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5

Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 CONCLUSIONS

ASCMD, OCMD, and TBMD capabilities are essential if naval forces are to operate in littoral areas. Threats to naval and joint forces operating in littoral areas stress the capabilities of current ASCMD, OCMD, and TBMD systems, and all indications are that they will become even more stressing. Future cruise missile threats are likely to be characterized by features such as low-altitude terminal flight paths, low-RCS values, high agility and Mach number, ECM-resistant sensors, and precision terminal homing capabilities.

The Marine Corps operational concepts embodied in OMFTS and STOM will not be feasible without effective TBMD and OCMD if operations are conducted in this threat environment. In addition, the requirements to provide naval surface fire support, OCMD, and TBMD in littoral areas will mean that its ships must operate in near-shore waters, where their survival will be totally dependent on the availability of robust ASCMD capabilities. Current ASCMD systems have marginal or poor performance in littoral areas against some existing advanced ASCM threats. The Navy has many significant improvements under development—e.g., MFR, SSDS, ESSM, SPY-1D(V) radar—which should be fielded as soon as possible. Some needed components are not under development (e.g., an ESSM launcher for non-Aegis combatants). Furthermore, naval combatants need an elevated detection platform and an over-the-horizon engagement system to restore an area defense capability providing the depth of fire needed for robust defense.

Unless there are significant (and unanticipated) increases in Navy budgets



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Page 129 5 Conclusions and Recommendations 5.1 CONCLUSIONS ASCMD, OCMD, and TBMD capabilities are essential if naval forces are to operate in littoral areas. Threats to naval and joint forces operating in littoral areas stress the capabilities of current ASCMD, OCMD, and TBMD systems, and all indications are that they will become even more stressing. Future cruise missile threats are likely to be characterized by features such as low-altitude terminal flight paths, low-RCS values, high agility and Mach number, ECM-resistant sensors, and precision terminal homing capabilities. The Marine Corps operational concepts embodied in OMFTS and STOM will not be feasible without effective TBMD and OCMD if operations are conducted in this threat environment. In addition, the requirements to provide naval surface fire support, OCMD, and TBMD in littoral areas will mean that its ships must operate in near-shore waters, where their survival will be totally dependent on the availability of robust ASCMD capabilities. Current ASCMD systems have marginal or poor performance in littoral areas against some existing advanced ASCM threats. The Navy has many significant improvements under development—e.g., MFR, SSDS, ESSM, SPY-1D(V) radar—which should be fielded as soon as possible. Some needed components are not under development (e.g., an ESSM launcher for non-Aegis combatants). Furthermore, naval combatants need an elevated detection platform and an over-the-horizon engagement system to restore an area defense capability providing the depth of fire needed for robust defense. Unless there are significant (and unanticipated) increases in Navy budgets

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Page 130 that would permit new classes of sensors to be fielded, the negation of OCM and ASCM threats will require the Navy and the Marine Corps to field new sensor and weapon capabilities and/or to become dependent on and integrated with the nonorganic sensor systems of other Services and agencies. These nonorganic sensor systems might include AWACS, JLENS, UAVs, and DSP's SBIRS-high and SBIRS-low. If budget resources were to become available, any new sensors that might be fielded by the Navy and Marine Corps should include an elevated AMTI capability consisting of either a suitable radar (hosted on an E-2C or other airframe) or a multistatic system based on UAV receivers and AWACS, E-2C, or JLENS transmitters. Future ballistic missiles are likely to be characterized by features such as spin-stabilized RVs, separating ACMs and RVs, low-observable RVs, maneuvering and tumbling RVs, and an ensemble of penetration aids that might include decoys, shrouds, jammers, and debris. The NAD and NTW Block I systems will enable defeating some current unsophisticated ballistic missile threats; however, until upgraded systems are fielded, these systems will have limited capabilities against postulated advanced ballistic missile threats. Nonseparating theater ballistic missiles can be engaged and negated by these systems, although hitting the warhead of a tumbling vehicle remains a challenge. However, NTW Block IA and B will not be capable of providing simultaneous TBMD and ASCMD/OCMD. NTW Block IA and B ships will require the presence of supporting ships. Although NTW Block IC will integrate TBMD with other Aegis capabilities, NAD and NTW Block IC will not provide a robust capability for negating ballistic missiles with sophisticated penetration aids. This will require a substantial increase in radar capability over the SPY-1. The SM-2 Block IVA and SM-3 programs appear to be well structured, but upgrades are required to the SPY-1 radar to make its capabilities compatible with the reach of the SM-3. These might include increased propulsion for the SM-3 to provide better performance robustness in the face of payload growth uncertainties and an improved HTK vehicle characterized by enhanced divert capabilities, two- or three-color IR sensors, laser radar, and so on. Although both the NAD and NTW systems are based on the concept of spiral development (build-improve-build-improve . . .), the R&D to support such a development concept is not in place. BMDO controls investments in missile defense R&D, and its current levels of such investment are insufficient to result in significantly improved capabilities. BMDO control of missile defense R&D is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it discourages Service investment. On the other hand, it fences missile defense R&D from other Service priorities. Service-sponsored R&D in support of out-of-the-box solutions for missile defense can only take place in special access programs that often do not result in the acquisition of operational systems. Naval forces lack a competent battle management command, control, and

