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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program 2 Investment in Science and Technology CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS Congressional concerns arose during the 1990s about reductions in the DoD S&T program, particularly in the Air Force S&T program. Figure 2–1 shows the relative changes in the total DoD budget since 1989. The decline in the total DoD budget by about 25 percent in real terms from FY89 to FY01 reflects attempts by Congress to realize a post-Cold War peace dividend and to deal with growing federal budget deficits in the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 2–1 also shows that over the same period, the Air Force reduced its S&T program by about 50 percent—about twice the reduction in the overall DoD budget. In 1989, the Air Force S&T program was almost as large as the Army’s and the Navy’s S&T pro FIGURE 2–1 Percentage change in total DoD budget and service S&T funding since 1989. Data from Tables 2–2 and 2–3, constant dollars. grams combined; by 2000, it was the smallest program of the three (see Figure 2–2) (Tuohy, 1999), whereas the Navy’s S&T program had actually increased. According to congressional staff members who met with the committee, the Air Force had proposed even deeper reductions but had been prevented from making them by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. In addition, in 1999 the Air Force moved two relatively large programs, the Discoverer II space-based radar demonstration and the Space-Based Laser Program, which had previously been funded outside S&T, into its S&T funding line. But because total S&T funding was not increased, these two programs were funded at the expense of ongoing and new S&T programs (Gessel, 2000). From FY89 to FY98, the Air Force reduced its S&T investment to about 46 percent of its FY89 level in real terms. From FY98 to FY01, the Air Force increased its S&T investment. By FY01 it had been increased to 54 percent of its FY89 level. Despite the turnaround, congressional concerns remained. TRENDS IN FUNDING FOR DoD S&T The committee examined overall DoD S&T funding trends during the 1990s to provide a context for evaluating the Air Force’s funding reductions. Tables 2–1 and 2–2 show the breakdown of DoD S&T funding in current and FY01 constant dollars, respectively, for FY89 to FY01. Table 2–3 shows DoD funding by major budget category in both current and FY01 constant dollars for the same time period; Table 2–4 gives the same information for the Air Force. Table 2–5 shows changes in

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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program FIGURE 2–2 Service investments in S&T (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3). FY89 to FY00, appropriated; FY01 to FY05, President’s budget request. SOURCE: Tuohy, 1999. funding for DoD budget categories (1) as the average annual percentage change since FY89, (2) in terms of the largest annual percentage reduction in each budget category, and (3) as the annual percentage change between FY97 and FY01 for each budget category; Table 2–6 shows the same data for the Air Force. Table 2–7 uses the same three indicators to show the percentage changes in funding for each defense S&T category. The tables show reductions, in real terms, in almost all categories of defense and Air Force funding since 1989: The total DoD budget is down approximately 25 percent in real terms (Table 2–5). The total Air Force budget is down 32 percent (Table 2–6). Total DoD research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding, of which S&T is a part, is down about 21 percent (Table 2–5). Air Force RDT&E funding is down 26 percent (Table 2–6). From FY97 to FY01, there was a significant turnaround. The total Air Force budget, driven by a strong increase in procurement funding (39 percent) and operations and maintenance funding (10 percent), increased about 7 percent overall (Table 2–6). Even in those five years, however, Air Force RDT&E declined another 8 percent (contributing to an 18 percent cut since FY90). Air Force S&T investment declined from FY97 to FY99 (in real terms) but rose in FY00 and FY01, resulting in a 9 percent increase for the five-year period (Table 2–7). If DoD S&T funding is examined by agency, some differences are evident (Table 2–7). The Army shows an overall real increase in S&T funding of about 20 percent over the entire 12-year, post-Cold War period, with a 29 percent increase in the last five years. The Air Force shows an overall reduction