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Appendix G

Mission Need Statements

BATTLEFIELD SHAPING AND FORCE PROTECTION AGAINST PERSONNEL THREATS1

Defense Planning Guidance Element

This requirement responds to the following:

  • Defense Planning Guidance for FY99-03, page 84, 2 July 1997 requires the development of a resource plan addressing implementation of alternatives that meet the President's direction on Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL). Alternatives may be lethal, nonlethal, or a mix of the two, but will discriminate if they are lethal.

  • Emerging Joint and Service Concepts of Operations (such as: Joint Vision 2010, Marine Corps Master Plan for the 21st Century, Army After Next, Global Engagement, etc.).

  • Presidential Decision Directives 48 and 54, and Public Law 104-107 pertaining to the restricted use and banning of APL.

  • Presidential statement of 17 September 1997 announcing the United States goals to end use of pure self-destructing APLs outside Korea by 2003. In Korea, alternatives are to be ready to replace pure APL (both non-self destructing and self-destructing) by 2006.

In response to both domestic and international efforts to restrict or ban the use of APL, the Department of Defense, with CINC and Service participation, has conducted assessments of APL utility as well as requirements for APL alternatives. Materiel and non-materiel alternatives to provide APL-like effects have been studied as part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Working Integrated Process Team effort. Preliminary work showed technological alternatives that would have significant programmatic and operational implications over the 99-03 FYDP. Alternatives that protect our service men and women while addressing humanitarian concerns must be further explored and assessed. Alternatives must address CINC mission needs and be consistent with US policy and goals. The purpose of the MNS is to facilitate development of alternatives that address critical warfighting capabilities of battlefield shaping and force protection against personnel threats in full spectrum operations.

Mission and ThreatAnalyses

Mission

Military forces, operating in all environments and terrain, across the full spectrum of military operations, require capabilities for battlefield shaping and force protection that enhance operational and tactical flexibility. These capabilities must contribute to economy of force operations and provide force multiplier effects. Capabilities will enable deter, delay, and deny effects oriented on identified personnel threats using lethal and/or non-lethal means. These capabilities will enable friendly forces to:

  • Delay, disrupt, and/or canalize enemy movement/ maneuver

  • Deny enemy access to terrain or facilities (including short and long term deterrent for boundaries and DMZ areas)

  • Enhancement of friendly force weapons, obstacles, and munitions effects (including Anti-Tank mines)

  • Generate exploitable delays and opportunities (fix or contain enemy)

  • Generate detection, alert, classification and/or early warning

  • Produce desired effects on enemy forces (non-lethal to lethal)

  • Reduce casualties/risk for U.S. and/or allied forces

  • Deter pursuit to facilitate breaking of contact under pressure



1 Landmine Alternatives Track III Broad Agency Announcement DAAE30-99-BAA-0103



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Page 118 Appendix G Mission Need Statements BATTLEFIELD SHAPING AND FORCE PROTECTION AGAINST PERSONNEL THREATS1 Defense Planning Guidance Element This requirement responds to the following: Defense Planning Guidance for FY99-03, page 84, 2 July 1997 requires the development of a resource plan addressing implementation of alternatives that meet the President's direction on Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL). Alternatives may be lethal, nonlethal, or a mix of the two, but will discriminate if they are lethal. Emerging Joint and Service Concepts of Operations (such as: Joint Vision 2010, Marine Corps Master Plan for the 21st Century, Army After Next, Global Engagement, etc.). Presidential Decision Directives 48 and 54, and Public Law 104-107 pertaining to the restricted use and banning of APL. Presidential statement of 17 September 1997 announcing the United States goals to end use of pure self-destructing APLs outside Korea by 2003. In Korea, alternatives are to be ready to replace pure APL (both non-self destructing and self-destructing) by 2006. In response to both domestic and international efforts to restrict or ban the use of APL, the Department of Defense, with CINC and Service participation, has conducted assessments of APL utility as well as requirements for APL alternatives. Materiel and non-materiel alternatives to provide APL-like effects have been studied as part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Working Integrated Process Team effort. Preliminary work showed technological alternatives that would have significant programmatic and operational implications over the 99-03 FYDP. Alternatives that protect our service men and women while addressing humanitarian concerns must be further explored and assessed. Alternatives must address CINC mission needs and be consistent with US policy and goals. The purpose of the MNS is to facilitate development of alternatives that address critical warfighting capabilities of battlefield shaping and force protection against personnel threats in full spectrum operations. Mission and ThreatAnalyses Mission Military forces, operating in all environments and terrain, across the full spectrum of military operations, require capabilities for battlefield shaping and force protection that enhance operational and tactical flexibility. These capabilities must contribute to economy of force operations and provide force multiplier effects. Capabilities will enable deter, delay, and deny effects oriented on identified personnel threats using lethal and/or non-lethal means. These capabilities will enable friendly forces to: Delay, disrupt, and/or canalize enemy movement/ maneuver Deny enemy access to terrain or facilities (including short and long term deterrent for boundaries and DMZ areas) Enhancement of friendly force weapons, obstacles, and munitions effects (including Anti-Tank mines) Generate exploitable delays and opportunities (fix or contain enemy) Generate detection, alert, classification and/or early warning Produce desired effects on enemy forces (non-lethal to lethal) Reduce casualties/risk for U.S. and/or allied forces Deter pursuit to facilitate breaking of contact under pressure 1 Landmine Alternatives Track III Broad Agency Announcement DAAE30-99-BAA-0103