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Page 131 communications (BMC3) capability in terms of both concepts of operation and systems for missile defense in coordination with offense operations in littoral areas. Inadequate procedures and technical capabilities exist for coordinating assets in the battle space, and current enhancement efforts are often based on legacy technology (e.g., Link 16) that does not support the necessary flexible modes of operation. Link 16 and CEC cannot be evolved far enough to provide the necessary flexible connectivity. Evolving commercial wireless technology can be leveraged to meet communications needs—thereby disentangling the communication problem from the battle space coordination problem. Current efforts to improve battle space coordination must be continued (and possibly augmented). The Navy and Marine Corps have no current capability for OCMD and no accepted CONOPS for it. The CONOPS for NTW and NAD are still evolving. Neither naval nor joint operations are addressed in a comprehensive way. Commanders in chief (CINCs) generally must create their own CONOPS based on ad hoc situations that arise in their area of responsibility. The Joint Forces Command has overall responsibility for development of CONOPS for theater missile defense. Airspace deconfliction while conducting effective TMD is an important and difficult problem that does not appear to have been addressed adequately. 5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS During the course of this study the committee developed recommendations to address the following issues: Prioritization of cruise and ballistic missile defense programs; Stove-piped theater missile defense systems; Limitations related to the concept of operation for the conduct of OCMD and TBMD in the course of expeditionary warfare operations when joint and coalition forces are present; ASCMD, OCMD, and TBMD deficiencies and the programs to correct them; Current and projected Marine Corps OCMD capabilities; BMC3; and Technology investment. The committee's recommendations are discussed next. 5.2.1 Prioritization of Cruise and Ballistic Missile Defense Programs Antiship cruise missile defense, overland cruise missile defense, and ballistic missile defense will all be necessary for naval (and joint) forces conducting 21st-century military operations for a number of reasons:

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Page 132 ASCMD—Antiship cruise missiles in the hands of potential adversaries are numerous, sophisticated, and widespread. Every naval combatant becomes a target whenever it enters a theater and must defend itself effectively if it is to be an asset rather than a liability. OCMD—In the future, land attack cruise missiles will allow potential adversaries to deny military forces access to ports, airfields, and other entry points. In effect, the Navy has no OCMD capabilities, and building such capabilities will require time and investment. BMD—Tactical ballistic missiles are widespread weapons of terror and potential mass destruction. Naval forces need capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense to ports, airfields, and other entry points until assets arrive in-theater from other Services. In the future, longer-range ballistic missiles will become more prevalent and an adequate theater ballistic missile defense will require defense in depth. With the exception of developing a robust capability for OCMD, there is little disagreement within OPNAV and the Navy acquisition community concerning missile defense programs. Moreover, all Navy ballistic missile defense programs are matched to funding limitations or BMDO-imposed cost constraints and as a result have adopted evolutionary development programs that defer the development of necessary capabilities until far into the future.1 In the likely event that budget levels will not be sufficient to fund all cruise and ballistic missile defense efforts fully, the committee believes that the Department of the Navy will need to assign funding priorities for R&D efforts as follows: 1. ASCMD, 2. Area defense of forces and assets ashore against both overland cruise missiles and ballistic missiles (NAD system), and 3. The NTW system. The committee's rationale for according first priority for R&D funding to ASCMD is that if the Navy does not have a robust ASCMD capability, its abilities to undertake or support operations in littoral areas will be seriously limited. 1 The committee is also concerned that in those areas where naval R&D needs and priorities are not supported by BMDO investment, there is no safe mechanism for the Department of the Navy to apply funding of its own. Furthermore, the committee believes that if the Department of the Navy allocates R&D funds for theater missile defense, congressional committees will most likely cut those funds on the basis that missile defense R&D has already been accounted for in the BMDO budget. In the end, there is no investment for theater missile defense R&D. Therefore, the committee believes that a stronger organizational link should be established between the Department of the Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and BMDO in order that R&D be supported.