of 46 percent for the entire period. The Navy shows a 47 percent increase in S&T funding over the 12-year period. The positive shifts in Navy funding are mainly the result of increases in advanced technology development (6.3), which increased more than 212 percent from FY89 to FY01. All three services experienced reductions in basic research over the 12 years. Army and Navy applied research grew during the period. Air Force applied research declined. Defense-wide S&T funding, which includes S&T funding directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and funding by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program TABLE 2–1 DoD S&T Funding, Total Obligational Authority, FY89 to FY01 (current dollars, millions) Component Science and Technology Category Dollar Type FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Army Basic Research Current 172 178 180 197 214 202 214 182 175 177 176 202 210 Army Applied Research Current 573 549 639 680 729 618 595 451 542 663 613 793 832 Army Advanced Technology Development Current 461 608 604 470 863 516 738 580 651 678 635 721 815 Total   1,207 1,335 1,423 1,347 1,806 1,336 1,547 1,213 1,368 1,518 1,425 1,716 1,857 Navy Basic Research Current 352 363 390 392 426 412 408 369 346 332 354 367 394 Navy Applied Research Current 430 444 485 488 578 438 502 536 514 463 551 610 662 Navy Advanced Technology Development Current 197 230 244 238 440 417 481 466 462 521 570 739 786 Total   979 1,037 1,119 1,118 1,443 1,267 1,391 1,371 1,322 1,316 1,474 1,717 1,843 Air Force Basic Research Current 197 193 205 206 239 225 225 216 182 188 197 208 213 Air Force Applied Research Current 587 570 578 618 617 601 643 627 631 546 584 587 657 Air Force Advanced Technology Development Current 1,343 936 926 677 694 468 538 517 446 441 462 564 587 Total   2,127 1,699 1,709 1,501 1,549 1,295 1,406 1,361 1,260 1,176 1,243 1,359 1,456 DoD-wide Basic Research Current 228 197 380 345 434 340 328 331 330 317 336 359 498 DoD-wide Applied Research Current 955 849 1,016 1,188 1,300 1,093 1,189 1,217 1,130 1,239 1,311 1,426 1,534 DoD-wide Advanced Technology Development Current 1,366 1,121 1,669 1,673 2,187 2,477 2,054 2,028 2,061 2,110 1,820 1,754 1,785 Total   2,549 2,167 3,065 3,206 3,920 3,910 3,572 3,576 3,521 3,666 3,467 3,539 3,816 Grand Total   6,861 6,238 7,316 7,172 8,719 7,807 7,916 7,520 7,470 7,676 7,610 8,332 8,973 NOTE: Rounded amounts may not add to the correct totals shown. SOURCE: Personal communication, Stanley Trice, staff member, ODUSD (S&T), February 23, 2001.

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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program TABLE 2–2 DoD S&T Funding, Total Obligational Authority, FY89 to FY01 (FY01 constant dollars, millions) Component Science and Technology Category Dollar Type FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Army Basic Research Constant 221 219 214 227 243 225 233 195 184 185 182 206 210 Army Applied Research Constant 733 676 758 786 828 688 650 483 572 692 634 807 832 Army Advanced Technology Development Constant 590 748 718 543 980 574 806 621 687 708 656 734 815 Total   1,544 1,643 1,691 1,557 2,051 1,487 1,689 1,229 1,444 1,585 1,472 1,746 1,857 Navy Basic Research Constant 451 447 463 453 483 459 446 396 365 347 366 374 394 Navy Applied Research Constant 550 546 576 564 656 488 548 574 543 483 569 621 662 Navy Advanced Technology Development Constant 252 284 290 275 499 464 525 499 488 544 589 752 786 Total   1,252 1,276 1,329 1,292 1,639 1,411 1,518 1,469 1,395 1,374 1,524 1,747 1,843 Air Force Basic Research Constant 251 237 243 239 271 251 246 232 192 196 204 212 213 Air Force Applied Research Constant 751 702 687 715 701 669 702 672 666 571 604 597 657 Air Force Advanced Technology Development Constant 1,718 1,152 1,099 782 788 521 588 554 471 461 477 574 587 Total   2,721 2,091 2,029 1,735 1,760 1,441 1,535 1,458 1,330 1,228 1,285 1,383 1,456 DoD-wide Basic Research Constant 292 243 451 399 492 378 358 355 349 331 347 366 498 DoD-wide Applied Research Constant 1,221 1,045 1,207 1,373 1,477 1,216 1,298 1,304 1,192 1,294 1,355 1,451 1,534 DoD-wide Advanced Technology Development Constant 1,747 1,380 1,982 1,933 2,483 2,758 2,242 2,173 2,175 2,204 1,881 1,785 1,785 Total   3,260 2,668 3,640 3,705 4,452 4,352 3,899 3,831 3,716 3,829 3,582 3,601 3,816 Grand Total   8,776 7,687 8,689 8,288 9,902 8,691 8,641 8,056 7,885 8,016 7,863 8,477 8,973 NOTE: Rounded amounts may not add to the correct totals shown. SOURCE: Personal communication, Stanley Trice, staff member, ODUSD (S&T), February 23, 2001.

