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Scientific Communication and National Security Scientific Communication and National Security A report prepared by the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy National Academy of Sciences National Academy of Engineering Institute of Medicine NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS Washington, D.C. 1982
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Scientific Communication and National Security NOTICE: The National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863 by Act of Congress as a private, nonprofit, self-governing membership corporation for the furtherance of science and technology for the general welfare. The terms of its charter require the National Academy of Sciences to advise the federal government upon request within its fields of competence. Under this corporate charter, the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine were established in 1964 and 1970, respectively. The Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy is a joint committee of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. It includes members of the councils of all three bodies. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 82–62183 International Standard Book Number 0-309-03332-2 Available from NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20418 Printed in the United States of America First Printing, October 1982 Second Printing, October 1982 Third Printing, November 1982 Fourth Printing, April 1983 Fifth Printing, January 1984
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Scientific Communication and National Security SPONSORS This study was supported by the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Chemical Society, the American Geophysical Union, and the National Academy of Sciences. The NAS contribution was drawn from funds used for Academy-initiated projects; the funds were provided by the NAS consortium of private foundations. The consortium comprises the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Charles E.Culpeper Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Andrew W.Mellon Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation.
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Scientific Communication and National Security NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 2101 CONSTITUTION AVENUE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20418 September 30, 1982 Scientific Communication and National Security addresses one of the most difficult of policy issues: one in which fundamental national objectives seem to have been abruptly thrown into direct conflict. Advances in science and technology have traditionally thrived in an atmosphere of open communication; openness has contributed to American military and economic strength and has been a tenet of American culture and higher education. However, recent trends, including apparent increases in acquisition efforts by our adversaries, have raised serious concerns that openness may harm U.S. security by providing adversaries with militarily relevant technologies that can be directed against us. As would be expected when major national interests are in question, signs of distrust have appeared on all sides of the growing public discussion. The federal government, through its research and development agencies, and the university research community, where most basic research is conducted, both will lose much if the nation cannot find a policy course that reflects legitimate concerns. The Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security was constituted to address this complex and critical issue. It combined unusual breadth, practical experience, and variety of viewpoint—from government, industry, and the scientific community. With energy and a sense of commitment, the Panel searched for a sensible and practical policy amid controversies that continued even as it carried out its deliberations. Chairman Dale Corson guided its systematic evaluation of the costs and the benefits of openness with patient wisdom. The Panel has provided a set of principles that shows a way to resolve the current dilemma. However, the existence of valid principles is only part of what the nation needs; success in translating such ideas into practical governmental action is by no means assured. It is the Panel’s hope and my own that it will be possible to establish within the government an appropriate group to develop mechanisms and guidelines in the cooperative spirit that the report itself displays. As the Panel points out, a key need is to improve mutual understanding between national security officials and members of the scientific community; representation of both in the process of implementing the report’s recommendations would be an excellent first step. Frank Press President