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Page 133 The committee could not come to a consensus on the relative prioritization of R&D funding between OCMD and NAD. All members of the committee recognized that defense against land attack cruise missiles and defense against ballistic missiles are necessary components of the same mission, particularly if the Navy is to protect forces and assets ashore. Some argued that since ballistic missiles are widely available to probable or potential adversaries, and since land attack cruise missiles currently are not widely proliferated, priority for R&D funds should be assigned to the NAD program. Furthermore, ballistic missiles, which may be configured to carry weapons of mass destruction, can have a major political impact on allies and on forces ashore. Others argued that the development of an OCMD capability (be it naval or joint) was essential for the protection of forces ashore against a threat that would have a high probability of proliferating if no such defense were to be developed. Those who supported a relatively high priority for R&D funding for OCMD also pointed out that that the most effective means of developing an OCMD capability is through the use of an elevated detection platform. The same elevated platform and sensor system that is needed for OCMD can be used to extend the detection horizons of a surface ship. Thus, sensor developments that will be necessary to provide OCMD capabilities will also contribute to the improvement of the Navy's ASCMD capabilities. Although the committee could not achieve a consensus on the relative priority for R&D funding between OCMD and NAD, it had significant concerns that R&D funding for the development of a competent OCMD capability has been relatively limited. Unless R&D funding for OCMD is given higher priority than it currently has, the prognosis for the development of OCMD capabilities will continue to be bleak. Furthermore, if the Navy cannot provide OCMD in support of Marine Corps or Army forces ashore, at least in the early stages of operations, then the full potential of naval expeditionary forces (as envisaged in Forward...From the Sea and OMFTS) will not be achieved.2 Thus, without a land attack cruise missile defense capability to supplement its ballistic missile defense capabilities, the ability of naval forces to influence events ashore will be limited to attacks on stationary targets with standoff missiles and air-delivered ordnance. In its assessment of the Navy's existing and planned ballistic missile defense capability, the committee would emphasize the NAD system over the NTW 2 Some might argue that in a developed theater the Army's Patriot advanced capability (PAC-3) would be deployed. As currently configured, PAC-3 does not depend on the availability of an elevated air moving target indication radar to detect and track missiles that make maximum use of terrain obscuration in order to evade detection by ground-based radars. Thus, until PAC-3 is provided with a robust capability to negate missiles that employ terrain-obscured trajectories, no OCMD capability exists.

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Page 134 system.3 The basis for this emphasis on NAD relates to BMDO's role in defense-related development and acquisition for TMD systems. In some developed theaters, competent land-based theater missile defense systems might be predeployed. For example, if the development and deployment of the Army's THAAD system were successful, it could provide significant midcourse engagement capabilities in a theater where it had been deployed prior to the onset of conflict. In addition, if the development and deployment of the Air Force's ABL system were successful, it could provide ascent-phase engagement capabilities against shorter-range ballistic missiles. In such circumstances, the NTW system would supplement the projected capabilities of these systems in addition to the projected endo-atmospheric ballistic missile engagement capabilities of both the NAD and the Army's PAC-3 systems. Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) should assign R&D funding priority in the following order: (1) antiship cruise missile defense, (2) area defenses against both overland cruise missiles and ballistic missiles (NAD system) for the protection of forces and assets ashore, and (3) the NTW system. 5.2.2 Stove-Piped Theater Missile Defense Systems The committee recognizes that the distributed architectures envisioned for future theater missile defense operations, driven by the realities of the availability and the readiness of defense elements, make it a risky and uncertain business to provide the required level of protection against threatening ballistic and cruise missiles. A significant part of the uncertainty associated with connecting available sensors and shooters into an effective defense network comes from the fact that TMD systems are developed and tested largely as vertically integrated defense systems (as, for instance, are NAD and PAC-3) and are relatively loosely integrated as a family of systems. This suggests that if dynamically assembled distributed architectures are to function effectively, a new paradigm for development and testing needs to be applied by BMDO and the Services. The committee is well aware that a number of concepts, studies, and research activities have addressed this general issue, with proposals ranging from tightened integration of the family of systems (FOS) to creation of a single distributed TMD system, to replace the concept of an FOS. The Navy's concept for moving from platform-centric to network-centric forces is related to the more narrow issue of TMD addressed here. The scope of such a transformation is 3 program budget decision 224 calls for a shift of $121 million from the Navy theater wide program to the Navy area defense program over FY02 and FY03 (Inside the Pentagon, January 18, 2001, pp. 12-13).