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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program TABLE 2–3 DoD Funding by Major Budget Category, FY89 to FY01 (current and FY01 constant dollars, millions) Budget Category FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Current Dollars, Millions   Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 37,306 35,793 34,714 37,879 37,677 34,508 34,422 35,115 36,481 37,184 38,104 38,582 37,862 Procurement 79,412 79,709 71,416 61,919 53,621 43,761 43,084 43,432 43,149 44,884 50,770 54,998 60,270 Military Construction 5,680 5,158 5,496 4,988 3,905 6,477 5,874 7,358 6,003 5,469 5,148 4,993 4,568 Operations and Maintenance 86,623 88,431 109,764 92,145 90,767 89,091 93,989 93,233 91,834 95,856 102,661 106,564 109,044 Military Personnel 78,448 78,864 83,974 81,055 75,983 71,293 71,473 69,699 70,187 69,686 70,731 73,690 75,802 Family Housing 3,350 3,165 3,385 3,705 3,822 3,566 3,728 4,312 4,122 3,931 3,553 3,583 3,480 Revolving and Management Funds 772 237 1,871 3,504 3,881 2,643 1,645 1,903 2,411 2,114 1,764 1,800 1,304 DoD Total 291,540 291,356 310,620 285,195 269,655 251,339 254,215 255,052 254,186 259,123 272,729 284,210 292,332 FY01 Constant Dollars, Millions   Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 47,715 44,056 41,229 43,774 42,790 38,414 37,576 37,615 38,508 38,831 39,372 39,254 37,862 Procurement 98,667 95,721 83,331 70,631 59,973 48,066 46,552 46,250 45,432 46,825 52,317 55,877 60,270 Military Construction 7,156 6,270 6,486 5,754 4,429 7,171 6,401 7,880 6,364 5,740 5,329 5,082 4,568 Operations and Maintenance 119,994 118,453 135,530 113,859 109,173 104,396 108,069 104,836 101,137 102,962 108,326 110,450 109,044 Military Personnel 112,997 111,868 113,502 106,701 95,810 87,724 85,841 81,859 80,096 77,076 75,931 76,068 75,802 Family Housing 4,263 3,889 3,985 4,263 4,304 3,931 4,041 4,590 4,329 4,089 3,659 3,648 3,480 Revolving and Management Funds 929 292 2,216 4,128 4,448 3,034 1,894 2,128 2,615 2,266 1,811 1,828 1,304 DoD Total 391,722 380,548 386,280 349,111 320,927 292,736 290,374 285,150 278,481 277,790 286,744 292,206 292,332 NOTE: Rounded amounts may not add to the correct totals shown. SOURCE: DoD, 2000.

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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program TABLE 2–4 Air Force Funding by Major Budget Category, FY89 to FY01 (current and FY01 constant dollars, millions) Budget Category FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Current Dollars, Millions   Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 14,551 13,553 11,890 13,051 12,789 12,178 11,605 12,518 14,090 14,278 13,732 14,580 13,686 Procurement 30,611 30,104 24,514 23,539 21,505 17,501 15,829 16,619 14,388 15,328 18,209 18,612 20,939 Military Construction 1,408 1,334 1,142 1,217 1,036 1,587 1,081 1,282 1,576 1,570 1,399 1,471 968 Operations and Maintenance 25,157 25,493 29,020 22,829 22,870 24,542 24,537 23,405 22,795 25,131 27,068 26,025 28,056 Military Personnel 21,854 21,773 22,717 21,306 20,201 18,133 19,593 19,276 19,171 19,099 19,366 20,235 20,892 Family Housing 946 876 962 1,106 1,164 985 1,123 1,130 1,119 1,103 1,058 1,162 1,050 Revolving and Management Funds 187 111 945 0 0 12 5 0 31 33 31 28 0 Air Force Total 94,713 93,244 91,189 83,048 79,566 74,938 73,773 74,230 73,170 76,543 80,862 82,113 85,590 FY01 Constant Dollars, Millions   Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 18,593 16,664 14,085 15,603 14,441 13,503 12,626 13,361 14,809 14,869 14,146 14,819 13,686 Procurement 38,240 36,290 28,674 26,875 24,054 19,219 17,076 17,651 15,103 15,948 18,742 18,901 20,939 Military Construction 1,751 1,600 1,331 1,387 1,158 1,740 1,165 1,361 1,658 1,636 1,441 1,494 968 Operations and Maintenance 34,751 34,331 34,940 28,478 27,617 29,048 28,749 26,800 25,431 27,104 28,704 27,357 28,056 Military Personnel 31,587 30,954 30,809 28,081 25,473 22,331 23,554 22,655 21,915 21,146 20,805 20,890 20,892 Family Housing 1,202 1,073 1,127 1,270 1,308 1,084 1,215 1,202 1,175 1,146 1,089 1,184 1,050 Revolving and Management Funds 240 137 1,119 0 0 13 6 0 32 35 32 29 0 Air Force Total 126,365 121,049 112,085 101,154 94,051 86,939 84,390 83,030 80,123 81,884 84,959 84,674 85,590 NOTE: Rounded amounts may not add to the correct totals shown. SOURCE: DoD, 2000.