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Scientific Communication and National Security PANEL ON SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY DALE R.CORSON (Chairman), President Emeritus, Cornell University RICHARD C.ATKINSON, Chancellor, University of California, San Diego (Former Director, National Science Foundation) JOHN M.DEUTCH, Dean of Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Former Under Secretary, Department of Energy) ROBERT H.DICKE, Einstein Professor of Physics, Princeton University (Former Member, National Science Board) EDWARD L.GINZTON, Chairman of the Board, Varian Associates MARY L.GOOD, Vice President and Director of Research, UOP, Incorporated (Member, National Science Board) NORMAN HACKERMAN, President, Rice University (Former Chairman, National Science Board; Former Member, President’s Science Advisory Committee) JAMES R.KILLIAN, President Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Former Presidential Science Advisor; Former Member, President’s Science Advisory Committee) FRANKLIN LINDSAY, Chairman, Executive Committee, ITEK Corporation RICHARD A.MESERVE, Attorney, Covington and Burling WOLFGANG K.H.PANOFSKY, Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University (Former Member, President’s Science Advisory Committee) WILLIAM J.PERRY, Partner, Hambrecht and Quist (Former Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, Department of Defense) SAMUEL C.PHILLIPS, Vice President and General Manager, TRW Energy Products Group (Former Director, National Security Agency) ALEXANDER RICH, Sedgwick Professor of Biophysics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Former Member, National Science Board) JOHN D.ROBERTS, Provost, California Institute of Technology (Member of the Council of the National Academy of Sciences) HAROLD T.SHAPIRO, President, University of Michigan CHARLES P.SLICHTER, Professor, Department of Physics, University of Illinois (Former Member, President’s Science Advisory Committee; Member, National Science Board) MICHAEL I.SOVERN, President, Columbia University ELMER B.STAATS (Former U.S. Comptroller General; Former Deputy Budget Director; Former Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board, National Security Council) Staff LAWRENCE E.MCCRAY, Project Director ELIZABETH G.PANOS, Administrative Assistant MITCHEL B.WALLERSTEIN, Staff Consultant
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Scientific Communication and National Security COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC POLICY GEORGE M.LOW (Chairman), President, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute SOLOMON J.BUCHSBAUM, Executive Vice President, Customer Systems, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. EMILIO Q.DADDARIO, Hedrick and Lane, Attorneys at Law ELWOOD V.JENSEN, Professor and Director, Ben May Laboratory for Cancer Research, University of Chicago ALEXANDER LEAF, Chief of Medical Sciences, Massachusetts General Hospital, and Jackson Professor of Clinical Medicine, Harvard Medical School GARDNER LINDZEY, President and Director, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences J.ROSS MACDONALD, William Rand Kenan, Jr., Professor of Physics, University of North Carolina JOHN L.MCLUCAS, President, World Systems Division, Communications Satellite Corporation ELIZABETH C.MILLER, WARF Professor of Oncology, McArdle Laboratory for Cancer Research, University of Wisconsin GEORGE E.PALADE, Chairman and Professor, Section of Cell Biology, Yale University School of Medicine JOSEPH M.PETTIT, President, Georgia Institute of Technology LEON T.SILVER, Professor of Geology, Division of Geological and Planetary Sciences, California Institute of Technology HERBERT A.SIMON, Professor of Computer Science and Psychology, Carnegie-Mellon University I.M.SINGER, Professor, Mathematics Department, University of California, Berkeley F.KARL WILLENBROCK, Cecil H.Green Professor of Engineering, Southern Methodist University Ex Officio FRANK PRESS, President, National Academy of Sciences COURTLAND D.PERKINS, President, National Academy of Engineering FREDERICK C.ROBBINS, President, Institute of Medicine ALLAN R.HOFFMAN, Executive Director BARBARA DARR, Administrative Assistant
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Scientific Communication and National Security PREFACE The use of American science and technology in the rapid increase in Soviet military strength over the past decade has aroused substantial concern in the current administration. This concern has been expressed frequently in recent months by high-ranking officials, who have called for tighter controls on all forms of technology transfer, including communication among scientists by such means as the publication of papers in scientific journals and by face-to-face meetings. In addition, federal agencies have already taken steps to control the flow of data and information from scientific research. These statements and actions have led to rising concern in the U.S. scientific community that such controls might impede scientific progress and its contribution to the national welfare. In March 1982, discussions among officials of the Academy complex and the Department of Defense led to the creation of the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security under the aegis of the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, a standing committee, to study the question. The charge to the Panel was, generally, to examine the relation between scientific communication1 and national security in light of the growing concern that foreign nations2 are gaining military advantage from such research. It states four major elements, as follows: An examination of the national security interests and the interests in free communication in two or three specific fields of science and technology (e.g., cryptology, 1 The Panel has concerned itself with scientific communication flowing from a range of research activities embracing basic and applied research and extending over a series of institutions, including universities, industrial laboratories, and government laboratories. A major share of the Panel’s attention has been devoted to university research where no restraints on dissemination of findings—such as restraints to preserve proprietary interests, for example—have existed, 2 The Panel has concentrated its effort primarily on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship, given the level of concern about that problem and the limited time and resources available.
