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OCR for page 1
Executive Summary
How do global networks especially the Internet affect a com-
munity's political, economic, and cultural values? How do these values,
in turn, affect the ways in which global networks are designed, operated,
and regulated?
As a first step toward addressing some of the issues related to the
impact of global networks on local values, and vice versa, the Computer
Science and Telecommunications Board of the National Research Council
(United States) and the Max-Planck-Project Group on Common Goods,
Law, Politics, and Economics (Germany) conducted a study whose goal
was to help policymakers understand the issues, how they are linked to
one another, and how action targeting one problem or issue can have
effects often-times unintended on others.
To keep the scope of the study manageable, the Committee to Study
Global Networks and Local Values concentrated its work on Germany
and the United States, two countries that are different enough to contrast
on a variety of critical issues yet similar enough to invite useful compari-
sons. In addition, the study did touch on some questions from a more
global perspective. Furthermore, instead of making specific policy rec-
ommendations, it sought to develop insights that will be useful to policy-
makers around the world in thinking about policy decisions.
THE INTERNET AS GLOBAL NETWORK
The Internet was initially created for the purpose of linking academic
computer scientists' research, and the technology most importantly, the
1
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2
GLOBAL NETWORKS AND LOCAL VALUES
protocols to support the early version of the network was created to meet
its needs. But while today's Internet is widely regarded as a new medium
for all to exploit and use, the underlying protocols have not changed sig-
nificantly since, and they still embody the values of those early days. For
example, one value of that era was trust; destructive hacking was not re-
garded as much of a problem, and the protocols were designed with that
assumption in mind. Today, much of the concern over cyber-vulnerabil-
ity results from those protocols' inattention to security.
The Internet is a network of networks that is truly global. The TCP/IP
protocol, on which the Internet is based, allows a network to be designed
in such a way that the "intelligence" that controls interactions is located
primarily at the nodes and edges of the network (i.e., under the control of
information suppliers and end users rather than some "global" central
authority). Thus, the Internet is not subject to strong centralized manage-
ment in its day-to-day operations. Technical decisions about architecture
and design are coordinated at present through an informal working
group, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), though this may
change in the future. In particular, as the Internet becomes more impor-
tant to governments and business interests, commercial and political pres-
sures are likely to emerge that seek to change the traditional forms of
Internet management.
It should be noted, however, that the success of the Internet is largely
the result of the lack of a master plan to guide its development. In its early
stages, the Internet was promoted and funded, but not designed, by the
U.S. government. This is not to say that government input was irrelevant.
Indeed, the government made three critical decisions to allow the origi-
nal research and education network to evolve toward a general-purpose
network, to select TCP/IP for the NSFNET and other backbone networks,
and subsequently to privatize the NSFNET backbone that had a power-
ful influence on the Internet's evolution. Nevertheless, direct control over
future development of the Internet through comprehensive action plans
will be even more difficult in the future, if only because the Internet has
now extended itself across so many national borders and has mobilized
such a diverse ensemble of interested parties.
Because the Internet is not subject to centralized management over its
operations (and arguably should not be in the future), the fact that it
crosses local and national boundaries introduces new dimensions of con-
cern for communities accustomed to exercising sovereignty within their
borders. Thus, the presence of the Internet raises the essential question of
how (or whether) they should exercise authority over this new medium.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3
VALUES
Public opinion tends to start from a simplistic hypothesis: global net-
works threaten local values. But before they take action, policymakers
should first understand whether values are really the issue; what values
do for the individual, society, and government; whether the values are
legitimate and thus deserve protection; and how global networks might
affect local value orientations.
Values help individuals understand, decide, and even exist. Values
endow individuals with a normative language that allows them to distin-
guish and judge their own behavior. And this allows them to decide on
courses of action, and to preserve self-esteem.
Values help society to convey information, facilitate coordination, and
give the group an identity. Precisely because they share values, the mem-
bers of a society can interpret the behavior of other members and estab-
lish expectations about it. Through the sharing and communication of
values, the behavior of individuals can be coordinated and made cohe-
sive. Building a community essentially involves aligning people with
shared values.
