National Academies Press: OpenBook

Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft (2001)

Chapter: 2 Magnitude of the Problem

« Previous: 1 Introduction
Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×

Page 14

2

Magnitude of the Problem

When the Cold War ended, it became possible to reduce the size of U.S. forces significantly. Between 1989 and 1999, the number of active duty military personnel, as well as civilian DoD employees, was reduced by 34 percent (CBO, 2000). Because of the downsizing, a surplus of equipment became available from the procurement programs of the 1980s; therefore, there was a corresponding reduction in the purchasing of new weapons.

By the end of the 1990s, the downsizing was essentially complete. However, because of the downturn in procurement, the average age of many kinds of military equipment had increased. This older equipment requires increased maintenance and is vulnerable to a lack of parts, which has led to the cannibalization of one unit to keep another running. The overall result has been lower mission-capable rates and a decrease in readiness.

Although U.S. military forces must be modernized to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, DoD has been caught in a vicious cost spiral of modernization costs and constantly increasing support costs. Because of a relatively flat total budget, funds needed for modernization are often siphoned off to meet growing support costs, which continue to increase as equipment ages. This trend must be reversed. The problem of maintaining and modernizing aging avionics is acute.

DIMINISHING MANUFACTURING SOURCES/ OUT-OF-PRODUCTION PARTS

As the size of U.S. forces has decreased, there has been a corresponding consolidation of the defense industrial base, including a consolidation of the suppliers of avionics components. The reduction in the number of prime contractors, combined with reduced procurement budgets, has led to a commensurate reduction in market opportunities for lower tier suppliers. This has further exacerbated the DMS problem.

Even companies that have continued to supply DoD have, in many cases, shifted their focus to meeting the requirements of commercial markets, which are characterized by ever shorter product life cycles. As a result of these trends, fewer suppliers of legacy avionics components are available today, and parts that are available are going out of production at an accelerating pace.

Transition Analysis of Component Technology (TACTech), Incorporated, is a company that tracks the availability of electronic components and provides information tools for managing parts obsolescence. Table 2-1 shows the rates at which standardized military/aerospace devices listed in the TACTech database went out of production between 1986 and 1996. During that 10-year period, the percentage of parts that

Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×

Page 15

TABLE 2-1 Accelerating Obsolescence of Military/Aerospace Devices

Year

Number of Parts in TACTech Database

Number of Parts Discontinued

Percentage of Parts Discontinued

1986

22,341

1,675

7.5

1988

30,811

2,975

9.6

1990

55,326

4,371

7.9

1992

72,089

7,593

10.9

1994

58,295

9,659

16.5

1996

45,873

6,210

13.5

Source: TACTech, 1997.


were discontinued almost doubled, from 7.5 percent of the total to 13.5 percent of the total. There is every reason to believe that these percentages will increase in the future. Although the total number of unique part styles is decreasing as levels of circuit integration increase, the percentage of discontinued parts is not expected to decrease at the same rate.

A significant portion of funds allocated to each weapon system is being used to contend with the DMS/ OP problem. Estimates of the cumulative amount of money required to address DMS/OP for the F-15, F-22, and U-2 (including development, production, and installation) are close to $1 billion each (U.S. Air Force, 2000a). It is important to stress that these funds are required simply to maintain current functions and do not buy any additional capability.

RISING SUPPORT COSTS

A DoD report, Product Support for the 21st Century: A Year Later (September 2000) notes that DoD spends about $62 billion annually to support and maintain its equipment (DUSD[AT&L], 2000). In fiscal year 1999 (FY99), the Air Force spent about $3 billion for depot-level repairs of its aircraft. Approximately one-third of this, or $1 billion, was spent on maintaining and supporting avionics systems (operations and maintenance [O&M] funds), as shown in Figure 2-1 . An additional

Image: jpg
~ enlarge ~
FIGURE 2-1 Cost of avionics in depot-level aircraft maintenance for FY99. Source: U.S. Air Force, 2000a.

Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×

Page 16

Image: jpg
~ enlarge ~
FIGURE 2-2 Projected depot-level avionics operations and maintenance costs. Source: U.S. Air Force, 2000b.


$250 million to $275 million per year is needed to address the aging avionics problem (personal communication from Lt. Gen. R. Raggio, Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, July 2, 2000). In fact, avionics systems are the second largest component of Air Force O&M costs after engines.

