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OCR for page 35
The Evolution of Technology:
From Radical to incremental innovation
Anyone trying to buy a car in 1905 was confronted with a bewil-
dering array of products and technologies. There were cars
powered by steam, electricity, or gasoline; cars with three or four
wheels; cars with open-air cabs or closed carriages. These differ-
ences were not merely cosmetic. Structural features, mechanical
principles, and performance characteristics varied widely from car
to car.
Seventy-four years later, before the oil crisis of 1973, that
technological diversity had all but disappeared. To be sure, the
cars of the early 1970s displayed an immense, if superficial, varia-
tion in styling and model choice. But the underlying technology--
the fundamental characteristics of structure and mechanical
system--had become standardized. So, too, had the processes of
production.
This evolution of the automobile industry from a state of tech-
nological diversity to one of standardization--and, for that matter,
from a state of rapid and at times radical change to one of incre-
mental innovation--is neither a random event nor an event pecu-
1 far to the automobile industry. The history of many industries
and of many individual products shows the same development
toward mature standardization from an earlier, more f luid
condition.
The technological maturation of the auto industry, however,
appears to be closely related to the nature of competition. In this
chapter we contrast U.S. development with the quite different
pattern in Europe. The evidence confirms the importance of com-
petition and consumer tastes and suggests that government policy
may affect the character of technological advance.
INFANCY TO MATURITY:
A PARADIGM OF TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
In general terms the evolution of a given product line and its
associated production processtes) can be meaningfully described by
35
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37
(1) the character of the production process~es), (2) the diversity of
the product line, and (3) the nature of innovation. Table 3.1
describes several characteristics of the stages of development of a
product. At the early stages, new products typically lack well-
defined performance criteria, and market needs or process diffi-
culties are approached through a variety of different product or
equipment designs. Given a broad spectrum of possible designs,
each embodying a fundamentally different technology, the product
line is necessarily diverse. As a result, change is rapid and often
alters the nature of the product itself. The production process, in
turn, must be highly flexible, relatively labor intensive, and
somewhat erratic in workilow.
At later stages of development, however, technological diver-
sity gives way to standardization. Innovation, even if significant,
alters only a small aspect of the basic product. Indeed, innovation
at the mature-product stage is often difficult to perceive for any
but the most knowledgeable engineers working on the project.
Economies or scale guarantee a Production orocess unlike the fluid
_. · r ~
"job shop" of the early years. Workflow is now rationalized, inte-
grated, and linear; skilled labor is now replaced by highly specific
"dedicated" equipment.
The development of technology from the fluid to the specific
or mature state is initially a process of successive selection among
competing design concepts; at the latter stages, it consists of
refinements and extensions of concepts currently in use.2 In
identifying the nature of technical change associated with this
pattern of evolution, it is helpful to distinguish between radical
and incremental innovation. As used in this analysis, product
innovation is labeled "radical" if it cannot be produced effectively
in the existing production process. An incremental innovation, in
contrast, utilizes the existing setup.
The labels "radical" and
"incremental" refer not to the change itself but to its impact on
the production process.
It is essential in this context to distinguish between the general
design concept and specific improvements in that concept through
technical change. In automobile engines, for example, the V-8
gasoline engine was a general design concept that underwent a
long series of improvements through innovations in materials and
mechanical features. Such innovations are incremental; they
refine and improve a general design concept that is currently in
use. Radical innovation occurs with the introduction of a new
approach or concept that cannot be produced effectively with the
existing production process. A radical innovation need not be
completely novel. Radical departures from existing concepts may
have been known and available for some time but not used because
of market preferences, relative prices, or technical problems.
The evolution from radical to incremental innovation is
OCR for page 38
38
characterized by a "technological hierarchy" within each of the
various technical systems or components that make up the product
in question.3 This hierarchy of development arises out of
technical and economic constraints that strongly influence the
sequence of system developments. To use the engine as an
example, the fundamental design choice seems to have been the
type of fuel (which also implies external versus internal combus-
tion). Once the gasoline engine achieved market dominance, other
aspects of the engine (cylinder configuration, fuel delivery,
materials) were successively chosen, developed, established, and
then refined. The sequence is rarely of a rigid or linear sort.
Many innovations come in bunches and interact with one another.
Yet some appear to be of a more fundamental nature, affecting a
significant number of cooperating features or aspects of the tech-
nical system; these require priority in development.
