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7 Sentencing Reforms and Their Impacts Jacqueline Cohen and Michael H. Tonry INTRODUCTI ON The sentencing reform movement has forced us to look at the sentencing process whole. Until recently the word sentencing usually evoked images of defendants in the dock, berobed judges, and high-ceilinged courtrooms. The roles of police, prosecutors, and parole and prison professionals in sentence outcomes were little attended to. Now, after a decade of ferment, most discussions of sentencing reform address not only the discretion of judges, but also that of prosecutors, parole boards, and sometimes other officials. Sentencing is no longer commonly perceived as simply what the judge does, but rather as a complex process in which various people make decisions that influence the quality and quantum of punishment a defendant receives. Most sentencing reforms have focused on only one part of the process. Maine, for example, abolished parole but addressed no other punishment power; the abolition of parole without development of criteria and constraints for judges, however, gave little reason to expect that sentences imposed by judges would also change in some desired way. California "abolished" parole and set detailed statutory criteria for judges imposing prison sentences on convicted offenders, raising the possibility that much of the power in determining sentence outcomes would thereby be shifted to prosecutors through the charging and plea negotiation processes. Illinois 305

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306 abolished parole, set only loose statutory sentencing criteria, and established "day-for-day" good time. Prisoners, however, have no vested entitlement to accrued good-time credits, leaving corrections authorities with the power to increase a prisoner's nominal sentence by as much as 100 percent by withdrawing good-time credits to penalize prisoner misconduct. In view of this complexity, evaluations of the impact of sentencing reforms should not be limited to the domain in which these schemes are implemented. To see the impact of parole guidelines, one must consider not only the actions of the parole board, but also those of judges, lawyers, and prison officials. To see the impact of sentencing guidelines, one must consider their implications for plea bargaining, parole release decisions, and so on. This paper reviews the scanty evaluation literature on the impact of various sentencing reforms. We begin with the abolition of plea bargaining. The next section deals with mandatory-minimum sentencing laws and is followed by one on California's determinate sentencing scheme. The next section is concerned with the impact of sentencing guidelines: both the descriptive variety first developed in Denver and their prescriptive cousins promulgated by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission. The final section discusses the abolition of parole and parole guidelines. Impacts Considered We use the term impact evaluation as if it were a term of art in this context. In fact, evaluation may be, but impact certainly is not. In order to assess the impact of anything sensibly, one must have some sense of what to look for. In considering the impact of a sentencing reform scheme, one might look at any of the following: (1) The realization of proponents' purposes or goals. One would be interested to identify in legislation or the legislative history (or their analogies in an administrative or judicial innovation) precisely what various architects of reform wanted, then to consider the extent to which those wants were satisfied. (2) Mechanical or literal compliance with the statute (or rule or guideline, etc.). One might assume

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307 that the purpose of the reform scheme was that all cases covered by the literal terms of the rule be handled in a manner consistent with the rule. (3) The effect on crime rates. The extent to which crime and criminality are affected, particularly any reduction or redirection, as a result of deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. (4) Work group behavioral and attitudinal reactions. What precisely did judges, lawyers, and defendants do under the new scheme that was different from their behavior under the preexisting law; what are their reactions to the new scheme; what changes, if any, do they believe have resulted; do they approve or disapprove of the new regime and why. (a) Sanctioning rates and distributions. What effect has the new scheme had on the distribution of sanctions--did more people go to prison for shorter or longer terms, did different people go to prison, etc. (6) Case flow. Was the flow of cases through the system changed; did guilty plea rates, trial rates, dismissal rates, charging rates, and indictment rates change, in what directions, and for what categories of offenders and charged offenses. (7) Public attitudes/opinions/morale. Did public attitudes about the legitimacy or effectiveness of the punishment process specifically, or the criminal process generally, change, and if so in what ways. We are here primarily concerned with the effectiveness of sentencing reforms as means to reduce disparities, to increase or decrease sentence severity, and to systematize decision making by reducing discretion. our analysis thus concentrates on how innovations have affected what happens to defendants and how judges and lawyers have changed their behavior. These concerns relate primarily to the impact criteria listed as numbers 2, 4, 5, and 6 above. The literature on crime rate impact through deterrence and incapacitation as well as rehabilitative effects has been reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Blumstein et al., 1978 and Sechrest et al., 1979). Relatively little effort has been made in impact evaluations to measure the congruence between proponents' goals and system effects (but see Casper et al., 1981). Similarly, we are aware of no useful body of literature

