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NUCLEAR ARMS-
CONTROt
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
Committee on International Security and Arms Control
National Academy of Sciences
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D. C. 1985
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NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS 2101 CONSTITUTION AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20418
NOTICE: The National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863 by Act of
Congress as a private, nonprofit, self-governing membership corporation for the
furtherance of science and technology for the general welfare.
The Committee on International Security and Arms Control is a committee of the
National Academy of Sciences.
This work was supported by special grants from the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation and by grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York,
the Charles E. Culpeper Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation,
the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Richard
Lounsbery Foundation.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 84-62287
International Standard Book Number 0-309-03491-4
(: opyright ~ 1985 by the National Academy of Sciences
No part of this book may be reproduced by any mechanical, photographic, or elec-
tronic process, or in the form of phonographic recording, nor may it be stored in a
retrieval system, transmitted, or otherwise copied for public or private use, without
written permission from the publisher, except for the purposes of official use by the
United States Government.
Printed in the United States of America
First Printing, December 1984
Second Printing, January 1988
Third Printing, March 1988
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Contents
Committee on International Security
and Arms Control .
Foreword Frank Press
Preface Marvin L. Goldberger
Overview
Arms Control as a Process, 2
The Objectives of Arms Control, 4
Approaches to Arms Control, 6
The U.S.-Soviet Strategic Relationship, 11
Other Nuclear Powers, 15
Verification, 17
Record of Compliance, 18
Political or Military "Linkage", 19
The Negotiating Process, 20
Domestic Political Acceptability, 22
Specific Proposals, 22
. vet
. vie
. ax
2 Strategic Offensive Nuclear Arms Control .
PART I: THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS
(SALT) .
Introduction, 24
Background, 25
· · .
· · · · .
. 24
24
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1V
The Provisions of SALT ~ and SALT IT, 32
The Main Issues Surrounding SALT II, 35
PART IT: THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS
(START) .
Background, 58
U.S. and Soviet START Proposals, 65
The Main Issues Surrounding START, 67
3 The Nuclear Freeze .
Introduction, 81
Background, 81
Description of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Freeze Proposal, 88
The Main Issues Surrounding the Comprehensive
Nuclear Freeze, 90
4 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force
(INF) Negotiations .
Introduction, 107
Background, 108
Summary of the U.S. and Soviet INF Positions as of
November 1983,121
The Main Issues Surrounding the INF Negotiations, 123
6 Strategic Defensive Arms Control: The SALT
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty .
Introduction, 136
Background, 136
Provisions of the SALT ~ ABM Treaty, 148
The Main Issues Surrounding the SALT ~ ABM Treaty, 149
6 Anti- S atellite (A SAT) Arms C o ntro!
Background, 160
Summary of U.S. and Soviet Positions on ASAT Arms
Control, 171
The Main Issues Surrounding Anti-Satellite
Arms Control, 173
CONTENTS
58
81
. 107
. 136
. 159
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CONTENTS
7 Nuclear Test Bans
Introduction, 187
Background, 187
The Main Issues Surrounding a Comprehensive
Test Ban, 204
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons .
Introduction, 224
The Nature of the Risk, 226
The History of Non-Proliferation, 233
Nuclear Export Policy, 237
The Role of International Non-Proliferation
Agreements, 242
The Adequacy and Sufficiency of International
Safeguards, 251
Holdouts from the International Regime, 265
Acronyms .
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Index .
v
. 187
. 224
SALT ~ Interim Agreement on Strategic
Offensive Arms .
SALT I! Treaty .
SALT ~ ABM Treaty .
[Limited Test Ban Treaty .
ThreshoIc! Test Ban Treaty .
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
Non-Proliferation Treaty .
.
.
-
275
279
289
323
335
339
345
363
369
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Committee on International Security and Arms Control
MARVIN L. Go~DsERGER, President, California Institute of
Technology, Chairman
LEW ALLEN, dR., Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California
Institute of Technology
PAUL M. DOTY, Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology,
and Director, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
University
HERMAN FESHBACH, Institute Professor, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and President, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
A~ExANDER H. Fax, President Emeritus, Institute for Defense
Analysis
RICHARD L. GARWIN, Science Advisor to the Director of Research,
Thomas J. Watson Research Center, IBM Corporation
DAVID A. HAMBURG, President, Carnegie Corporation of New York
SPURGEON M. KEENY, JR., Scholar-in-Residence, National Academy of
Sciences
JOSHUA LEDERsERG' President, Rockefeller University*
RICHARD A. MULLER, Department of Physics, Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory, University of California
WOLFGANG K. H. PANOFSKY, Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center, Stanford University
JACK P. RUINA, Department of Electrical Engineering, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program,
Brookings Institution
CHARLES H. TOWNES, University Professor of Physics, University of
California
JEROME B. WIESNER, Institute Professor, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
WALTER A. ROSENBLITH, Foreign Secretary, National Academy of
Sciences, ex officio
TORI A. ESPOSITO (through July 1984), Professional Associate
LYNN F. RUSTEN (from August 1984), Staff Associate
~ Joined committee too late to participate in preparation of this book.
V1
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Foreword
The advent of the nuclear age after World War II profoundly
changed the nature of warfare and the strategic relationship of the
superpowers. The scientific developments that produced this revolution
in warfare also created a new, special relationship between the scien-
tific community and the government. Scientists were not only partners
in the rapid evolution of military technology but were also major partic-
ipants in the formulation of military and foreign policy reflecting the
new technology. Conscious of the terrible consequences of nuclear war,
scientists played a central role in developing approaches to control nu-
clear weapons and reduce the likelihood that they would ever be used.