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Scientific Communication and National Security very high speed integrated circuits, artificial intelligence) to be selected by the study panel in consultation with the Department of Defense. This analysis will include an examination of the extent to which American research has been used in Soviet military programs and, if possible, a consideration of how such information was transferred. In addition, the Panel will assess and compare the contribution to Soviet military strength from the transfer of research information with that arising from other means of technology transfer, such as the Soviet acquisition of American hardware. A review—with an emphasis on the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and a proposed executive order on the classification system—of the principal policy and operational concerns of the respective government agencies, universities, scientific societies, and researchers. (The proprietary concerns of industry will not be considered.) The goal is to identify issues where common agreement exists, to expose those where apparent disagreements are based on misperceptions and misunderstandings, and, perhaps, to narrow and sharpen the issues on which genuine differences exist. A rigorous evaluation of critical issues concerning the application of controls on the flow of research information. The development of recommendations and conclusions concerning: (i) the intended and proper reach of controls vis-à-vis various categories of science and technology; (ii) areas of science and technology that are or should be outside the operation of controls; (iii) approaches that might provide more certainty and predictability to the regulatory system; and (iv) alternative procedures that might prove acceptable to all of the concerned sectors. This study has been sponsored by the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Chemical Society, the American Geophysical Union, and the National Academy of Sciences.3 The Panel, composed of 19 members, includes senior members of university faculties and administrations, former federal agency officials, and leaders in high-technology industrial firms. At the time the Panel was created, conversations among the Panel chairman, the President of the National Academy of Sciences, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering led to a decision that Panel members would be given security clearance (if they 3 The NAS contribution was drawn from funds used for Academy-initiated projects; the funds were provided by the NAS consortium of private foundations. The consortium comprises the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Charles E.Culpeper Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation, the Andrew W.Mellon Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation.
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Scientific Communication and National Security did not already possess it) so that it would be possible for them to receive classified information about technology transfers to other countries. The Panel was subsequently given three secret-level briefings by members of the intelligence community. In addition, a subpanel, comprising six members of the Panel who hold clearance at the highest level, was briefed at two additional meetings. The Panel has examined the evidence provided at the intelligence briefings and has sought to deal with this information in a way that would eliminate the need to classify this report. The main thrust of the Panel’s findings is completely reflected in this document. However, the Panel has also produced a classified version of the subpanel report based on the secret intelligence information it was given; this statement is available at the Academy to those with the appropriate security clearance. The Panel invited as participants in its sessions liaison representatives from all the study’s sponsors as well as from the departments of State and Commerce, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the intelligence community, the Association of American Universities, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and the American Physical Society. Liaison members participated in the Panel’s open sessions and those with the appropriate security clearance attended the Panel’s classified briefings. A list of all those who participated in the Panel’s deliberations is included (see pages 72–76). The Panel held three two-day meetings in Washington at which it was briefed by representatives of the departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, and by representatives of the intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. The Panel also heard presentations by members of the research community and by university representatives. In addition to these briefings, the Rand Corporation prepared an independent analysis of the transfer of sensitive technology from the United States to the Soviet Union.4 To determine the views of scientists and administrators at major research universities, the Panel asked a group of faculty members and administrative officials at Cornell University to prepare a paper incorporating their own views and those of counterparts at other universities (see Working Papers). The Panel also requested and received letters from a group of executives from high-technology industries expressing their views (see Appendix C). The Panel commissioned papers by experts in various aspects of technology transfer and studied the published material on the subject. It examined a few specific scientific areas in some detail. In order to determine how and where controls might further the national welfare, it is necessary to balance many factors, including the military advantage from controls, their impact on the ability of 4 This paper, among others, is included in the collected working papers used by the Panel. A photocopy is available from the National Academy Press, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418.
