3
Translating Blast-effects Research into Practice

From the beginning of the committee’s work in support of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program, it was understood that the output of the program would have to be made available to a broad community of stakeholders in both the public and private sectors. Potential users of the information include engineers of various disciplines, architects, building owners and managers, construction contractors, materials and equipment suppliers, emergency responders, and medical personnel. DTRA understandably has tended to focus on military applications, but the committee believes that to achieve maximum effectiveness in realizing the goal of “protecting people in buildings,” the results of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program should be targeted to nondefense government agencies and the civilian design and building community, i.e., the nonspecialists in protective design.

Although the military and civilian sectors have essentially identical technical requirements, somewhat different technology transfer approaches are warranted for the military versus the civilian and commercial aspects of the program. For example, the private sector is much more cost sensitive than the military or civilian federal sectors. Cost and market demands are very likely to determine what, if anything, is done to protect commercial buildings and their occupants from bombing attacks. In the committee’s judgment, the cost sensitivity of the private sector can best be addressed by a multihazard approach to blast-effects mitigation that will provide collateral protection against, for example, earthquakes and extreme wind events.



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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation 3 Translating Blast-effects Research into Practice From the beginning of the committee’s work in support of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program, it was understood that the output of the program would have to be made available to a broad community of stakeholders in both the public and private sectors. Potential users of the information include engineers of various disciplines, architects, building owners and managers, construction contractors, materials and equipment suppliers, emergency responders, and medical personnel. DTRA understandably has tended to focus on military applications, but the committee believes that to achieve maximum effectiveness in realizing the goal of “protecting people in buildings,” the results of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program should be targeted to nondefense government agencies and the civilian design and building community, i.e., the nonspecialists in protective design. Although the military and civilian sectors have essentially identical technical requirements, somewhat different technology transfer approaches are warranted for the military versus the civilian and commercial aspects of the program. For example, the private sector is much more cost sensitive than the military or civilian federal sectors. Cost and market demands are very likely to determine what, if anything, is done to protect commercial buildings and their occupants from bombing attacks. In the committee’s judgment, the cost sensitivity of the private sector can best be addressed by a multihazard approach to blast-effects mitigation that will provide collateral protection against, for example, earthquakes and extreme wind events.

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER Technology transfer is an established process by which acquired knowledge is transferred to interested parties. As such, it is useful for the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program to be aware of the historic role of U.S. defense and other agencies in the technology transfer and knowledge dissemination process. Over the years since World War II, a U.S. model of technology development and subsequent transfer has evolved that has been described as having three attributes (COSEPUP, 1992): A high level of support for research by defense and other agencies, A prominent role for universities as performers of the research, and Minimal assistance for industrial technology adoption. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is considered a good example of a federal agency that sponsors defense-oriented research and is also successful as a research organization capable of technology transfer. The reasons cited for this success are the fact that DoD itself is the customer for the products of the research and that DARPA builds strong working relationships with its clients within DoD (COSEPUP, 1992). The nuclear weapons laboratories have been successful for similar reasons. The government, as “customer,” has established the specifications or performance objectives, taken delivery of the final product, and been responsible for evaluating the product against the stated performance requirements. At each stage of the process, there are clear and well-defined linkages and feedback mechanisms, with ample opportunities for interaction between research and development activities and the ultimate consumer. Successful technology transfer is goal-driven and the result of a cooperative association of the research, development, manufacturing, and user communities. Therefore, a key element of a Blast Mitigation for Structures Program technology transfer effort should be a periodic and systematized method for obtaining from the customer community (i.e., in the case of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program, the military services, civilian agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector) a clear statement of issues, needs, and solution domains. Such communication could be promoted in several ways. Focus groups of interested private sector building owners could be convened on a regular basis by DTRA or another entity charged with technology transfer to provide direct input to the program. Sessions at conferences and other professional meetings are also valuable but are usually not as targeted as focus groups. To its credit, the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program has always demonstrated a strong customer orientation. Much of the research and testing done to date has been

