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Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines (2001)

Chapter: 7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006

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Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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7

Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006

We can transform today in a time of peace and prosperity. Or we can try to change tomorrow, on the eve of the next war, when the window has closed, our perspective has narrowed, and our potential is limited by the press of time and the constraints of resources. (Shinseki, 2000)

OVERVIEW

The near-term and midterm alternatives described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are purposely conservative, which has little to do with available technology and much to do with the time required for DOD's decision, program development, procurement, and acceptance procedures for new weapons. In other words, without fast-track development and procurement procedures, even suggested systems using available technology and well-known assembly practices may not be available for service use by 2006. In this chapter, which describes alternatives that might be available after 2006, the committee is under no such constraints. Therefore, available and emerging technologies are more liberally considered for use in potential APL alternatives.

Advanced Technologies

Advanced technologies will have a profound effect on the capabilities of U.S. forces. The rapid emergence of new technologies will create opportunities after 2006 for the development of future systems that can outperform today's APL and be compliant with Ottawa. Alternative systems that separate the sensor from the shooter will provide powerful new capabilities, particularly in sensing and command and control, which could not only replace APL, but could also reinforce the information superiority concept in Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020. Information systems to manage battlefield operating systems, especially interactive communication with deployed mines, could be one of the most significant features of future mine warfare. Future systems could provide precise locations and operational status reports for all types of mines in near real time. Cost may be the controlling factor, but the capability seems to satisfy a key requirement of the CCW.

Elements of technology development expected to be pertinent to APL alternatives include advanced intelligence, sensors, and reconnaissance capabilities; new weapon systems and munitions; and integration through networking. The Army Research Laboratory's Annual Review publishes many descriptions of projects in support of a future digitized battlefield, including ideas for advanced sensors, signal and image processing, displays, information distribution, visualization, modeling, simulation, vehicles, armor, and munitions (U.S. Army, 1998a). Publications by laboratories in other military services include similar scenarios.

In addition to retaining the militarily desirable characteristics of current APL, future systems may satisfy new requirements, including the ability to distinguish among friends, foe, and neutral parties rapidly and reliably; easy recovery after hostilities; and having benign effects on the environment.

Civilian applications are expected to continue to lead the way in communications and information technology. Indeed, DOD is no longer the driving force behind research and development and applications of many technologies in the United States. Therefore, the use of commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software for military communications and information systems seems certain to increase.

Surveillance and Targeting Sensors

The military requirement for comprehensive surveillance of minefields and the necessity of accurately targeting lethal or nonlethal components comes at a propitious time in sensor development. With emerging technologies, nearly everything about a battlespace can be known, and anything in it can be hit. The development of sensor technology is characterized by the following trends (NRC, 1997):

  • continuing decreases in size and cost, as MEMS evolve into nanoelectronic systems limited only by the physics of the interfaces

  • migration of the analog-to-digital conversion to the front end of the sensor, leaving only those analog elements absolutely necessary for interfacing with the physical phenomenon to be sensed (e.g., microwave, low-noise amplification; filters and power amplifiers; fiber-optic transducers; MEMS transducers, etc.)

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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  • increasing applications of computer processing as gigaflops grow to teraflops and then petaflops1

  • development of monolithic smart sensors that combine sensing transducers, analog-to-digital conversion, digital-signal processing, communications input and output, and, perhaps, power conditioning on a single chip (could lead to the development of very small, very smart sensor systems and weapons, including affordable smart bullets)

  • integration of autonomous, mobile, communicating sensors that can cooperate to function as single, high-level metasensors

Recommendation. The development of sensor-net technology should be pursued aggressively and eventually incorporated into a fully militarized, deployed system characterized by networking, strong detection and tracking capabilities, robustness, low power consumption, low cost, covertness, low probability of intercept, easy deployment, and disposability.

Recommendation. Investments already being made in new technologies for other purposes should be leveraged and applied to the search for alternatives to antipersonnel landmines.

Network-Centric Battlespace

With major advances in communications, all elements in and supportive of a battlespace are being linked in near real time, making possible what has come to be called networkcentric warfare. The new systems will involve sensors, communication and communication relays from satellites, manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, sea-based and ground-based mobile platforms, and ground stations.

In most cases, the two-way communication link between the surveillance element of a future minefield alternative and a remote operator would not require line of sight, would be secure, and would be capable of working with network-centric architecture. Its primary purpose would be to enable a remote operator to evaluate mounted and dismounted intrusions into the minefield, distinguish enemy from friend and noncombatant, and control the actions of the lethal and/ or nonlethal elements. Its secondary purpose would be to contribute to overall situational awareness in the battlespace.

During the course of this study, a good deal of discussion was focused on the ability (or inability) of a remote operator to remain alert and to control the minefield during an intrusion, possibly under extreme combat conditions. An advantage of integration of the operator-to-minefield communication link with the network-centric architecture is that the operator would not have to be in the combat zone.

Energetic Explosives

Until 1940, military explosives such as TNT and mercury fulminate generated an energy release of approximately 1 kilocalorie per gram. During World War II, advanced compounds, such as nitramines, were increasingly introduced. During the Cold War, the energy content of explosive compounds continued to increase slowly and steadily. Today the energy content of military explosives is approaching 4 kilocalorie per gram.

Research supported by all of the armed services in the past 15 years indicates that the energy release of military explosives, acceptably desensitized, is likely to be doubled in the foreseeable future. This improvement will allow a significant reduction in the size and weight of explosive devices, as well as further advances in special effects. An increase by a factor of two could also have a profound effect on logistics and combat effectiveness.

Minefield Deliverability

Current pure and mixed minefields can be emplaced by hand, ground vehicle-mounted dispensers, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, artillery, and missiles. As lighter forces are used in more situations, tactical minefields that can be quickly and remotely emplaced and quickly removed through command detonation and/or retrieval of the more expensive and reusable components will be necessary. The trend in remote mine delivery modes will be toward artillery, missiles, fixed-wing, and rotary-wing aircraft.

The potential size reduction of explosive devices combined with alternative systems to replace minefields with small alerting sensors will make the timely, remote emplacement of mines easier. Extended range guided munition-like artillery rounds and Army TACMS missiles will provide effective delivery modes. However, the accurate emplacement of the minefield surveillance component, particularly if it is combined with an alternative system, could complicate delivery. For example, the surveillance/kill system could be delivered separately by helicopter or Osprey (V-22) and hand emplaced by the crew once the location of the minefield had been determined, its boundaries known, and the best site for the surveillance/kill systems determined. At some point, precision emplacement of components using GPS, combined with digital maps, will make remote emplacement of the surveillance/kill system feasible.

Location and Precision Emplacement

For precision weapon delivery, modeling, simulation, and operational planning, the U.S. military has long had a requirement that maps be accurate to within 30 meters. In the current geopolitical environment, such maps are required for most of the earth's land surface. The recent Shuttle Radar Topography Mission now promises to provide digital maps of more than 80 percent of the earth's land surface and 95 percent of populated areas with data taken at 30-meter



1 Flops is a unit of computer speed equal to one floating-point arithmetic operation per second. Giga is 109 (one billion), tera is 1012 (one trillion), and peta is 1015 (one thousand trillion).

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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intervals and an accuracy of ± 15 meters in the vertical and ± 30 meters in the horizontal. These maps, combined with GPS guidance and position reporting, will profoundly influence all aspects of military activity, including site location, precision emplacement, and precision boundary marking of future minefields.

