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U.S.-Japan Strategic Alliances in the Semiconductor Industry: Technology Transfer, Competition, and Public Policy (1992)
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National Research Council. "8 Issues for U.S. Policy: Global Technological Stratification and U.S. Technological Capabilities." U.S.-Japan Strategic Alliances in the Semiconductor Industry: Technology Transfer, Competition, and Public Policy. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1992. 1. Print.

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U.S.-Japan Strategic Alliances in the Semiconductor Industry: Technology Transfer, Competition, and Public Policy

Logic Corporation and Nippon Electric Corporation (NEC), should benefit most from being suppliers to the ACE alliance of computer original equipment manufacturers (OEM). Furthermore, NEC's ability to supply large quantities of high-density DRAMs to the alliance members would help ensure a strong challenge in the industry.

The big potential loser in the industry would be Intel, which has enjoyed a virtual microprocessor monopoly in personal computers. If ACE succeeds, software portability across a wide range of hardware devices from a multitude of vendors would force Intel to offer more aggressive price-performance characteristics for its architecture.

During the year after ACE was formed, the consortium has run into a number of obstacles, although the members remain publicly committed to its goals. For example, Intel has accelerated the commercialization of its next generation microprocessors in response to the ACE push for a RISC personal computer standard and to the introduction of MPUs compatible with its X86 line by Advanced Micro Devices and others. Compaq decided that the performance of Intel's new products will obviate some of the rationale for RISC personal computers, and dropped out of ACE in April 1992.34In addition, MIPS was acquired by workstation maker Silicon Graphics in early 1992, leading some analysts to question whether all ACE computer makers would have equal access to MIPS designs. In the spring of 1992, it was unclear whether the leading companies in ACE would be able to provide strong enough leadership to push the consortium to a timely achievement of its objectives.

A second significant alliance was launched on July 5, 1991, when Apple Computer and IBM Corporation joined forces in a wide-ranging pact to jointly develop powerful, easy-to-use desktop computer systems. Formerly fierce rivals, the two companies will cooperate in the development of next-generation computer operating software and advanced RISC hardware. Furthermore, to pave the way for its joint venture with Apple, which is known as Taligent, IBM forged a series of pacts with software publishers, computer companies, and chip makers in which member companies will develop software and hardware to take advantage of the systems that Apple and IBM develop together.

Within weeks of announcement of the Apple-IBM partnership, Motorola and Siemens AG were invited to participate as key suppliers. Motorola will second source the IBM-designed RS6000 microprocessor (also known as the Power PC chip), and Siemens will produce the world's most advanced computer memory chips (at first the 16 megabit DRAM).

34  

Peter Lewis, ''Whither the ACE Consortium? Maybe Nowhere," The New York Times, May 10, 1992, Section 3, p. 10.

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