demands of a dangerous world by shaping and responding throughout the next 15 years, while at the same time transforming U.S. combat capabilities and support structures to be able to shape and respond effectively in the face of challenges in the future. (DOD, 1999)
To carry out its strategy, the DOD will take the following actions:
Pursue a focused modernization program to replace aging systems and incorporate cutting-edge technologies to ensure continued U.S. military superiority.
Continue to exploit the revolution in military affairs to improve the U.S. military's ability to perform nearterm missions and meet future challenges.
Exploit the revolution in business affairs to reengineer DOD's infrastructure and support activities.
Ensure against unlikely, but significant, future threats so that risk in a resource-constrained environment can be managed effectively, and position the military to respond quickly and effectively to new threats as they emerge.
Joint Vision 2010, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in 1996, is consistent with both the president's national security strategy and DOD's strategy. Joint Vision 2010 provides:
...the conceptual template for how America's armed forces will channel the vitality and innovations of our people and leverage our technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. (CJCS, 1996)
Based on assumptions about emerging information-age technologies, the strategy in Joint Vision 2010 depends on unprecedented cooperation between the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force (Close, 1999).
Joint Vision 2020, issued in June 2000, builds on and extends the conceptual template established by Joint Vision 2010 to guide the continuing transformation of U.S. forces. The goal of the transformation is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations, based on the strategic concepts of decisive power, power projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility. Although considerable emphasis is placed on information operations, “...information superiority neither equates to perfect information, nor does it mean the elimination of the fog of war” (CJCS, 2000). Joint Vision 2020 is based on the following assumptions:
The United States will continue to have global interests and to be engaged with a variety of regional actors.
Potential adversaries will have access to the global commercial industrial base and much of the same technology as the U.S. military.
Potential adversaries will be able to adapt as U.S. capabilities evolve.
Strong statements in support of the continued use of landmines were made in the testimonies of two regional CINCs before the U.S. Congress. General John H. Tilelli, Jr., then CINC of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea, testified that that “these weapons...are absolutely vital to the success” of the U.S. mission in Korea (Tilelli, 1999). During an informal meeting with the committee, General Tilelli restated this opinion (Tilelli, 2000). Mines have been used for many years in Korea to defend the Demilitarized Zone and are anticipated to be used extensively if North Korea again attempts to cross the 38th parallel.
Several factors are involved in the decision to use APL in Korea. First, the allies anticipate having to fight with very little warning and being overwhelmingly outnumbered by an enemy seeking to enter Seoul, only 50 miles from the border. Therefore, the faster North Korea can be stopped the better. Second, rugged mountains characterize much of the topography. In this type of terrain, mines are ideal for creating obstacles that can slow a military advance (Troxell, 1999).
General Wesley K. Clark, then CINC of the United States European Command, stated that:
Self-destructing and self-deactivating APL, and anti-tank (AT)/APL mixed systems constitute a critical force protection and countermobility asset. Our field commanders count on these systems to protect the force, influence maneuver, shape the battlespace, and mass combat power for decisive engagement. The requirement for such a capability is increasing in light of evolving and future operational concepts that envision our forces conducting dispersed operations over expanded battlespace. (Clark, 1998)
The purpose of the Concept for Future Joint Operations, issued in May 1997 by the CJCS, was to move the military toward the implementation of Joint Vision 2010. The Concept for Future Joint Operations is expected to be updated, based on Joint Vision 2020; for the present, however, this edition remains authoritative. The Concept, which offers a marketplace of ideas and tools for thinking about future operations, identifies the following military-specific trends (CJCS, 1997):
The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles will increase the vulnerability of U.S. and allied forces in theater and jeopardize access to ports and airfields.
Advanced technology weapons, platforms, and sensors will significantly increase the capabilities of some military forces.