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Scientific Communication and National Security the research process to serve military, commercial and basic cultural goals, and their effects on the education of students in science and technology. The Panel hopes that this report serves to identify these important issues and to set out recommendations that achieve an appropriate balance. The Panel is grateful for the assistance provided by the departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, and by the various intelligence agencies. Without their generous help, our task would have been impossible. The liaison representatives of the various departments, agencies, and organizations also contributed to our effort, and we thank them as well. We are also appreciative of the work of the Cornell University committee, which was headed by W.Donald Cooke. We wish to express special thanks to Frank Press, President of the National Academy of Sciences; Courtland Perkins, President of the National Academy of Engineering; and Philip M.Smith, Executive Officer of the National Academy of Sciences for their help and support. I wish to extend my personal thanks to Lawrence McCray, project director, Mitchel Wallerstein, staff consultant, and to Elizabeth Panos, administrative assistant, for their staff support. We are also grateful to Barbara Darr and Allan Hoffman of the COSEPUP staff. Finally, I wish to express my thanks to the individual members of the Panel for their dedicated service in making an early report possible. Dale R.Corson Chairman
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Scientific Communication and National Security CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 Unwanted Transfer of U.S. Technology, 1 Universities and Scientific Communication, 2 The Current Control System, 2 Costs and Benefits of Controls, 3 Principal Findings and Recommendations, 4 INTRODUCTION 9 1 CURRENT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT UNWANTED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ITS MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE 13 The Quality of the Evidence, 14 Potential Channels and Types of Technology Transfer, 14 The Soviet Acquisition Effort, 16 Evidence of the Extent of Unwanted Transfer, 17 Evidence of the Soviet Absorption Capacity, 18 Evidence of the Military Significance of Technology Losses, 19 Projections for Change, 19 2 UNIVERSITIES AND SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION 22 University Research and Teaching, 22 Scientific Communication, 24 3 THE CURRENT CONTROL SYSTEM 27 Classification of Information, 27 Export Controls, 28 Contractual Restrictions, 35 “Voluntary” Restrictions, 36 Controls on Foreign Visitors, 36 4 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: BALANCING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CONTROLS 39 Preventing Soviet Military Advances Based on U.S. Research, 40 Fostering U.S. Military and Economic Strength, 42 Protecting Educational and Cultural Values, 45 The Feasibility of Controls, 46 Balancing Competing Objectives: The Panel’s Judgment, 47
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Scientific Communication and National Security 5 IMPROVING THE CURRENT SYSTEM 52 The Workability of the Current System Can Be Improved, 53 The Factual Basis for Decisions Can Be Improved, 57 Better Mutual Accommodation Between the Government and Researchers Can and Must Be Achieved, 60 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Scientific Exchange Programs Should Be Brought into Better Balance, 62 6 COMPILATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 65 Control of University Research Activities, 65 The Workability of Export Controls on Scientific Communication, 66 Data for Decision Making, 68 The Government-University Relationship, 68 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Scientific Exchanges, 69 ADDITIONAL COMMENT BY HAROLD T.SHAPIRO 71 LIST OF BRIEFERS, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES 72 LIST OF ACRONYMS 77 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 78 APPENDIXES Panel and Staff Papers A Memorandum from the Intelligence Subpanel to the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security (unclassified version) 91 B The Historical Context of National Security Concerns About Science and Technology Mitchel B.Wallerstein 97 C A Study of the Responses of Industry to a Letter of Inquiry from the NAS Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security Edward L.Ginzton 110 D A Brief Analysis of University Research and Development Efforts Relating to National Security, 1940–1980 James R.Killian, Jr. 117 E Voluntary Restraints on Research with National Security Implications: The Case of Cryptography, 1975–1982 Mitchel B.Wallerstein 120 F The Role of Foreign Nationals Studying or Working in U.S. Universities and Other Sectors Mitchel B.Wallerstein 126
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Scientific Communication and National Security Background Documents G Letter from Five University Presidents 136 H Statement of Admiral B.R.Inman for the May 11, 1982, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Technology Transfer 140 I Executive Order on National Security Information 143 J Correspondence Between the State Department and the University of Minnesota and M.I.T. Restricting Foreign Visitors 171 WORKING PAPERS OF THE PANEL [Photocopies of the collected working papers of the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security are available from the National Academy Press, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418.] Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition Arthur J.Alexander Restrictions on Academic Research and the National Interest W.D.Cooke, Thomas Eisner, Thomas Everhart, Franklin A.Long, Dorothy Nelkin, Benjamin Widom, and Edward Wolf East-West Technology Transfer John W.Kiser, III Comments on Historical Aspects of Classification and Communication in Magnetic Fusion Research Richard F.Post, Melvin B.Gottlieb, and Wolfang K.H.Panofsky The Office of Strategic Information (OSI), U.S. Department of Commerce, 1954–1957 Mitchel B.Wallerstein The Coordinating Committee for National Export Controls (COCOM) Mitchel B.Wallerstein with Annex by John P.Hardt and Kate S.Tomlinson
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