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308 that assesses the impacts of sentencing innovations on public attitudes or opinions. Innovations Considered The broadest continuum of decisions that affect criminal punishment begins at one pole with the victim or witness who elects whether to report an apparent crime to the police and terminates at its opposite pole with officials who decide whether to revoke the parole status of an uncooperative parolee. Recent reform efforts attend to a shorter continuum ranging from prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions through initial parole release. From a civil liberties perspective this narrower focus may not be too unfortunate. "Wrong" decisions not to report, record, or charge are a windfall to the suspect, who certainly has no basis for complaint. "Wrong" decisions to complain or initiate charges are unfortunate, but they are reviewed by prosecutors and judges. The reform movement's failure to address parole revocation procedures and standards may be more troublesome: Those proceedings afford parolees only rudimentary procedural safeguards, are of low visibility, and are not subject to judicial review on their substantive merits. This review is thus concerned with reforms and evaluations of reforms directed at the actions and decisions of prosecutors, judges, and parole authorities. Often one reform scheme affects more than one actor and causal relationships are difficult to isolate. For organizational purposes only, this review somewhat artifically isolates reform efforts, beginning with the prosecutor and ending with parole. ABEL ITION OF PLEA BARGAINING Plea bargaining has long been subject to criticism. Calls for its abolition have been frequent. For many years, it was a dirty secret and required that defendants be thespians who would affirm in court, before lawyers and judges who knew better, that guilty pleas were wholly voluntary, the consequence of contrition, and not induced by assurances of leniency. Plea bargaining has now been legitimated by the Supreme Court and has become overt. The Supreme Court

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309 has established that the defendant is entitled to the bargain that has induced a plea and that the judge must accept the arrangement or permit the defendant to reconsider whether to plead guilty (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 25 7 [1971]). The Supreme Court has also held that the prosecutor's charging and threat tactics before and during plea bargaining are not subject to review by the courts; virtually anything goes (Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 [1978]). These developments and the advent of sentencing schemes that specify criteria for sentencing give the prosecutor immense influence over the applicable sentence through charging and dismissal decisions; the courts can do little about it. General antipathy for plea bargaining and the realization that prosecutors can manipulate determinate sentencing laws have led to a number of efforts to "abolish" plea bargaining in full or in part. Some of _ these efforts are directed principally at Plea bargaining. The attorney general of Alaska in 1975 forbade plea bargaining (Rubinstein et al., 1980). The prosecutor of one county in Michigan abolished charge bargaining in drug trafficking cases (Iowa Law Review, 1975; Church, 1976). Other plea bargaining bans have been associated with other major reforms. The Wayne County (Detroit) prosecutor, for example, forbade bargaining over firearms charges carrying a mandatory two-year sentence (Heumann and Loftin, 1979). Restrictions were also placed on negotiated charge reductions in New York's mandatory sentencing law for drug offenses (Joint Committee, 1977). Only the first three of these plea bargaining bans have been studied in any detail; these impact evaluations are reviewed in this section. The broadest generalization that derives from these evaluations is that plea bargaining can be substantially controlled when the chief prosecutor wishes to do so and establishes internal reviews and management systems that effectively monitor the behavior of assistant prosecutors. Conversely, if controls are not established, there is a strong tendency for judges and lawyers to establish alternative bargaining systems. Subsidiary generalizations supported by the studies reviewed are that increased numbers of defendants are diverted from the system at screening or by dismissal, that assistant prosecutors generally prefer working in a system having little or reduced plea bargaining, and that defense lawyers generally dislike the new systems.