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation at the request of individual agencies with specific issues or problems. The committee believes that this customer focus should be sustained and enhanced with ample opportunities for all potential end users to play an active role in defining requirements and other aspects of product development. The historic value of the U.S. model for technology transfer may be readily seen in certain industrial sectors that have benefited from spin-offs of defense-oriented, federally funded R&D, such as computers, semiconductors, airframes, and aircraft engines. The focus of technology transfer is changing, however, with increasing emphasis placed by the military and other government agencies on the use of commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and products. The Blast Mitigation for Structures Program is in an excellent position to take advantage of the movement toward COTS technologies as most of the products being investigated are in the commercial sector. In this instance, the defense and civilian missions are nearly congruent, and there is little need to attempt the sometimes arduous task of “commercializing” a purely military product or application. The emphasis on COTS applications does raise some programmatic questions for the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program, however. One of the characteristics of successful technology transfer activities is a strong relationship between the product developer and the customer (COSEPUP, 1992). For example, the degree to which the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program is (or should be) actively participating in product development or merely testing what is currently available is not clear to the committee. However, the committee sees a potentially vital role for the program in defining performance objectives for materials and products and encouraging industry to take an active role in developing them as well as participating in developing the scope of investigations and test programs. The Blast Mitigation for Structures Program also could help to design appropriate test methods and in certain cases, provide testing facilities (e.g., the controlled test structure and the large blast and thermal simulator at White Sands Proving Grounds). The committee would favor a more activist role for the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program because the somewhat limited market for blast-effects mitigation products appears to provide little incentive for manufacturers to participate actively in a “technology push” type environment, absent clear and specific guidelines for new product development. The committee does believe, however, that manufacturers should accept some responsibility by submitting their products for testing and by publication of test results in their product literature. The Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (COSEPUP) of the National Academies underscored this point in its report on the government’s role in civilian technology:

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation Private companies have little financial incentive to invest in R&D that will be available outside the company and therefore involves significant problems in appropriability for the firm. It is when scientific inquiry involves the promise of useful new knowledge that is generic in nature, with wide applications across economic activities, and there are insufficient private returns on investments in R&D that government must act. (COSEPUP, 1992) ACADEMIC INVOLVEMENT In its prior report, the committee identified several potential research, training, and technology transfer roles for academia in the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program but does not believe that the program has taken full advantage of the capabilities of U.S. universities to participate in the program (NRC, 2000). The committee finds the lack of academic involvement unfortunate because the United States arguably possesses the world’s most dynamic and productive system of university research. The committee believes that significant work in structural systems and materials that has been underway for many years in U.S. research universities could advance the objectives of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program. This work should be evaluated with the objective of identifying and synthesizing what may be of value for improving the performance of buildings in a blast environment. In addition, university centers such as the Protective Technology Center at Pennsylvania State University and the National Center for Explosion Resistant Design at the University of Missouri-Columbia offer opportunities in research and training that could be valuable resources for the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program and its client agencies. Universities also have a powerful, if indirect, role in technology transfer through the knowledge imparted to new graduates who will themselves become the next generation of practitioners. The NRC report Protecting Buildings from Bomb Damage: Transfer of Blast-Effects Mitigation Technology from Military to Civilian Applications emphasized the importance of addressing gaps in the education of design profession as a means of strengthening technology transfer for blast-effect mitigation: The committee has found that there are several serious barriers to technology transfer from the military to the civilian sector. The first major barrier is education. The current academic and professional training of architects and engineers does not adequately prepare the design professionals, either technically or philosophically, to incorporate blast-hardening principles in civilian structures. Thus, a strong educational commitment is required by university schools of architecture, construction, and engineering, as well as by professional engineering societies, if the potential for technology transfer is to be realized. (NRC, 1995)