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Page 119 The need exists to minimize risk to non-combatants while applying these capabilities to protect friendly forces as they shape the battlefield in a manner that recognizes economy of force concerns and force multiplier issues. Threat Analysis The DIA validated threat is documented in the: Land Threat Environment Projection Vol1 & 5, NGIC-1100-649-96, Feb 96: Threat to US Ground Maneuver Forces, Vo15: Special Operations Forces, NGIC-1100-653-97 Vol5, Nov 96. Statements of the threat are also documented in the: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Mid-Range Threat Estimate 1997-2007; Army Land Warrior System Threat Assessment (LWSTA) dated 7 August 1994; Section I.C.6. of Defense Planning Guidance 1997-2001. Operations across the spectrum of conflict will expose US forces to threats ranging from highly organized to loosely structured groups of potentially hostile or adversary forces. Personnel threats will attempt to breach friendly force obstacles and barriers designed to deter, delay, or deny hostile forces. The Threat can vary from large concentrations of infantry to localized numerically superior hostile personnel to small units operating covertly across the spectrum of military operations. Asymmetric or symmetric, unconventional or conventional threats, will operate in all terrain types and all environments to include urban areas and mega-cities, heavily forested/vegetated areas, and mountainous terrain. Current Deficiencies - Shortfalls United States APL policy directs the military to find alternatives for several fielded systems which are currently providing battlefield shaping and force protection capability against personnel threats. Deficiencies of the existing systems which must be corrected are: Current APL are target activated and are not designed to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants (no target classification, sensing, combat ID). Current non-self destructing APL needed for extended duration minefields are not designed to self destruct or self deactivate, therefore posing a residual hazard. Their target activation cannot be controlled (system effectiveness, capability, and availability). Fielded landmine systems impose both finite capability and operational limitations/shortfalls on the military. Limitations/shortfalls refers to both enhancements to military value and humanitarian concerns. The following capabilities and limitations/shortfalls should be addressed: Current APL do not provide an interrupt capability between sense, warn and apply effect, nor do APL systems provide flexible command destruct options (command and control). Current APL apply only one level of force when activated (system capability). Hand emplaced minefields require a significant amount of logistical support and are manpower intensive; current self destruct APL systems are not recoverable or reusable (responsiveness, logistics). The obstacle or minefield is vulnerable to breaching (system effectiveness). Obstacles or minefields can limit friendly force mobility (control, combat ID) and pose fratricide risks. No extended-duration lethal obstacle capability exists to counter dismounted forces worldwide. Limited remote/autonomous ability for force protection. Limited ability to complicate and reconstitute obstacles. Current lethal pursuit deterrent / break in contact capability against personnel will not exist after 2003. Timing and Priority Alternatives to Anti Personnel Landmines are high National priorities. An ADAM/RAAM conversion effort will be complete and in place by FY03. An APL-A full operational capability for USFK by FY 06 is required. The need exists for an APL-A outside of Korea. Nonmateriel Alternatives No feasible combinations of changes to doctrine, organization, concepts or training have been identified that satisfy the needs as constrained and defined in this MNS. The OSD sponsored study conducted APL analysis at the tactical and operational levels. At both the Tactical and Operational levels, removal of APL from the combined arms synergy of combat effects has created an additional burden on the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP), organizational and equipment infrastructure and force structure. At the tactical level, modeling concluded, in most scenarios, that only significant increases in infantry or artillery can offset the loss of APL with corresponding increased losses of friendly forces. Additionally, Anti-handling Devices on Anti-Tank mines and Claymores (M18A1) are important and necessary military capabilities but are not effective as APL alternatives. Operational level modeling identified force structure alternatives that had the potential to perform APL functions, but required such forces (CAS, artillery, cavalry, attack helos, MLRS, etc.) to be in place and theater specific prior to commencement of hostilities. The loss of APL as a battlefield shaping and force protection asset will present a significant change to force ratios, force multipliers and tempo of operations.