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310 Plea Bargaining Ban in Alaska Alaska is the only state to attempt to eliminate plea bargaining statewide in all its variant forms. On July 3, effective August 15, 1975, the attorney general of Alaska ordered Alaskan prosecutors to desist from plea bargaining and sentence recommendations. There was early ambiguity about the legitimacy of charge bargaining, but the policy was soon clarified: Charge dismissals or reductions as inducements to guilty pleas were forbidden; unilateral charge dismissals for good faith professional reasons were permitted. The Alaska Judicial Council evaluated the impact of the abolition in Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau (Rubinstein et al., 1980). The evaluation involved statistical analyses of case processing for the ~ -month periods preceding and following implementation of the ban and a series of structured and open-ended interviews with police, lawyers, and judges. The statistical analyses included tabular presentations of disposition data and a multiple regression analysis to investigate factors influencing outcomes. Nearly every judge, prosecutor, assistant public defender, and active private defense lawyer in the three cities was interviewed, many of them several times. There were, in the mid-1970s, stark differences in legal culture in the three cities. Prosecutors and defense lawyers were highly adversarial in Fairbanks, and judges were "relatively tough and unsentimental." Counsel in Juneau prided themselves on their harmonious relations, and judges had reputations for leniency. Styles in Anchorage were more varied and fell somewhere in between (Rubinstein et al., 1980:45). The interviews indicated that local legal culture affected implementation of the ban. Plea bargaining was greatly diminished in all three cities, but it appears that there were greater flexibility and accommodation in collegial Juneau than in legalistic Fairbanks. Because the Alaska plea bargaining ban is the most ambitious effort of its type, and because the evaluation appears to be the most comprehensive, we describe it in considerable detail below. Many observers expected either widespread circumvention of the ban or, if plea bargains were truly eliminated, a slowdown in case processing with resulting backlogs, many more trial demands, and longer disposition times. None of these occurred. The Rubinstein et al.

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311 (1980) evaluation concluded that during the first 12 months after the ban took effect: (1) Plea bargaining was effectively curtailed and was not replaced by covert or implicit substitutes; (2) Defendants continued to plead guilty at about the same rates as before; (3) The trial rate increased, but the absolute number of trials remained small; (4) Sentence severity generally did not increase, except for drug offenses and less serious offenses committed by offenders with modest criminal records; and (5) Conviction rates changed little. These conclusions, however, must be viewed in the light of several methodological shortcomings. First and foremost, we are skeptical in the extreme about the credibility of the statistical analyses and conclusions deriving from them. For reasons not made clear, the unit of analysis in the statistical analyses of case processing is separate charges. These are referred to as "cases, defined as "a single charge against a single defendant" (Rubinstein et al., 1980:135). Using this approach, multiple charges against a single defendant appear as several cases in the data. These "cases" may be seriously misleading. Table 7-1 shows the breakdown of "cases" and defendants, by year when possible. The only information provided about defendants is that there were 2,283 defendants in the 2-year period, of whom 56 percent (1,278) were charged with only one felony charge (Rubinstein et al., 1980:134). Apparently screening eliminated 137 single-charge defendants (Table V-4), leaving a total of 1,141 single-charge defendants. It is impossible to determine how many multiple-charge defendants were screened out of the system or how many defendants were charged with specific offenses, either in specific years or in specific cities. All the statistical analyses of screening, dispositions, and sanctions are based on cases (i.e., charges), not defendants. This approach seems to us unsatisfactory. If it is true that sentence bargaining was prevalent before the ban took effect (Rubinstein et al., 1980:1-11), the number of separate charges, that is, "cases," would usually have been irrelevant. The central issue is the sentence for the defendant; whether, for