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation The Blast Mitigation for Structures Program could assist universities in closing the training gap and make a significant contribution to technology transfer by encouraging and supporting course work in blast-resistant design. Training could be supplemented by university involvement in research related to the improved blast resistance of structures. In its 2000 report, the committee also noted that government support for fortification-related research at universities had declined since the early 1980s, with the predictable result that academic involvement had decreased as well (NRC, 2000). The committee does not believe that the full potential of U.S. research universities will be realized unless funding is made available to both advance the state of knowledge and contribute to technology transfer. During the Cold War, federal funding for research on blast-related topics and fortification technology was instrumental in developing both an academic research infrastructure and a cadre of qualified research and teaching faculty. Additional research and training opportunities for U.S. universities exist in such fields as injury epidemiology, emergency preparedness, disaster recovery, multihazard mitigation, and decision support. The committee believes that the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program should align itself with other potential sponsors to support university programs in these areas in addition to the more traditional topics of structural and blast-effects engineering. A STRATEGY FOR THE BLAST MITIGATION FOR STRUCTURES PROGRAM There are three elements in the technology transfer process for the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program. The committee believes that the first— identification of the information and technology for which there is the most need and that would be of the most value—has been accomplished to a large degree through its workshop, “Protecting People and Buildings from Bomb Damage.” The second is the determination of the best venue for dissemination of various types of information to multiple stakeholder groups. The third and broader element is articulation of the appropriate role of a defense support agency such as DTRA in facilitating technology transfer, particularly to the civilian sector. Venues for Dissemination of Information The Blast Mitigation for Structures Program is supporting research in many areas, including structural systems, structural and nonstructural components, retrofit materials and techniques, computational modeling, and the distinct but related area of health and injury effects. Although a single

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation approach to technology transfer will not be appropriate for all of the areas under investigation by the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program, the committee believes that knowledge diffusion in building research is sufficiently mature so that successful paradigms for translating Blast Mitigation for Structures Program research into practice exist and can be readily modified to meet the specific needs of the program. The committee also notes the substantial work that has been done on the epidemiology of earthquake-related injuries and believes that it could serve as a valuable model for technology transfer to reduce blast-related injuries. Earthquakes provide perhaps the closest analog for blast loads on buildings, and earthquake engineering offers the best example of a “lessons learned” program that could serve as a guide for the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program. Following several devastating earthquakes in the 1960s and 1970s, and the appropriation of substantial government funds, U.S. universities and other research facilities began concentrated research efforts to identify and quantify the forces acting on structures and their components during these events and devising design approaches and solutions for addressing them. Over the past 30 years these activities have spawned a vibrant and dynamic infrastructure for both generating new knowledge and translating it into practice. Through the active collaboration of universities, government agencies, and professional groups, earthquake engineering research in the United States has made great strides toward increasing the understanding of these events, their effects on building structure and nonstructural components, and design and construction methods to mitigate their impact. Engineering research in this area has found its way into practice sooner than has traditionally been the case because code development bodies have maintained close and productive links with the research community. Several government agencies, notably the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the U.S. Geological Survey, have been legislatively designated to conduct or sponsor research and to support the development and publication of design guides and other tools. These efforts are continuing with the establishment of the NSF Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation, an $81.9 million effort to improve testing equipment and link research results through a high-performance Internet network. Traditionally, structural research results have been disseminated in a number of ways—in published papers and in lectures; through participation in conferences, code committees, and other activities of professional societies and organizations; and by the sharing of methods and software (McGuire, 1995). Increasingly, research results are also posted to the Internet on industry, university, or organizational Web pages. The Web