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Page 120 Potential Materiel Alternatives A variety of systems under development or available as off-the-shelf technologies and systems provide sensing, detection, delivery and effects that satisfy only portions of suitable capability alternatives. However, these alternative solutions impose force structure implications and are not easily adapted to satisfy all environmental, terrain and operational tempos. Furthermore, no system or simple system-of-systems has been identified which addresses the missions and deficiencies described previously. Additional analysis could occur in: C4ISR: Triggered detection devices (e.g., tripwirelike) not activating the munition until an external command to fire is received, this link could also provide command initiated self-dudding or destruction. Munitions: Replacement of current lethal munition payload with nonlethal or a variable nonlethal-to-lethal effects element or enhanced lethality munitions. Weapons: Joint Services Small Arms Program (Objective Individual Combat Weapon and Objective Crew Served Weapon, etc.). Constraints Overarching Constraints The defined level of mission capability for all weather environments and under all terrain conditions across the full spectrum of conflict must satisfy an around-the-clock duty cycle. The following general constraints on the capabilities must be recognized: Able to provide target discrimination for lethal weapons systems in accordance with dynamic Rules of Engagement (ROE). Enable rapid operational and tactical deployment, employment, and recovery. Provide event- as well as time-based initiated actions. Possess Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) compliance for C4ISR interoperability. Comply with standards with regard to logistics, training, manpower, etc. Will not leave any greater residual hazards than non APL systems. Must be developed under aggressive material development timeline consistent with presidential policy. Logistics Weapons, munitions, and equipment with the capabilities to satisfy this MNS must be supportable within the existing Joint Service sustainment and maintenance concepts. The capability must possess Joint, Allied and coalition force interoperability (Joint C4ISR Interoperability Doctrine) and it must comply with transportation and employment standards with regard to logistics, training, and manpower. Survivability Solutions to this MNS will enhance and complement mission performance and will represent neither an operational encumberment nor a mission detractor. Requirements for operation, maintenance, or support will not increase fratricide, risk of attack or injury, or adversely impact on physical and mental fatigue. It is desired that the alternatives have increased effectiveness against hostile breaching or countermeasures. Components will have the same NBC survivability and decontamination survivability as currently fielded systems. Operational Environment 1.Full Spectrum of Conflict; Major Theater War to Peace Operations. 2. Must include the capability to meet asymmetric threats where lethal force may not be desired. Scaleable to the degree of threat and scope of operations. Employment may be a system-of-systems, “layered defense” approach. 3. Urban and Mega-cities (MOUT). 4. Weather and Terrain. Solutions will operate and be maintained in all types of climate and terrain where US forces deploy. 5. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC). Hardening to non-nuclear electromagnetic, radio interference and blast overpressure is required. Must be functional in an NBC environment while wearing NBC protective clothing, mission oriented protective posture IV gear. MISSION NEED STATEMENT(MNS) FOR MIXED LANDMINE SYSTEMS ALTERNATIVES Defense Planning Guidance Element The purpose of this MNS is to facilitate development of alternatives to the Anti-Personnel (AP) submunitions in mixed landmine systems and/or to the entire mixed landmine system that addresses and responds to critical warfighting capabilities across the continuum of potential conflict. Alternatives must address both combatant Commanders in Chief (CINC) needs and be consistent with US policy goals and objectives. Current systems meet the combatant CINCs' requirements, and it is a warfighting imperative that gaps in capabilities not occur. This requirement responds to the following: Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-64 (PDD-64) of 23 June 1998. PDD-64 expands upon and strengthens US APL policy established in PDD-48 and PDD-54.