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312 TABLE 7-1 Description of Data Available for "Cases" and Defendants in Evaluation of Alaska Plea-Bargaining Ban A. Number of "CasesH and Defendants Number of Number of Years "Cases Defendants Both Years 3,586 2,283 Arrests 3,483 N/A Information/Indictments 103 N/A Year 1 1,815 N/A Arrests 1,776 N/A Information/Indictments 39 N/A Year 2 1,771 N/A Arrests 1,707 N/A Information/Indictments 64 N/A B. Defendants by Number of Charges One More Than Total Years Charge One Charge Defendants Both Years 1,278 1,005 (2,308 2,283 charges) Screened Out 137 N/A 137+ Prosecuted 1,141 N/A Fewer than 2,146 Year 1 N/A N/A N/A Year 2 N/A N/A N/A NOTE: Breakdowns by offense and by city were not available.

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313 example, a three-year sentence was for one charge, with two others dismissed, or one year for each of three charges served consecutively, or three years for each of three charges served concurrently would often have been immaterial. These alternative configurations would nevertheless appear to be quite different when outcomes on the separate charges were examined. There is thus every reason to suspect that the "case" is not a meaningful unit for characterizing case processing before the ban. If sentence and charge bargaining did substantially disappear after the ban, the judges' sentencing decisions would appear no more inherently related to the number of charges, or cases, than before Many of the findings based on comparison of dispositions in different cities, years, and offense types may be artifactual. If "cases" are not a meaningful operational unit, analyses based on comparison of "cases" are likely to reveal case-processing patterns, although they may not accurately reflect processing of defendants. Many of the "case" analyses show substantial dispositional stability over time. Why that should be, we cannot say. Prosecutors' charging patterns and judicial sentencing patterns for defendants might remain relatively consistent or change during the two years, and the "case" analyses could remain consistent.] Whatever the reason for the "cases approach, we believe it substantially diminishes the integrity and credibility of the resulting statistical analyses. There are other problems as well. First, the study considered developments only in the years immediately before and after August 15, 1975; apparent changes during those two years may reflect long-term trends that the research design fails to identify. Second, offenses are divided into six ad hoc vertical classes (murder and kidnapping; other violent felonies; burglary, larceny, and receiving; fradulent property offenses; drug felonies; and "morals" felonies). Primary reliance on those classes for year-to-year comparisons may mask changing patterns within a class. Crimes charged as aggravated assaults in year one, for example, may be charged as simple assaults in year two. The maximum authorized sentences would be affected and judges might react differently to the different offense labels. The classification scheme is insensitive to changes of that type.

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314 Third, the study looks only at felony prosecutions in either year. If the ban caused prosecutors to file misdemeanor charges in year two when they would have filed felony charges in year one (or vice versa), the study design will miss that change. There are other, lesser limitations to the design that we mention below as they become pertinent. Because of these methodological problems, the statistical analyses should be regarded with skepticism, if they are not disregarded altogether. Fortunately, most of the study's major conclusions derive from extensive interviews. In our discussion we draw heavily on the interview data and use the statistical data as supplementary information. Prosecutorial Involvement in Sentence Bargaining Although sentence bargaining was routinely practiced before the ban took effect, the study concluded that "plea bargaining as an institution was clearly curtailed" (Rubinstein et al., 1980:31, emphasis in original). Sentence bargaining and prosecutorial sentence recommendations declined abruptly in all three cities, with the greatest drop in Fairbanks. Table 7-2 shows the patterns of sentence recommendations in guilty plea cases before and after August 15, 1975. Here and elsewhere, periods 1 and 2 refer to the two six-month periods preceding the ban and periods 3 and 4 refer to the two six-month periods immediately after the ban. Before the ban, Anchorage prosecutors made sentence recommendations in half the guilty plea "cases" (i.e., charges); afterward in about 16 percent. In Fairbanks, sentence recommendations declined from a third of guilty plea charges to 6 percent. In Juneau sentence recommendations declined the least, from over half of guilty plea charges before the ban to 25 percent afterward.2 Interview respondents "agreed with the statistical finding that sentence bargaining had been essentially terminated" (Rubinstein et al., 1980:93). The report contains numerous references to statements by judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel who believed that the ban was observed and, often, especially among defense counsel and in Juneau, that substantive justice had suffered as a result.