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation page of the Blast Mitigation Action Group, under the auspices of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program, is a limited tool for disseminating product test information (BMAG, 2000). The improvements in engineering design developed through research and testing have ultimately been incorporated into practice, albeit rather slowly, through inclusion in one or more building code documents published by technical or professional societies such as the American Concrete Institute (ACI), the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), and the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). These documents, together with their accompanying commentary, provide a well-accepted process for subjecting research results to peer review by practitioners and, after they are found credible, a ready conduit for moving the results into practice. The committee believes that code addenda and commentaries would also be an ideal vehicle for making blast-effects mitigation techniques (and their rationale) readily available to the design engineer. A reason that this process often takes far longer than seems necessary is the different professional venues of researchers and practitioners and the absence in most research proposals of plans and funding for dissemination. On a positive note, evidence suggests that when research has been directly coupled with knowledge dissemination, such as in the earthquake engineering field, the results have been adopted into practice fairly quickly (Roeder, 1995). Although federally supported research efforts cannot contribute directly to the writing of design standards, such efforts can analyze, organize, and present results in a format suitable for ready review and adoption by standards organizations (Noland and Kingsley, 1995). For example, the seismic standards promulgated by FEMA for new construction and structural rehabilitation were developed using this model (FEMA, 1997). Problems of venue are further compounded by the fact that researchers and practitioners from the defense-oriented blast effects community do not necessarily participate in the same professional events as do architects and engineers from the commercial sector. For example, much interesting work in blast effects and protective design is reported at the biennial “International Symposium on Interaction of the Effects of Munitions with Structures,” an event sponsored jointly by DTRA and the German military. Although attendance at most symposium sessions is open to all, some sessions are restricted, and in any event, attendance outside the defense community has traditionally been minimal. Similar conditions prevail at the annual “Shock and Vibration Symposium” sponsored by the Shock and Vibration Information Analysis Center (SAVIAC). Both research results and applications are reported, but typically by members of the defense engineering establishment to others of similar background. There is some evidence that this situation is improving, however. For example, the “2001 Structures Congress and Exposition” sponsored sev-

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation eral sessions on blast effects and blast-resistant design, and the American Concrete Institute and American Institute of Steel Construction are including blast-related sessions in their annual conference programs. Although the committee views these as favorable developments, such activities will not, absent other proactive efforts, resolve the issue of bringing together the research and practitioner communities for the exchange of concerns, needs, solutions, applications, and deployment strategies. This is especially important given the multidisciplinary aspects of blast-effects mitigation. As was so amply demonstrated by the committee’s workshop, “Protecting People and Buildings from Bomb Damage,” it is necessary not only to bring together engineers engaged in research and practice, but also to involve architects, builders, and emergency service providers as well. The role of the architect/engineer, in particular, cannot be overemphasized in the practical diffusion of new knowledge and approaches. Interaction with the client/owner in a building project most often occurs through the architect/ engineer, and it is often left to the architect/engineer to explain the design philosophy inherent in blast-resistant construction, its potential multihazard benefits, and cost tradeoffs. Obviously, to play this role, the architect/ engineer must accept blast mitigation as a design parameter or program requirement, be well versed in all aspects of the field, and have the necessary informational resources available. This range of capabilities has certainly become the norm in seismic design and rehabilitation (California Seismic Safety Commission, 1992). In its earlier report, the committee noted that the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program should consider sponsoring an annual or biennial conference on blast-mitigation design and engineering (NRC, 2000). Despite the fact that these issues are discussed at existing engineering, construction, security, and emergency management conferences, the committee now believes even more strongly that a single, integrated, multidisciplinary event would be of enormous benefit in the dissemination of the latest advances in blast-resistant design and construction, could stimulate the development of new and effective retrofitting concepts for existing structures, and could promote desirable interactions among all involved stakeholder communities. For example, the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program is sponsoring the development of computer models to predict blast-related injuries to persons from glazing, nonstructural building components, and office equipment. The committee believes that both the program and the emergency medical community would benefit from an ongoing dialogue regarding the analytical approach, data needs, and field observations from other bombing events as well as severe earthquakes. However, no such dialogue is occurring. Another potentially valuable opportunity for stimulating productive communication among stakeholders arises from the “Symposium on Secu-