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Page 121 The PDD directs the Department of Defense to investigate the use of alternatives to existing Anti-Personnel Landmines (APLs) to replace the anti-personnel submunitions in mixed anti-tank mine systems and to actively explore the development of other technologies and/or tactical operational concepts which may result in a new, innovative approach to barrier systems that could replace the entire mixed munition; be advantageous militarily, cost effective, and safe; and eliminate the need for mines entirely. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for FY99-03 of 2 July 1997. The DPG requires development of a resource plan to implement the President's direction on anti-personnel landmines. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Report to the Secretary of Defense on the Status of DOD's Implementation of the U.S. Policy on AntiPersonnel Landmines of May 1997. The report summarizes DOD direction to seek technological alternatives to APL and to review/modify operational doctrine, tactics and plans to reduce and ultimately eliminate reliance on APL. Mission and Threat Analyses Mission Military forces, operating in all environments and terrain, across the full spectrum of military operations, require capabilities for battlefield shaping and force protection that enhance operational and tactical flexibility and set conditions for friendly dominant maneuver. These capabilities must contribute to economy of force operations and provide force multiplier effects against mounted and dismounted forces. They must degrade enemy capabilities and disrupt enemy maneuvers and operational tempo. Mission essential system capabilities include the ability to: Enhance the effects of close and deep friendly fires. Provide multiple methods of delivery. Provide a range of effects that inhibit mounted and dismounted maneuver. Resist the full spectrum of enemy breach methods including dismounted means. Provide early warning of a ground attack. Additional warfighting needs include: Safety of use to own forces. Effectiveness in all types of terrain and weather. Minimization of residual hazard to own forces and non-combatants after military conflicts. Difficulty of detection by enemy forces. Minimization of fratricide. Selectable degree of effects against mounted and/or dismounted threat. Controllable activation/deactivation and duration before and after installation. Effectiveness in nuclear, chemical and biological environments. Ease and efficiency of distribution. Threat Analysis Operations across the spectrum of conflict will expose US forces to threats ranging from organized, conventional forces to loosely structured groups who fight symmetrically and asymmetrically. US forces will potentially be outnumbered and continue to face these threats in all terrain and environments. Enemy forces will equip themselves with increasingly advanced weapons and sophisticated countermine equipment. The dismounted soldier will continue to play a key role both in ground combat and in clearing the way for mounted forces irrespective of the type of opposing force. Military operations in areas with large populations of non-combatants (urban areas) are expected to increase in frequency of occurrence. The DIA validated threat is documented in the: Land Threat Environment Projection (LTEP) Volume 1: Threat to US Ground Maneuver Forces, NGIC-1100-649-96 Feb 96 and Volume 5: Special Operations Forces, NGIC-1100-649-97 Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare Threat Environment Projections (EWTEP) Executive Summary, MCIA-1234-001-98 and Volume 3: Direct Fire and Maneuver, Fire Support, and Engineering, MCIA-1143-001-98 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Mid-Range Threat Estimate 1997-2007 Director Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee on Worldwide Threat 1999 Army Land Warrior System Threat Assessment Report (LWSTAR), 15 June 1998 Agile Combat Support Threat Environment Description (TED), NAIC-1571-0664-98, July 1998. Current Deficiencies - Shortfalls While current systems meet the combatant CINCs' requirements, there are several system specific deficiencies that, if corrected, would enhance the warfighting capability. These deficiencies include: Susceptibility to increasingly sophisticated countermine methods. Reliance on pre-determined self destruct. Limited effectiveness in restricted and urban terrain. Logistically burdensome. Does not adequately contribute to situation awareness. No selectable target effect options.