For government, values are the link to its citizenry. They provide a
basis for the development of statutes to which people are inclined to ad-
here. They give legitimacy to governmental action. And shared values are
the bedrock of a national identity.
Individuals are not likely to have a consistent order of values, and
even less are societies or states. A more appropriate picture is a basket of
values that are in tension and in permanent motion. History, culture, and
public discourse shape the dominant balance of these values at any given
time. Nations, societies, and individuals differ less by adhering to entirely
different values, and much more by how they balance them.
Values can be either formal (like tolerance) or substantive (like na-
tional pride. Modern societies are characterized by strong formal and
relatively weak substantive values; but no society has ever existed with-
out some shared substantive values.
Protecting local values is not a value as such. The locally prevailing
values can be inappropriate for a changed world, for example, or they can
be illegitimate (like obedience to an autocratic regime).
iFormal values (American legal scholars might term these "neutral" values) are, to a first
approximation, those associated with social processes rules of behavior that facilitate dis-
course and, indeed, can be a key element in making a community possible while substan-
tive values come closer to moral convictions or beliefs. While the committee recognizes that
this distinction is not always crisp, it is useful for this report. More discussion of this point
can be found in Chapter 3.
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4
GLOBAL NETWORKS AND LOCAL VALUES
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF GLOBAL NETWORKS
ON LOCAL VALUES
Global networks can influence local values in a number of ways. The
networks may enable individuals to remove themselves from the reach of
a community's influence on enforcing a particular set of values. That is, if
an individual dislikes a value or a set of values dominant in his or her
local environment, networks enable that person to exit from the commu-
nity.
Global networks give individuals access to values that differ from the
ones prevailing in their society of origin, and to different ways of balanc-
ing competing values. Having been exposed to the fact that values and
their balance are historically contingent, individuals can use this knowl-
edge for questioning their society's traditional values.
Global networks may lead to a convergence of values, raising con-
cerns over cultural hegemony. In particular, the central role of the United
States in developing and populating the Internet, the predominance of
English in Internet content, and the vitality of the traditionally egalitarian
Internet culture all contribute to what some outside observers character-
ize as U.S. cultural hegemony.
Global networks enable communication that is almost devoid of con-
text. The user often does not know the content provider. Internet use is
mostly unnoticed by the physical communities to which the user belongs.
This is important because values are embedded in context. Trespassers
cannot be reminded of the value if the violation remains invisible.
THE INTERNET AND THE DEMOCRACTIC PROCESS
The Internet has potentially large effects on democracy and the politi-
cal process generally. Established political arenas are more easily engaged
through the Internet than through conventional channels, and the exist-
ence of new arenas may challenge existing institutions, especially those in
government. Political actors gain leverage by virtue of the Internet's abil-
ity to facilitate organization; the Internet also allows for better or
worse a larger degree of unmediated communication between the pub-
lic and its political leaders.
The Internet can also change the political process. It enables issues to
be brought to the forefront of policymaker attention in very short times,
and it lets stakeholders and advocates press their cases in a multiplicity of
forums. Meanwhile, the Internet and its associated technologies provide
tools for policymakers to make their case to the public without intermedi-
ar~es.
The Internet can change the balance between direct and representa-
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
5
live democracy in favor of the former: it allows broader and faster public
dissemination of more types of information and ideas relevant to the
policymaking process. But whether the Internet will result in a more ef-
fective selection process through which ideas can be sifted and evalu-
ated in a reasonable and deliberate manner is an open question.
Because of its pluralizing potential, the Internet increases the likeli-
hood that transnational conflicts will arise but because there is no sover-
eign international authority to adjudicate and, especially, to enforce, the
resolution of Internet-driven conflicts is highly complex. At the same time,
the Internet and information technology have the potential to fractionate
the public because they allow individuals to customize the information
they receive.