It is clear that a critical point in the transition from fluid
infancy to standardized maturity is the development of a "domi-
nant product design"--a synthesis of earlier innovations and design
concepts that achieves significant market acceptance.4 Both in
components and in systems and overall product configuration, a
dominant design permits standardization and economies of scale
and, thus, introduces cost as a major aspect of competition.
. . .
THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
At first glance the automobile industry appears to be an exception
to this process of development. A growing diversity in styling,
m odel choice, and available options seems to belie any broad
movement toward standardization. Appearances, however, are
deceiving. Despite apparent diversity the underlying move in that
direction has been pronounced. The pattern is well illustrated by
the development of the gasoline engine.
Developments in Engine Technology
We have already noted the diversity of engine options available in
the early days of the industry. Following the market's selection of
gasoline over the electric and steam designs, technical change was
focused on the development of cylinder configuration, mech-
anical efficiency, and materials. Though the basic combustion
concept (internal) and fuel (gasoline) had been selected, there was
a great deal of experimentation with other aspects of design. As
Charles Sorenson, Ford's production manager in the Model T years,
put it
OCR for page 39
39
. . . it took four years and more to develop the Engine for
the] Model T. Previous models ~two-, four-, and
six-cylinder] were the guinea pigs, one might say, for
experimentation and development.5
The history of engine development at Ford is presented in
Table 3.2. The table indicates the various cylinder configurations
and the range of displacement and the number of different models
in each category. Until 1970 two epochs are evident. The first
lasted from 1910 until 1932 and was dominated by the four-
cylinder IL-LH engine. ~
. . ..
~l~he only other engine produced in that
period was a V-LH ~ used in Lincolns. The second major epoch
stretched from 1947 to 1970 and was the heyday of the V-OH 8. In
this scheme, the period 1932 to 1942 was a transition era in which
the \/-LH 8 was joined by several V-LH 12 models in the Lincoln
and by in-line, four- and six-cylinder versions. The V-OH 8
emerged as the dominant design, although several IL-OH 6 engines
were available on small models.
At the same time that a single configuration achieved domi-
nance, manufacturers offered an increasing range of size and
performance options. Thus, from 1958 to 1970, Ford produced 15
different sizes of the basic V-OH 8 engine. Moreover, the basic
engine was constantly refined and developed through the use of
new materials and components. Yet from a manufacturing stand-
point, and from the perspective of competitive rivalry, the engine
offerings at Ford were highly standardized. Diversity in the size
of the engine did not require diversity in process capability. Quite
the opposite was true, because the dimension along which variation
was introduced (cylinder size) was relatively easily accommodated
in the same production process.6 Likewise, the innovations that
advanced engine capabilities preserved the competitiveness of the
existing concept and extended its range of performance. Even
though from a technical or engineering standpoint developments in
such materials as grey cast iron may have been significant and
even revolutionary, little change in basic manufacturing processes
was required to implement a new material.
The standardization of the engine was intimately related to
changes in the engine production process. Originally character-
ized by ill-structured tasks, highly skilled craftsmen, a job-shop
workflow, and general-purpose equipment, the production of
engines was transformed into a tightly integrated process utilizing
operative skills, dedicated equipment, and much higher levels of
automation. We refer not to the modern engine plant but to the
engine plants of the late 1920s. In the case of Ford the surge in
volume following the Model T both facilitated and made impera-
tive the introduction of a less flexible, more specialized process
capable of turning out a standardized product at lower and lower
costs.
OCR for page 40
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OCR for page 41
41
Modern developments have accentuated the pattern established
in the 1920s. Two trends have been dominant. The first was the
continued development of automatic transfer machines that link
operations without operator intervention. The growth of transfer
capabilities preceded the second major trend: the development of
higher levels of automation involving feedback control and
machine self-correction. These advances have occurred within the
context of a relatively stable product design and continued
specialization or dedication of a particular production line to a
particular engine.
The Body and the Assembly Plant
The process of technical development played out in the engine--
establishment of dominant design, refinement, and extension--was
repeated in the other major technical systems of the vehicle.
Work on transmissions, bodies, and other components resulted in
the development of preeminent concepts. Historical accounts
make clear, however, that product technology in Ford's assembly
plant (bodies, components, and the like) remained fluid and
unstable far longer than was the case with engines.7 A string of
early innovations increased the scope and variety of assembly
operations, among them: left-hand steering wheel (1908), steel
running boards (1909), electric lights made standard (1915), baked
enamel finishes by dipping (1917), starter available as an option
( 1920), and pyroxylin paint multicolors and closed steel bodies
(1925~.