Because of the growing DMS/OP problem, depot-level support costs for avionics are projected to increase by about 50 percent in the next five years ( Figure 2-2 ). Monies spent strictly on DMS/OP for one-for-one replacement are not available for modifications that could improve the reliability or maintainability of avionics components or reduce TOC. Thus, the Air Force is compelled to continue to play catch-up with its O&M funds. For example, O&M budget constraints on the Air Mobility Command have left insufficient funds for the C-5, C-141, and C-17 to fly the required number of flight hours to meet training requirements (U.S. Air Force, 2000a).

BUDGET FOR MODERNIZING AVIONICS

The Air Force must maintain an inventory of approximately 6,000 aircraft to sustain 195 active air wings. For the past five years, the average annual procurement of new aircraft has been only 25 aircraft: 22 in 1996, 22 in 1997, 24 in 1998, 26 in 1999, and 28 in 2000 (Hitt, 2000). If this low rate of procurement continues, the USAF will turn over its aircraft inventory every 240 years. Until something is done to reverse this trend, as the age of aircraft increases, O&M costs will also increase. With an essentially flat DoD budget and strong pressure against increasing aircraft procurements, O&M dollars are being diverted from budgets for modernization, which exacerbates the problem. The limited remaining dollars for modifications are being used to fund modifications to enable airplanes to operate in controlled airspace and to make existing aircraft compatible with the new “smart weapons” that are coming into the inventory. Consequently, very few dollars are left to modernize aging avionics systems or the infrastructure to support these systems.

The Air Force modernization account (modernization includes R&D, testing, evaluation, and procurement), approximately $20 billion per year, has remained at about that level throughout the 1990s and is projected to remain flat through FY07 (Durante, 2000). Figure 2-3 shows funding for avionics modernization from the FY01 President's Budget Request (PBR) (PBR, 2000).

As Figure 2-3 shows, funding would increase through FY01 and decrease thereafter. According to the committee's analysis, however, the avionics investments already approved in the FY01 PBR will cost an additional $5 billion beyond FY05, which is inconsistent with the decrease after FY01. Figure 2-4 shows a breakdown of funds already committed to out-year costs by weapon system, which are dominated by modifications to the C-130.

Some of the upgrades funded in the PBR will be necessary to ensure that U.S. aircraft meet the requirements of the GATM. In addition, most of the transport aircraft from Air Mobility Command will be provided with the TCAS and ground proximity warning equipment. These upgrades account for approximately 20 percent of the modernization budget each year.

Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×

Page 17

Image: jpg
~ enlarge ~
FIGURE 2-3 FY01 President's Budget Request for avionics modernization. Source: PBR, 2000.

Image: jpg
~ enlarge ~
FIGURE 2-4 Out-year costs after FY05 for avionics modernization (approximately $5 billion). Source: U.S. Air Force, 2000a.

Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×

Page 18

Unfortunately, these modifications do not replace high-TOC subsystems or out-of-production avionics components and, therefore, will not substantially improve the DMS/OP picture. For instance, the complex F-16 APG-68 radar has the highest O&M cost of all F-16 avionics, yet none of the planned modifications in the budget involve upgrading or replacing the F-16 radar (PBR, 2000). Because GATM upgrades are considered necessary for aircraft to continue flying, they take priority over the replacement of these high-TOC subsystems. To put the issue in perspective, the shortage of funds available to address the aging avionics problem is so acute that an option under consideration by Air Combat Command is the early retirement of the F-117 stealth fighter because of insufficient funds to replace the infrared acquisition and designation system (IRADS), the color multipurpose display system (CMDS), and the electronic data transfer system (EDTS), all of which are facing obsolescence problems.

Image: jpg
~ enlarge ~
FIGURE 2-5 Declining Air Force mission-capable rate. Source: Air Force Magazine, 1999.

Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×

Page 19

TABLE 2-2 Aircraft Currently in Service

Type

Quantity

Role

USAF

A-10 Thunderbolt II

127

Close air support/forward air control

OA-10 Thunderbolt II

99

Close air support/forward air control

B-1B Lancer

81

Strategic bomber

B-2A Spirit

19

Strategic bomber

B-52H Stratofortress

85

Strategic bomber

C-5A Galaxy

28

Transport

C-5B Galaxy

50

Transport

C-5C Galaxy

2

Transport

C-9A/C Nightingale

23

Transport

C-12 Huron

36

Transport

C-17A Globemaster III

41

Tactical transport

C-21A (Learjet 35A)

79

Transport/communications

C-23A Sherpa

3

Freight transport

VC-25A (Boeing 747)

2

Presidential transport

C-27A Spartan (G.222)

10

Transport

C-130E/H/J Hercules

183

Transport

EC-130E/H Hercules

22

Electronic intelligence

AC-130H/U Spectre

21

Gunship

MC-130E/H/P Hercules

66

Special operations

NC-130 Hercules

4

Test and evaluation

C-135A/B/C/E

7

Transport

EC-135

12

Electronic intelligence

OC-135

3

“Open Sky” Treaty

RC-135

20

Reconnaissance

KC-135

249

Tanker

NKC-135

2

Tanker

C-137B/C

6

VIP transport

C-141B Starlifter

95

Transport

E-3B/C Sentry

32

AWACS

E-4B (Boeing 747)

4

AACP

E-8C J-STARS

5

Surveillance

E-9A (DHC Dash-8)

2

Range surveillance

EC-18B/D (Boeing 707)

4

Reconnaissance/surveillance

F-15A/B/C/D Eagle

404

Fighter

F-15E Eagle

201

Fighter/attack

F-15A/B/C/D Eagle

14

Test

F-16A Fighting Falcon

3

Fighter/attack

F-16B Fighting Falcon

18

Fighter/attack

F-16C Fighting Falcon

568

Fighter/attack

F-16D Fighting Falcon

88

Fighter/attack

F-117 Nighhawk

52

Attack

KC-10A Stratotanker

59

Tanker

RQ-1A Predator (UAV)

6

Reconnaissance/surveillance

TG-3 (glider)

3

Reconnaissance/surveillance

TG-4 (glider)

14

Reconnaissance/surveillance

TG-7 (glider)

9

Training

TG-9 (glider)

4

Reconnaissance/surveillance

TG-10 (glider)

1

Training

TG-11 (glider)

2

Training

HH-1H Iroquois

8

Missile support

UH-1N Iroquois

64

Missile support

TH-53A Sea Stallion

6

Search and rescue

MH-53J Sea Stallion

40

Special operations

HH-60G Black Hawk

54

Search and rescue

MH-60G Black Hawk

10

Special operations

T-1A Jayhawk

183

Training

T-3A Firefly

111

Training

T-37B Tweet

415

Training

T-38A Talon

414

Training

AT-38B Talon

78

Training

T-41 Mescalero

3

Training

T-43A (Boeing 737)

10

Training

CT-43A (Boeing 737)

1

Training

TC-18E (Boeing 707)

2

Training

UV-18 Twin Otter

2

Parachute training

U-2R/S

31

Reconnaissance

TU-2R/S

4

Training

WC-130H/W

3

Weather reconnaissance

Total

4,307

Air Force Reserve (AFRES)

27

Close air support

OA-10 Thunderbolt II

27

Forward air control

B-52H Stratofortress

9

Strategic bomber

C-130 Hercules

112

Transport

C-141B Starlifter

44

Transport

C-5A Galaxy

32

Transport

F-16C Fighting Falcon

56

Fighter/attack

F-16D Fighting Falcon

8

Fighter/attack

HH-60G Black Hawk

21

Special operations/search and rescue

KC-135E/R

75

Tanker

WC-130H/W

10

Weather reconnaissance

Total

421

Air National Guard (ANG)

A-10 Thunderbolt II

78

Close air support

OA-10 Thunderbolt II

18

Close air support

B-1B Lancer

14

Strategic bomber

C-5A Galaxy

14

Transport

C-130 Hercules

215

Transport

C-141B Starlifter

16

Transport

C-21 (Learjet 35A)

4

Transport/commun.

