secretary of Transportation, Neil
Goldschmidt, to establish a "blue-ribbon" committee to
assess the procedures and practices used by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to assure the safety of
commercial passenger aircraft. In making the request,
the secretary asked that the study be completed no later
than June 30, 1980. For its part, the Research Council
accepted the commission, knowing full well that a six-
month timetable to examine the complicated issues con-
nected with FAA operations would require a knowledgeable
committee working to a navigable course.
The members of the committee were selected consis-
tent with the Research Council's policy of providing
expert competence and balanced viewpoints. The
chairman, who is now president of Rensselaer Poly-
technic Institute, was manager of the Apollo spacecraft
program and, later, deputy administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. Other members of
the committee include three academic authorities in
aeronautical engineering; three former aircraft and air-
line executives with experience in the design, manufac-
ture, and maintenance of commercial airplanes; two
members who were professional airline captains; an
attorney in private practice who specializes in aviation
law and regulations; a transportation economist; and two
former government officials--one from the FAA, the other
from the National Transportation Safety Board. The
latter is also an engineer and attorney.
Of the three elements that determine safety in com-
mercial passenger aviation--the flight crew, the control
of traffic, and the quality, or airworthiness, of the
machine itself--the committee was charged to focus its
attention on the airplane. Its study examined the ways
xv
OCR for page R16
in which the FAA approves the design, fabrication, and
production of each new aircraft, as well as the mainte-
nance and continuing airworthiness of each airplane.
Concentrating on the large passenger aircraft used by
the major commercial airlines, the committee's charter
excluded from its study the certification of engines,
airplanes operated by commuter airlines, businesses, and
individuals, as well as aircraft under 12,500 pounds.
These are regulated by separate, though similar, proce-
dures. Although the committee learned about the airwor-
thiness approval procedures in Great Britain and France,
it restricted its concerns to understanding the important
differences from the FAA process.
The committee began its work with three days of
public meetings in Washington, D.C., where it heard from
the Department of Transportation and the FAA, from
industry representatives, and from various aviation
interest groups. The participants are listed in
Appendix A. It visited production facilities and met
with representatives of the three major U.S. manufac-
turers--Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed. It
spent a day in Seattle with staff members of the FAA's
Northwest Regional Office and a day in Los Angeles with
representatives of the FAA Western Regional Office. Of
the 12 regional offices, these two are responsible for
certificating the design and production of large trans-
port aircraft built in the United States. The mainte-
nance facilities, programs, and interactions with the
FAA of Air Florida, United Airlines, and USAir were the
subject of visits by members of the committee to the
three airlines and with their corresponding FAA inspec-
tors. In addition, committee members received briefings
from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
tNASA), from the staff of the Government Activities and
Transportation Subcommittee of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, and from
representatives of the aviation authorities of the
governments of Great Britain and France.
Failures play a role in examining any system and
determining its weaknesses. In the case of aviation,
failures can result in fatal accidents. The committee
reviewed a number of accidents and incidents that invol-
ved malfunctions of aircraft. Some are used in the re-
port as examples. Each is referred to usually by title,
accompanied by commentary as necessary. For those
xvi
OCR for page R17
readers who want to know more about two significant
accidents caused by the condition of the aircraft,
materials drawn from the official reports are provided
in Appendix B.
The term "airworthiness," as defined by the FAA in
briefings for the committee, refers to the safety and
physical integrity of an aircraft, including its compo-
nent parts and subsystems, its performance capabilities,
and its handling characteristics. The practice of award-
ing actual certificates for design, production, and air-
worthiness has resulted in reference to the system as
"certification," and to aircraft as having been "certifi-
cated." Because both terms are widely used in practice
and in the regulations, they appear throughout this
report to describe the FAA's process of assuring the
safety of aircraft.
Other terms or acronyms used by those familiar with
aviation but not known generally are defined when first
introduced and also listed in the Glossary. A biblio-
graphy, listing reports and other information made
available to the committee is also provided.
Throughout the study, the committee received unstint-
ing cooperation from people in government and industry.
In more than one instance, officials and staffs gave up
weekends to meet with members of the committee. In par-
ticular, FAA staff members replied to committee inqui-
ries with documents and briefings on frequent occa-
sions-. We are indebted not only to those who took the
time to meet with us and make formal presentations, but
also to those who helped prepare such material and pro-
vided answers to questions, very often on short notice.
Although this report was reviewed by individuals
representing the National Academy of Sciences' Report
Review Committee and the National Research Council's
Assembly of Engineering, none of whom took part in the
study, the findings and recommendations are those of the
committee.
· .
XV11
OCR for page R18
OCR for page R19
Contents
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Type Certification and Rule Making
Production and Maintenance
Leadership and Advice
Concluding Remarks
TYPE CERTIFICATION AND RULE MAKING
FAA Personnel and Organization
Designated Engineering Representatives
A New Process for Type Certification
The Need for Timely Rule Making
Flight After Failure--A Specific Rule
The Issue of Public Access
PRODUCTION AND MAINTENANCE
Quality Assurance in Production
Maintenance Surveillance
Licensing of Maintenance Personnel
Page
1
5
10
13
15
19
20
29
31
33
40
44
49
50
53
58
Reassignment of Personnel 60
xix
OCR for page R20
CONTENTS (Continued)
The Manufacturer's Continuing Role
Information System
Damage to Primary Structure
LEADERSHIP AND ADVICE
A Senior Technical Advisory Committee
Aviation Safety Policy Board
61
64
68
73
73
74
Selection of the Administrator and Deputy Administrator 76
Industry Responsibility
REFERENCES
APPENDICES
A. Presentations at Public Meetings, January 21-23,
1980
B. Excerpts From Official Accident Reports
Dan-Air Services, B-707, May 1977
American Airlines, DC-10, May 1979
Fatal Accidents Attributed Primarily to Airframe,
Powerplant and Systems Failure on Jet Transport
Aircraft
GLOSSARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
xx
76
79
85
87
87
95
101
103
113
OCR for page R21
OCR for page R22