. ~ _~ 1 _ a_ ~ I ~ ~ . . · . . ~
In time, though, the pace of radical innovation diminished,
giving way to the annual model change as the principal source of
incremental innovation in body configuration. With the evolution
of common body/frame "families" and the standardization of com-
ponents within families, diversity among models has proven more
and more a styling--and not a technological--reality. All that
distinguishes most models from each other are appointments and
trim; technological differences are embedded in component lines.
. . .
Variation in styling and similarity in technology thus offer
double support for the U.S. automakers' traditional balance of
marketing strategy with production efficiency. Differences among
models most important in the showroom simply do not bulk large
in the production process. Between 1949 and 1972, for example,
the fraction of Ford assembly plants that produced only a single
car (i.e., cars of a single wheelbase) rose from 6 to 35 percent.8
And in those plants that produced two cars, the cars generally
came from the same family. How different this is from the
situation before World War II when many of Ford's 32 assembly
plants were involved in the production of each Ford car
.
OCR for page 42
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OCR for page 43
43
Modern assembly operations are highly mechanized, integrated,
automated, and specialized. The data in Table 3.3, which presents
three characteristics of process technology at Ford during the
period 1914-1974, document this point very clearly. When Ford
changed over from the Model T to the Model A in 1925, all produc-
tion facilities had to be closed down for a period of nine months,
which effectively abandoned market leadership to General Motors
(GM). Though the conversion wrought great changes in the engine
and components plants (many machines were scrapped altogether;
4500 new ones were bought and over 50 percent of the machine
tools were rebuilt), the assembly plants were only minimally
affected.
By contrast, conversion of a modern assembly plant to a new
vehicle family takes months of planning and several months of
retooling. Unlike their highly flexible precursors, the assembly
plants of the mid-1970s were highly specialized and capital
intensive.
Two additional points are worth making about the development
of the automobile at Ford. Though we have spoken mostly about
engines and bodies, we could just as easily have spoken about
transmissions or other major components. On balance the market
views the car as a whole, and the evolutionary picture we have
drawn applies to the whole car as well as to its individual systems
or components.
The Model T. for example, was a dominant design for almost 20
years. It was designed td capture the "basic transportation"
market and embodied a synthesis of major advances designed to
reduce weight, toughen construction, increase reliability, and
lower cost. The development of closed steel bodies in the 1920s
changed the character of the automobile. "Basic transportation"
was replaced by roominess, comfort, and smoothness of ride as
principal design criteria. Developments along these lines led to
the all-purpose road cruiser, which dominated the U.S. market
from 1948 to 1970. In a functional sense, the designs of the major
manufacturers in that era were quite similar. The dominant over-
all configuration included a large V-8, water-cooled, front-
mounted gasoline engine, with rear-wheel drive, automatic
transmission, and a comfortable roomy interior.
Throughout the era of the all-purpose road cruiser, improve-
ments in technology (as opposed to, say, the great changes in sheet
metal usage and appearance) have by and large been the result of
incremental and not radical innovation. Nor is this pattern of
development limited to Ford. By the early 1970s all of the major
U.S. manufacturers had undergone a comparable evolution through
the stages outlined above. All of them became the purveyors of a
standardized product and the masters of a specialized process
technology.
. . lo. . .
OCR for page 44
44
CONTRASTS IN THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
When compared with European developments the evolution of the
automobile in the United States reflects both a distinctive tech-
nological thrust and a particular mode of competition. Though
innovation in each technical system was not the result of a
coordinated development effort, the character of the changes
introduced were related through the driving force of consumer
preference and market competition.
Almost from its beginning the U.S. industry was oriented
toward the mass market and the provision of a comfortable,
reliable, general-purpose vehicle easy to operate and to maintain.
Major developments in the technical systems that achieved market
dominance were those that reduced costs, increased comfort, and
eased operation. Model changes in the pre-World War II years
were more important competitively than in later years when
designs stablized, but the market in the 1920s and 1930s did not
demand continuing advances in the technical sophistication of the
product. Indeed, sophisticated engineering features, or advanced
technical changes that departed from the main lines of develop-
ment, often met with market failure.
