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weapons-usable nuclear materials, using these technologies along with political and operational approaches. The Committee will be examining the more policy-oriented issues during the remaining time. It would therefore be premature to provide specific conclusions or recommendations at this juncture.

Tasks 1 to 7

The study is being conducted in two phases, each of which requires approximately 12 months. The seven tasks of the study are described below. Phase 1 focused primarily on Task 1, Task 2 and Task 3 which are summarized below, plus an initial treatment of the issues in Task 4, Task 5, Task 6 and Task 7. Phase 2 will complete the study. The project began on March 29, 2000. Progress toward completing these tasks is reported below.

Task 1)

A description of the objectives of reductions in and limitations on warhead and weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and why these objectives are important.

As discussed in detail in CISAC’s earlier reports on the dispositon of excess weapons plutonium (1994 and 1995) and U.S. nuclear weapons policy (1991 and 1997), the objectives of reductions in and limitations on warhead and weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles are to reduce the risks these weapons and materials may pose to U.S. national security and to global security in general. 2For example, as discussed below, the threat from terrorists would be lessened by better controls on these materials and by reductions in any excess amounts. The purpose of this study is to discuss the technology and policy/challenges of the issues associated with an arms reduction regime that could limit all categories of nuclear warheads and eventually all weapons-usable nuclear materials as part of that risk-reduction effort. The initial focus of the study is on the United States and Russia, but part of the design process includes consideration of how the

2  

Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (1991), The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (1997), Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (1994), and Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (1995) (Washington, DC, National Academy Press).



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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report weapons-usable nuclear materials, using these technologies along with political and operational approaches. The Committee will be examining the more policy-oriented issues during the remaining time. It would therefore be premature to provide specific conclusions or recommendations at this juncture. Tasks 1 to 7 The study is being conducted in two phases, each of which requires approximately 12 months. The seven tasks of the study are described below. Phase 1 focused primarily on Task 1, Task 2 and Task 3 which are summarized below, plus an initial treatment of the issues in Task 4, Task 5, Task 6 and Task 7. Phase 2 will complete the study. The project began on March 29, 2000. Progress toward completing these tasks is reported below. Task 1) A description of the objectives of reductions in and limitations on warhead and weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and why these objectives are important. As discussed in detail in CISAC’s earlier reports on the dispositon of excess weapons plutonium (1994 and 1995) and U.S. nuclear weapons policy (1991 and 1997), the objectives of reductions in and limitations on warhead and weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles are to reduce the risks these weapons and materials may pose to U.S. national security and to global security in general. 2For example, as discussed below, the threat from terrorists would be lessened by better controls on these materials and by reductions in any excess amounts. The purpose of this study is to discuss the technology and policy/challenges of the issues associated with an arms reduction regime that could limit all categories of nuclear warheads and eventually all weapons-usable nuclear materials as part of that risk-reduction effort. The initial focus of the study is on the United States and Russia, but part of the design process includes consideration of how the 2   Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (1991), The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (1997), Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (1994), and Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (1995) (Washington, DC, National Academy Press).

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report regime could eventually become a global arrangement. The reasons these objectives are important are discussed below. To date, nuclear arms control agreements have focused on deployed strategic delivery vehicles and launchers – the ballistic missiles, silos, submarines and bombers. This focus is understandable. First, they are a unique part of systems that deliver nuclear weapons at great distances and with high accuracy. Second, they are much larger, easier to count, and far more difficult to hide than warheads or their fissile components. This was particularly important during the Cold War, when on-site inspections and increased openness were difficult to negotiate and most monitoring was done using national technical means (e.g., reconnaissance satellites). On-site inspections under the INF and START treaties have greatly enhanced monitoring capabilities, improving the data used to assess compliance with the treaties. Should future deployed strategic forces reach START-II levels or be reduced further, while other nuclear weapons remain unconstrained, then deployed strategic warheads will become a decreasing fraction of the total inventories of nuclear weapons. If significant further reductions in nuclear weapons are to succeed, the present regime will need to be enhanced with new approaches to provide greater assurance that reductions are taking place, whether through formal agreements or unilateral measures. This will be explored more fully in the next phase under Task 5. This means developing ways to include nuclear warheads in addition to delivery vehicles. At the same time, there is concern that weapons-usable fissile materials or nuclear weapons, especially in Russia, could be stolen. A recent report to the Secretary of Energy, A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, 3 concludes: The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material 3   Russia Task Force, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, chaired by former Senator Howard Baker and former Presidential Counselor Lloyd Cutler, A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs With Russia, January 10, 2001. http://www.hr.doe.gov/seab .