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Page 122 A complete loss of current systems would create a greater set of deficiencies that would promote significantly higher levels of risk to US personnel and mission accomplishment. Regardless of region, nature of conflict or adversary, the capability afforded by our current systems must be retained as a minimum level of performance or must be enhanced. Timing and Priority The development of Mixed Landmine System Alternatives has been identified as a major DOD priority. Timing goals and objectives for the development of alternatives are outlined in PDD-64. Militarily advantageous, cost effective and safe alternatives must be fielded before ending the use of our current systems. Nonmateriel Alternatives No feasible combinations of changes to doctrine, organization, concepts or training have been identified that satisfy the needs defined in this MNS. OSD-sponsored studies at the tactical and operational levels show that elimination of mixed systems significantly increases risk and reduces effectiveness of the force. Tactical level modeling concluded that even significant increases in maneuver forces and supporting arms result in increased US combat losses and also cannot fully offset the loss of mixed systems. Additionally, M18 Claymore mines and anti-handling devices (AHD) on AT mines are important and necessary military capabilities but cannot substitute for mixed munitions. Operational level modeling identified force structure alternatives that had the potential to perform the battlefield functions of mixed systems but required a broad-spectrum of additional forces (tactical air, artillery, cavalry, attack helicopters, Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS), etc.) to be in place prior to commencement of hostilities. The loss of mixed system munitions as a battlefield shaping and force protection asset will present a significant negative change to force ratios, force multipliers and tempo of operations. No change in doctrine alone offsets the loss of mixed systems without associated changes in force structure. Replacement of mixed system munitions by other types of obstacles is not as effective, mandates an increase and reallocation of men and equipment, and detracts from other missions. Potential Materiel Alternatives The variety of systems fielded, under development or available as off-the-shelf technologies satisfy only portions of the required capabilities. In addition, these alternative solutions have force structure implications and are not easily adapted to satisfy all operational tempos and weather and terrain conditions. Since no system or system-of-systems has yet been identified that fully addresses the missions and deficiencies described previously, additional analysis is required to determine how critical technologies can be effectively integrated into a robust system. These critical technologies include sensors and target recognition, command and control, nonlethal and lethal munitions and effects, and communication/low power networks. Emphasis should be placed on these system characteristics: tunable munitions effects, countermeasure resistance, all terrain and weather operation, target identification and tracking, early warning, and situational awareness. Constraints Key Overarching Constraints The new system must have the ability to support the full spectrum (or range) of military operations from peace operations to full military conflict. It should be designed to address dismounted, mounted, or a combination of these two types of threat maneuver methods. The new system must be all weather capable during delivery/emplacement and after activation. It should be able to be deployed and operate in all types of terrain and vegetation, to include steep gradient mountains, urban areas and the littorals. The new system should be effective on hard road surfaces independent of the delivery method. The new system design should be easily incorporated into inter-service tactics, techniques, and procedures utilizing current platforms where possible, and interoperable with other coalition and allied military forces. Communications and computer equipment should be designed to be compliant with the Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DII COE), Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) as well as interoperable with existing U.S. forces inventory [C4ISR], and allied forces. The new system should address all MANPRINT domains to enable rapid, safe and reliable deployment of the equipment. The system should be able to be employed throughout the theater of operation either by hand or utilizing remote air delivery methods. The design should allow the system to operate without degradation in a biological/chemical environment, and should have the same operational survivability as similar existing systems in a nuclear environment. The design must allow for the system to be removed or rendered inoperable once the tactical situation requires that the new system's effects be removed from the battlefield. If the system is destroyed, it must minimize residual hazards. The system or its sub-components must not be controllable or reuseable by belligerents at any time. Logistics The maintenance concept for the new design should incorporate common troubleshooting and repair procedures and should not require new military occupational skills or additional manpower to operate or maintain the system. The system should be able to be configured for transportation in

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Page 123 U.S. and allied countries using common light, medium, and heavy ground haul assets as well as military air and sea platforms. The total system design should incorporate minimum packaging materials and be packaged so that the new system can be stackable, storable, and easily inspected throughout its shelf life. Packaging for an individual system intended for hand-emplacement should incorporate MANPRINT design features focusing on lightweight characteristics. Survivability The new system should be capable of airborne and remote delivery conditions in all expected operational environments and conditions. The system should be re-useable if not fully deployed, and the design should incorporate all MANPRINT domains to ensure the system is durable. The new design should make the system resistant to common battlefield effects, including small arms (up to .50 cal), small fragmentary (hand grenade), fire, overpressure, and radio frequency signals. The new system should be recoverable, corrosion resistant, electro-magnetic pulse hardened, and remain functional after biological or chemical attack contamination. Operational Environment The new system must be insensitive to the wide range of weather effects where U.S. forces deploy, both during the delivery/emplacement and after activation of the system, to include effects from wind, lightning, fog, rain, snow and precipitation in general. Once activated, the system must operate in the residual and time-based effects of weather to include build up of snow, ice, frost, and mud to provide an around-the-clock duty cycle operational capability. If sensors are incorporated in the new design, they must be able to operate in extreme hot and cold environments and should be insensitive to temperature cycles associated with diurnal temperature variations.