Rather than advanced designs and engineering, demand
centered on costs and styling and acceptable levels of perfor-
mance. As was noted in Chapter 2, the success of GM's strategy
seems to confirm the secondary role of evident technical advance
in competition. GM avoided competition on the basis of advanced
technology and adopted an approach emphasizing incremental
change, acceptable designs. and broad Droduct-line Doliev to meet
market needs.
The contrasts with European developments are instructive.
Although the industry began in Europe, it grew far more vigorously
in the United States.9 By the 1920s, 1 out of every 5 Americans
owned an automobile; in Germany, only 1 out of 56. In comparison
to their U.S. counterparts, European drivers were more sophisti-
cated. They were attracted to features that required and
enhanced driving skill. It was not a mass market. In fact, not
until the 1 950s did car ownership in Europe become genuinely
widespread. Beyond such differences in timing, systematic
government policy after World War I helped distinguish the
European industry from the American. Various tax and regulatory
policies defined the market and shaped its development in each of
the producing European nations. In Britain, for example, there
was a horsepower tax, which strongly influenced the development
of a small-bore, long-stroke engine. Then, too, high fuel costs--
also, to some extent, a reflection of government tax policy--
placed an early premium on fuel efficiency. The result was a path
of technical development that emphasized vehicle performance.
~ - ~ r - - - - ~
OCR for page 45
45
Beyond tax and regulatory measures, government policy on
transnational trade had a profound influence on the growth of
distinctly national markets. Surrounded by relatively high tariff
barriers (e.g., the French had a 90 percent tariff in 1931 ) and
m otivated by distinctive domestic tastes and preferences, the
European auto firms developed sharply differentiated products
with distinctive national characteristics. Thus, the major German
firms produced cars that were quite different from those
developed by the French.
Within the context of broadly similar national technology, the
particular firms in each country developed products and systems
that were different. While BOW products, for example, were more
closely related to those of Audi and Mercedes than they were to
those of Peugeot or Renault, their design and technical features
were distinctly different from their domestic competitors. Both
among countries and among firms, the phenomenon of a "dominant
design" failed to emerge in most of the major technical systems.
In engines, suspensions, drive trains, fuel delivery, and so forth, a
diversity of technology characterized the European market.
The absence of a dominant design and the consequent diversity
in automotive technology in Europe seem to have been a result of
the nature of competition. It is true that government trade policy
had a strong bearing on the growth of national markets, but
diversity has persisted long after the European Common Market
was established.
_ ~ . 1 1 ~ . · . · . .
Table 3.4 provides examples of the kind of distinctions industry
experts use to characterize products of the major producing
countries in Europe. These differences reflect a long tradition of
technological development in each country that has been preserved
despite greatly increased inter-European trade. It appears that
preferences and tastes remain sufficiently diverse to St]DOOrt
range of designs Ancl t-rhnir;~l nntinnc
or -
l~loreover, the search for competitive advantage demands it.
The European emphasis on vehicle performance Ornate Onr1~r_
"unities for competitive advantage through
_ _ ~ . . ~
~ I! ~ _.
nonincremental
Innovation and advanced engineering. 1ne Industry originated less
in the demand for basic transportation and more in the search for
high-performance luxury vehicles. Cost was far less important;
technical performance was essential. In this sense the European
industry retained a level of diversity in design approaches more
characteristic of the fluid stage of U.S. development.
In this context it is not surprising that the European sub-
sidiaries of U.S. companies have been operated as separate
businesses. This is true not only in terms of manufacturing,
product policy, and market strategy but more importantly in terms
of organizations, systems, and personnel. The changes in the U.S.
market in recent years have prompted concerted effort to bring
OCR for page 46
46
TABLE 3.4 National Characteristics in European Automobiles
Major Producers
Characteristics
France Renault, Peugeot-Citroen Soft ride; low performance, highly
idosyncratic styling.
West Germany VW-Audi, Opel, BMW, Quick acceleration; firm ride; high
Mercedes, Ford performance/high speed.
Italy Fiat, Alfa-Romeo High revolutions; specializing in
small sporty cars.
Sweden Volvo Large, heavy cars; safety or~enta-
tion; distinctive styling, boxy.
SOURCE: Discussions with industry observers.
the U.S. and European pieces of the U.S. domestic producers
closer together.
We have argued that technical diversity and national identity
characterized the European market from its inception and that
they have persisted in the face of large trade flows. There are
indications, however, that the quite different U.S. pattern of
development is present in the low-cost segment of the market.