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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program TABLE 2–5 Percentage Changes in Funding for DoD Budget Categories (FY01 constant dollars)   Since FY89 Deepest Annual Cut FY97 to FY01 Total Budget −25 −10 +5 Procurement −39 −20 +33 O&M −9 −16 +8 Military Personnel −33 −10 −5 RDT&E −21 −10 −2 S&T +2 −12 +14 Basic Research +8 −12 +21 Applied Research +13 −16 +24 Advanced Technology Development −8 −17 +4 (DARPA), the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, and other defense research agencies, grew 17 percent (in real terms) following the end of the Cold War. Table 2.2 shows that defense S&T funding fluctuated over the past 12 years. Overall, however, defense S&T funding was higher by FY01, including total DoD, Army, Navy, and DoD-wide S&T funding. The sole exception was Air Force S&T funding, which by FY01 was 46 percent lower. VALUE OF DEFENSE S&T INVESTMENTSCOUNTERING A RANGE OF THREATS To address the question of the level of investment necessary to maintain an adequate technology base in the areas of air, space, and supporting information systems, the committee examined how the value, or utility, of the defense S&T investment has changed since the end of the Cold War. The most striking characteristic of defense S&T resources, which represent only 2 to 3 percent of total expenditures for national security, is their astonishing impact on the shape of DoD. Since World War II, for example, investments in S&T have led to the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles, stealthy aircraft, and reconnaissance satellites. One could legitimately ask whether the war against Japan would have ended by August 1945, the Cold War in 1989, or the Gulf War only 100 hours after the allied ground campaign started if key S&T investments had not been made. Today, however, the national security situation has changed radically, requiring a reconsideration of both the level of national security expenditures and the proportion that should be devoted to S&T. TABLE 2–6 Percentage Changes in Funding for Air Force Budget Categories (FY01 constant dollars)   Since FY89 Deepest Annual Cut FY97 to FY01 Total Budget −32 −10 +7 Procurement −45 −21 +39 O&M −19 −18 +10 Military Personnel −34 −12 −5 RDT&E −26 −15 −8 S&T −46 −23 +9 Basic Research −15 −17 +11 Applied Research −13 −14 −1 Advanced Technology Development −66 −34 +25 By their very nature, S&T resources entail management problems. Significantly useful S&T programs are almost always unique. The nature of the personnel and other resources involved make it particularly difficult to establish schedules and to predict financial requirements. The military payoffs of S&T programs cannot always be specified with certainty at their initiation and, in fact, are usually difficult to quantify even in retrospect because they gain utility in “system of systems” applications. Despite these difficulties, management must estimate the magnitude and direction of the defense S&T investment to provide a basis for determining the best mix of weapon systems to meet current and future security threats. Those threats have changed since the Cold War. The Soviet Union had military systems and capabilities competitive with those of the United States, as well as potentially superior numbers of forces. Although there were other potential adversaries around the world, the overwhelming focus of U.S. military strategy, forces, and systems was countering the single adversary that could conceivably match the United States blow for blow in a full-scale nuclear or conventional conflict. The symmetry of capabilities, combined with potentially superior numbers of forces, drove the United States to pursue weapons and systems development programs, as fast as possible and at almost any cost, to create and maintain a technologically superior military capability. In keeping with this single-adversary orientation, defense S&T programs were oriented toward developing technologies that pushed the limits of weapon system performance, range, lethality, precision, and survivability.