The Internet poses different challenges to the legal and constitutional
environments in which the United States and Germany operate. To the
extent that the courts are able to rely on the values expressed in their
respective constitutions (rather than rights that have been explicitly ar-
ticulated in the documents themselves), they will have greater flexibility
to facilitate evolution of their legal and constitutional environments as the
technologies and uses of the Internet change.
Finally, government reactions to the Internet may not necessarily be
benign or constructive. Indeed, governments may well choose to use more
traditional command-and-control regulation to deal with what they may
see as problems created by the Internet. Such actions do not necessarily
serve democratic and freedom-preserving interests.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Although both the United States and Germany recognize a constitu-
tional right to freedom of expression, the interpretation of that right in the
two countries is significantly different. Moreover, and just as important,
the weight given to that right in comparison with other values is different
in the two societies. As a result, the legal structures and protections that
have developed to implement the right are different, and they exemplify
why harmonization of the laws related to many aspects of freedom of
expression on the Internet is likely to remain quite difficult.
Consider two types of speech for which the United States and Ger-
many have different legal regimes. Hate speech the willful public ex-
pression or promotion of hatred toward any segment of society distin-
guished by color, race, religion, or ethnic origin is generally proscribed
by the German legal system. Such a prohibition is not surprising given the
nation's determination to avoid the reestablishment of a national socialist
authority. By contrast, hate speech is generally deemed a constitutionally
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GLOBAL NETWORKS AND LOCAL VALUES
protected form of expression in the United States; only when such speech
can lead to a hate-engendered crime is it prohibited.
A second type of speech that the two countries regard differently is
speech that is deemed detrimental to minors. Both nations proscribe child
pornography. But they have dealt differently with material that might be
psychologically traumatic to minors. The United States has sought to pass
laws that hold providers criminally liable for supplying minors with ma-
terials that are "obscene," "indecent," "patently offensive" (the Commu-
nications Decency Act, or CDA), or "harmful to minors" (the Child Online
Protection Act, or COPA). CDA was held unconstitutional, and COPA
was overturned at the district level and now awaits appeal. Germany has
proscribed the distribution to minors of material that is "immoral, [has] a
brutalizing effect, [gives] incentive to violence, crimes or racial hatred, . . .
[or glorifies] the war," but these laws have not been seriously challenged
in court.
The global nature of the Internet makes it extremely difficult and
costly for national authorities to unilaterally implement laws and regula-
tions that reflect national, rather than global, moral standards. But com-
mercial law (or private law, as it is usually known in Europe), self-regula-
tion, and encouragement of intermediation provide additional tools.
Commercial law is useful when material on the network injures a clearly
identifiable party (for example, if a Web site published libelous material
about a person or violated someone's legally protected privacy).
Self-regulation through site-identification and labeling schemes,
age-verification software, and the provision of filtering software allows
for greater diversity of Internet material, enhanced freedom of expres-
sion, and customization of controls to fit the needs and desires of indi-
viduals. Intermediaries, such as host providers, can play a useful role in
offering the public a regulating or authenticating service. That is, host
providers can market their Internet access software by promising to in-
clude certain kinds of content and to exclude others. In each of these alter-
natives, government has a role in ensuring their quality; thus, they are
examples of "hybrid" regulation, combining governmental and nongov-
ernmental approaches to the overall regulatory process.
THE INTERNET, PRIVACY, AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Potential tensions between privacy and freedom of information (FOI)
illustrate contrasts between a substantive value (privacy) and a formal
value (transparency in government, as exemplified by freedom of infor-
mation). Privacy asserts the ability of individuals to control and restrict
the dissemination of information about themselves, while FOI refers to
the free availability of information related to the conduct of government
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
business. Both public and private institutions gather, organize, store, and
in some instances disseminate information about people. Thus both kinds
of institutions are key actors in threats to, as well as protection of, privacy.
Both are also involved in FOI issues, though private institutions play only
an indirect role.
Though privacy and freedom of information are not necessarily in
opposition, they do come into conflict in some instances. For example,
information on individuals is collected by governments. Asserting an ab-
solute right to privacy would argue for never releasing such information,
while asserting an absolute right to FOI would argue for releasing any of
it on demand. In these cases, the substantive value of privacy is in conflict
not only with the formal value of transparency of state activities, but also
with the public interest (in the prevention and prosecution of criminal
offenses) and commercial interests (in the collection and exploitation of
data).
Global networks such as the Internet have raised the stakes signifi-
cantly for both privacy and freedom of information. Clearly, they facili-
tate dissemination of information held by both public and private institu-
tions. But perhaps more significantly, computers and software have
greatly enhanced the storage, mining, sorting, and reorganizing of data.
This has increased the ability of institutions to develop comprehensive
and accessible profiles on private individuals as well as on the actions of
governmental bodies from disparate databases and put the information
into useful formats.
The German and American approaches to privacy and freedom of
information are opposites of each other. Germany, and European nations
in general, have comprehensive systems of law and regulation that reflect
strong commitments to protection of privacy. The United States has a
patchwork of incomplete protections reflecting uncertain commitment to
privacy. With respect to freedom of information, the situation is reversed.
The United States has a comprehensive system in place that reflects its
commitment to access. Germany has a patchwork system, reflecting its
ambiguity about access.
In the context of the Internet, privacy and freedom of information
raise many policy issues. For example, because routine consumer transac-
tions can easily involve players in a number of countries, applying na-
tional regulations represents a major extraterritorial extension of domes-
tic or regional law. Furthermore, attempts to find a common solution to
privacy problems in a globally networked world are difficult because na-
tions such as Germany and the United States approach privacy from very
different political and legal viewpoints and traditions. Germans tradition-
ally vest considerable trust in government to protect their privacy inter-
ests. By contrast, Americans tend to mistrust governmental institutions
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8
GLOBAL NETWORKS AND LOCAL VALUES
and have a strong tradition of relying on market forces not only to regulate
the economy but also to serve many other social needs. As a consequence,
Americans have been more ambivalent about turning to the government
to protect their personal privacy.
Despite these differences, both Germany and the United States over
the last 25 years have developed fair-information principles that reflect
substantial agreement on basic questions regarding privacy. These prin-
ciples include openness, individual participation, collective limitation,
data quality, finality, security, and accountability. However, it should be
noted that implementation of fair-information practices may differ sig-
nificantly from system to system even though the same general principles
or framework applies in all cases.
International law could theoretically play an important role in the le-
gal protection of personal privacy because of the ease with which per-
sonal data can be transferred electronically across national borders. Har-
monization can be effected through conventional treaties that express
substantive rights and that obligate national authorities to enforce those
rights through national legal institutions. But treaties work only when
there is near-complete agreement on the values involved; furthermore,
negotiating them is a very slow process.
An alternative to treaties are framework agreements based on "hy-
brid" forms of international organization. In these matrices, or frame-
works, of international public law, private self-regulation is used to work
out the details. Such hybrid regimes will be acceptable only if they offer
new flexibility in rule making if they tailor substantive requirements to
the realities of rapidly changing technologies. They also must offer more
flexibility and lower transaction costs for complaint- and dispute-resolu-
tion, and an effective state-based system to ensure compliance.
Freedom of information is a pillar of democratic societies, and one of
the greatest potential contributions of global networks is enhanced public
access to government information. As court decisions, legislative docu-
ments, and regulations of administrative agencies become more easily
available through the Internet's World Wide Web, the rule of law is
strengthened.
Such "primary legal information" information having the force of
law, such as parliamentary enactments, judicial decisions, and comparable
instruments from administrative agencies such as rules and orders must
be public for effective governance. But as noted above, public records con-
taining personal information can pose a conflict between freedom of in-
formation and privacy rights a conflict exacerbated by advances in in-
formation technology that make it more practical to extract and cross-link
personal data from public records.
Similarly, notes, drafts, and intermediate documents of public offi-
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
9
cials and bodies can give the public insights into the decision-making pro-
cesses of government and administration, but how far a society should go
in providing access to such records is a matter requiring further discus-
sion. The value of transparency in the decision-making process must be
weighed against the need for administrators or judges and their advisors
to have candid discussions without which the quality of decisions might
well be reduced. Government also needs space and time in which to as-
sess arguments and conduct its own debates with a degree of privacy.
The international legal complications related to freedom of informa-
tion are neither as pervasive nor as challenging as those related to privacy
protection, and the drive for harmonization is less urgent. The differences
arise because in the FOI area, the principle underlying national law is to
compel disclosure of government information, while in the privacy arena
the principle is to prohibit disclosure of personal information. Therefore,
transborder data flows are a lesser threat to freedom-of-information val-
ues than they are to privacy values. Even under changed technological
conditions, each country can pursue its own FOI policy since it exercises
control at the point of origination of information.
Nevertheless, there are reasons for a nation such as Germany to try to
bring its freedom-of-information principles closer to those of the United
States. First, global networks expose people to governmental openness in
other states, which can lead them to demand more openness and access in
their own country. Second, a restrictive national policy with respect to
freedom-of-information principles can be undermined to a certain extent
by the dissemination capabilities of the Internet. Third, and perhaps most
important, economic considerations may provide an even stronger moti-
vation for adopting freedom-of-information principles in Germany; ac-
cess to public information increases the predictability of political condi-
tions that may affect economic actors.
COMMERCE
Values associated with commerce can be placed in three categories:
those values directly related to the fairness of doing business (e.g., "fair"
taxation and competition); those related to basic constitutional founda-
tions of commerce (e.g., property and contract); and those related to other,
more general institutions (e.g., the rights to privacy and to information
access or delivery).
In an Internet environment, small businesses often face lower costs of
entry than they might in the physical world. Thus, they can occupy new
niches of promising commercial activity more easily, and large numbers
of small-business entities seek to identify and construct such niches. On
the other hand, "network effects" associated with the Internet environ-
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GLOBAL NETWORKS AND LOCAL VALUES
ment can help lead to "winner take all" situations for larger companies
that already enjoy significant market share, thus facilitating their further
growth and dominance. As for taxation, the relative permeability of na-
tional borders to Internet traffic (and many of the goods and services the
network can carry) is likely to increase the difficulty of imposing taxes on
sales made to foreign customers through the Internet.
Enforcement of intellectual property rights in an Information Age is
greatly complicated by global networks. Because these networks make it
profoundly easier to copy and transmit information, old balances of prop-
erty rights against "fair use" have been upset, and a new political and
social equilibrium has not yet been established. The moral rights of au-
thors, which allow an individual to try to prevent the distortion of his or
her work a concept well-recognized in the European Community but
not in the United States seem particularly challenged by the ease with
which digital representations can be disseminated.
New practices in the Internet realm also appear to raise issues about
contract. For example, in an electronic transaction, it is arguably harder to
confirm the voluntary and informed consent of the parties involved, as
contract terms are often hidden on a Web page. In other cases, computer
programs make selections that imply contract acceptance. In still other
cases, obligations may automatically be incurred with an acquired infor-
mation product.
GOVERNANCE
The examples addressed above commerce, free speech, privacy,
freedom of information, democracy illustrate that Germany and the
United States differ on the role of the state in promoting social integration
and protecting local value systems. Americans emphasize individual lib-
erty, reliance on markets to organize economic activity in the face of tech-
nological change, and the use of a variety of nongovernmental organiza-
tions to mediate political change. Germans tend more to look to the state
as a protector of values, especially when these values are threatened by
market and technological forces.
Despite these differences, it is clear that for both nations, the state is
an important actor in managing the impact of the Internet on these and
other areas. States will be obliged to come to terms with how gover-
nance in cyberspace is to proceed, and in doing so will need to draw on
the full range of governance mechanisms available to them.
At one level, nonregulatory mechanisms are available. Technical so-
lutions and informal rules of behavior can help to lubricate points of fric-
tion caused by the conflict of values. For example, filtering and portals
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
11
help to target the information that is accessible to individuals, and infor-
mal rules for behaviors, such as "Netiquette," facilitate interaction.
On the other hand, social conventions are nonbinding, which makes
them weak tools for compelling behavior in persons unwilling to conform
to such conventions. Thus, when rules are necessary, legal tools of one
sort or another will generally prove more effective.
National law and regulation are likely to be of limited effectiveness,
however, because global networks make national boundaries highly po-
rous with respect to information. In principle, extraterritorial enforcement
of national laws and rules is possible assuming cooperation from other
nation-states but in practice such cooperation is the exception rather
than the rule. Nevertheless, while before-the-fact denial of access to infor-
mation is technically hard to achieve, the presence of individuals on sov-
ereign soil provides a route through which local laws can be enforced.
Further, intermediaries such as service providers or credit card agencies
are subject to national regulation as well.
International legal harmonization is an obvious solution to conflicts
over values in cyberspace. It can be achieved through agreements that
allocate regulatory authority or by harmonizing the regulations them-
selves. The former is unlikely, however; states tend to balk at cooperating
when their own laws and attitudes toward a particular issue differ from
those of the state whose laws they are being asked to enforce. Only when
there is consensus about an issue can international cooperation be quickly
and effectively achieved.
A second possibility is the use of internationally coordinated private
laws to regulate conduct on global networks. The role of the state under
those circumstances is simply to interpret and judge the validity of con-
tracts, to protect people's interests in the contracting process, and to help
them in the enforcement of legal titles. In addition, tort law can establish
liability, generating financial incentives for private entities to refrain from
inappropriate conduct. As a general rule, national private-law systems
are much better coordinated internationally than are systems of public
law; thus private law may have greater potential to facilitate governance.
Finally, hybrid regulation an arrangement that involves elements
both of private cooperation and public law has some potential. From
this perspective, governance is about the allocation of power not only in a
public setting but within private associations as well, and power is exer-
cised by a multitude of actors at different levels of authority and opera-
tion. In hybrid regulation, public law provides a framework for private
self-ordering that meets certain minimum requirements. Over time, this
may lead to an increasingly limited role for the state, as new actors appear
who assume regulatory powers that have traditionally been exercised by
the state.
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GLOBAL NETWORKS AND LOCAL VALUES
GLOBAL NETWORKS AND CULTURE
Global networks affect culture in three ways. First, they give rise to
concerns about hegemony. Networks provide an infrastructure whose
actual characteristics are largely determined by those who design and use
them, and the fact is that one nation is dominant. The majority of the
Internet's designers and users, and much of its hardware and software,
hail from the United States. Thus some fear that the preponderance of the
information available on the network is likely to reflect the interests and
culture of American users more than those from less influential states.
The Committee to Study Global Networks and Local Values believes
that these fears are overdrawn at least for Western industrial nations.
The reason is that these states have the resources to create language and
cultural "zones" that cater to their own interests and tastes. So, for ex-
ample, most German, French, and Japanese computer and Internet users
can conduct all of their day-to-day activities in their native languages be-
cause content providers have already generated or translated information
for local consumption. Furthermore, even if it is indeed U.S. companies
that provide the bulk of the software in use, these companies realize that
other nations represent markets large enough to warrant the development
of software customized to their particular needs. Thus for developed na-
tions it appears likely that the use of information networks will reflect
local values rather than replace them.
For the developing world, the situation is far more complex. In the
newly industrialized countries of East Asia, for example, economic glo-
balization is considered a key to development. These nations see global
networks as a tool that they have a natural advantage in adopting rather
than as a threat to local culture. On the other hand, the incentives for
localization of network content and applications are much fewer there
than for the developed world. To the extent that the United States seeks to
promote democratic change in developing nations, its efforts may be seen
as promoting forms of cultural hegemony for example, in the technical
structure of global networks that make it difficult for these nations to in-
terdict the flow of information they deem undesirable.
Second, global networks affect the distribution of power and infor-
mation within and between social classes. In fact, these networks appear
more likely to affect relationships between groups defined by profession
and level of education than between those defined by national identity.
Because Internet technology will not diffuse throughout a society in a
uniform manner, and those that obtain it first are most likely to be mem-
bers of privileged classes, incentives to provide societal services to all
classes may wane if the privileged classes because of their access to the
Internet are able to obtain such services on their own; this may be espe-
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
13
cially true in nations without a strong countervailing tendency toward
egalitarianism. Such changes result from the differential relationships of
these groups to the Internet, different interdependencies between groups
that occur as a result of the Internet, and changes in the modes of opera-
tion of certain professions that affect activities unrelated to electronic net-
works as well as those directly related to the networks.
Finally, global networks shift boundaries between public and private
spaces. Historically, those boundaries, in both principle and practice, have
been largely determined by cultural norms. Which people know about us
and what they know, what they physically see of us, how we feel about it
and the extent to which we control it, differ widely from one culture to
another. How and where one entertains, the candor and directness with
which one expresses ideas, how publicly and under what circumstances
one displays one's body, are all related to the boundaries between public
and private spheres but follow no obvious, logical, or consistent pattern.
In the physical world, it is reasonably clear how to maintain these bound-
aries. But network technologies have the potential to shift them in either
direction, depending on circumstances and the sophistication of the user.
Encryption technologies, for example, can increase the effective domain
of private space; on the other hand, connecting to the Web can increase
public space by exposing the contents of one's computer to inspection or
alteration.
PRINCIPLES AND CONCLUSIONS
Global networks present a variety of new challenges to national gov-
ernments. While in some cases governments have faced these challenges
before, global networks have some potential for altering the balances of
power between government and those governed that were established in
pre-network eras. Nevertheless, the Internet is not the only influence on
the evolution of values, and a multitude of other influences will affect
such evolution as well. Thus, a government's stance toward global net-
works (and the Internet in particular) must be part of a larger strategy
aimed at promoting the healthy evolution of a society's value set. That is,
government must respond to (rather than simply resist) the many changes
occurring as society becomes better educated, more diverse, and more
fully connected to the wider world around it.
Because the Internet is only one factor, albeit an important one, in
globalization and modernization, the focus of policymakers when policy
action is necessary should be on outcomes rather than on tools or modali-
ties. Thus they should seek to define what outcomes are desirable and
undesirable rather than seek to regulate one particular instrumentality
such as the Internet.
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GLOBAL NETWORKS AND LOCAL VALUES
A second important point is that command-and-control regulation is
unlikely to be well matched to the technological realities of the Internet.
An alternative to command-and-control regulation is the use of self-regu-
lation and intermediation within a statutory framework. This hybrid ap-
proach to regulation is likely to be more effective than command-and-
control regulation in addressing many aspects of the public interest, and
it serves as counterpoint to formal regulation. One reason is that global
networks are characterized by a complex system of market forces pri-
vate, public, and quasi-public and a stable balance among them is easier
to achieve when stakeholders are well informed and can take an active
part in shaping their roles. Command-and-control regulation often attacks
a well-balanced status quo; because hybrid regulation builds on the status
quo, it is more likely to be successful.
Finally, the history of the Internet's technology suggests that it would
be a mistake for governments to seek to control the future development
through comprehensive action plans. Indeed, despite U.S. government
promotion and funding of the Internet in its early stages, at no time did
some kind of master plan exist to guide the Internet's evolution. Alterna-
tives to centralized approaches, such as coordination and self-regulation,
are worth considering, though they may require new forms of hybrid pub-
lic-private international regimes.
Chapter 10 discusses other principles and conclusions related to free
speech, privacy, and freedom of information.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
local values