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation FIGURE 3.1 Overall strategy for technology transfer for the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program. rity and Openness in Federal Architecture” sponsored in 1999 by the General Services Administration and the Department of State. The dominant theme of the symposium was the question of whether security considerations inherently meant fortress or bunker-type buildings or otherwise precluded good design. Contributors to the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program could provide valuable guidance to architects and to the landscape architecture and site design professions through papers, presentations, and workshops delivered at professional conferences and other gatherings of these groups. Again, the committee does not believe that these interactions currently occur at a rate sufficient to satisfy the demand for information. Figure 3.1 depicts elements of a comprehensive technology transfer strategy for the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program. Table 3.1 identifies target stakeholder groups for the various products that the technology transfer effort could yield. Risk Management for Multiple Hazards Experience over the past decade has shown that while attacks against buildings and their occupants utilizing large, vehicle-bombs have been infrequent, hundreds of smaller bombing attacks against buildings do occur (FBI, 1998). However, given the large inventory of buildings potentially at risk, the probability of an attack against a specific building is quite low. The magnitude of the threat and the likelihood of an attack against a specific building depend on the building’s mission and location and will vary con-

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation TABLE 3.1 A Technology Transfer Framework for Blast-effects Mitigation   Target Audience Activity/ Product Focus Academia Design Practitioners Public Policy Makers Owners, Users, and Other Groups Informed Lay People Technical reports Blast Mitigation for Structures Program research topics X X X   Engineering applications Blast Mitigation for Structures Program research and test results X X   X   Newsletters/ Internet postings Blast Mitigation for Structures Program research updates, activities X X X X   Workshops State-of-knowledge exchange X X   Conferences Review, application of research X X X   Seminars, briefings Current issues of technical interest X X X X   Short courses Professionally relevant research and applications X X X   Owner/ public awareness Hazard and risk education; design philosophy X X X X X Computer programs Design analysis, vulnerability assessments X X     SOURCE: After Lee and Dargush (1995).

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation siderably. Protective design guidelines are intended to be applicable to a wide range of buildings and facilities constructed in various locations, both domestically and overseas. These buildings vary in use from general-purpose office buildings, to personnel quarters, to maintenance facilities. Depending on their geographic location, they will also be faced with a wide range of natural hazards, including earthquakes, extreme wind events, land-slides, and floods. Each facility will have a unique set of mission objectives, design considerations, site characteristics, threat profiles and risk tolerance, and budgetary limitations. Under these circumstances, it is impractical, and certainly inefficient, to prescribe the same uniform set of security requirements for all buildings at all locations. Determining what security and hazard mitigation measures are necessary and acceptable should be done on a case-by-case basis and be the consensus outcome of an interactive planning and programming process. The committee recognizes that the principles of security engineering, defensive planning and architecture, and blast-effects and natural hazard mitigation are well known to those routinely involved with these matters. However, as the committee’s recent workshop made clear, the process of planning and programming new facilities involves many individuals who lack such specialized knowledge. During the building planning process, a range of functional issues must be addressed. For example, if assets of special value (e.g., critical infrastructure elements, mainframe computer installations, communications, vital records, or back-up data) are to be housed in the building, any required blast mitigation or other security provisions have to be identified in the beginning stages of the design process, and not as an issue after the fact. Damage to critical equipment represents a serious capital loss and could compromise the facility’s mission as well. During the planning phase, it should be recognized and discussed that “least-cost” construction may compromise desired structural and operational performance. Essentially a one-way process, traditional facility delivery provides little opportunity to revisit initial assumptions, verify the acceptability of changes made during subsequent steps in the process, and benefit from the synergy of a fully integrated project delivery team. The delivery process for all facilities that could be the target of a terrorist attack, as well as buildings subject to natural hazards, should have as its goal the identification and successful management of risk factors that can adversely affect facility performance. Investigations of performance failure, whether structural or with respect to user expectations for a facility, have usually determined that most failures are preventable. Many failures can be traced, at least in part, to poor communication between individual elements of the project delivery system and to the fact that each building is one of a kind, presenting no real opportunity to test prototypes as in a mass production process. Shortcomings in communication are magnified in the