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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program TABLE 2–7 Percentage Changes in Funding for DoD S&T Categories (FY01 constant dollars)   Since FY89 Deepest Annual Cut FY97 to FY01 S&T   Total +2 −12 +14 Army +20 −27 +29 Navy +47 −14 +32 Air Force −46 −23 +9 DoD-wide +17 −18 +3 Basic Research   Total +8 −12 +21 Army −5 −13 −16 Navy −11 +14 +8 Air Force −15 −17 +11 DoD-wide +71 −23 +43 Applied Research   Total +13 −16 +24 Army +14 −26 +45 Navy +20 −26 +22 Air Force −13 −14 −1 DoD-wide +26 −18 +29 Advanced Technology Development   Total −8 −17 +4 Army +38 −41 +19 Navy +212 −7 +61 Air Force −66 −34 +25 DoD-wide +2 −21 −18 With the fall of the Soviet Union, however, some of the impetus for the development of advanced systems has diminished. Despite Russia’s formidable conventional and nuclear forces and the improving military capabilities of other countries, the U.S. military, for the time being, is the predominant military force in the world. This does not mean, however, that the threats faced by the United States are simpler or less dangerous. In fact, the opposite is true. Instead of a monolithic adversary whose capabilities and strategies are similar to those of the U.S. military, the United States now faces a growing number of threats. First, other nations continue to improve and increase their military capabilities in many areas such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. Although these nations could not yet prevail against the United States in a full-scale conflict, they can threaten and significantly harm the vital interests of the United States and its allies. In addition, international terrorism is increasing, and the U.S. military and U.S. allies are favored targets. The asymmetry between these threats and U.S. military capabilities compounds the problem. The worldwide availability of advanced technologies has enabled relatively small forces or groups to wield great destructive power for striking at nonmilitary populations as well as military forces. As the U.S. military and the world are learning, a large, technologically superior military designed to fight a similar enemy is not necessarily well prepared to deal with these asymmetrical threats. The attack on the USS Cole illustrates how an asymmetric threat can seriously damage an opponent that was once considered overwhelming and invulnerable. Civilian societies are also vulnerable. For example, attacks on the electrical power, financial, or transportation systems through their supporting information systems could cause great damage. Concerns about whether the United States is prepared to defend itself against such attacks are now widespread. No one knows which of these potential threats will become real, which terrorist group will be the first to possess a weapon of mass destruction, when and where it will strike, and what constraints will be imposed on a defense against them. The growing number of threats, their asymmetric nature, and their uncertainty have increased the complexity and difficulty of defending against them—and, as a consequence, the potential utility of S&T in helping to meet these challenges. IMPETUS FOR ONGOING INVESTMENT IN DEFENSE S&T Given the demonstrated value of DoD S&T programs over more than the past half-century and the need for strong capabilities to meet a changing global threat, the committee concluded that the post-Cold War trend toward reductions in S&T spending should be reexamined in light of the need to deal with the threats that have arisen since the Cold War. First, if current defense systems cannot defend against the new threats, new systems must be developed, which will require reoriented and increased investment in defense S&T. Because the nature and scope of these threats are uncertain, the S&T investment should be broad and flexible. Second, increased S&T investments are needed to support aging military systems, many of which are decades old but are expected to last many more years

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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program until new systems can replace them. All of the services, including the Air Force, have already discovered that S&T programs will be necessary to extend the lifetimes of these systems. Third, rapid deployment and reduced dependence on overseas bases in force projection will require capabilities beyond those provided by current operational technologies. The Air Force’s Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept is a case in point. The S&T requirements to support new operational concepts are just beginning to be understood. Fourth, although the impetus for the development of some advanced systems has diminished, continued investment in S&T supporting advanced systems is still necessary. Russia and other developed nations possess technologically competitive systems and, just as important, the capability to improve them. Other countries could buy these systems, thus increasing both their military capabilities and their own technology bases. The United States still relies on technological superiority to reduce casualties and provide a military advantage in the event of conflict. Therefore, maintaining the defense S&T base to ensure these advantages is prudent and necessary. DoD and Air Force S&T programs are as important as ever, perhaps more important. In light of the current threats faced by the United States, the prospective utility of the U.S. investment in defense S&T has actually increased. NONDEFENSE PAYOFFS Although nondefense applications are not a primary criterion in the allocation of DoD resources, these payoffs have been, and can continue to be, extensive. Among the many recent nondefense economic and social benefits that have