Vulnerabilities

New technologies provide not only new improved capabilities, but also new or additional vulnerabilities. This will certainly be true of operational interfaces between communication and sensor systems, as well as the more general battlefield C4ISR systems. The very large volume of information now available through the C4ISR systems must be balanced against the tactical and operational requirements of the warfighter who must respond to changing situations with great immediacy and reliability, avoiding, as much as possible, information traffic jams, delays, and disruptions that often affect communications systems. Systems that take advantage of future C4ISR network capabilities will probably rely on radio-frequency communication links, which can be vulnerable to jamming and other countermeasures. Because the cost of ensuring against jamming in systems used for every munition may be prohibitively high, some loss of system performance as a result of active countermeasures should be expected.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DARPA manages and directs selected basic and applied research and development projects. The agency pursues research and development for which both risks and payoffs are very high, and successes may lead to dramatic advances in traditional military roles and missions, as well as dual-use applications. DARPA has been involved in the search for alternatives to APL, directly through research and development on Track II and indirectly by research and development on a variety of devices that can increase the likelihood that future alternatives, particularly sensor-related ones, will be developed successfully.

Representatives of DARPA met with the committee on several occasions, and small groups of committee members visited the main DARPA facility twice. The following descriptions include a variety of ongoing DARPA programs that may affect the development of future APL alternatives.

Affordable, Moving-Surface-Target Engagement Program

This program conceptually leverages recent advances in sensor technology for the development of an affordable, precise means of identifying and destroying a moving surface target. The fundamental concept to be investigated is a network of two radar systems, ground moving targets indicating (GMTI) radar and synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), to provide precision fire-control tracking of moving surface targets. The network would update precision-guided munitions in flight for precise engagement of moving surface targets (Grayson, 2000).

The goal of the program is to develop, investigate, and evaluate technologies that could lead to affordable architectures for destroying specific moving targets on land, the littorals, and water. The focus is on weapon system technologies that would enable precision, affordable, all-weather engagement of a wide range of moving surface targets, both on land and at sea. Research and development will focus on the use of netted GMTI/SAR sensors to provide precision fire control of inexpensive, nonsmart weapons (DARPA, 2000c).

SensIT Program

The SensIT Program is founded on the concept of a networked system of inexpensive, pervasive platforms that combine multiple sensor types, reprogrammable generalpurpose processors, and wireless communication (Kumar, 2000). The multiple-sensor module might combine optical, acoustic, triple-axis, seismic, magnetic, moisture, pollution, poison, organic pressure, temperature, acceleration, and physiological variables. The goal of the SensIT Program is to create an interface between the physical world and cyberspace.

Current information systems use human input or computer-generated data. Future systems will build on continuous streams of real-world physical data to create a “virtual” supercomputer, miniaturized and distributed into the environment, with each node computing and collaborating to “see” into its sensor region. The mission of the SensIT program is to develop all necessary software for networked microsensors (DARPA, 2000d).

Microunattended Ground Sensors Program

The goal of this program is to develop a distributed network of miniature unattended ground sensors (UGSs) based on acoustic, magnetic, seismic, meteorological, and imaging technologies, and advanced fusion algorithms for tactical use (Carapezza, 2000). These sensors should be low-power miniature imaging and nonimaging variants. The long-term objective is to support the pursuit of time-critical mobile targets, combat vehicles, and dismounted soldiers. Miniature UGSs could be used singly or in networks to provide a local, in-situ detection, tracking, and identification capability at high-value manmade facilities or at choke points in denied areas (DARPA, 2000e).

Future Combat System Program

The future combat system (FCS) will be a multifunctional, multimission, reconfigureable system of systems designed to maximize joint interoperability, strategic transportability, and commonality of mission roles, including direct and indirect fire, air defense, reconnaissance, troop

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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transport, countermobility, nonlethal options, and command and control on the move. The goal of the program is to develop a network-centric advanced force structure that will be overwhelmingly lethal, strategically deployable, self-sustaining, and highly survivable in combat through integrated command and control capabilities that provide unsurpassed situational awareness for commanders at all levels (DARPA, 2000a).

Nonlethal Alternatives

Nonlethal devices of the future might use real or virtual images. Making large images appear by projection or reflection of small objects is not difficult if the viewing point and the ambient light level are controllable. However, for the illusion to extend over a large space, to be visible from various angles, and to be viewable in daylight, the problem is much more complicated. Images are, after all, nothing more than a directed configuration of photons. The more extensive the image is spatially, the more illuminating power it requires; hence, the availability of a power source on the battlefield may be a problem. Climate, vegetation, and terrain may also disrupt or degrade images.

A static image is not likely to arouse fear or dread for an extended period of time. With the advent of inexpensive, robust scanning technology, along with lightweight mirror materiels, a plasma point could be created with one or more focused beams swept over an area to create a more realistic image. Although a single laser creates only a single plasma point, hysteresis in the human eye makes the image appear constant and solid. (For instance, on a TV screen, a single electron beam scans the phosphor dots on the inside of the screen many times per second, exciting the appropriate dots one at a time to create an image that the eye perceives as constant and whole.)

The use of movement is yet another futuristic possibility. “Seasickness” is familiar to most people, if not directly, then by empathy or observation. Small amplitude vertical vibrations of 0.5 Hertz are known to create this effect. If enemy troops and equipment must cross bridges or other solid manmade structures, it may be possible to deploy a device that generates small amplitude movements at the nauseogenic frequency, thus incapacitating troops with seasickness. This device could provide in such situations a more effective delay than APL (Haseltine, 2000).

As discussed earlier, nonlethal variants have certain drawbacks: (1) nonlethal systems could cause inadvertent fatalities; (2) they are likely to be less of a deterrent to a determined enemy and may even be interpreted as weakness; and (3) even if nonlethals confuse an enemy initially, he is unlikely to make the same mistake twice. Nevertheless, in light of the increasing frequency of peacekeeping operations, the development of nonlethal variants to support APL alternatives should be a high priority.

Recommendation. Several other technologies or systems already under development for other purposes should be considered as potential components of long-term alternatives to antipersonnel landmines, including unmanned air and ground vehicles, directed-energy weapons, battlefield sensory-illusion devices, passive transponders (e.g., tags), and other lethal and nonlethal systems.

MATERIEL ALTERNATIVES

After 2006, improvements in the tactical effectiveness of existing or proposed remotely delivered AT landmines ought to be technologically feasible, which could eliminate the need for mixed systems. Future systems that separate the sensor from the shooter could be improved by multiple means of remote deployment and resistance to countermeasures through signature reduction and other techniques. Track III programs, like the Track I initiative, will require concentrated effort and stable funding. In the long term, the emergence of new technologies, such as the ability to distinguish accurately between combatants and noncombatants, could lead to the development of systems that can outperform today's APL.

The most promising alternatives received high scores on both military effectiveness and humanitarian criteria, which reflects the greater battlefield awareness provided by advanced technologies. The same alternatives received low scores for technical risk and economic criteria because they tend to be conceptual and on the cutting edge of technology.

Table 7-1 shows systems that might be available sometime after 2006. The table also describes their principle characteristics. Full descriptions and brief written assessments follow, as well as a table measuring each alternative against the criteria described in Chapter 4.

For Use Against Dismounted Threats

Radio/Radar Sensor Munition System

Source: Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

The Radio/Radar Sensor Munition System (RRASMS) would consist of four parts: a sensor and communications unit that would function as a hub for a section of the denied zone; an overwatch controller to control the modular munitions; the modular munition; and an electronically programmable radio.

The radio would perform three functions:

  • self-location and munitions location using either GPS or multilateration with other units

  • communication to the overwatch controller unit with a soldier/operator in conjunction with other sensor and communications units

  • multistatic radar to detect and track human intruders

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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TABLE 7-1 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006
         

Dismounted Enemy

 

Mounted Enemy

 

System Name

APL/AT/Mixed Non-Mine

Self-destructing/Self-deactivating

Lethal/Nonlethal

Ottawa Complianta

Remotely Delivered

Hand Emplaced

Remotely Delivered

Hand Emplaced

Radio / Radar Sensor Munition System (RRASMS)

APL

Y

L

Y

 

X

   

Unmanned Remote Ambush System (URAS)

APL

Y

L

Y

 

X

   

Tags / Minimally Guided Munitions Track II

n/m

n/a

n/a

Y

X

     

Laser Radar Directed Machine Gun (LDMG)

n/m

n/a

L

Y

 

X

   

Distributed-Sensor Antipersonnel “Minefield”

n/m

n/a

L

Y

X

     

Distributed Web-Sensor Complex (DWSC)

n/m

n/a

n/a

Y

   

X

 

Raptor

AT

Y

L

Y

   

X

 

RAAMS Enhanced with Telemetry and Sensor Package (RD Sensor)

AT

Y

L

Y

   

X

 

Remotely Delivered Hornet/WAM (RD-WAM)

AT

Y

L

Y

   

X

 

Self-Healing Minefield Track II

AT

Y

L

Y

   

X

 

BAT Antiarmor Mine (BATAAM)

AT

n/a

L

Y

     

X

Early Warning Subsystem for Remotely Delivered AT Minefields (EWSS)

n/m

n/a

n/a

Y

   

X

 

RAAMS with Nonlethal Capability (RAAMS-NL)

Mix

Y

N/L

Y

X

 

X

 

a The committee used the definition found in the Ottawa Convention to determine whether a system would be Ottawa compliant.

The modular munition units would be connected remotely to the sensor and communications unit via trip wire/communication lines. Remotely deployable versions might use radio-frequency links. Modular munition units would come in three basic types:

  • warning devices, such as flashers or sirens

  • nonlethal deterrents, such as flash/bang units and malodorants

  • lethal devices, such as small fragmentation grenades

The overwatch control unit, a computer terminal with a radio, would perform three functions:

  • display a situational awareness map to the soldier/ operator showing the geometry of the munitions in the denied zone

  • sound an alert and display the track of an intruder

  • allow the soldier/operator to command a lethal response when necessary

To create a denied zone, RRASMS would be deployed in the following way. The soldier/operator would place sensor and communications units in the denied zone approximately 50 meters apart. He would then attach as many as 32 modular munition units to each sensor and communications unit in dispersed locations. In general, warning devices would be placed farthest forward in the denied zone; nonlethal devices would come next; and lethal devices would be placed behind the others.

Once the field was activated, the sensor and communications units would go through an initialization process to determine their locations and the locations of the modular munition units. Each sensor and communications unit would periodically transmit a radar pulse, and other sensor and communications units would listen. If an intruder were detected, the overwatch control unit would be alerted. Depending on the situation, the sensor and communications unit could autonomously activate warning and/or nonlethal devices. After assessing the track of the intruder(s) and the response to the nonlethal devices, the soldier/operator could command a lethal response.

Advantages

  • This system would be compliant with the CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

  • With an electronically programmable radio, the RRASMS could communicate with a wide variety of radios on the battlefield, could receive GPS signals, and provide guidance updates to incoming ordnance.

  • With a radar mode, it could provide all weather, day/ night sensing and tracking of human intruders and would have some foliage penetration capability.

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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  • As a backup, the wires connecting the modular munition units to the sensor and communications unit could also serve as trip wires for sensors.

  • The soldier/operator would have the flexibility to attach any mix of warning, nonlethal, and lethal modular munition units to the system.

  • The system would give the operator the time and information necessary to determine if a lethal response is necessary.

  • The system could be enhanced by providing devices to friendly soldiers that would identify them as friendly and would disable lethal responses in their vicinity, thus allowing them free passage through the denied zone and avoiding fratricide.

  • RRASMS could be used in conjunction with covert tags on enemy soldiers for longer range tracking.

Disadvantages

  • RRASMS would have significant technical risk and development costs and would require successful development of electronically programmable radios, which would significantly reduce the risk and cost of adding the radar function.

Unmanned Remote Ambush System

Source: Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

The ambush has been an effective tactic throughout the history of warfare and will continue to be effective in certain types of future conflicts. With modern technology, ambushes could be operated without on-site personnel.

The mine used in the unmanned remote ambush system (URAS) concept could be any of a number of current APL mines. Claymores, modified for timed self-deactivation and command detonation, would be most appropriate for ambushes and would be CCW and Ottawa compliant.

URAS would require small cameras for discriminating between friend and foe. The US Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate is working on the development of an uncooled infrared camera (a the forward-looking infrared radar, microcamera [UL3]) that is about 5 centimeters long and 6.4 centimeters square, weighs 70 grams, and requires 540 microwatts at 3.5 volts. The UL3 can detect a walking man at ranges of 250 to 700 meters, day or night, depending on the angle of view. To conserve power, an acoustic instant wake-up for the camera is available. Also available, if required, is an eye-safe laser illuminator for better target identification. DARPA is developing a television camera of similar size, capable of projecting its image onto the upper quadrant of a specially equipped pair of glasses or goggles (if the operator is moving).

The dispersal of Claymores at the ambush site would depend on the nature of the terrain and the anticipated size and dispersion of the intruding force. The camera and laser illuminator could be colored to blend in with the environment and attached to a tree, rock, or stake to provide the proper field of view. The preferred communication link would be an aircraft or satellite so that distance and terrain would not matter. A small broadcast terminal and disk antenna would be required for this communication mode.

In operation, the first transmission from the ambush would be accompanied by a sound and/or flashing light to alert the remote operator. Upon identification of the target, the operator would detonate the Claymores at the proper distance between mines and intruders. The Claymores might be given different firing codes for staggered firing. Antihandling features might be added, as needed.

URAS is covered by doctrine governing ambushes and APL minefields. All of the major components of URAS are available or in an advanced stage of development. The components would have to be merged into a system and a two-way communication package assembled.

Advantages

  • URAS would be CCW and Ottawa compliant.

  • The concept would not require on-site personnel.

  • No friendly lives would be placed at risk during the ambush.

  • The URAS poses little logistics burden and could be easily and quickly emplaced.

  • URAS provides firing versatility for maximum effectiveness.

Disadvantages

  • URAS would require a reliable two-way communication link with one-way imagery.

  • Aircraft might be necessary for the communication link. However, the aircraft would probably be used for multiple purposes.

  • Camera performance may be degraded by adverse atmospheric conditions (e.g., heavy rain, fog, etc.).

Tags/Minimally Guided Munitions

Source: DARPA Track II (Altshuler, 1999)

The Tags/Minimally Guided Munitions concept is under development at DARPA. The agency has already initiated research and development on required technologies for this system. Preliminary demonstrations of tag attachment have met with some success. However, it is extremely unlikely that the system could be available by 2006.

In this system, small burr-like transmitters would be affixed to the clothing of enemy soldiers as they traverse a field (called a “tag-field”). The method of attaching the tags is still under development; a “lawn-dart” and a “brier” are being considered. The tags, anticipated to be smaller than

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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0.5 centimeters in all dimensions, would alert a man-in-the-loop with motion sensors or equivalents. Tags would provide one- or two-way communication over a short transmission range of less than 100 meters (longer transmission would require a relay network). The man-in-the-loop would launch munitions, which would be target-oriented rather than area-oriented and would home in on an individual tag or cluster of tags, making small in-flight course corrections as necessary. The course correction capability would have to be greater than the distance the target could move in the interval. Tag lifetime would range from minutes to hours.

Effective tags will require millimeter-sized transmitters and antennae. The power source for the lifetime of tags will also require further work (thick or thin battery technology), as will delivery of the tags and their adhesion to the target. Other issues that would have to be addressed include: packaging tags; delivering tags; recognizing and discriminating targets; reducing vulnerabilities to countermeasures; extending the transmission range; and developing repeaters (a multitiered communication system) to ensure that communications reach the command center.

Research and development on the munitions will have to address the following issues: homing technology using a radio-frequency signal; lowering the cost and increasing the sensitivity of the receiver; flight control/flight errors (precision strike) and time of flight; and the overall efficiency of operation.

Integrating tag and munition technologies to ensure reliable operation and include a man-in-the-loop will involve tactical changes based on studies of the behavior of individual soldiers and units. An overall cost analysis and technology implementation routine would also have to be developed.

Advantages

  • This system is envisioned to be compliant with the CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

  • The system would improve situational awareness.

  • Not many tags would be required for the system to be effective (modeling shows that only one-third of the enemy population would have to be tagged).

  • Tags would be particularly effective for protecting flank positions and preventing infiltration by small groups.

  • Environmental and post conflict effects would be minimal.

Disadvantages

  • It is not clear how the munition would differentiate among moving tags and home in on a specific target.

  • Communications might be jammed as a consequence of in-flight confusion.

Laser Radar-Directed Machine Gun

Source: Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

The Laser Radar (LADAR)-directed machine gun (LDMG) would use laser radar (or other means) to maintain surveillance over a denied zone and for precision aiming of an automatically aimed machine gun. The machine gun would fire two types of munitions: nonlethal rubber bullets and lethal explosive/fragmentation rounds. The gun would have an antihandling mechanism that would disable it in the event of enemy capture. An overwatch control unit would have to be activated before a lethal response was initiated.

The LDMG would consist of four units. The first unit, the LADAR surveillance sensor and fire control unit, would use laser radar to create a three-dimensional picture of the denied zone out to a range of about 500 meters and across an angle of about 60 degrees. If a change in the background were detected, the unit would zoom in on that area to identify the intrusion. The unit would also act as a very precise fire-control system for both nonlethal and lethal responses from the machine gun. The second unit, a machine gun (the objective individual combat weapon), would be a low-recoil system that could shoot both 5.56-mm bullets from its top barrel and exploding 20-mm projectiles from its bottom barrel. For the LDMG, the top barrel would shoot nonlethal rubber bullets. An add-on, increased ammunition feed capability would be developed. The third unit, the gun cradle, would be a tripod with servomotors that could aim the gun based on inputs from the fire-control system. The fourth unit, the overwatch control unit, a computer display that would receive alerts and images via radio from the LADAR, would allow the soldier/operator to determine if the intrusion required a lethal response.

The LDMG would first be used to create a denied zone in the following way. First, one or more LDMGs would be set up behind the denied zone. In general, two or more LDMGs would be used to obtain crossing fires. The LADAR would scan the denied zone to establish the background image. The soldier/operator would then proceed to his post and test radio connectivity with the LDMG. If an intruder were detected, the LDMG would send an alert and image to the soldier/ operator and might respond autonomously with nonlethal rubber bullets from the 5.56-mm barrel. The soldier/operator would determine if a lethal response were required. A lethal response fired from the 20-mm barrel would be a projectile that would explode just above the location of the intruder based on range information from the LADAR. To prevent capture, the surveillance/kill system would be equipped with an antihandling device and rigged for timed self-destruction.

Advantages

  • This system would be compliant with the CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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  • The LDMG would be a tireless area-denial sentry with the flexibility to use either nonlethal or lethal responses.

  • This system might have multiple uses.

Disadvantages

  • The LDMG would be very bulky and would have high electrical power requirements.

  • The LDMG would be less effective in rugged or foliated terrain, in adverse weather conditions, or in the presence of smoke.

  • The active sensor might reveal its position.

  • The surveillance/kill system would have to be hand emplaced.

Distributed-Sensor Antipersonnel “Minefield”

Source: Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

This system, which could be used either against dismounted targets or for protection of an AT minefield, would have separate sensor and kill components that would not be co-located. The sensor component, about the size of a tube of Chapstick, would consist of a dismounted sensor (pressure, seismic, or tremble switch, with pressure preferred) and a short-range radio-frequency communicator. These small, rugged, inexpensive sensor packages could be distributed by air, missile, artillery, or hand. Upon activation by an intruder, the sensor would emit a single radio-frequency pulse that would alert the kill component. All sensor packages in a given field would use a unique coded pulse to reduce the chance of spoofing. However, to allow for reuse, the kill component would be set to respond to any of the allocated codes.

The kill component would be a .30-caliber or .50-caliber machine gun mounted on a tripod. To ensure stability, concealment, and a clear field of view, the kill component would be emplaced by hand on the periphery of the sensor field. The system would consist of both optical and infrared sensors for day/night surveillance and would be able to transmit its field of view to a remote operator.

Upon receiving a signal from any sensor in the field, the kill component would be switched on, rise to its surveillance position, transmit its picture to the remote operator for identification of friend or foe, and await permission to fire. Once permission was received, the kill system would become autonomous. The gun would fire only when the target was centered in the cross hairs of the aiming system. The system would be able to train across the entire sensor field and engage multiple targets in rapid succession. The operator could interrupt firing at any time.

The sensor package would use state-of-the-art technology and would not require research. The surveillance system would also use available infrared and optical technologies. The capability of firing only when the target was centered might involve pattern recognition technology or the use of tags now being developed by DARPA for the robot sniper and Land Warrior programs. To prevent capture, the surveillance/kill system would be equipped with an antihandling device and rigged for timed self-destruction.

Advantages

  • This system would be compliant with the CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

  • The most expensive part of the system would be recoverable.

  • With recovery of the kill component, no explosives would be left on the battlefield.

  • The system would have a significantly higher probability of being effective against multiple intrusions than a typical AP minefield.

  • The surveillance/kill system would present a very small target.

Disadvantages

  • Removing either the remote operator or the kill component could defeat the system.

  • The surveillance/kill system would require research and development and would be expensive.

  • The surveillance/kill system would have to be hand emplaced.

For Use Against Mounted Threats

Distributed Web Sensor Complex

Source: Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

The concept of the Distributed Web Sensor Complex (DWSC) is based on an Army science and technology program intended to enable a commander to take advantage of high-tech sensor and communications technology by providing near real-time situational awareness of the extended battlefield. This approach is intelligence oriented, rather than minefield oriented. The essential aspect of the DWSC is the rapid, remote placement of numerous, inexpensive, expendable sensors by artillery or air. Depending on the situation, emplacement could range from relatively close to friendly positions (within a few kilometers) to extended ranges. Any combination of acoustic, magnetic, seismic, motion, infrared imaging, video, biological or other sensors capable of identifying signals from vehicles and/or humans could be used.

Once sensors had landed on the ground, they would be activated by an accompanying gateway, which would also establish communications with and identify the location of each sensor. The gateway would also establish communication with nearby gateways, thereby creating a large web of sensors that could cover the entire front of a deployed unit

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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(several kilometers). Low-power sensors, such as acoustic sensors, would begin functioning. Upon recognizing certain sensory inputs, these low-powered sensors would signal the gateway to “wake up” the more power-intensive sensors, such as infrared imaging, that had been in a stand-by, power-saving mode. The gateway could be programmed to sort through sensor inputs and look for combinations (target templates) to define an intruder. This information would be sent by communication links back to an operations center where sensor intelligence could be fused with other intelligence to give the commander a high level of situational awareness across the entire front. When an enemy target was confirmed, the commander could call for any direct or indirect weapon in range, including rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, AT weapons, mortars, artillery, and air-delivered munitions. Because DWSC sensors could be distributed at significant depth, commanders at all levels could evaluate sensor input and respond by rapidly changing priorities of fire or locations of combat systems. This would allow a sequenced attack against numerous enemy targets by the most appropriate combat system.

The gateway could be programmed to interface with hand-emplaced or remotely delivered nonlethal weapons, AT mines, other sensors, or nearby outposts or patrols. If the situation indicated a need for remotely delivered AT mines, the gateway could also be programmed to communicate with and direct action of friendly AT mines in the vicinity. Through the gateway, the mines could be activated or deactivated by a man-in-the-loop in the operations center. These mines could also be part of a network that would communicate locations to each other, assess the situation based on programmed logic, and detonate according to programmed logic or human command.

The DWSC would not depend on the use of mines. It would be a sensor-based intelligence system that could be used in combination with different systems as the situation dictated, and would move warfare toward an integrated system of sensors, communications links, and combat systems. Because DWSC would exploit existing and future combat system capabilities and would not rely on a dedicated, unique kill mechanism, it might be more cost effective than some other mixed-system alternatives to APL. A concept of operations would have to be articulated throughout the user community, and doctrine for use would have to be developed prior to fielding. Because this system is still in the early concept phase, considerable research and development would be required to develop, produce, and field the DWSC.

Advantages

  • Because the DWSC does not include APL, it would be conceptually compliant with the CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

  • Rapid emplacement of sensors, gateways, AT mines (when required), and other systems could be valuable for protecting early-entry units or other friendly units.

  • The man-in-the-loop capability should minimize friendly and noncombatant casualties out to significant depths on the battlefield.

  • The DWSC would increase lethality by improving commanders' situational awareness and enabling them to bring combined arms capabilities to bear, as necessary.

  • The DWSC would support emerging concepts of the future, nonlinear battlefield peopled by highly mobile, moderately armed forces.

  • The system would provide a measure of security for AT mines, sensors, and other forward-deployed capabilities.

  • The presence of DWSC could impart a psychological fear of death or injury throughout the battlefield.

  • The presence of a self-destruct feature on any remotely delivered mines would address humanitarian concerns.

  • The antihandling device on remotely delivered mines would have a psychological impact on dismounted enemy forces.

Disadvantages

  • Because the system has no APL or human sensors, the mines could be very susceptible to clearance by a dismounted enemy, especially at some distance from friendly forces.

  • Costs of development, production, and fielding would be very high. Given the complexity of the system, maintenance and logistics costs could also be high.

Raptor

Source: U.S. Department of Defense/Office of the Project Manager, Mines, Countermine, and Demolitions (Strano, 2000)

Raptor, a system being developed by DARPA, based on an Army science and technology program, has been described as a smart, autonomous, antiarmor/antivehicle system that provides situational awareness and targeting information to Hornet/WAM and other shooters. The system consists of an advanced overwatch sensor, deployed at depth, that can detect, track, and classify individual vehicles and recognize larger combat formations. The initial or “core” capability is based on hand-emplaced components delivered by truck or helicopter up to 25 kilometers from the forward line of friendly troops.

Vehicle-detection information from the advanced overwatch sensor would be electronically relayed through a gateway to “wake up” nearby Hornet/WAM AT munitions2 in a stand-by, power-saving state. The gateway would be



2 Raptor could also be implemented with other kill mechanisms, such as a mine patterned after BAT warhead technology.

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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programmed with the commander's tactics in selectable tactical “templates” to coordinate automatically the Hornet/ WAM attack based on the threat. The system would be controlled by a Raptor control station located at the brigade tactical operations center.3 The link between the gateway and the control station might be through radio line-of-sight transmission aided at extended ranges by antennas. The operator would automatically receive the exact location of the Raptor field components, including munitions, and would be able to turn the field on or off and select tactics remotely for the gateway.

A Raptor system could be modified to include a space-based, near real-time communication link so that joint tactics would be possible. With this improvement, the sensor target information would be relayed through the Raptor control station to the army tactical command and control system. The commander could then initiate additional checks by other sensors, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, and take action, such as directing the gateway to attack the threat by activating mines according to an emplacement template, targeting indirect-fire weapons, and/or alerting nearby combat units.

The fully developed Raptor system could be used for operations as much as 300 kilometers away with satellite and other communication links; mines deployed by powered parafoil or airdrop; mines embedded with the ability to discriminate between friend and foe; and sensors capable of detecting, reporting, and targeting light wheeled vehicles, low-flying aircraft, and artillery/missile firings. Incremental upgrades, including links to other Army tactical communications system, and other capabilities, should be ready for production at various times up to fiscal year 2008.

Raptor could move antivehicular mine warfare toward an integrated system of sensors, communication links, mines, and other combat systems. The concept of operations would be articulated throughout the user community, and doctrine would have to be developed prior to fielding. Because this system is still in the early concept phase, considerable resources would be required to develop, produce, and field Raptor.

Advantages

  • Because there are no APL in this system, it appears to be conceptually compliant with the Ottawa Convention and CCW Amended Protocol II.

  • The self-destruct feature would further address humanitarian concerns.

  • The man-in-the-loop should minimize friendly and noncombatant casualties out to significant depths on the battlefield.

  • Raptor would increase lethality by coordinating the attacks of two or more mines against detected vehicles, as determined by situation-dependent tactical templates.

  • The system would dynamically integrate AT munitions into a combined joint sensor/killer team.

  • The presence of Raptor would impart a fear of death or injury throughout the depth of the battlefield.

  • The Hornet/WAM has an antihandling device to inhibit tampering, which may have a psychological impact.

Disadvantages

  • The hand emplacement of vehicle sensors, gateways, and Hornet/WAM would dramatically increase manpower requirements and delivery time, especially when used at depth and across wide fronts. Emplacement by unmanned helicopters (if developed) or similar means could facilitate the use of Raptor in areas beyond the direct control of friendly forces.

  • The absence of APL or human sensors could make Raptor mines susceptible to clearance by a dismounted enemy, especially at a distance from friendly forces.

  • Development, production, and fielding costs would be high.

  • Given the complexity of the system, maintenance and logistics costs could also be high.

Remote AntiarmorMine System Enhanced with Telemetry and Sensor Package

Source: Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

The Remote Antiarmor Mine System (RAAMS) enhanced with telemetry and a sensor package (RD-Sensor) would have the enhancements proposed in the RD-Telemetry (RAAMS enhanced with telemetry) concept. RD-Sensor would also contain a sensor package in addition to the AT mines. Once delivered, the AT mines and sensor packages would fall to the ground, deploying one or more low-power, miniature sensors. At least one of the sensors should be imaging (infrared, motion detection, video), with others being acoustic, seismic, or other types. The lowest power sensor, probably acoustic, would first detect vehicles or dismounted intruders and then “wake up” the more powerconsuming imaging sensor.

A transmitter would send appropriate imagery information back to a friendly operations center, most likely located tens of kilometers away. If enemy dismounted forces were identified, the man-in-the-loop could call for indirect fire to keep the enemy from clearing the AT mines, reinforce the minefield with more AT mines, or take other action.

To reduce power and bandwidth requirements, one (or a limited number) of RD-Sensor projectiles/dispensers could be added to a minefield consisting of many remotely delivered, but not sensor-equipped, AT mines. RD-Sensor could also be incorporated into air-delivered or ground-delivered scatterable minefields.