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Page 135 beyond the charter of this study, but the committee believes that the challenge of utilizing available missile defense resources in a dynamic theater environment needs to be acknowledged and that some of the changes required in the development and testing process to meet that challenge need to be faced. The process of dynamically assembling defense resources in-theater, otherwise known as network-centric operations, requires that advanced engagement modes be employed, such as “launch on remote” and “forward pass.” Some of these engagement modes are beginning to be tested in joint experiments, and the committee strongly believes that such tests should be continued and expanded. Fundamental to the success of network-centric operations, or any other version of distributed architectures, is the ability to break the bonds of the vertically integrated TMD systems without unduly compromising the effectiveness of engagements. All the TMD systems are being developed and tested with the tight bonds in place, having been trained, in effect, to function as autonomous systems. There is nothing wrong with this classical approach to development and testing, which has been conditioned by the interoperability, layered defense, and advanced engagement mode development and testing that is already in progress. However, when integrated systems are not available to provide defense, the different elements of the systems need to be adaptable for use in distributed architectures in order to enable distributed engagement modes, which need to be thoroughly developed and tested to demonstrate their feasibility. Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should support the expansion of distributed defense development and test plans by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and experiments to demonstrate the related advanced engagement modes. To the extent practicable, the system integrated tests being planned by BMDO and experimental programs such as the Theater Missile Defense Critical Measurements Program should be structured and extended to incorporate the critical defense functions unique to distributed architectures. 5.2.3 Limitations Related to the Concept of Operations for the Conduct of OCMD and TBMD in the Course of Expeditionary Warfare Operations When Joint and Coalition Forces Are Present The Navy has declared expeditionary warfare that will influence events ashore as one of its main missions. The Marine Corps Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 21 4 (EMW 21) strategy is consistent with and dependent on the Navy's 4 Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 21 is the Marine Corps overarching strategy for conducting 21st-century Marine Corps operations, such as those described in “Operational Maneuver From the Sea”; “Ship to Objective

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Page 136 capability in this area. Expeditionary warfare and theater missile defense are thus mutually dependent. Expeditionary operations envision the possibility of forcible seaborne entry into a theater in which Marine Corps forces are launched from Navy ships and proceed directly to targets beyond the shoreline. Such operations may include peace enforcement, noncombatant evacuations, or combat operations. For Marine Corps forces to have the required reach, it will be necessary that ship formations approach the shoreline as needed to deliver supporting fire and logistical support to the Marines ashore. The same kind of support could be required if Army elements are involved as part of a joint task force. In any scenario in the littorals, the Navy must be able to defend both its own ships and the assigned forces against attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles. Almost all the presentations to the committee began by showing the complexity of coordinating defensive measures with offensive operations in the same battle space. However, it is clear that no consistent CONOPS exists for integrating conventional supporting arms (attack and other helicopters, artillery, naval fires, and close air support) in the offense with TBM and cruise missile defense. The task is even more complicated in a joint operation because of the need for airspace deconfliction. The committee believes that the Navy's ability to defend a carrier battle group or an amphibious task force against aircraft at sea or in the littorals is well established. Likewise, the Marine Corps has clearly defined procedures and CONOPS for both helicopter-borne and surface assaults on objectives ashore as well as a reasonable defensive capability against enemy aircraft and helicopters. The evolving threat of theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles presents a challenge too tough for any one Service to counter effectively on its own. While the Services and the war-fighting CINCs accept the need for a fully joint solution to missile defense, progress is slow because each is pursuing a different approach. The committee believes that neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps, which must rely on the Navy for protection at least in the early stages of an operation, will carry out missions in this threat environment without assistance from other joint assets. Therefore, it is imperative that the Navy identify those intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets in other Services that can help it to carry out its TBM and cruise missile defense mission in the littorals. In addition, Maneuver” (Van Riper, LtGen Paul K., USMC, 1997, “Ship to Objective Maneuver,” Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., July 25, available online at < http://192.156.75.102/stom.htm >); “Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010 and Beyond” (Krulak, Gen C.C., USMC, 1997, “Marine Prepositioning Force 2010 and Beyond,” Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., December 30, available online at < http://192.156.75.102/mpf.htm >); “Sustained Operations Ashore” (Krulak, Gen C.C., USMC, 1998, “The Marine Air Ground Task Force in Sustained Operations Ashore,” U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., June 10, available online at < http://192.156.75.102/soa.htm >); and “Other Expeditionary Operations” (Warfighting Requirements Division, to be published, “Other Expeditionary Operations, Draft Concept Paper,” Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.).

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Page 137 the capabilities of such assets (AWACS, JSTARS, JLENS, and UAVs) should be integrated into a Navy CONOPS that supports the joint force commander under the joint theater air missile defense 2010 operational concept and its developing operational and systems architectures. Testing and demonstrations under this concept should be coordinated with the CINC, U.S. Joint Force Command. The committee believes that as the Department of the Navy continues to move forward with naval operations concentrated in littoral areas, there will be several operational implications for the integration and coordination of expeditionary and strike warfare assets. It further believes that the Department of the Navy should account for these implications either by accepting the need for changes to concepts of operations or by investing, as necessary, to achieve the technical advances necessary to make preferred concepts feasible. Of immediate concern is the need to achieve a CMD capability to support naval forces and joint forces operating in littoral areas. Recommendation: To achieve a competent cruise missile defense capability for the support of naval and joint forces operating in littoral areas, the CNO and the CMC should do the following: Develop a concept of operations with the other Services that routinely substitutes and employs assets such as the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) air moving target indication (AMTI) radar or the joint land attack cruise missile defense elevated netted sensors (JLENS) to perform over-the-horizon target acquisition and missile command functions envisaged for the E-2C Radar Modernization Program (RMP) radar; and Leverage joint experimentation in order to develop the operational concepts and technical capabilities necessary for joint missile defense operations. 5.2.4 ASCMD, OCMD, and TBMD Deficiencies and the Programs to Correct Them Over the past several years, lower levels of R&D investment have allowed the ASCM threat to evolve somewhat more rapidly than shipboard defenses have been improved. Future threats, which are projected to have much smaller radar signatures, greater agility, and electronic countermeasure (ECM)-resistant sensors, may well overstress these defenses when the Navy is constrained to operate in a littoral environment. The proposed acquisition and deployment of SPY-3 and the X-band horizon search MFR, along with some advances in the Navy's electronic warfare techniques, should redress some but not all of the Navy's projected ASCMD deficiencies. The committee is concerned that there are no programs in place to develop additional techniques to increase the Navy's ASCMD effectiveness.

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Page 138 In the final analysis, the ASCMD problem relates to the fact that a low-altitude cruise missile can get relatively close to a surface ship before it crosses the radar horizon of the ship's defensive sensors. If the number of incoming cruise missiles is sufficiently large, their agility and speed sufficiently high, and their RCS sufficiently low, the defensive system will be overwhelmed. A strong layer of short-range self-defense is needed, but robust defense requires a depth of fire that can be provided only by employing elevated sensors, such as the JLENS, that extend the horizon of the defensive sensors, along with the use of a missile that is designed to intercept targets beyond the line-of-sight horizon of the firing platform. The committee was not briefed on any systems other than the Army's JLENS for solving this ASCMD problem. With respect to OCMD, the committee observes that there is still no program that will provide a means for the ship-based defense of forces ashore against cruise missile attacks. Although ship-launched interceptor missiles of suitable range are available, the sensors that would permit them to engage cruise missiles not observable from the ship have not been developed or otherwise acquired. The Navy will have to develop the necessary airborne sensors to support an OCMD capability or seek ways in which systems of the other Services, such as JLENS, might be brought into position and employed. Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should support the development of a competent cruise missile defense against antiship and overland cruise missiles. Beyond supporting the programmed development and acquisition of multifunction radar (MFR) and volume search radar (VSR), such a capability should include the following components: An elevated AMTI radar—possibly AWACS or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-based—with robust overland clutter negation capabilities and with future capabilities to operate in a multistatic mode so that low-radar-cross-section overland targets can be engaged; An overland, over-the-horizon variant of the SM-2 missile with dual-mode, semiactive, and active terminal guidance; and The extension of cooperative engagement capability (CEC) to allow the employment of air-directed surface-to-air missiles (ADSAMs) against targets that are beyond the line-of-sight horizon of weapon launch platforms. The NAD program is designed to enable the defense of nearby forces against attack by shorter-range ballistic missiles. The committee observes that the program appears to be sound and adequately funded and that the necessary underlying R&D work is in place, including several improvements to SPY-1 signal processing that are also necessary for NTW. No significant deficiencies were noted.

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Page 139 The NTW program is not fully defined, and the portion defined so far is not completely funded. Although needed by the Navy for the defense of larger areas in a theater, including forces ashore, there is no funded program beyond the Aegis LEAP intercept effort funded mostly by congressional budgetary adjustments beyond those requested by the Navy. This effort includes the addition of a high-resolution-range unit to the SPY-1 radar, in addition to the upgrades made as part of the NAD program. In an effort to cope with the low funding priority that has been assigned to NTW by BMDO, Navy staff have laid out a spiral development concept, which is being implemented at a slow rate with small amounts of Navy and BMDO money. This concept, if fully funded, would provide for an interceptor missile and shipboard system upgrades that evolve from a basic (“contingency”) NTW capability (Block IA). The deployable version to follow would not permit simultaneous conduct of other Aegis missions (Block IB). A final Block I capability (Block IC) would restore the ability to conduct all Aegis missions simultaneously. An evolving NTW capability, designated Block II but not yet fully defined, would cope with the threat as it evolves in the next 10 to 15 years. This will require improvements to interceptor and radar performance, neither of which appears to be fully defined or funded as of yet. It appears possible that some system components will be developed incident to the cooperative program with Japan. Recommendation: Beyond supporting the SPY-1 upgrades to improve NAD and NTW discrimination capabilities, the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should pursue an aggressive R&D effort aimed at producing the following capabilities: A high-resolution, X-band adjunct to the S-band SPY-1 radar that will allow discrimination among warheads, decoys, and debris and reduce the need for salvo launches; A hit-to-kill (HTK) vehicle with greater agility, divert capability, and lethal radius than the Block I HTK vehicle, giving it the ability to handle tethered and tumbling target complexes; A multicolor infrared sensor with improved sensitivity to extend acquisition ranges against low-infrared-signature targets and aid in discrimination; and A radar and/or LADAR on the hit-to-kill vehicle that could precisely measure body dynamics for effective discrimination against replica decoys. Recommendation: In an effort to examine countermeasures beyond the design threat of naval theater ballistic missile defense systems, the Department of the Navy should maintain an ongoing red-blue effort that provides continuous analysis, design, and testing of potential theater ballistic missile

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Page 140 defense countermeasures and defense responses and works closely with corresponding Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) efforts. This effort could be conducted in a manner similar to the prior Advanced Ballistic Reentry System Program, which developed penetration aids for U.S. inter-continental ballistic missile systems, or an extension of the current project Hercules, supported by BMDO, that is looking at advanced discrimination techniques. 5.2.5 Current and Projected Marine Corps OCMD Capabilities Marine Corps plans for OMFTS and STOM depend on shipboard basing of assault elements and rapid transport of light forces to inland objectives. The Navy is expected to provide air support—close air support along with Marine Corps air; combat air patrol; ship-based fire support; and ship-based early warning of and defense against air and ballistic missile attack. The Marine Corps is also dependent on the Navy for logistical support of many kinds. In the future, the Corps will have a ground-launched advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) capability—a complementary low altitude weapon system—light enough to be taken ashore with assault units but with limited sensor capability, necessitating CEC cueing. The current Marine Corps air defense radar, AN/TPS-59 (V3), has a large footprint and is not carried on board amphibious assault ships, and yet this is the only GBR that will be available to support Marines ashore or Navy ships off a coastline against the cruise missile threat until a new radar is developed late in this decade. The committee learned that a smaller mobile radar—the MRRS—is under consideration for future development and acquisition. Until this occurs, the committee observes that the STOM concept will be entirely dependent on robust shipboard sensors and missile defense capabilities with sufficient range to cover assault objective areas and weaken the threat to levels tolerable by the forces ashore. Recommendation: Recognizing that there will always be some gaps in naval air defense coverage due to extended littoral operations, the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should support the development and acquisition of the complementary low altitude weapon system (CLAWS) and the multirole radar system (MRRS); interfaces should be developed for targeting and fire control to the following sensors: Army JLENS radar system, Marine Corps TPS-59 (V-3) radar system, E-2C RMP AMTI radar, and Air Force AWACS SPY-1/2 radar system.