accrued as a result of military technologies being transferred to the nondefense public and private sectors are the Global Positioning System, the ARPANET (the forerunner of today’s Internet), communication satellites, fiber optics, laser technology for medical and manufacturing uses, and composite materials for sports equipment and automotive vehicles, to name only a few. Defense S&T programs have contributed directly to a stronger economy, safer automobiles and aircraft, and more cost-efficient logistics. Such nondefense payoffs are directly related to the investment in defense S&T. Unique aspects of the public welfare such as national security require that the government make high-risk, sometimes long-term, investments that industry cannot or will not make. Most defense S&T programs are high-risk capital investments with a high potential for failure. Even large firms accustomed to taking risks can find it difficult to justify such programs on a commercial profit-and-loss basis. Accounting in advance for the incremental economic benefits to be gained from defense S&T spending is problematic. The modeling of projected economic and social benefits is extremely complex and difficult to do. However, Congress should remain aware of the nondefense benefits that frequently accrue from defense S&T programs. LEVEL OF AIR FORCE REPRESENTATION AND ADVOCACY FOR S&T Currently, the highest S&T-dedicated military position in the Air Force is the 2-star AFRL commander position at Wright-Patterson AFB near Dayton, Ohio. The AFRL commander reports directly to a general (4-star), the commander of the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), of which AFRL is a part. AFMC headquarters is also located at Wright-Patterson. The AFRL commander is also dual-hatted as the Air Force technology executive officer and as such also reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, whose office is in the Pentagon. The strength of S&T representation in the Air Force is weakened by the relatively small size of the S&T program compared with the Air Force’s total program and compared with the broad scope of responsibilities held by the assistant secretary for acquisition and the AFMC commander. In FY01, the Air Force total obligational authority (TOA) was approximately $85.6 billion. The TOA for RDT&E was approximately $13.7 billion, or about 16 percent. Of this amount, S&T TOA was approximately $1.2 billion, about 9 percent of RDT&E, or slightly more than 1 percent of Air Force TOA for FY01. The relatively small size of the S&T investment affects perceptions of its value and the amount of attention paid to it. The assistant secretary is a member of the Air Force Council, which is the Air Force corporate policy and decision-making body just beneath the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and is responsible for representing this S&T investment as the council makes its investment decisions.

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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program However, he is also responsible for representing all Air Force acquisition programs, which comprise the “D” part of the RDT&E investment and are much larger combined than the S&T program. The AFMC commander also has broad responsibilities. The commander is responsible for about 120,000 people, including approximately 5,700 people in AFRL, and the programs at four product centers, five air-logistics centers, three test centers, and two major specialized centers. In addition, until very recently, AFMC was not responsible for formulating the Air Force S&T program and budget or for including and representing them during the annual budget cycle. Instead, the S&T budget was formulated and represented by the assistant secretary’s office. The broad scope of responsibilities of the AFMC commander and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, combined with the relatively small size of the S&T program, can prevent them from effectively advocating for Air Force S&T at the corporate policy and decision-making level of the Air Force. The AFRL commander is focused and dedicated to S&T; however, his position is several levels below the Air Force Council and he is located in Ohio instead of the Pentagon. His ability to effectively represent and advocate S&T during corporate decision-making is, therefore, limited. The Air Force itself has recognized this problem and recently acted to increase the level of S&T advocacy within the Air Force. It announced plans to make the AFMC commander the advocate for S&T in the Air Force. In addition, starting in the FY03 budget, AFMC plans to include Air Force S&T in its budget formulation. These changes reflect efforts to increase the level at which S&T is advocated in the Air Force. However, the breadth of the AFMC commander’s responsibilities will not be diminished, and S&T will continue to represent a relatively small part of his overall responsibilities. Moreover, moving the responsibility for S&T budget formulation and advocacy from the assistant secretary’s office in the Pentagon to AFMC at Wright-Patterson also will distance the S&T voice from the locus of Air Force policy and decision making. Including the Air Force S&T budget in the AFMC budget also increases the possibility that S&T funding will be tapped to help pay AFMC’s bills, in addition to bills from Air Force headquarters. This would compound the effects of reductions that have already been made in S&T funding. CONCLUSIONS Decline in Air Force S&T Conclusion 2–1. Although the DoD investment in S&T has fluctuated since the end of the Cold War, it was higher by FY01, except for Air Force S&T, which accounted for the bulk of DoD S&T support for air and space systems. Air Force investment in S&T declined disproportionately during the