3 The committee questioned whether Raptor might be more appropriately controlled at a level lower than the brigade level.

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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Because RD-Sensor would provide near real-time knowledge of the location of remotely delivered minefields, the system could be used at the last minute against high payoff targets in support of mobile and other operations. This would reduce the time enemy forces would have to locate and clear remotely delivered AT mines. The integrated sensor package could also give the commander remote ears and eyes so he could call for indirect fire or take other actions to protect the AT mines from intruders. Near real-time sensor information would give the commander the option of reinforcing the minefield with additional remotely delivered mines or cover it with other AT weapons, such as SADARM, BAT, SFW, attack helicopters, or close air support while enemy vehicles were delayed by the AT mines. Antihandling devices on 20 percent of the munitions would discourage tampering.

RD-Sensor would require a considerable amount of research and development. To develop and integrate the sensor package into an existing dispenser, a number of technological challenges would have to be overcome: hardening and militarizing the sensors; developing enabling sensors that could determine their location and orientation; developing of infrared sensors that could “pop up” above vegetation and other obstacles; developing a limited, autonomous network of deployed sensors that could communicate with each other; devising methods of overcoming power and bandwidth challenges to allow nonline-of-sight communication of infrared imagery and other sensor feedback to friendly operations centers located many kilometers away.

Advantages

  • Because RD-Sensor does not include APL, it would be conceptually compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

  • The presence of a self-destruct feature and a man-in-the-loop would further address humanitarian concerns.

  • Twenty percent of the mines would have antihandling devices to inhibit tampering.

  • A more precise estimate of the ground location of remotely delivered mines might reduce fratricide.

  • More certain knowledge of the location of remotely delivered mines in critical locations would enable combat commanders to use remotely delivered AT mines at the last minute, thus reducing an enemy's ability to find and clear the minefield.

  • With information on an attempted breach of an AT minefield or certainty that enemy vehicles are being destroyed, a commander could take action to protect the AT mines or reinforce this success.

Disadvantages

  • A significant number of delivery assets would be required to emplace a large minefield.

  • On current mines, self-destruct times can not be reset from the factory-set times.

  • Current mines do not have a command-destruct feature.

  • Research, development, and acquisition costs would be high.

Remotely Delivered Hornet/Wide Area Munition

Source: Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

The Hornet/WAM is a hand-emplaced, autonomous AT mine currently entering inventory. The proposed alternative (RD-WAM) would add a remote delivery capability, via a Volcano launcher or from a deep-attack asset, such as MLRS or TACMS. It might also be possible to emplace the mine via gravity ordnance (such as Gator). The Hornet/WAM weighs about 16 kilograms, is about 36 centimeters high, and about 23 centimeters in diameter. When its seismic sensors detect movement, it alerts the mine to turn on its acoustic sensors, which detect and classify the target. If an armored target approaches within 100 meters, a submunition with an infrared sensor is launched over the target and fires an explosively formed projectile into the engine compartment. Hornet/WAM AT mines have an antihandling feature that causes the mine to detonate when disturbed. The mine is designed to operate for 30 days and then self-destruct.

The tactical use of a RD-WAM would have to be developed and added to doctrinal manuals. Although a comprehensive and lengthy research and development effort would be required to harden and otherwise modify the Hornet/ WAM for remote delivery, other nations have developed hardened mines similar in size to Hornet/WAM. Thus, hardening of Hornet/WAM should be feasible.

Advantages

  • RD-WAM would comply with CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

  • The self-destruct feature would further address humanitarian concerns.

  • The antihandling device would inhibit tampering.

  • The RD-WAM provides wide-area coverage and an off-route capability.

  • Remote delivery would increase the utility and range of use of Hornet/WAM on the battlefield.

Disadvantages

  • Development and procurement costs would be high.

  • Remote delivery would require the use of high-value assets.

Self-Healing Minefield

Source: DARPA Track II (Altshuler, 1999)

The self-healing minefield would be a dynamic,

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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scatterable AT minefield (the munition would be similar in size and delivery method to Volcano or Gator mines). Through mine-to-mine communication and interaction, individual mines would respond to breaching attempts by reorganizing (physically jumping) to fill in open lanes, thereby establishing a barrier. Because a breach could not be sustained, the enemy would be forced to change tactics from breaching to clearing the minefield. Thus, this system would be an alternative to mixed mine systems.

Before this technology can be transferred from DARPA to the Army, it will have to undergo several stages of testing: preliminary analysis to determine the validity of the concept; verification of its battlefield utility; development of enabling technologies; and testing of the technologies.

A preliminary modeling exercise has been completed by the Institute for Defense Analyses to demonstrate concept viability. Battlefield utility has been explored at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory through a simulation of a single scenario, which had favorable results. According to the program manager, Sandia National Laboratories have demonstrated preliminary physical/mechanical capability (a 12-centimeter diameter, 2.27-kg payload and actuator using liquid fuel was shown to travel 6 to 7.5 meters in the air). According to the program manager at DARPA, contracts of up to three years have been concluded for all aspects of the program. At the conclusion of these contracts the viability of the mine and technology for a 50-mine minefield should have been demonstrated. (Telephone conversation between Dr. Altshuler, DARPA Program Manager for Antipersonnel Landmine Alternatives, and Study Director about status of self-healing minefield progress, August 14, 2000.) The mobility target would include the capability of a mine to perform multiple jumps over hundreds of meters; the durability would be comparable to Volcano.

The developmental issues that must still be addressed can be categorized as mechanical issues and communications-related issues. Mechanical issues include mine mobility and distribution. The ability of a mine to jump distances of a few meters several times over will have to be convincingly and repeatedly demonstrated, as will the ability of a mine to jump in wooded areas, shrubs, and muddy terrain. Predetermined distribution (geolocation) of mines, particularly scatterable mines delivered by aircraft (fixed-wing or rotary-wing), will have to be demonstrated or shown to be unnecessary. The current DARPA program includes limited use of GPS; therefore system viability during periods when GPS is denied will have to be demonstrated. The response time to a breach will have to be ascertained and shown to be tactically significant.

According to the DARPA program manager, mine-to-mine communication technology and reliability are not considered major developmental issues because technology that is almost “off the shelf” can be used. The issue of vulnerability to countermeasures (jamming and spoofing) will have to be addressed, as well as whether it is possible to develop an advanced warhead with the same diameter and volume, but with increased penetration capability. Depending on the capabilities of the mines, the mine density in a field might have to be changed, which might require changes in doctrine or tactics, techniques, and logistics.

Advantages

  • Because these are AT mines, they are compliant with the Ottawa Convention and would be configured to comply with the CCW Amended Protocol II.

  • A self-healing minefield, although a long-term technology, would use advanced technologies and incorporate innovative, out-of-the-box thinking.

Disadvantages

  • The projected cost of laying a minefield is anticipated to be about twice that of laying a Volcano field.

  • It is likely to take a long time to bring this item into production.

BAT Antiarmor Munition

Source: Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Army developed to the prototype stage a distributed-sensor, antiarmor mine known as HOMINE (for homing mine), which consisted of a sensor field covering an area similar to that of an AT minefield and a separately located kill system. The BAT Antiarmor Munition (BATAAM) resurrects the basic HOMINE concept and broadens its capability by using a BAT as the kill system with the submunition and a “minefield” surveillance system controlled by a remote operator.