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315 TABLE 7-2 Sentence Recommendations in Alaska Guilty Plea Cases Before and After the Ban on Plea Bargaining Percentage Percentageof Percentag e of NoSpecific of Other Jurisdiction Reconunen-Sentence Recommen and Time cationsLength cationsN Anchorage Period 1 49.025.2 25.7210 Period 2 53.921.2 24.9193 Period 3 87.46.3 6.3175 Period 4 78.88.9 12.3146 Fairbanks Period 1 66.3 15.1 18.6 86 Period 2 72.7 20.7 6.6 121 Period 3 94.9 4.3 0.9 117 Period 4 93.0 2.0 5.0 100 Juneau Period 1 21.4 28.6 50.0 14 Period 2 51.2 31.7 17.1 41 Period 3 79.2 4.2 16.7 24 Period 4 68.8 12.5 18.8 16 NOTE: Periods 1 and 2 refer to the two six-month periods prior to the plea bargaining ban; periods 3 and 4 are the two six-month periods immediately following the ban. SOURCE: Rubinstein et al. (1980:Table II-1). Charge Bargaining and Other Circumvention Lawyers and judges have personal and bureaucratic interests that may be served by the expeditious disposition of cases. Private defense lawyers often operate high-volume practices in which fees per case are low. Public defenders often have large case loads. Negotiated pleas involve less work for everyone.

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449 implementation of the gun law. The authors' conclusion to the contrary notwithstanding, such a program might very well selectively affect sanctions in gun cases if other cases were more likely to be dismissed in clearing the backlog. 11. This could be verified by comparing the processing times of trial cases with those of other disposition types. To ensure greater comparability between the two samples, the preperiod sample could be restricted only to those cases initiated and disposed in the six-month period July 1, 1976, to December 31, 1976. 12. These expectations are discussed at length in Messinger and Johnson (1978), Cassou and Taugher (1978), Nagin (l979), Brewer et al. (1980), Lipson and Peterson (1980), and Casper et al. (1981). 13. The same pattern is reported for 1977-1978 by Lipson and Peterson (1980) using Judicial Council data on sentences imposed in court between July 1, 1977, and September 30, 1978; 60 percent of all sentenced cases received the middle term (Lipson and Peterson, 1980:Table 10). The court sentencing data, however, show slightly higher use of the upper base term than was indicated by the corrections statistics, perhaps reflecting a greater likelihood that defendants receiving the aggravated upper base term will appeal conviction and thus delay their reception in prison. 14. The crime types directly affected by SB709 were first-degree burglary, robbery, voluntary manslaughter, rape, crimes against children, and oral copulation. Both the middle and upper terms were increased for all these offenses except robbery, for which only the upper term was increased. 15. The 1977-1978 data are available in Brewer et al. (1980:Tables 7 and 8); comparable data for 1979 are found in Board of Prison Terms (1981:Table III). 16. Because of the way the model is specified with no interaction between jurisdiction and law period, we cannot sort out whether the jurisdiction differences var y for the different periods of law. 17. Lipson and Peterson (1980:21-22) report that for the state as a whole there was definite evidence of less