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nations states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home. The present CISAC study is examining the technical, operational and political building blocks that could be used to create a comprehensive arms reduction regime to include all nuclear warheads (strategic and nonstrategic, deployed and reserve) and all weapons-usable nuclear materials. As part of this study, we are exploring incentives that could increase the acceptability of such a regime. There are several reasons to consider such a regime: Enhance protection, control, and accounting of warhead and fissile material stocks. Increase the irreversibility of reductions in strategic nuclear forces. Permit verifiable reductions in nonstrategic forces. Over the long term, confidence in arms reductions will be much higher if we begin to build a system today when stockpiles are high. If we wait until most of the existing warheads have been dismantled under a shroud of secrecy, we will have less confidence in our knowledge of the stockpile of weapons and fissile materials. Work toward a comprehensive regime for monitoring and reducing warheads and fissile materials could also rightly be portrayed as partly fulfilling the obligation of the nuclear weapon states, as defined in Article VI of the NPT, to negotiate in good faith on nuclear disarmament. Enhance protection, control, and accounting of warhead and fissile material stocks. The Committee is greatly concerned about the long-term viability of maintaining control over nuclear materials and warheads. The 1994 CISAC report 4 on plutonium disposition concluded that “The existence of surplus weapons-usable fissile material also constitutes a clear and present danger to national and international security. ” The 1997 4   National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, ibid.

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report CISAC report 5 on The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy concluded that “smaller arsenals will be easier to safeguard and protect from accident, theft, and unauthorized use.” Reliable procedures for warhead accounting could also result in enhanced measures for control and security. We note that the cooperative Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) programs between DOE and Minatom are designed to give Russia improved tools to monitor itself. Currently, each nuclear weapon state creates its own standards for the protection, control, and accounting of its nuclear warheads and fissile materials. The nuclear weapon states afford their nuclear weapons varying levels of protection against theft or unauthorized use. The widespread lack of transparency regarding warhead stockpiles makes it uncertain that the level of security is adequate over the entire range of warheads, warhead components and fissile materials. Shared information could be used to improve protection, control, and accounting. Warhead transparency and verification measures would identify the level of security under which warheads are maintained. If security is lacking, transparency measures would help identify shortcomings and facilitate cooperation toward improving safeguards. The process of compiling the necessary data and preparing for inspections could deter or detect security threats and provide an impetus to improve procedures. Advances in information technology, encryption and the internet can be used to develop secure information that can be reliably monitored. In addition, transparency measures would make possible the development of joint standards for the protection and accounting of warheads. These considerations apply to weapons-usable fissile materials as well. The 1994 CISAC report, The Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, recommended that the high standards of security and accounting accorded to nuclear weapons should also apply to fissile materials.6 The United States funds programs to assist Russia in improving security and accounting for fissile materials, and the benefits 5   National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, ibid. 6   National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, ibid.

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report of such cooperation would undoubtedly be enhanced by a comprehensive transparency regime. Increase the irreversibility of reductions in strategic nuclear forces. At the high force levels permitted by START I and START II, the stability of the nuclear balance is relatively insensitive to the total number of warheads each side possesses and breakout concerns are not acute. But as the number of deployed strategic warheads declines, whether through further negotiated agreements or unilateral actions, uncertainties about the number of nondeployed warheads—and the amount of fissile material available to make new warheads—would loom larger. By reducing this uncertainty, a comprehensive verification and monitoring system would facilitate agreement on significant reductions in strategic nuclear forces. One of the most important ways such a regime would decrease uncertainty is by enhancing the irreversibility of reductions. As noted above, the START treaties limit the number of warheads on deployed strategic delivery vehicles, but they contain no limits on deployed non-strategic warheads or nondeployed warheads. Excess silos and SLBM launchers must be verifiably eliminated, and excess bombers must be verifiably converted to conventional use or eliminated, but this is not true for the nuclear warheads they were intended to carry. Placing limits on the total number of warheads and requiring the verified dismantling of excess warheads and the disposal of excess fissile material would make reversal of nuclear arms reductions more difficult, costly, and time consuming. Making agreed reductions in nuclear arsenals as irreversible as possible along with controls on both deployed and nondeployed warheads would benefit both countries, but the asymmetries between the countries must be taken into account when doing so. The primary reason why the irreversibility of reductions is such a crucial issue is each country’s concern that the other party might break out of the agreement by reconstituting its nuclear arsenal. The current arms control complex, with its large stockpiles and its emphasis on delivery vehicles, cannot address this concern sufficiently. There are three basic reasons for this problem:

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report “Hedge” Stockpiles: The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of 1994 resulted in a decision to maintain a significant stock of warheads in reserve as a hedge against the potential reversal of reform in Russia and a return to hostile relations. Russian officials have stated a desire to maintain extra warheads as well. Large stockpiles of nondeployed warheads create the potential for rapid and large-scale breakout from treaty obligations. Up-loading: The reason such large stockpiles are a concern in a breakout context is that many U.S. and Russian strategic delivery vehicles can be armed with more warheads than are permitted under START. Thus, either country could rapidly increase the size of its strategic force by replacing warheads that had been removed from missiles and bombers. Bombers are a clear example of this: nuclear bombers can carry additional bombs or cruise missiles and conventional bombers can be refitted for nuclear delivery. Cross-loading: In addition to their ability to re-load warheads on to their delivery systems, the United States and Russia have a considerable capability to interchange warheads among delivery systems. Different weapon systems can share similar nuclear warheads and components, so that one type could be used as the basis for another. Controls on both deployed and nondeployed warheads would address this problem. A comprehensive reduction regime would also facilitate efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals across the globe. The 1997 CISAC report considered an interim limit of 1,000 total warheads (all warheads, regardless of type, function, status, or basing mode) for the United States and Russia. Over the longer term, CISAC considered moving to a limit of a few hundred warheads each for both countries, when each of the other nuclear powers were also at these lower levels. Reductions to such levels would have to be part of a multilateral arrangement that included the United Kingdom, France, and China. In addition, consideration for such deep reductions would have to take into account the U.S. military posture, as well as U.S. relations with other nations. To make such arrangements

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report possible, it will be essential to have a system in place for verifiably accounting for warhead and fissile-material stockpiles. Permit verifiable reductions in nonstrategic forces. Many nonstrategic warheads lack unique nuclear delivery vehicles or launchers. Russia reportedly maintains a greater number and variety of nonstrategic weapons 7 designed for delivery by dual-capable launchers than does the United States. These weapons cannot be limited by imposing restraints on delivery vehicles; indeed, today the delivery of nuclear weapons is a part of the mission of nuclear-capable aircraft and cruise missiles. Verifying the production and dismantlement of warheads would confirm the reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles. Verifying inventories of these warheads would confirm that agreed or declared limits on these systems are being observed at declared sites. In 1991, on the eve of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev announced separately that all U.S. and Russian ground-based nuclear warheads on artillery, mines and nonstrategic missiles would be withdrawn and dismantled. 8 They also announced that all sea-based nonstrategic warheads would be withdrawn from active deployment and placed in central storage. President Yeltsin subsequently reaffirmed and extended these pledges. The commitments made in these unilateral declarations are not legally binding and there are no associated verification measures. National technical means provide only limited assurance that the promised reductions actually took place. Cooperative verification and transparency measures on warhead inventories and dismantling would give additional assurance. Verifiable restrictions on nonstrategic warheads will become more important as the number of strategic warheads is reduced, particularly because some nonstrategic warheads could either be adapted for use on strategic delivery vehicles or used in a strategic manner. If strategic warheads are limited, their nonstrategic counterparts should be limited as well. Russia has expressed concern that aerial-refueled tactical aircraft 7   Nonstrategic weapons are generally defined in the INF treaty to have ranges less than 5,500 km. This definition is easily blurred since the warhead can become strategic by mounting it on a system with a larger range.

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report based in Europe or nuclear-armed SLCMs based on submarines or ships off the Russian coast could be used in strategic attacks. The United States could have similar concerns about Russian tactical weapons, presumably maintained to offset a purported conventional arms imbalance. Agreed limits on nonstrategic warheads would be a useful confidence-building measure to address Russian concerns about the potential deployment of U.S. tactical warheads in an expanded NATO. The United States is concerned about the safety and security of Russia’s huge stockpile of nonstrategic warheads, which could be addressed through verifiable restrictions and cooperation to enhance stockpile security. Task 2) The structure of such a regime, including options for what would be limited and accountable and what might be subject to verification and transparency. We interpret task 2 as a listing of the options of items that could be constrained by unilateral or agreed arrangements, with varying levels of monitoring. The regime would cover warheads and weapons-usable nuclear materials – plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). The Committee has been examining the current work on monitoring technologies at the national laboratories, much of which holds significant promise to improve U.S. technical capabilities. In order to determine what is limited and accountable under monitoring, the Committee is currently working with the following definitions: A nuclear weapon is defined as a nuclear warhead, mounted on a delivery system. There is no one simple, unique definition that describes a nuclear warhead. Accordingly, the Committee defines a nuclear warhead as “any self-contained device that can release large amounts of nuclear energy in a short time.” This definition does not distinguish between “deployed” and “reserve” or between “strategic” and “tactical or non-strategic.” Most deployed nuclear weapons contain a primary stage that is made with a mass of plutonium surrounded by high explosives (HE). A nuclear weapon could also be built 8   “A New Era of Reciprocal Arms Reductions: Texts or President Bush’s Nuclear Initiative and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s Response,” Arms Control Today 21, 3-6 (October 1991). “Bush and Yeltsin Press New Nuclear Cutbacks,” Arms Control Today 22, 38, 48-49 (January/February 1992).

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report with a mass of highly enriched uranium (HEU) surrounded by HE. Nuclear weapons are also made with HEU in a gun-type shape that is ready for assembly by gunpowder or other propellant. Plutonium is not used in a gun-type weapon because it has a high rate of spontaneous neutron emission. The Committee is considering a warhead to be a plutonium or HEU “pit” surrounded by HE, or it can also be a mass of HEU configured for ready assembly with explosive propellant. The presence of plutonium and highly enriched uranium can be determined by passively observing their gamma-ray emissions. The HE can be detected with active means by using external neutrons or by other techniques. A definition of a warhead could exclude the electronics and other equipment that might be attached to the warhead, which is consistent with the fact that it is very difficult to monitor uniquely for the presence of electronic components (and other non-nuclear, non-HE components). By this definition, a pit (without HE) and a secondary stage would not be warheads but they could be treated as weapons-usable nuclear materials. A HEU gun-type primary that lacks a propulsion unit might not be considered a nuclear warhead. The secondary stage is imploded and heated by the exploding primary, sufficient to fuse isotopes of hydrogen into helium and produce a thermonuclear weapon. Since a stand-alone secondary cannot explode, it might not be considered to be a nuclear warhead. This study considers declarations and monitoring by the nuclear weapons states for all their stocks of plutonium, regardless of the isotopic content. This broad definition includes Pu-238, which is primarily used as a heat source to generate power in space. In principle, nuclear weapons can be made from U-233, Np-237 and several americium isotopes. Since there are considerable amounts of these materials available, the study is considering declarations and monitoring of all grades of plutonium, HEU (U-235 and U-233), Np and Am. 9 9   J.N. Cooley, “IAEA Implementation of the Board of Governors Decision on Neptunium and Americium,” Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, New Orleans, July 2000.

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report The Committee is also examining a phased approach, treating individual elements as building blocks that could be combined in a variety of ways – including, but not limited to – a comprehensive regime for all warheads and weapons-usable fissile materials. Each of the blocks can vary from the less intrusive transparency measures to the more-intrusive verification approaches. The information obtained from one transparency measure may not be definitive, but it can contribute to a larger whole. By combining the information from several measures, including multiple source data analysis and enhanced national technical means, estimates of stockpile sizes can be refined, shedding considerable light on the nuclear inventories. As part of task 2, we have been compiling from the literature approximate stockpile sizes of warheads and materials that would be covered by the regime. Task 3) The elements of a verification regime, including, for example, initial declarations, inspections to confirm accuracy and completeness and to provide confidence in dismantlement and suspect site inspections. The history of arms control negotiations – and unilateral measures to enhance stability – suggests that reductions in nuclear weapons stocks and the fissile material that is essential for their production are likely to come relatively slowly and in careful steps. Verification and transparency measures have become the reliable building blocks of such nuclear arms reductions and will continue to serve that function in the future. The Committee is examining the recent history of arms control measures with the Russian Federation for the lessons it may offer for future policy. This would include the present set of U.S./R.F. lab-to-lab programs, as well as the Russian and U.S. views toward the IAEA. As part of this study, the Committee is also focusing on the various kinds of incentives that would increase the acceptability of the regime, such as financial assistance, market-value purchases of nuclear materials, enhanced access to facilities on a reciprocal basis, simplified procedures, enhanced negotiations on an agreement for cooperation to facilitate these proposals, and joint research and development on verification technologies.

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report Verification of compliance and transparency cannot stand alone, however. They must be enhanced by careful analysis of all data available, from classified as well as open sources. NTM could be enhanced to provide improved monitoring and surveillance capabilities that will keep up with the demands. The building blocks of the regime should consist of carefully constructed groupings of compliance-observing and compliance-measuring methodologies, including on-site measures, whose purpose is to provide an effective level of assurance that participants in a nuclear weapons reductions regime are, in fact, fulfilling their obligations. A building block that measures arms control compliance has at least two dimensions: One might say that the width of the block represents its ability to cover a breadth of objects or actions; its height represents the robustness or effectiveness of the element. Building blocks of different magnitudes, effectiveness, and coverage can be combined into packages designed to achieve specific results. These packages would be assembled over a period of years to build continuous structures of assurance that would grow stronger with time. Improved relations between Russia and the United States could reduce the need for rigorous verification measures. Over time, the trend from verification to transparency can gain momentum as a global regime develops. By having a variety of building blocks, the development of the monitoring for the regime – whether confidence building measures, transparency measures, or verification arrangements – can take place in steps and phases. Some of the variable-sized elements of such a regime follow: Base-line declarations and annual declarations of weapons-usable nuclear materials. The declarations could be a mixture of stand-alone declarations without a verification regime and declarations with confirmatory inspections, with the specific mix evolving over time. Base-line and annual inspections to confirm the declarations. Ban on weapons-usable nuclear material production. There are a variety of monitoring methods to ensure that such a ban is being observed. Options are being

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report considered on how to move the negotiations for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty forward. Monitoring warhead production and disassembly. The identification of an object as a warhead could be done at various levels of confidence. When nuclear radiation from a warhead or component is monitored, it is usually necessary to use information barriers to prevent the loss of design information. At the same time, the information barrier technologies must be authenticated for the inspectors to have confidence that the data have not been falsified. Tags and seals can be used to make sure that an object has not been displaced during transportation or storage. A chain-of-custody that assumes that an object has not been displaced can be maintained by using robust tags and seals. Chain-of-custody control is important to maintain the history of objects in storage, during transportation, or during dismantlement. Warhead Storage. Random inspections at a few sites per year can confirm the baseline and annual declarations. Challenge inspections to search non-declared sites. The rigor of challenge inspections could vary from a few in number with little intrusiveness to more in number with greater intrusiveness. Materials accounting of plutonium and highly enriched uranium stocks. The MPC&A program is helping to establish materials accounting procedures in Russia that are relevant to the regime the Committee is studying. Nuclear Archeology to place limits on possible undeclared inventories. Such evidence should include the condition of production reactors, the size of the nuclear weapons infrastructure and production complex, and observation of maintenance activities that might be related to nuclear weapons. “Verification in practice.” The cooperative elimination of weapon systems under the Cooperative Threat Reductions programs has given considerable on-site experience with elimination of weapon systems, providing for a measure of “ flying before buying.” These trial runs could give confidence that the building blocks can be used fruitfully, as well as a sense of how best to phase in particular measures.

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report The problem of weapons stored at non-declared sites is addressed by examining challenge inspections, the required infrastructure to support clandestine stockpiles, the requirements for remanufacture and surveillance of clandestine stocks, and by examining the consistency between declared stockpiles with production records and the physical condition of production reactors. The military significance of undeclared stockpiles will be discussed in reference to varying levels of permitted deployments.10Challenge inspections at facilities that have national security significance can be complicated because of the possibility of the denial of access to areas considered highly sensitive, but in some cases this can be worked out with “managed access approaches.” Task 4) Implementation of the proposed regime, including those transparency elements that might be introduced immediately and those that would be introduced in the longer term. A comprehensive regime would, most likely, not be adopted with one initial agreement between the states. The monitoring technologies vary from those that give some confidence to those that give considerable confidence. The example of negotiating the HEU Purchase Agreement has shown that the monitoring process will be an evolutionary, continuous scale one, increasing in complexity and level of confidence. Each building block that is added can strengthen the over-all regime. As part of this process, it is useful to establish a chain-of-custody that can strengthen the less intrusive monitoring approaches. Because of the complexity of the options, CISAC is studying a phased approach with a spectrum of options. Task 5 The utility of mutual, non-binding declarations or voluntary transparency measures as compared with formal treaties or executive agreements. The reciprocal-unilateral measures initiated by Presidents Bush, Gorbachev and Yeltsin during 1991-92 were successful in removing significant numbers of deployed, 10   The concern over Soviet compliance to arms control treaties will be addressed within the context of the presidential reports on compliance.

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report nonstrategic warheads from operational status. Some of these unilateral measures could be monitored with our NTM assets in space and elsewhere. However, since many actions could not be monitored, there will always be uncertainty about the implementation of unilateral reductions. As stated above, these measures have been successful, and they can be enhanced with confidence building measures. Unilateral measures also provide for increased flexibility. This may be desirable in permitting military planners to respond to changing situations, but the potential for unilateral reversal can also lead to uncertainty about a nation’s intentions or commitment to a course of action. Task 6 When and in what way other states in addition to the United States and Russia might be expected to participate in the process. The Committee is in the preliminary stages of addressing this task. In doing so, CISAC will draw upon its longstanding program of private, off-the-record dialogues with groups of counterparts from China, Russia, and India 11 . The Russian dialogue just celebrated its 20th anniversary; the China dialogue has been active for over 10 years; and the India dialogue, CISAC’s newest, will be holding its third meeting this year. The members of the counterpart groups include distinguished current and former government officials and military officers, scientists and engineers with important roles in nuclear weapons matters, and policy analysts with close connections to decision makers. Meetings are scheduled with each of these groups between March and June 2001 and issues related to the creation of a comprehensive arms reduction regime, as they may affect each nation, are on the agenda of each meeting. After each meeting, CISAC will prepare an extensive written summary of the discussions, which it will distribute to DOE and other U.S. government agencies. Task 7 Whether the responsibility for implementation of some elements of the regime, such as verifying fissile material production of stockpiles, should be given to an international agency. 11   In addition, the Committee has been supplemented by participation in the annual Amaldi Conferences on international security of European academies of science and science societies and with CISAC members ’ informal meetings with representatives from countries of concern, such as Pakistan.

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A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime: Interim Report The Committee has examined the potential role of the IAEA in the comprehensive regime during the first phase of the study. CISAC has studied the ongoing trilateral (IAEA/RF/US) negotiations to monitor excess weapons-usable materials in Russia and the U.S. Such involvement by the IAEA in monitoring weapons-usable fissile materials in bulk form strengthens the NPT commitments of the nuclear weapon states. An issue that must be addressed is the use of international inspectors from non-nuclear weapon states. For example, it is questionable whether a nuclear weapon state would permit direct monitoring of actual weapon components by inspectors from non-nuclear weapon states. The Committee has also examined the strengthened IAEA safeguards provisions developed after the Gulf War. The declaration and monitoring regime developed in INFCIRC/540 has some promise for strengthening international monitoring for the production of undeclared weapons-usable nuclear materials.