period, exceeding the rate of the overall DoD budget decline and the rate of the overall Air Force budget decline. Impact of S&T Conclusion 2–2. Despite the relatively small share of total defense resources allocated for S&T, that investment has had major impacts on defense. The United States relies on its defense S&T base for the technological superiority that provides a military advantage and reduces casualties in the event of conflict. New Threats Conclusion 2–3. Since the end of the Cold War, threats facing the United States have changed considerably. New threats are diverse, asymmetric, and fraught with uncertainty. Cold War-era forces were not designed to meet these threats, and countering them will require broad capabilities that can best be provided by a broad program of defense S&T. Nondefense Spin-offs Conclusion 2–4. Defense S&T often has important nondefense benefits, especially in high-risk areas where industry cannot prudently invest on its own. S&T Representation and Advocacy Conclusion 2–5. The committee strongly believes that the Air Force needs authoritative, S&T-focused and -dedicated representation and advocacy at the corporate policy and decision-making level of the Air Force to help make informed trade-offs and budget decisions. Without corporate-level understanding and consideration of the effects its S&T investment can have on the Air Force’s future, the committee believes that the Air Force S&T investment faces undue risk that it will not provide the technologies and systems needed to meet

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Review of the U.S. Department of Defence Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Technology Program future threats. The committee is encouraged by the actions that the Air Force has recently taken to increase the level of S&T advocacy in the Air Force and believes these actions can result in a stronger S&T program. Additional actions could make Air Force S&T even stronger. RECOMMENDATIONS Restore S&T Dollars Recommendation 2–1. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force should continue to increase the Air Force investment in science and technology (S&T) to reach one-and-a-half to two times its current (FY01) level. Investments in S&T for air, space, and information systems should all be increased. Increasing one by decreasing the others will not satisfy current S&T program shortcomings and may create new ones. Redirect S&T for Evolving Threats Recommendation 2–2. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Air Force should continue to reorient their science and technology (S&T) programs toward discovery and development of technologies to meet evolving threats, enable evolving operational concepts, and support the aging military systems that are expected to last over many more years. In addition, DoD and the Air Force should ensure that their S&T programs remain broad and flexible to deal with the uncertainties of current threats. At the same time, DoD and the Air Force need to maintain an adequate S&T base to ensure the technological superiority of U.S. forces over potential adversaries with advanced systems. Promote Technology Transfer to Nondefense Sectors Recommendation 2–3. The U.S. Department of Defense and the Air Force should remain aware of the nondefense benefits that could accrue from defense investments in science and technology and should actively promote the transfer of research results and technologies to the nondefense public and private sectors. Strengthen S&T Advocacy Within the Air Force Recommendation 2–4. In addition to the actions they have already taken, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should continue to look for ways and take actions to further strengthen S&T representation and advocacy at the corporate policy and decision-making level of the Air Force. There are a number of options they can consider, including (1) formally designating the Air Force science and technology (S&T) program as a corporate program, (2) having the current AFRL commander/TEO position report directly to the Chief of Staff or be a member of the Air Force Council, and (3) establishing an Air Force Council member position (normally an assistant secretary or a 3-star deputy chief of staff), to be filled by a person in the Pentagon who is focused on, dedicated to, responsible for, and authorized to represent and advocate S&T within the Air Force, formulate Air Force S&T budgets, and participate in Air Force corporate policy and decision-making activities. The Air Force can also benefit from carefully examining the special roles accorded the Chief of Naval Research and the Office of Naval Research in the Department of the Navy to consider how these roles could be adapted to the AFRL commander/TEO and AFRL to strengthen Air Force S&T. These options or others the Air Force identifies can address remaining weaknesses in Air Force S&T representation and advocacy and build upon the recent successes of the Air Force. REFERENCES DoD (U.S. Department of Defense). 2000. National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2001 (Green Book). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Gessel, M. 2000. Congressional Perspectives, presentation by Michael Gessel, executive assistant to Congressman Tony Hall, to the Committee on Review of Department of Defense Air and Space Systems Science and Technology Program, Holiday Inn, Georgetown, Washington, D.C., January 24, 2000. Tuohy, R. 1999. Review of Department of Defense Air and Space Science and Technology Program, presentation by Robert Tuohy, director, DoD Science and Technology Plans and Programs, to the Committee on Review of Department of Defense Air and Space Systems Science and Technology Program, Wyndham Bristol Hotel, Washington, D.C., December 16, 1999.