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation traditional design and construction process, which is compartmentalized and tends to inhibit free and interactive exchanges between elements and across disciplines. Because many security and natural hazard issues, and approaches to mitigating them, are introduced at different steps in the facility delivery process, having a process flexible enough to integrate them with the facility’s primary mission is important. Although risk will always be a factor with facilities presenting security and natural hazard concerns, better systems can be designed to both reduce the overall level of risk and manage the residual risk more effectively, particularly if the issue of risk is presented in a format that is understandable to individuals of diverse backgrounds. The committee believes that the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program should give some consideration to supporting the development of a performance-based design process that integrates security and natural hazard mitigation objectives with new technologies and risk management principles as shown in Figure 3.2. FIGURE 3.2 A performance-based multihazard mitigation model.

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation The Role of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency As a technical support agency of the Department of Defense, DTRA (and its predecessors, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, the Defense Atomic Support Agency, and the Defense Nuclear Agency) has traditionally developed blast-effects information, with responsibility for dissemination falling primarily to the Army, Navy, and Air Force through the publication of technical manuals and design guides. The Defense Nuclear Agency sponsored much of the early work on the response of structures to nuclear blast effects. This research, although primarily oriented to the national defense, contributed significantly to the understanding of soil-structure interaction and the development of first-principles computer modeling techniques that underpin the seismic design of buildings. Today, the stated mission of DTRA is “. . . to safeguard America and its friends from weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives) by reducing the present threat and preparing for the future threat” (DTRA, 2001). At the committee’s workshop, Dr. Jay Davis, director of DTRA, underscored DTRA’s mission in his keynote address (see Appendix C) when he said: We are conducting a program focused on the needs of the Department of Defense. Although I cannot fund a civil research program, it will be scandalous if we don’t expand that program to deal with any possible civil questions that we can. My charge to you is that the civil design and building community needs to understand what we do in such a way that you can help us find some of those synergies, because we won’t find them all. Despite the fact that DTRA has had little direct responsibility for civil matters within the United States, the committee believes that transferring the results of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program to the civilian sector is in full accord with the DTRA mission and that the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program is also in an excellent position to facilitate Dr. Davis’s charge to the workshop attendees. The Department of Defense is also a member of the Interagency Security Committee that was established by Executive Order 12977 (Clinton, 1995) and has been charged, among other tasks, to: take such actions as may be necessary to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security and protection of Federal facilities, including but not limited to: encouraging agencies with security responsibilities to share security-related intelligence in a timely and cooperative manner; assessing technology and information systems as a means of

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation providing cost-effective improvements to security in Federal facilities; developing long-term construction standards for those locations with threat levels or missions that require blast resistant structures or other specialized security requirements; evaluating standards for the location of, and special security related to, day care centers in Federal facilities; and assisting the Administrator in developing and maintaining a centralized security data base of all Federal facilities. The committee believes that the results of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program should be made available to the Interagency Security Committee (and its member agencies) so that it can carry out the charge embodied in Executive Order 12977. The successes of earthquake engineering in the United States that have led to improvements in new construction and rehabilitated existing buildings are grounded in both the high quality of the research and the ready availability of institutional infrastructure to move it into practice. While funding for blast-effects mitigation will probably never approach the levels expended for improving seismic performance, the committee believes that the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program, with only slight reallocations of funding, could begin to establish a technology transfer infrastructure that would serve to disseminate the body of knowledge already created as well as future developments in the field. The committee noted this in its earlier report: Conclusion 10. The barriers to the complete and effective transfer of the results of the BMSP will require considerable time and effort to overcome. A convenient way to reduce the transfer time would be to use existing institutional infrastructures (i.e., building code and standards-writing organizations, professional and technical organizations, universities, and research centers) to disseminate knowledge. (NRC, 2000) However, the committee believes that if real and lasting progress in this area is to be achieved, there will have to be sustained funding for both continued research and technology transfer activities. The role envisioned for DTRA in this activity is twofold. First, as the primary sponsor of ongoing research, DTRA will have to continue in its present mode of identifying knowledge gaps, establishing priorities, and guiding the conduct and output of the research effort. Second, DTRA will have to establish working agreements and memoranda of understanding, and formalize other arrangements with government and private sector partners and technical and professional organizations. The purpose of these agreements would be to institutionalize relationships and establish roles and responsibilities for those organizations involved in the technology trans-