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450 serious felonies shifting to municipal court between 1971 and 1976. During this period, while the number of defendants sentenced to prison or to both probation and jail remained relatively constant, these cases constituted an increasing proportion of superior court sentences as fewer felony arrests reached superior court. The above conclusion rests on the assumption that the less serious felony cases shifting to municipal court were also more likely to plead guilty early. 18. Utz (1978) describes this cooperative process of "settling the facts" as a principal means for achieving "substantive justice." 19. The influence of this legislative change on case mix in superior court is noted in Lipson and Peterson (1980:21) to account for increases in use of prison among superior court convictions through the early 1970s. 20. Data on lower court prosecutions were not available after 1973. 21. An ordinal variable was used to represent the dependent sentence type variable where "prison" = 4, "California Youth Authority" = 3, "jail" = 2 and "no jail" = 1. The estimated model is S = aJ + cT + bX + where S is sentence type, J is jurisdiction (Sacramento = 1, Alameda = 0) and T is the time period (post-DSL = 1, pre-DSL = 0). X includes a number of case attribute variables, reflecting whether the offense was a residential burglary or not, weapon use, physical harm to victim, presence of a vulnerable victim, sophistication in committing the offense, prior record of offender, weight of conviction charges, and race and sex of offender. Only race and weight of conviction charges were not statistically significant; all other variables, except sex (female = 1) were found to have a positive contribution toward a prison outcome. In this model "a" represents the pre-DSL difference between jurisdictions, and a + c is the post-DSL difference between jurisdictions with c being the ISL to DSL change in sentence outcomes, regardless of jurisdiction. In the estimate of the model both a and c are positive and significant.

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451 As formulated the model does not permit separately identifying different effects of DSL in the two jurisdictions; instead, both jurisdictions are assumed to experience the same change in sentence type outcomes after DSL J namely, c. ~ ~ ~~ Inclusion of a simple interaction variable combining jurisdiction with time period (J x T = 1 for post-DSL period in Sacramento, and O otherwise) would have permitted isolating separate DSL effects in each jurisdiction. For d the coefficient of J x T. the ISL to DSL change is c in Alameda and d + c in Sacramento. While a number of different models containing various interaction terms were estimated, none of them included an interaction of jurisdiction with time period. 22. In the eight years from 1962 to 1970, the FBI'S reported index crime rate rose 97.3 percent: frown 2.019.8 to 3,984.5 per 100,0 00 Modulation. From 1970 to 1978 this rate rose only 28.2 percent: from 3,984.5 to 5,109.3 per 100,000 population (U.S. Bureau of Criminal Statistics, 1981). 23. The issue of changes in time served is discussed in detail in the next section. 24. Since most of the studies were undertaken in the first few vears after implementation of DSL, the number . . . Of individuals sentenced and subsequently released uncter DSL was quite small. Information from the Department of Corrections indicates that in the early years of DSL, with the admittedly limited experience of implementation of the early-release, good-time provisions, most prisoners were released with maximum good time off their sentences (Lipson and Peterson, 1980:25; Brewer et al., 1980:14-15; Utz, 1981:150). 25. The results from Ku (1980) were consistent for all offenses and for burglary; robbery, by contrast, increased slightly from ISL to DSL. Ku's estimates of the medians were consistently lower than comparable medians reported in Brewer et al. (1980) and Casper et al. (1981). The difference between these estimates lies in Ku's use of the population remaining in prison on December 31, 1975, while the other estimates were based on time served by persons released during 1975. For Ku, the proportion of inmates with time served of at least one to two years was derived from the admissions during 1974 who are still in prison on December 31,

