The need exists to minimize risk to non-combatants while applying these capabilities to protect friendly forces as they shape the battlefield in a manner that recognizes economy of force concerns and force multiplier issues.
The DIA validated threat is documented in the: Land Threat Environment Projection Vol1 & 5, NGIC-1100-649-96, Feb 96: Threat to US Ground Maneuver Forces, Vo15: Special Operations Forces, NGIC-1100-653-97 Vol5, Nov 96. Statements of the threat are also documented in the: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Mid-Range Threat Estimate 1997-2007; Army Land Warrior System Threat Assessment (LWSTA) dated 7 August 1994; Section I.C.6. of Defense Planning Guidance 1997-2001. Operations across the spectrum of conflict will expose US forces to threats ranging from highly organized to loosely structured groups of potentially hostile or adversary forces. Personnel threats will attempt to breach friendly force obstacles and barriers designed to deter, delay, or deny hostile forces.
The Threat can vary from large concentrations of infantry to localized numerically superior hostile personnel to small units operating covertly across the spectrum of military operations. Asymmetric or symmetric, unconventional or conventional threats, will operate in all terrain types and all environments to include urban areas and mega-cities, heavily forested/vegetated areas, and mountainous terrain.
United States APL policy directs the military to find alternatives for several fielded systems which are currently providing battlefield shaping and force protection capability against personnel threats. Deficiencies of the existing systems which must be corrected are:
Current APL are target activated and are not designed to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants (no target classification, sensing, combat ID).
Current non-self destructing APL needed for extended duration minefields are not designed to self destruct or self deactivate, therefore posing a residual hazard. Their target activation cannot be controlled (system effectiveness, capability, and availability).
Fielded landmine systems impose both finite capability and operational limitations/shortfalls on the military. Limitations/shortfalls refers to both enhancements to military value and humanitarian concerns. The following capabilities and limitations/shortfalls should be addressed:
Current APL do not provide an interrupt capability between sense, warn and apply effect, nor do APL systems provide flexible command destruct options (command and control).
Current APL apply only one level of force when activated (system capability).
Hand emplaced minefields require a significant amount of logistical support and are manpower intensive; current self destruct APL systems are not recoverable or reusable (responsiveness, logistics).
The obstacle or minefield is vulnerable to breaching (system effectiveness).
Obstacles or minefields can limit friendly force mobility (control, combat ID) and pose fratricide risks.
No extended-duration lethal obstacle capability exists to counter dismounted forces worldwide.
Limited remote/autonomous ability for force protection.
Limited ability to complicate and reconstitute obstacles.
Current lethal pursuit deterrent / break in contact capability against personnel will not exist after 2003.
Alternatives to Anti Personnel Landmines are high National priorities.
An ADAM/RAAM conversion effort will be complete and in place by FY03.
An APL-A full operational capability for USFK by FY 06 is required.
The need exists for an APL-A outside of Korea.
No feasible combinations of changes to doctrine, organization, concepts or training have been identified that satisfy the needs as constrained and defined in this MNS.
The OSD sponsored study conducted APL analysis at the tactical and operational levels. At both the Tactical and Operational levels, removal of APL from the combined arms synergy of combat effects has created an additional burden on the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP), organizational and equipment infrastructure and force structure. At the tactical level, modeling concluded, in most scenarios, that only significant increases in infantry or artillery can offset the loss of APL with corresponding increased losses of friendly forces. Additionally, Anti-handling Devices on Anti-Tank mines and Claymores (M18A1) are important and necessary military capabilities but are not effective as APL alternatives. Operational level modeling identified force structure alternatives that had the potential to perform APL functions, but required such forces (CAS, artillery, cavalry, attack helos, MLRS, etc.) to be in place and theater specific prior to commencement of hostilities. The loss of APL as a battlefield shaping and force protection asset will present a significant change to force ratios, force multipliers and tempo of operations.