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation fer effort. For example, the AIA, ACI, AISC, ASCE, and ASME all have an interest in blast-effects mitigation and all are involved in code-writing activities. What is absent from the technology transfer model that has proved successful for earthquake engineering is a mechanism for these groups to actively influence the content and conduct of the research program, identify gaps and overlaps, and link the research results with ongoing code development activities within their respective organizations. The Blast Mitigation for Structures Program has developed a working relationship with the AISC Committee for the Design of Blast Resistant Buildings. Although no formal relationship exists, this activity could lead to the type of interactive relationship that the committee believes is critical to the long-term success and legacy of the program. Another example from earthquake engineering practice of the benefits of collaboration is the development of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Guidelines for Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings and Commentary (FEMA, 1997). The Building Seismic Safety Council of the National Institute of Building Sciences, under contract to FEMA, retained the Applied Technology Council and the American Society of Civil Engineers as technical consultants to produce what has become the national standard for seismic rehabilitation of existing buildings. Organizations such as the Applied Technology Council have participated in many technology transfer and information dissemination activities that have been instrumental in advancing the practice of earthquake engineering and post-earthquake operations. Their involvement has included providing the technical basis for the seismic provisions in the current Uniform Building Code, methods for assessing earthquake damage and loss estimation that have been widely used for earthquake insurance portfolio analysis, and standard methods for determining if damaged buildings can be safely occupied. These documents have been widely accepted by practicing design professionals in the private sector. Numerous information clearinghouses compile, organize, and disseminate information on various topics on behalf of government agencies. They are increasingly Web-based and usually have quite powerful directed search capabilities. The Department of Defense originated the Information Analysis Center to serve in this capacity for technical activities of interest to DoD and its many ancillary organizations. SAVIAC, the Shock and Vibration Information Analysis Center, and DTRIAC, DTRA’s Nuclear Weapons Effects Information Analysis Center, have addressed blast-effects and protective design issues and could potentially serve as a clearinghouse for products of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program and other blast-related information. If desired, a clearinghouse on the model of the information analysis center could be structured to provide several classes of access ranging from unrestricted distribution to classified. This type of

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation layered security architecture could address some of the questions that are raised in the next section regarding the handling of potentially sensitive information. Although the details will differ from application to application, the committee believes that there are sufficient and adequate models to serve as examples of what DTRA could accomplish in the transfer of blast-resistant technology. Similar efforts should be cultivated with other groups that have an interest in blast-effects mitigation. Security Issues Although earthquakes and extreme wind events may have effects analogous to blast loadings in certain respects, they are natural events, not malevolent acts. It is not possible to alter their timing or path to maximize the damage inflicted on persons and property—precisely the objective of terrorist bombers. The committee believes that the potential for deliberate, planned infliction of devastating damage is an aspect of the technology transfer question that must be openly discussed and resolved before there can be any meaningful dissemination of the results of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program to the private sector. The primary objection raised to widespread dissemination of the results of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program is that some of the information would be of value to terrorists in planning and carrying out future attacks. The committee agrees that some of the results of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program (as well as other information in existing military and government manuals) are potentially sensitive in this regard. For example, certain test data concerning the performance of columns or other structural components subjected to a bomb of a given size at a specific standoff distance would be valuable to a terrorist. Similarly, the design basis (underlying assumptions of design blast loads and the location and configuration of critical services) for a specific building would be invaluable to terrorists planning an attack. Also of concern are the various damage assessment programs, planning tools, and injury-prediction models that either already exist or are being produced as a result of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program. These computerized models permit the rapid comparison of attack scenarios for the purpose of devising and testing defensive strategies. In the wrong hands, they could compromise security and aid terrorists. Overall, however, the committee believes that knowledge diffusion and information sharing on generalized design approaches to mitigate blast effects (such as discussed in this report) would generate considerable benefit and very little harm. (No need has been seen, for example, to restrict access to fire resistance ratings or the design of fire suppression systems out of fear