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452 1975. When releases during 1975 were used (Brewer e t al., 1980, and Casper et al., 1981), time served of at least one to two years derives from admissions on or before January 1973 to January 1974 for January 1975 releases, and so on, to admissions on or before Decembe r 1973 to December 1974 for December 1975 releases. Thus, there is greater representation of earlier admission cohorts in the estimates based on releases. To the extent that time served has been decreasing for more recent cohorts as suggested in Figure 7-9, the estimates of time served based on more recent cohorts from data on remaining populations w ill be lower. 26. In comparing ISL to DSL, Lipson and Peterson (1980:Table V) concluded that there were substantial reductions in time served under DSL for burglary, but only slight reductions for the persons offenses of robbery and assault. This imputed difference between or ime types was then the basis for the authors to conclude that the overall decrease in prison terms wa s largely the result of a greater representation of minor convictions previously sentenced to jail but now appearing among prison commitments with shorter terms on average. This seems an excessively strong conclusion to draw from these data. Allowing for maximum credit for good time, as they do for burglary, the combined 1977 and 1978 reductions for robbery (from 35 to 29 months) and assault (from 31 to 26 months) are comparable to those for burglary (from 21 to 13 months). 2 7. The control variables include whether the offense was a residential burglary or not, weapon use, physical harm to victim, presence of a vulnerable victim, sophistication in committing the offense, severe 1 indicators of prior record of the offender, weight of the conviction charges, and race and sex of the offender. 2 8. Only three control variables were significant: physical harm to victim, an interaction variable of weight of conviction counts and time period, and number of conviction counts. Neither race nor sex was s ignificant. 2 9. These results are consistent with the independent assessment of differences in case seriousness in the two counties (Utz, 1981:22-27) .

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453 30. If T = a + b Jurisdiction + c (Jurisdiction x Time) + dX + then the total effect of jurisdiction is given by (b + c Time) x Jurisdiction. When Time = 0 (ISL) the jurisdictional difference is only b; for Time = 1 (DSL) this difference is b + c. 31. For example, as specified, the model includes an interaction between time period and the weight of the conviction charges. To the extent that conviction charges and jurisdiction were negatively correlated, with the Sacramento sample, tending to have offenses of lower seriousness, the differential effect of DSL found for different levels of seriousness might be reflecting a difference in DSL effects in the two counties, with prison terms decreasing more under DSL in Sacramento than they do in Alameda. 32. The 80 percent mid-range, for example, is the range of prison terms that includes 40 percent of cases below the median and 40 percent above the median. 33. The seven crime types include second-degree murder, . . . robbery, assault wits a deadly weapon, first-degree burglary, receiving stolen property, forgery and checks, and rape. The standard deviation decreased for all but assault with a deadly weapon and rape. 34. The Denver data file included all cases for which charges were filed in district court between May 1, 1975, and October 31, 1978, and sentences were imposed by April 30, 1979. These included 1,208 cases sentenced before guideline implementation and 2.397 cases sentenced after guideline implementation. However, many of these cases could not be used because of missing data, and there is little basis for assessing the representativeness of those cases that were used. 35. There is no indication of the extent of missing data in Philadelphia. The cases actually used in the impact analysis number 920 before and 429 after guideline implementation. 36. The preguideline data include randomly selected presentence reports prepared in calendar year 1975 and all presentence reports during January, February, and March 1977. Of a total of 1,704 preguideline cases, 258 were deleted because of missing data. The postguideline

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454 data include 702 cases in which guidelines were used from July 1977 through January 1978; 68 cases were excluded be- cause of missing data. Guidelines were not used in all cases sentenced after July 1977, and there is no informa- tion available on the basis for selecting cases for guideline use. 37. Maine State Prison is the long-term prison; prisoners sent to the Maine Correctional Center are under sentences of three years or less. 38. This issue is discussed at length in the context of discrimination in sentencing in the paper by Klepper et al. (in this volume). REED RENCES Anspach, Donald F. 1981 C rossroads of Justice: Problems With Determinate Sentencing in Maine. University of Southern Maine, Portland, Maine (April 1, 1981). Arthur D. Little, Inc., and Goldfarb, Singer, and Austern (ADL) 1981 An Evaluation of Parole Guidelines in Four Jurisdictions. Unpublished document prepared for the National Institute of Corrections by Arthur D. Little, Inc., Washington, D.C. 1981a Consistency: An Analysis of the Parole Decision Guidelines of the Oregon Board of Parole. In ADL (1981) . 1981b Consistency: An Analysis of the Parole Decision Guidelines of the U.S. Parole Commission. In ADL (1981) . 1981c Consistency: An Analysis of the Parole Decision Guidelines of the Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Parole. In ADL (1981). 1981d The Parole Guidelines of the Minnesota Corrections Board. In ADL (1981). 1981e The Parole Guidelines of the U.S. Parole Commis- sion: An Analysis of Disparity. In ADL (1981). 1981f Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles: An Analysis of Release Decision-Making Under Guidelines. In ADL (1981). Beha, James A. 1977 "And nobody can get you out"--the impact of a