The BAT submunition (described in Chapter 5) was originally designed to be delivered by missile or aircraft, at long range, for a many-on-many attack against armored columns. In the BATAAM concept, the same munition would be positioned on the ground and activated by sensors. The BATAAM concept would lend itself to two deployment options.

Option 1. BATAAM could eventually be a replacement for WAM PIP, the advantage being its broader kill radius. Equipped with the WAM PIP detection/localization sensors (acoustic/seismic), and incorporating a GPS receiver and antihandling device, the single-weapon BATAAM launch canisters would be hand emplaced in the centers of the BAT target acquisition footprint (the spacing between weapons would be an abutting grid of such footprints). The minefield surveillance package would consist of infrared/optical sensors, communication equipment, and a GPS receiver linking the package to both the individual weapons and an operator. Surveillance-to-operator communications would be line-of-sight, radio-frequency transmissions for short distances (3 to 5 kilometers) and aircraft or satellite-link communications for longer transmissions. Each BAT sensor would remain on to alert the surveillance system but could only be fired

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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when enabled by the operator (after which it could be activated by its own sensors). In addition, the operator would have the ability to fire or command detonate each weapon. A timed, self-deactivation feature and antihandling device would provide backup in the event the operator were not able to perform this function.

Option 2. In the second deployment option, the minefield would have small, hand-strewn or helicopter-deployed magnetic/pressure sensors. The surveillance/communications package and the multiple-shot BAT kill system could be colocated or separately positioned on the periphery of the minefield. A radio-frequency signal from a small sensor would wake up the surveillance system. With the locations of the surveillance and kill system determined by the GPS, and using a topographic map, the operator could superimpose a grid on the minefield if necessary. Individual BAT weapons, equipped with propulsion to loft them from the canister to an altitude for target surveillance within the minefield, would be command-fired by the operator.

As in Option 1, the surveillance and kill system would be equipped with an antihandling device, but in Option 2, the weapon could only be fired by the operator, thus allowing for friendly transit as well as optimum enemy force deployment within the minefield. The operator would have the option of command detonating the BAT weapons. In both options, the weapon system would be equipped for self-deactivation in the event of operator neutralization.

The WAM PIP sensors and the BAT upgrade are under development. The components of the surveillance package are available, but would have to be assembled and militarized. Tactical employment of the BATAAM would have to be added to doctrinal publications as the system is fielded.

Advantages

  • This AT mine would comply with the Ottawa Convention and could be made to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II.

  • BATAAM would provide for a less expensive means of delivering the BAT submunition than the present missiles.

  • Weapon delivery against targets would be more precise.

  • An AT minefield could be established for close-in protection (battlefield conditions permitting). In Option 2, the sensor could be delivered by missile, artillery, or aircraft.

  • BATAAM would allow safe passage by friendly forces.

  • Both deployment options would permit optimum deployment of intruding forces before weapon release.

  • Expensive components could be command detonated or retrieved for reuse.

Disadvantages

  • BATAAM must be hand emplaced; in high-visibility terrain, BAT canisters might require burial.

  • The system would be somewhat more expensive than other alternatives.

  • BATAAM would require a man-in-the-loop for optimum effectiveness.

Early-Warning Subsystem for Remotely Delivered Antitank Minefields

Source: Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

The Early-Warning Subsystem (EWSS) for remotely delivered AT minefields would be based on small electronic components integrated into Volcano, Gator, RAAMS, and other scatterable AT systems to transmit their location, direction, and relative position. Friendly forces would be equipped with receivers that could interpret subsystem transmissions to provide real-time information on nearby, friendly, scattered minefields. With this situational awareness, friendly forces could maneuver around the minefields, thus reducing the likelihood of fratricide.

With this system, next-generation AT mines might be programmed with additional self-destruct times. Very brief self-destruct times, perhaps fractions of an hour, would have several advantages. First, a commander would have the option of using an extremely short-duration, precise minefield that would support the plan of maneuver and minimize fratricide and the risk to noncombatants after friendly forces had passed. Second, it would enable commanders to use scatterable minefields in high-risk locations in all weather conditions, just in time, and close to friendly troops. Much longer self-destruct times of up to 30 days or more could be used for static situations where there were few noncombatants.

Ideally, transmissions from the subsystem could be received by and displayed on the screens of standard mounted and dismounted digital command and control devices. As an interim alternative, a small, single-purpose receiving device could be developed to digitally display warning signals from scatterable minefields. The receiver could also include a command-destruct option to allow AT mines to be detonated as the situation warranted.

Tactics, techniques, procedures, and training devices would have to be developed to teach soldiers to interpret and react to warning signals emanating from actual or simulated remotely delivered minefields. Emulators could be routinely used during field training exercises to increase the organization-wide understanding of and confidence in using scatterable AT mines in combat. With the high level of situational awareness, scatterable minefields could be emplaced at the last possible minute, thereby providing AT mines with a measure of protection by giving the enemy less time to react and breach the minefield.

Considerable research and development assets would be required to develop the transmitter, receiver, and other

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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hardware/software necessary to implement this concept. User documentation would also have to be developed to articulate the battlefield need for an EWSS.

Advantages

  • The EWSS would use AT mines that are compliant with the CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

  • An EWSS would improve the situational awareness of friendly units and reduce the likelihood of fratricide.

  • Precise information about the location of scatterable minefields could lead to shorter self-destruct times for AT mines.

  • A command-destruct option would be viewed positively by friendly forces and humanitarian organizations.

  • The use of early-warning emulators in training could increase the confidence of commanders and soldiers in using scatterable minefields in combat.

Disadvantages

  • Information provided by EWSS would have to be integrated into digital displays.

  • The minefields could be easily breached if the enemy obtained the information provided to friendly forces.

  • Research and development costs could be high.

Remote Antiarmor Mine System with Nonlethal Capability

Source: Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

A modification of the RAAMS concept, the Remote Antiarmor Mine System with nonlethal capability (RAAMS-NL) would include eight current RAAMS AT mines augmented with Taser nonlethal munitions in a 155-mm howitzer projectile. The purpose of the Taser nonlethal munitions would be to provide protection against a dismounted enemy breaching force. When the infrared sensors detect a human intruder, the munition would propel small barbed darts out to 6 meters. When the darts entered an intruder's skin or clothing, an incapacitating electric shock of 50,000 volts would be produced in 4 to 6 microsecond pulses, 10 to 20 times per second. The current Taser nonlethal munition power supply could support approximately 10 minutes of continuous operations. However, the electric shocks could be cycled less frequently to incapacitate an enemy for several hours.

Existing doctrine and tactics should be adequate for this system, although publications and firing tables would have to be adjusted. Gun-hardening, modifying, and integrating the Taser nonlethal munitions into the RAAMS-NL projectile would require significant research and development. Development of a long-term, reliable power supply could present a major challenge.

Advantages

  • The AT mines and Taser nonlethal munitions comply with the CCW Amended Protocol II.

  • Even though the Taser nonlethal munition fires electrically charged darts, the electric shocks are considered to be nonlethal, which should make this system acceptable under the Ottawa Convention.

  • Taser nonlethal munitions would provide the AT minefields a measure of protection against dismounted breaching forces.

Disadvantages

  • The effects of Taser nonlethal munitions on humans (particularly children) are not fully known. However, police forces that use Taser devices have collected large amounts of data in this area.

  • The Taser is not lethal and, therefore, would have limited psychological and physical impacts against a determined enemy.

  • Intruders could deflect darts by carrying antiriot shields.

  • Battery/power issues would increase maintenance and storage costs over the life cycle of the system.

