The following HTML text is provided to enhance online
readability. Many aspects of typography translate only awkwardly to HTML.
Please use the page image
as the authoritative form to ensure accuracy.
A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report
The problem of weapons stored at non-declared sites is addressed by examining challenge inspections, the required infrastructure to support clandestine stockpiles, the requirements for remanufacture and surveillance of clandestine stocks, and by examining the consistency between declared stockpiles with production records and the physical condition of production reactors. The military significance of undeclared stockpiles will be discussed in reference to varying levels of permitted deployments.10Challenge inspections at facilities that have national security significance can be complicated because of the possibility of the denial of access to areas considered highly sensitive, but in some cases this can be worked out with “managed access approaches.”
Implementation of the proposed regime, including those transparency elements that might be introduced immediately and those that would be introduced in the longer term.
A comprehensive regime would, most likely, not be adopted with one initial agreement between the states. The monitoring technologies vary from those that give some confidence to those that give considerable confidence. The example of negotiating the HEU Purchase Agreement has shown that the monitoring process will be an evolutionary, continuous scale one, increasing in complexity and level of confidence. Each building block that is added can strengthen the over-all regime. As part of this process, it is useful to establish a chain-of-custody that can strengthen the less intrusive monitoring approaches. Because of the complexity of the options, CISAC is studying a phased approach with a spectrum of options.
The utility of mutual, non-binding declarations or voluntary transparency measures as compared with formal treaties or executive agreements.
The reciprocal-unilateral measures initiated by Presidents Bush, Gorbachev and Yeltsin during 1991-92 were successful in removing significant numbers of deployed,
The concern over Soviet compliance to arms control treaties will be addressed within the context of the presidential reports on compliance.