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455 mandatory prison sentence for the illegal carry- ing of a firearm on the use of firearms and on the administration of criminal justice in Boston. Boston University Law Review 57:96-146(Part I), 289-333(Part II). Blumstein, A., J. Cohen, and D. Nagin 1978 Deterrence an~cj ~ Estimating the , Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates. Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Washington, D.C.: Na tional Academy of Sciences. Blumstein, A., J. Cohen, and H. Miller 1980 Demographically disaggregated projections of prison populations. Journal of Criminal Justice 8:1-26. Board of Prison Terms 1981 Sentencing Practices: Determinate Sentencing Law. California Board of Prison Terms, February 11, 1981. Brewer, D., G.E. Beckett, and N. Holt 1980 Determinate Sentencing in California: The First Year's Experience. California Department of Correction, Chino. Ca lifornia Department of Justice 1980 Criminal Justice Profile--1979. Bureau of Crim inal Statistics and Special Services, California Department of Justice. 1981 Criminal Justice Profile--1980. - - Casper, 1981 Cassou, 1978 Church, 1976 Bureau of Crime inal Statistics and Special Services, California Department of Justice. J.D., D. Brereton, and D. Neal The Implementation of the California Determinate Sentencing Law. Draft final report to National Institute of Justice. A.K., and B. Taugher Determinate sentencing in California: the new numbers game. The Pacific Law Journal 9(1):2-106. - Thomas, Jr. "Plea" bargains, concessions, and the courts: analysis of a quasi-experiment. Law & Society Review 10:377-401. Cohen, J., and J. Helland 1981 Methodology for Evaluating the Impact of Sentenc- ing Guidelines. Unpublished paper, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University.

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456 Frankel, M.E. 1972 Criminal Sentences: York: Hill and Wang. General Accounting Office 1982 Federal Parole Practices: Law Without Order. New Better Management and Legislative Changes are Needed. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Gottfredson, D.M., L.T. Wilkins, and P.B. Hoffman 1978 Guidelines for Parole and Sentencing. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. Hay, Douglas, P. Linebaugh, J. Rule, E.P. Thompson, and C. Winslow 1975 Albion's Fatal Tree. New York: Pantheon. Heumann, Milton, and Colin Loftin 1979 Mandatory sentencing and the abolition of plea bargaining: the Michigan Felony Fire Arm Statute. Law & Society Review 13:393-430. Hubay, C. 1979 Study of robbery cases in Alameda County funded as part of Research Agreements Program of the National Institute of Justice to the Rand Cor- poration, Santa Monica, California. Iowa Law Review 1975 The elimination of plea bargaining in Black Hawk County: a case study. Iowa Law Review 61:1053. Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation 1977 The Nation's Toughest Drug Law: Evaluating the New York Experience. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Knapp, K. 1982 Impact of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines on Sentencing Practices. Hamline Law Review 5 (June): 237-256. Kramer, J.H., F.A. Hussey, S.P. Lagoy, D. Katkin, and C.V. McLaughlin 1978 Assessing the Impact of Determinate Sentencing and Parole Abolition in Maine. Draft report to National Institute of Justice. Ku, R. 1980 American Prisons and Jails: Vol. IV Supplement Report--Case Studies of New Legislation Governing Sentencing and Release. National Institute of Justice. Washington, D.C.: Justice. Lipson, A.J., and M.A. Peterson 1980 California Justice Under Determinate Sentencing: A Review and Agenda for Research Report U.S. Department of

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