Within the last few years, for example, the major manufacturers
have developed low-priced cars with very similar technical con-
figurations. Indeed, the Renault R5 with its boxlike exterior,
front-wheel-drive, four-cylinder engine, and 4- to 5-gear manual
transmission seems to have established a dominant design in what
m ight be called the "econobox" segments. Ford (Fiesta), Fiat
(Strada), VW (Rabbit), and GM (Kadett) have all offered products
with a similar design approach.
The appearance of standardization in the low-priced segment
reflects the efficiency orientation of consumers in this market.
Performance in terms of handling, power, and so forth are less
critical than low-cost operation and efficient use of space.
Efficiency and cost also seem to have played a role in the decision
of Ford of Europe to break away from nationally based designs.
I ~ ~= Awry `o ra~ona~ze His European operation led Ford to
develop a truly European product line and to coordinate its
European production facilities. As in the United States, Ford
sought to decrease the underlying technological diversity of its
European products at the same time that it increased their variety
in styling and appointments. Though Ford offered, say, four engine
types within a given model, it kept those engines common across
several model lines. While specializing engine production by plant,
Ford could thus retain a real measure of choice on the showroom
floor.t °
Furthermore, European-wide sourcing of components allowed
T ~ ~ ,
OCR for page 47
47
plants to be dedicated to a smaller number of products than
before. The Fiesta plant that Ford built in Valencia, Spain,
specializes entirely in the production of Fiestas. It is, of course,
less flexible than the older plants, which had to accommodate
several different models, but it has been able to achieve for his:,h~r
levels of automation and integration. ~
Tl~ ~ · . .
~ O
~ ~ ~= reeve to curopean-w~ae sourcing and increased common-
ality is also apparent at Volkswagen (V W). Commonality and
standardization have been introduced to such an extent that VW's
whole European product line uses only one automatic transmission.
The eight models in its line (and the many variations within those
models) require only five basic platforms and four basic engines.
While the available evidence suggests that GM's subsidiaries have
developed a similar approach to design and sourcing, other major
producers have continued in traditional patterns.
A degree of standardization in the lower-priced segments has
been a factor in the recent penetration of the Japanese into the
European markets. While not as technically sophisticated as some
of the leading European firms, the Japanese have developed very
reliable vehicles of acceptable function and styling and are selling
them at prices below comparable European products. In contrast
to the United States where the Japanese price their vehicles above
the market, in Europe the Japanese have used a penetration
pricing policy. This approach has been highly successful in those
segments where Decency and low cost are paramount.
TECHNOLOGY CONVERGENCE:
I MPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION ANI) ORGANIZATION
The diversity of product technology in Europe underscores the
intricate connection between the character of competition and the
pattern of technological innovation. With much less emphasis on
product performance in the U.S. competitive arena, particularly
after 1945, technology assumed a neutral role in the fight for
competitive advantage. The very notion of convergence in product
and process characteristics across firms implies a similar evolution
of technology and organization within firms. The patterns are not
identical either in specific forms or in their timing, but in its
fundamental characteristic the evolutionary process has signifi-
cant commonalities. Evidence for this proposition is provided by
the pattern of diffusion of several major innovations Fines ~ l
. . ·, ~ . . ~
~ , ... _, _. , ~, ~~~l l~# ~ 'CEIL' ~ ' '
. . ~ . . .
presents Dyson data for a few s~gn~cant technological
developments from 1910 to 1974. The rapid diffusion evident in
the data suggests that the productive units in the major firms
were at similar stages of development when the innovations were
introduced.
OCR for page 48
48
o
0 20
-
C:
C:
O 40
11
O 60
At
AL
C:
a:
LU
80
Car Lines with
Closed Steel Body
Cars with
Air Conditioning
Cars with \
Power Steering \
-
Cars with
Automatic Transmission
Cars with
Disc Brakes
\
\
\ ~
~ \ ~
\
Coo; 1 1
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
1 1 1 1
\
\
\
\
I I I I I I ,J
YEAR
FIGURE 3.1 Diffusion of selected
Abernathy, 1978.)
innovations. (Adapted from
The almost complete diffusion of the innovations in Figure 3.1
suggests that any competitive advantage accruing to the innovator
was shortlived; what was initially a unique feature available on a
limited basis became widespread, even standard equipment on all
cars. Where competitors are at similar stages of development, and
where development has proceeded through a particular sequence
of dominant designs, technology becomes competitively less sig-
nificant. Because all firms have evolved in a similar fashion, no
single firm can sustain a competitive advantage through incremen-
tal product innovation. Rapid replication by competitors quickly
eliminates any gains. Under these circumstances the incentive for
significant product innovation is diminished. Innovation occurs,
but as we have seen it is increasingly incremental, defensive, and
invisible.