Over the years many U.S. scientists have served in important govern-
ment positions and as influential advisors on these matters.
In this tradition the National Academy of Sciences has an important
role to play. It has undertaken many studies relating to matters of
national security, and currently several committees of the National
Research Council advise branches of the military on questions of scien-
tific research. One committee of experts is evaluating the impact of a
major nuclear war on the earth's atmosphere and climate. Another is
advising the government on issues related to scientific communication
and national security.
The Committee on International Security and Arms Control reflects
the Academy's deep interest in international security and the potential
of arms control to reduce the threat of nuclear war. ~ believe this is as
expert a group of individuals as one could assemble to consider these
critical problems. Its members have been deeply involved in many as-
·e
V11
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viii
FOREWORD
pects of military technology and arms control. They have advised sev-
eral presidents and served in senior governmental posts; they have
been involved in military research since the days of the Manhattan
Project; they have headed universities and research centers; they have
been involved with important arms control negotiations. The members
of this committee have thought Tong and hard about these issues.
The committee has pursued a number of activities in response to its
broad charter. Twice each year it has met with its counterparts from the
Soviet Academy of Sciences to explore problems of international secu-
rity and arms control. In response to the widely expressed interest of
members of our Academy in learning more about issues and opportuni-
ties in arms control, it has also served an important educational role,
holding a number of meetings and sessions on arms control for the
Academy's membership. This educational role culminated in the spring
of 1984 in a major tutorial that brought together over 200 Academy
members for two days of meetings and discussions prior to the Acad-
emy's annual meeting.
The response to the background materials prepared for the tutorial
was so positive that ~ asked that they be expanded and refined for a
broader audience. ~ believe that the result is a unique volume timely,
comprehensive, authoritative. It thoroughly describes the history and
status of the arms control debate. At the same time, it presents a wide
diversity of views on the underlying issues in a nontechnical, nonparti-
san fashion. ~ believe that it will prove to be a valuable resource for our
national leaders, for students and researchers, and for the growing
number of people who are concerned about this issue of vital importance
to our future.
Frank Press
President
National Academy of Sciences
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Preface
There is no more important challenge in our time than how to
prevent the unprecedented catastrophe of nuclear war. But despite al-
most universal agreement on the overriding imperative of averting
such a disaster, there are fundamental differences between the United
States and the Soviet Union and between groups within our own coun-
try on how best to accomplish this goal. In particular, serious observers
differ strongly over the appropriate role for arms control in this process
and over the formulation of specific approaches to arms control.
The Committee on International Security and Arms Control was cre-
ated by the National Academy of Sciences in 1980 to study these issues
and to advance understanding of them both in the United States and
abroad. In the course of our study, we have been impressed by the exten-
sive literature dealing with the appalling consequences of nuclear war,
with nuclear arsenals and strategic doctrine, and with the detailed
diplomatic and bureaucratic politics of particular efforts to achieve
specific nuclear arms control agreements. At the same time, we have
sensed the lack of an objective overview of current arms control agree-
ments and proposals that brought into focus the evolution of these con-
cepts and the issues underlying the often confusing domestic and
international debate on them. We concluded that there was a useful role
to be filled in sharing our collective background on these subjects with
our colleagues in the Academy.
This book had its immediate origins in a two-day tutorial on the prob-
lems of arms control and international security that the National Acad-
emy of Sciences held for its membership in the spring of 1984. To assist
1X
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x
PREFACE
the participants in preparing for the tutorial, the committee prepared a
background paper on the major agreements and proposals directed at
the control of nuclear arms. This paper has now been expanded and
substantially reworked to form this book.
We have not attempted in this volume to reach conclusions or make
recommendations on specific arms control proposals or issues. Rather,
we have endeavored to present the reader with an overview of the his-
torical development of present U.S. and Soviet positions on specific
arms control proposals and to identify the underlying issues on which
opinions are so divided. In presenting issues, we have chosen the ap-
proach of stating opposing points of view in order to illuminate the
nature of the debate. In doing this, we have tried to avoid both extreme
arguments that would unfairly discredit a position and compromise
positions that would obscure the underlying issues. There are many
variants to all of these arguments, and it is most unlikely that a spokes-
person for any particular position would use or even support all of the
arguments presented for that position. The Committee on International
Security and Arms Control and its individual members obviously do not
agree with all of the conflicting opinions set forth in this document, but
they do believe that these opinions present a balanced view of the scope
of the debate.
On behalf of the committee I would like to express our special appreci-
ation to our fellow committeeman Spurgeon M. Keeny, cr., Scholar-in-
Residence, National Academy of Sciences, whose dedicated efforts
made this volume possible. We also join in thanking Lori Esposito, who
provided our staff support, for her invaluable contribution in research-
ing and preparing drafts of many sections of this volume. We would! also
like to thank Charles van Doren for his assistance on the chapter on the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Lynn Rusten and Steve Olson for
their editorial assistance, and Barbara Wollison for her secretarial sup-
port in preparing the many drafts that led finally to this volume.
In the preparation of this book we have all learned a great deal about
the background and issues underlying the current debate on nuclear
arms control. We hope that others will also find this book useful in their
own efforts to understand the debate and to develop positions on the role
of arms control in reducing the threat of nuclear war.
Marvin 1.. Goldberger
Chairman
Committee on International
Security and Arms Control
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NUCLEAR ARMS
CONTROL
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES