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Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies (1999)
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (CBASSE)

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National Research Council. "Contents of Report." Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1999. 1. Print.

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gives them institutional representation, which in theory can be based on almost any electoral system, but in practice is usually based on the block vote (e.g., in Mauritius, Lebanon and Singapore).

Consociationalism

One of the most discussed prescriptions for plural (segmented) societies remains that of consociationalism, a term first used by Althusius, and rescued from obscurity by Lijphart in the late 1960s. Consociationalism entails a power-sharing agreement within government, brokered between clearly defined segments of society which may be joined by citizenship but divided by ethnicity, religion, and language. Examples of consociational societies include Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland. Cyprus and Lebanon are cited as countries which had, but no longer have, a consociational ethos (Lijphart, 1977). The mechanics of consociationalism can be distilled into four basic elements which must be present to make the constitution worthy of the consociational name. They are: (1) executive power sharing among the representatives of all significant groups (a grand coalition in the cabinet); (2) a high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it (constitutionally entrenched segmental autonomy); (3) proportional representation (through list PR) and proportional allocation of civil service positions and public funds (proportionality); and (4) a minority veto on the most vital issues (a mutual veto for parties in the executive) (Lijphart, 1977:25).

These arrangements encourage government to become an inclusive multiethnic coalition, in contrast to the adversarial nature of a Westminster winner-take-all democracy. Consociationalism rests on the premise that in bitterly divided societies the stakes are too high for politics to be conducted as a zero-sum game. Also, the risks of governmental collapse and state instability are too great for parties to view the executive branch of government as a prize to be won or lost. The fact that grand coalitions exist in Westminster democracies at times of particular crisis further supports the consociational claim.17

Arguments in Favor

Consociationalism is particularly reliant on a PR electoral system to provide a broadly representative legislature upon which the other tenets of minority security can be based. Lijphart clearly expresses a preference for using party list forms of PR rather than STV, or by implication open list PR systems and mixed systems which give the voter multiple votes. In a discussion of the proposals for South Africa he noted that STV might indeed be superior for reasonably homogeneous societies, but "for plural

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