This is not to argue that the innovative process in a mature or
maturing industry is not a significant factor in any given firm's
competitive survival. Clearly the product does evolve and change;
the production process becomes increasingly more productive.
Without refinements in existing design concepts a firm will fall by
OCR for page 49
49
the wayside. What is important however is that innovation is
incremental and slowly cumulative in its impact. It is critical for
survival but not for competitive advantage.
This changing pattern of innovation as a product matures is
accompanied by an evolution in the capabilities of the firm as an
organization. The organizational changes are likely to be complex,
but a few key stylized facets of development will serve to indicate
the basic pattern of evolution.
As far as technology is concerned, the key competitive task for
the maturing firm is the steady refinement of design concepts
currently in use. This fact conditions the kinds of technical
changes made, the character of technical and human resources the
firm acquires, and even the origin of improvements. Innovations
of a radical sort are destructive of existing capital and generally
highly risky in both the market and technical senses. A sweeping
shift to totally new design concepts requires an entrepreneurial
thrust both in its technical development and in its commercial
application. In contrast, an organization with a dominant orienta-
tion toward mass production of a mature product, economies of
scale, and incremental innovation must place far greater emphasis
on cost control and coordination. Entrepreneurship in such a
setting may be quite dysfunctional; where it exists, it is likely to
be organizationally separated from the core activities of the firm.
Rather than brilliant but risky technologies, the firm oriented
toward incremental innovation will emphasize engineering appli-
cations that push existing in-use technologies to their limits.
With an increasingly complex process the successful firm in a
maturing industry is likely to evolve an organization and a man-
agemer~t team that excels at coordination and control. As the
production process becomes increasingly capital intensive and
complex, there is likely to be greater specialization of tasks both
f or workers and managers and an increasin~lv hierarchical
organization.
O ~ · O ~ ~ · · ~
With competitive emphasis on production, costs, and incre-
mental change, the organization adapts to support that thrust.
Firms in the auto industry seem to fit this pattern of organiza-
tional evolution quite well. If the auto companies excel at
anything, it is in the efficient operation of a highly complex
production process. Indeed, if one were to ask what does the auto
industry do well, coordination and control--essentially a cost
emphasis through exploitation of economies of scale--would be
high on the list. It is important to see, however, that the organi-
zation's capabilities in other dimensions--rapid innovation, for
example--may be more limited.
The implication for responses in the current crisis are clear:
Should major changes in strategic emphasis be required, success-
f ul adaptation will involve a fundamental organizational trans-
OCR for page 50
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f ormation as well as changes in characteristics of products and
technologies. The changes required will apply not only to design
and engineering but also to the relationship between these
functions and operations and to top management. If innovation
becomes a more significant factor, a closer integration of R&D
and the marketplace will be required. Design targets and the
discipline imposed may well change. Competition will turn more
on the ability to bring new ideas into operation than on the
bureaucratic control of the cost of a standarized product.
NOTES
1. The basic notion of process and product evolution has been
developed in a series of articles by Abernathy and Townsend
(1975), Utterback (1974), and Utterback and Abernathy (1975~.
For an extension and application to the auto industry, see
Abernathy (1978~.
2. The notion of a "design concept" in this context was
introduced in Abernathy (1978), p. 54.
3. The technical hierarchy referred to here has been discussed
in Abernathy (1978), pp. 20,62-65.
4. For a discussion of the concept of "dominant design," see
Abernathy (1978), p.57, and Abernathy and Utterback (1978), p.46.
5. Sorensen (1956), p.102.
6. Abernathy (1978), pp.95-97.
7. For evidence on this point, see Abernathy ~ 1978), pp.
114-143.
8. Abernathy ~ 1978), pp.131 -132.
9. For a wealth of historical data on the international
.
automotive industry, see Wilkins (1980~.
10. See Doz (1979) on these matters.
11. Ibid., pp. 20-22.
12. The evolution of organization in the auto industry has been
examined in Abernathy (1978) and Chandler (1964~.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
incremental innovation
