. "An Industrial Perspective." Definition of Pain and Distress and Reporting Requirements for Laboratory Animals: Proceedings of the Workshop Held June 22, 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2000.
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DEFINITION OF PAIN AND DISTRESS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR LABORATORY ANIMALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP HELD JUNE 22, 2000
that is not more than slight or momentary, you are correct, there is not really any duration or intensity consideration. I would ask you for a proposal to include that issue in a way that would not complicate the system so much that reporting really would become a burden. I think it would be a great idea to incorporate it according to agreed breakdowns such as 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 2 days, 2 weeks, or whatever is appropriate.
DR. ANDERSON: My point was that the USDA should not attempt to place certain procedures or animal models into specific pain and distress categories because animals do not respond to the same procedures with the same intensity or duration of pain and distress. For example, ovariohysterectomy may induce a very different pain response in a mouse than it would in a dog or other species. In this example, the pain or distress associated with the procedure would depend on many factors, including the interventions used to prevent pain. If, for example, the USDA were to suggest that all abdominal procedures cause severe pain and distress, the use of professional judgment would be precluded.
DR. GLUCK (John Gluck, Kennedy Institute): With respect to the point about how is it going to benefit animals to categorize pain, I think the answer is in your own talk. You started with Jeremy Bentham and the ethical system that he promulgated, which of course requires a judgment of right behavior based on consequences. I think if I, as a researcher, am faced with having to confront both my own and my expert colleague's judgment about the consequences of a particular intervention, whether it produces extreme, moderate, or mild pain, this ethical system will permit me to make explicit judgments about the ethical basis of my own experimental work. I believe it is valuable in that previous speakers have talked about our incredible ability as human beings to distance ourselves from some of the consequences of what we do, especially when we know our heart is really in it and we are really interested in those kinds of issues. I think the animals potentially can benefit, and I think the science can also benefit.