C-22B (Boeing 727)

3

Transport

C-26A/B (Metro III)

11

Transport

F-15A/B/C/D Eagle

90

Interception

F-16A Fighting Falcon

102

Fighter/attack

F-16B Fighting Falcon

26

Fighter/attack

F-16C Fighting Falcon

340

Fighter/attack

F-16D Fighting Falcon

29

Fighter/attack

HH-60G Black Hawk

17

Special operations/search and rescue

KC-135 Stratotanker

225

Tanker

T-43 (Boeing 737)

2

Training

Total

1,204

Grand Total

5,932

Source: U.S. Air Force, 2000b.
Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×

Page 20

DECLINING READINESS

Beyond the problem of rising maintenance/logistics costs and insufficient resources for modernization is the fundamental issue of combat and mobility readiness.

The Air Force reports that mission-capable rates for its aircraft have declined by 10 percentage points—from 83 percent to 73 percent— since 1991. And rates of cannibalization (a measure of how often maintenance crews must take a part off one aircraft to maintain another) increased by 78 percent between 1995 and 1998, indicating a shortage of spare parts (CBO, 2000).

These data are illustrated in Figure 2-5 . Although the committee does not have specific data linking the decline in readiness to aging avionics, the fact that avionics maintenance accounts for approximately one-third of total aircraft maintenance costs supports this conclusion. Air Force officials from the Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command interviewed by committee members confirmed the linkage (personal communications with Brig. Gen. Randolph Bigum, director of requirements, Air Combat Command; and Maj. Gen. Michael Wooley, commander, Tanker Air-Lift Control Center, Air Mobility Command, September 26, 2000).

The magnitude of the Air Force's aging avionics problem cannot be fully comprehended without considering the diversity of types of aircraft flown (68 in the Air Force, 11 in the Air Force Reserve, and 17 in the Air National Guard), the small fleets of some types of aircraft (e.g., only 1 CT-43A), the multiple versions of the same aircraft (e.g., F-15 A, B, C, D, and E), and multiple users of the same aircraft (e.g., A-10 used by Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard). In light of these data ( Table 2.2 ), the committee concluded that the magnitude of the aging avionics problem is large and is growing. This urgent problem must be addressed by Air Force management through enterprise management supported by informed program management.

Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×
Page 14
Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×
Page 15
Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×
Page 16
Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×
Page 17
Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×
Page 18
Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×
Page 19
Suggested Citation:"2 Magnitude of the Problem." National Research Council. 2001. Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10108.
×
Page 20
Next: 3 Current Activities and Programs »
Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft Get This Book
×
Buy Paperback | $47.00 Buy Ebook | $37.99
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

Extending the life of an airframe has proven challenging and costly. Extending the life of an avionics system, however, is one of the most critical and difficult aspects of extending total aircraft system lifetimes. Critical components go out of production or become obsolete, and many former suppliers of military-grade components have gone out of business. From 1986 to 1996, for example, the percentage of discontinued military/aerospace electronic devices nearly doubled—from 7.5 percent to 13.5 percent. In addition, legacy avionics systems, which were designed to meet requirements of the past, generally lack the full capability to perform new missions, meet new threats, or perform well in the new information-intensive battlefield environments.

As the legacy aircraft fleet ages, avionics systems will become more and more difficult to support and maintain. Whereas the military once provided a large and profitable market for the electronics industry, the military electronics market today constitutes less than 1 percent of the commercial market. As a result, the military must increasingly rely on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies for its avionics hardware and software. Although COTS items are generally less expensive than comparable items designed especially to meet military specifications, the technology-refresh cycle for COTS is typically 18 months or less, which exacerbates the obsolescence problem for aircraft whose lifetimes are measured in decades. The short refresh cycle is driven mostly by the tremendous advances in computer systems, which comprise an increasing percentage of avionics content.

In response to a request by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the National Research Council convened the Committee on Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft, under the auspices of the Air Force Science and Technology Board, to conduct this study. This report summarizes the following:

  • Gather information from DoD, other government agencies, and industrial sources on the status of, and issues surrounding, the aging avionics problem. This should include briefings from and discussions with senior industry executives and military acquisition and support personnel. A part of this activity should include a review of Air Force Materiel Command's study on diminishing manufacturing sources to recommend ways to mitigate avionics obsolescence.
  • Provide recommendations for new approaches and innovative techniques to improve management of aging avionics, with the goal of helping the Air Force to enhance supportability and replacement of aging and obsolescing avionics and minimize associated life cycle costs. Comment on the division of technology responsibility between DoD and industry.
  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    Switch between the Original Pages, where you can read the report as it appeared in print, and Text Pages for the web version, where you can highlight and search the text.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  9. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!