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The Committee is also examining a phased approach, treating individual elements as building blocks that could be combined in a variety of ways – including, but not limited to – a comprehensive regime for all warheads and weapons-usable fissile materials. Each of the blocks can vary from the less intrusive transparency measures to the more-intrusive verification approaches. The information obtained from one transparency measure may not be definitive, but it can contribute to a larger whole. By combining the information from several measures, including multiple source data analysis and enhanced national technical means, estimates of stockpile sizes can be refined, shedding considerable light on the nuclear inventories. As part of task 2, we have been compiling from the literature approximate stockpile sizes of warheads and materials that would be covered by the regime.

Task 3)

The elements of a verification regime, including, for example, initial declarations, inspections to confirm accuracy and completeness and to provide confidence in dismantlement and suspect site inspections.

The history of arms control negotiations – and unilateral measures to enhance stability – suggests that reductions in nuclear weapons stocks and the fissile material that is essential for their production are likely to come relatively slowly and in careful steps. Verification and transparency measures have become the reliable building blocks of such nuclear arms reductions and will continue to serve that function in the future. The Committee is examining the recent history of arms control measures with the Russian Federation for the lessons it may offer for future policy. This would include the present set of U.S./R.F. lab-to-lab programs, as well as the Russian and U.S. views toward the IAEA. As part of this study, the Committee is also focusing on the various kinds of incentives that would increase the acceptability of the regime, such as financial assistance, market-value purchases of nuclear materials, enhanced access to facilities on a reciprocal basis, simplified procedures, enhanced negotiations on an agreement for cooperation to facilitate these proposals, and joint research and development on verification technologies.



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