ply-reduction strategies, and enforcement efforts directed at drug users were considered demand-reduction strategies.
Second, new supply-reduction instruments emerged that were not enforcement activities. The idea took hold that those now engaged in the production of heroin and cocaine in Asia, South America, and elsewhere might be persuaded to stop not by the threat of crop eradication and arrest, but through subsidies supporting efforts to shift production to other, less profitable crops. Similarly, programs to improve the labor market conditions of disadvantaged youth might induce street-level drug dealers to move into legitimate employment. In addition, it was an explicit strategy of major multimodality treatment programs in the early 1970s to reduce local heroin supplies by recruiting user-dealers into treatment. Thus, crop substitution programs, youth employment programs, and programs treating user-dealers became part of the nation’s portfolio of drug control instruments.
Third, a new demand-reduction strategy, drug abuse prevention, assumed a more important place in thinking about drug policy. Of course, law enforcement already aimed to prevent drug use. Drug laws put society on notice that use of certain drugs is deviant, and enforcement of these laws sought to deter potential drug users by threatening arrest and incarceration. The new notion of drug abuse prevention brought into play efforts by schools, neighborhood groups, and parents to persuade youth and other populations at risk that drug use is bad and dangerous. It also brought into play efforts by the military, civilian employers, and schools to deter drug use by initiating drug-testing programs and by levying noncriminal sanctions (e.g., fines, suspensions, dismissal) on soldiers, employees, and students found to use drugs.
Box 1.1 displays these different policy instruments in the form of a matrix that shows how the original ideas of the law enforcement and
BOX 1.1 Matrix of Drug Control Instruments