COMMITTEE ASSESSMENTS

Materiel Alternatives Against Dismounted Targets

The committee considered five systems for use against dismounted targets that should or could be available after 2006. Compared to the M14/M16 baseline system, all of the systems appear to meet both the military and humanitarian requirements developed by the committee. Several of the alternatives would provide graduated responses and could be used either in pure APL modes or as mixed munitions. They are presented below beginning with the alternative that scored highest in military criteria, but the committee believes all of them warrant consideration.

The RRASMS would use an electronically programmable radio to facilitate communications and self-locate. The sensor information would be provided to a soldier/operator who could select a response from a menu of increasingly lethal modular munitions.

The URAS would use Claymores appropriate to the nature of the terrain and the anticipated size and distribution of intruding forces. URAS would provide firing versatility for maximum effectiveness.

A DARPA Track II concept, the Tags/Minimally Guided Munitions, could detect and locate dismounted enemies through tags that affix themselves to enemy soldiers. The tag-cued munition, released after a man-in-the-loop decision, would make possible post-apogee trajectory changes to focus on the target (tag) rather than an area.

The LDMG would use laser radar and an automatically

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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aimed machine gun. The soldier/operator would decide whether the response should be lethal or nonlethal.

A distributed-sensor AP minefield could be used as an area-denial weapon or in mixed mode as protection for an AT minefield. The kill system would have to be installed by hand. The system would rely on remote observations by a man-in-the-loop who had been alerted by optical and infrared sensors.

Materiel Alternatives Against Mounted Targets

After 2006, it will be technologically feasible to improve the tactical effectiveness of existing or proposed remotely delivered AT mines by providing multiple means of remote deployment and additional resistance to countermeasures through signature reduction and the use of nonlethal techniques. The committee considered eight systems that might be available after 2006 that could be used against mounted enemies. Compared to the Volcano baseline system, all of them appeared to meet the military and humanitarian requirements for an APL alternative (see Table 7-2 for score sheet).

Mixed Antitank/Nonlethal Alternatives

RAAMS-NL would modify the existing RAAMS munition to include a Taser nonlethal device activated in some manner (e.g., by a trip wire). The Taser would protect the deployed AT mines from attempts to breach them by subjecting an intruder to high-intensity electric shocks. Although gun-hardening, modifying, and integrating the Taser munitions into the RAAMS projectile would require significant research and development, the RAAMS system would be greatly improved by the addition of a nonlethal antipersonnel component.

Pure Antitank Mine Systems

The Raptor, already in development, would be a smart, autonomous, AT system that would improve situational awareness and provide targeting information for other weapons, such as Hornet/WAM. The system would be deployed, initially hand-emplaced, deep in the battlespace to detect, track, and classify individual intruding vehicles. Soldier/ operators at the brigade tactical operations center would know the exact locations of the Raptor components/munitions and would be able to operate these components from a distance. Although Raptor would be very expensive, the system could be highly effective, especially with remote delivery modifications. Raptor received high scores in the military-effects category.

RAAMS enhanced with telemetry and sensor package (RD-Sensor) would add a sensor package to the RD-Telemetry alternative described in Chapter 6. Following delivery, the AT mines and sensor package would deploy one or more low-power, miniature sensors to detect vehicles or dismounted intruders. A transmitter would send appropriate imagery information back to the soldier/operator who could determine the appropriate course of action.

Recommendation. The Army should proceed rapidly with plans for modernizing existing remotely delivered pure antitank landmine systems, such as RAAMS and Volcano (M87A1), by incorporating other technologies, including sensors, precision locators, and nonlethal devices.

The remotely delivered RD-WAM would be an enhancement to the current Hornet/WAM, which requires hand emplacement. A modified, hardened Hornet/WAM could be remotely delivered using a Volcano launcher, an MLRS, or a tactical missile system. The remotely delivered Hornet/ WAM received higher combined scores in the areas of technological risk and cost than did other alternatives. The committee believes this alternative has great potential because the Hornet/WAM is a superior weapon except for its limited means of delivery.

The Self-Healing Minefield, a DARPA Track II program, would be an intelligent, distributed network of AT mines with decentralized control. Unlike many of the other alternatives, the Self-Healing Minefield would not have a manin-the-loop. Individual munitions would detect breaching attempts through mine-to-mine communications and automatically react by moving to fill gaps in the minefield. This promising innovative system is unlikely to be available for at least 10 years.

Recommendation. The development of the Self-Healing Minefield concept, which automatically reacts to any breaching attempt by refilling gaps, should be experimentally evaluated to determine its operational effectiveness.

The BATAAM provides a means of using the smart munition BAT in a static minefield situation. Although it provides no increased military effectiveness over current systems, the introduction of the sensor field provides the commander with greater battlefield flexibility.

Sensor Systems

The EWSS for remotely delivered AT minefields would integrate small electronic components into scatterable AT systems to transmit their location to friendly forces equipped with receivers who would then be able to maneuver around minefields. EWSS would reduce fratricide and allow more confident use of the “just-in-time” delivery of AT mines to discourage breaches and reinforce high-risk locations. The committee believes that EWSS could leverage emerging information systems technologies.

DWSC would be a sensor network linked to existing combat systems by a communications network. DWSC would involve delivering, by artillery or air, hundreds, or even thousands, of small, expendable sensors over a wide area that would communicate data back to a central point. Using a

Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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TABLE 7-2 Score Sheet for Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006
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Suggested Citation:"7 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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FIGURE 7-1 Military effectiveness of alternatives potentially available after 2006 based on qualitative scoring by the committee.

man-in-the-loop, a commander could make an informed decision about an appropriate response to an intrusion. DWSC would exploit existing and developing communications and combat systems. Because DWSC would not require a dedicated, unique kill system, it could be more cost effective than some other APL alternatives. This integrated approach would be one of the most effective future systems and scored very high in the military effects category. In addition, DWSC is already the focus of a major Army science and technology program. However, several technology issues would have to be solved before the system could become operational.

Summary

The criteria and scores are displayed in tabular form in Table 7-2. The details of how these scores were derived can be found in Chapter 4.

Figure 7-3 is a graphical summary of the scoring. In keeping with the Statement of Task, this graph shows only the relative military effectiveness of candidate systems without regard to cost, risk, or humanitarian factors. Each bar on the graph is a composite. The lower portion (white) shows the degree to which each system meets the military effectiveness requirements in comparison to the baseline system. If the candidate system meets all of the requirements at least as well as the baseline system, the score is 0. If it is less effective in any requirement, the score is less than 0. The upper portion (dark shading) of the bar shows capabilities that exceed those of the baseline system.

These graphs use the methodology described in Chapter 5. In general, if the total bar height is high, the system is likely to be militarily effective. If the value of the lower portion of the bar is near 0, the system meets most of the military requirements. If the lower bar is much lower than 0, the system probably has significant differences from the baseline mine and will not perform some desired functions. However, that system may still be militarily effective if it performs some functions much better than the baseline system. Because the scoring criteria were not weighted, these graphs should be used only for assessing trends and making qualitative comparisons.

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Next: 8 Conclusions and Recommendations »
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This book examines potential technologies for replacing antipersonnel landmines by 2006, the U.S. target date for signing an international treaty banning these weapons. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines emphasizes the role that technology can play to allow certain weapons to be used more selectively, reducing the danger to uninvolved civilians while improving the effectiveness of the U.S. military. Landmines are an important weapon in the U.S. military’s arsenal but the persistent variety can cause unintended casualties, to both civilians and friendly forces. New technologies could replace some, but not all, of the U.S. military’s antipersonnel landmines by 2006. In the period following 2006, emerging technologies might eliminate the landmine totally, while retaining the necessary functionalities that today’s mines provide to the military.

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