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Page 141 Recommendation: Recognizing that the MRRS may not be ready in time to provide an initial targeting and fire control radar for the CLAWS, the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should consider deployment of the TPS-59 radar on designated maritime preposition force squadrons as an interim measure. 5.2.6 Battle Management Command, Control, and Communications (BMC3) A commander must have the means to understand the operational environment, the location and condition of his forces, and the actions of the enemy. He/ she must be able to communicate well enough to reallocate resources and vary subordinate assignments as appropriate to achieve his/her mission, keeping superiors advised as necessary. The need today to comprehend and control on a theater-wide basis presents an immense challenge. The committee received several BMDO and Navy briefings about work on this subject. Although the various efforts seem necessary, clearly, they are not sufficient. The BMDO programs in this area do not appear to address the needs of a theater-level commander, and the Navy programs appear mostly to be concerned with the command and control of defensive systems. No concepts were presented for assembling an integrated picture of theater-level activity and presenting it to a commander in a useful way. As was noted above, no work seems to be under way to enable deconfliction of offense and defense operations. The committee observes that program effort in this area seems not to be coupled to thinking about a more open, network-centric communications architecture that would enable better access to information by lower-level participants, more useful reporting by those participants, and better decisions by the theater commander. Recommendation: Given that management of battle-space force components is a critical aspect of missile defense that is currently seriously deficient, Department of the Navy leadership should actively support efforts relating to doctrine, acquisition programs, and research to overcome such deficiencies, in particular by: Supporting current efforts such as the Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) System Engineering Office Program, which is seeking to enhance the quality of the air-space picture; Supporting the development of concepts of operations necessary for expeditionary and joint Service littoral operations, including means for offense-defense coordination; Recognizing that for success in these operations the Department of the Navy will require support from other Services; and Recognizing that all battle-space management development efforts must seek to accommodate the inclusion of unplanned force components.

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Page 142 Recommendation: Given that Link 16 and CEC, even when evolved and improved, will not provide a full battle management command, control, and communications (BMC3) capability for either overland cruise missile defense or theater missile defense, the Department of the Navy leadership should initiate actions leading to the development of a next-generation BMC3 system. This entirely new system, leveraging both commercial and defense technology advances, should include the following features: Support of highly flexible and adaptable combinations of naval and joint force configurations by allowing assets to interface readily with one another (e.g., through an Internet Protocol-based, quality-of-service-guaranteed infrastructure); Wide-bandwidth, bandwidth-on-demand wireless communication networks with dynamic allocation of resources; and Initial development of a prototype in parallel with existing BMC3 systems to encourage experimentation and adoption. In addition, development of a high-bandwidth test bed would be particularly valuable. It would allow new capabilities to be tested and explored in the near term while the existing BMC3 systems continue to undergo their intended evolution; transition to the new capabilities would occur only after they had been adequately developed and accepted. 5.2.7 Technology Investment As presented to the committee by the Navy and Marine Corps, the developmental paths intended to evolve TMD capabilities are generally reasonable, although several exceptions are identified in this report. The evolutionary, or “spiral,” development of added capabilities to pace the threat is a reasonable concept. However, the committee is concerned that the technology required to support the intended evolution is not being developed. The necessary investments must be made to bring the required technology to a state where it is available for use in the time frame intended. Recommendation: In its technology investment program, the Department of the Navy should develop sensors, weapons, and BMC3 architectures and algorithms that are adaptive and flexible enough to allow responding to unexpected threat capabilities and characteristics. These ballistic missile defense system elements should be combined into experimental systems for evaluation and refinement. The mature technologies from the program should be incorporated into future spirals of the NAD and NTW ballistic missile defense systems.