likely be unsuccessful.

Methods for encouraging movement toward the best practices described above are not obvious, and it is not clear how to structure the technology incubators for success. It is likely that (1) there are a number of different successful structures, and (2) the organizational management of the incubator might be more or less successful, depending on the type of technology.

Along with the development of methods to promote successful technology incubators, a major hurdle to overcome in transitioning to such a structure will be the determination of methods for measuring the success of any given scheme. Methods to assess the performance of the technology transition scheme must be delineated so that investments in the more successful structures can be more frequently realized. Methods for assessment must also provide some measure of accountability within the organization that is funding the development. By developing technology incubators and finding performance indicators to assess their success, the time duration for technology transition from conception to implementation is likely to decrease.

It is not clear that technology incubators alone can overcome what is called the Valley of Death concept—that is, the gap between technological invention and acquisition; there is still a large disconnect between military acquisition and what the incubators can create. One possible model is the venture-capital firm, In-Q-Tel, sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency. This firm’s mission is to identify and invest in cutting-edge technology solutions that serve U.S. national security interests.¹⁴ Through this paradigm, the intelligence community can procure technology without going through the standard procurement and acquisition processes. It is unclear, however, whether this model will work for large-scale activities. Perhaps a champion needs to be found at the level of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs, and a small, venture-like Skunk Works be nucleated. The military mindset of small rewards and large punishments, respectively, for success and failure tend to defeat any motivation generated by individuals. If this approach were changed in a Skunk Works venture, it would be more consistent with the military's overarching goals to have the best equipment possible for the warfighter.

The committee concludes that there is no single solution that will accelerate the insertion of new technologies into either commercial or military systems. Instead, it is more likely that failure will occur if a key component is missing. Common characteristics of successful technology innovators include the following: (1) the establishment of enterprises similar to Skunk Works, that is, committed multidisciplinary teams led by champions who inspire and motivate the teams toward specific goals; (2) team determination to make the technology succeed and be profitable, including convincing the customers that they need the technology; (3) mechanisms of open, free communication of knowledge and problems in meeting goals; and (4) a willingness of the champion to take personal risk, which leads to a willingness of the organization to take risks at the enterprise level. As described in detail in Chapter 1, having this organizational culture and structure in place is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the successful acceleration of technology transition.

These three best practices were identified as being critical to such streamlining. While other corporate best practices are also effective at accelerating technology development and product introduction into the commercial marketplace, these three have been shown to increase the chances of success and to lower the perceived risk of failure, including personal, technical, and business risk.

Front Matter (R1-R12)

Executive Summary (1-7)

1 Creating a Culture for Innovation and Rapid Technology Transition (8-23)

2 Methodologies and Approaches (24-33)

3 Enabling Tools and Databases (34-44)

Appendix A: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members (45-50)

Appendix B: Workshop Agenda (51-54)

Appendix C: Acronyms (55-56)