National Research Council. "CASE STUDIES." Intellectual Property Rights and Research Tools in Molecular Biology: Summary of a Workshop Held at the National Academy of Sciences, February 15-16, 1996. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1997. 1. Print.
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Intellectual Property Rights and Research Tools in Molecular Biology: Summary of a Workshop Held at the National Academy of Sciences, February 15–16, 1996
and no quarrel with the principle of charging licensing fees to researchers. The controversy has been primarily over the amount of the royalty fees.
Cetus Corporation sold the PCR patent to Hoffman-LaRoche for $300 million in 1991. In setting the licensing terms for research use of PCR, Roche found itself in a very different position from Stanford with respect to the Cohen-Boyer patent. First, it was a business, selling products for use in the technology. That made it possible to provide rights to use the technology with the purchase of the products, rather than under direct license agreements, such as Stanford's. This product-license policy was instituted by Cetus, the original owner of the PCR patents. An initial proposal to the scientific community by the president of Cetus for reach-through royalties—royalties on second-generation products derived through use of PCR—was met with strong criticism. Ellen Daniell, director of licensing at Roche Molecular Systems, noted that the dismay caused by the proposal has continued to influence the scientific community's impression of Roche's policy.
Roche's licensing fees have met with cries of foul play from some scientists who claim that public welfare is jeopardized by Roche's goals. Nevertheless, most scientists recognize that Roche has the right to make business decisions about licensing its patents. The fact that Roche had paid Cetus $300 million for the portfolio of PCR patents led some observers to think that Roche intended to recoup its investment through licensing revenues, a point that Daniell disputed. She pointed out that Roche's business is the sale of products and that licensing revenues are far less than what would be needed to recoup the $300 million over a time period that would be relevant from a business viewpoint. Daniell listed Roche's three primary objectives in licensing technology:
Expand and encourage the use of the technology.
Derive financial return from use of the technology by others.
Preserve the value of the intellectual property and the patents that were issued on it.
Roche has established different categories of licenses related to PCR, depending on the application and the users. They include research applications, such as the Human Genome Project, the discovery of new genes, and studies of gene expression; diagnostic applications, such as human in vitro diagnostics and the detection of disease-linked mutations; the production of large quantities of DNA; and the most extensive PCR licensing program, human diagnostic testing services. Licenses in the last-named category are very broad; there are no upfront fees or annual minimum royalties, and the licensees have options to obtain reagents outside Roche.
Discussion about access to PCR technology centered on the costs of Taq polymerase, rather than on the distribution of intellectual property rights. Tom Caskey's view was that "the company has behaved fantastically" with regard to