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation that the information will be of use to arsonists.) Discussions at the workshop focused on the needs of architects and engineers in the private sector for tools to aid the planning and design process, rather than damage assessment. The committee believes that the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program is in an excellent position to provide the type of design guidance needed without compromising sensitive information that could aid terrorists. It is the committee’s considered opinion that it would be shortsighted in the extreme for a government program to develop a body of knowledge that could save lives, reduce injuries, and mitigate property damage, and then withhold this knowledge from broad public access. The committee also believes that current limitations on the availability of existing government manuals are unduly restrictive. There are excellent documents produced by the military (e.g., Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons Effects [U.S. Army et al., 1997] and Security Engineering [U.S. Army, 1993]) that could address (perhaps with some information deleted or restated) many of the questions raised by private-sector stakeholders at the committee’s workshop. However, these documents can be distributed to “U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only” or carry “Official Use Only” designations that limit their availability to a small group of architects and engineers—a practice viewed by the committee as a major barrier to effective technology transfer. The committee strongly supports the ongoing efforts of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program to maximize public availability of all but the most sensitive test data and design assumptions and notes that Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions (U.S. Army, 1990), a widely used and valuable reference, is currently listed for “Unlimited Distribution.” The committee offers the following two examples of valuable technology transfer products that would couple existing design approaches with new information developed by the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program and would have no negative security impacts. At the workshop there was considerable discussion of the need for simplified procedures for identifying and estimating the cost of blast-resistant features for commercial construction, particularly specific products that meet a performance specification. Security Engineering Manual TM 5-853 (U.S. Army, 1993) contains just such simplified procedures for selecting glazing, walls, and other components based on an assumed weight of explosive and standoff distance. However, TM 5-853 is restricted to “Official Use Only”—use by government agencies and their contractors—and also does not identify specific products that satisfy design conditions. The committee believes that a guide with unrestricted distri-

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation bution and modeled on the Security Engineering Manual approach would be an excellent product for the Blast Mitigation for Struc-tures Program to develop. It would enable architects and engineers, in concert with their clients, to identify possible threat scenarios, design solutions, and products that have been shown by testing to satisfy their assumed design conditions. Another example of a guidance document that the committee believes would find widespread acceptance is a guide for decreasing the injury potential of interior spaces subject to blast energy. The Blast Mitigation for Structures Program has tested numerous office configurations and methods of restricting the movement of nonstructural elements such as furniture, overhead fixtures, and office equipment. There has also been a good deal published on how to address this issue in buildings subject to earthquake. It would be a relatively simple matter to combine the guidance already available for earthquake protection with the empirical results of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program and produce a straightforward, practical guide that could be useful to the military as well as civilian government agencies and the private sector. Additional products that the committee believes would support the widespread dissemination of blast mitigation guidance include: Research summaries with a view to implementation in practice and results of tests that have demonstrated blast-resistant design methods for both new construction and retrofit conditions, Reports on the cost impact of varying levels of blast resistance for new and retrofit construction for different classes of buildings, and Reports on the importance of providing safety against blast similar to existing reports on protection against earthquakes. SUMMARY The Blast Mitigation for Structures Program offers a great opportunity to save lives and reduce injuries in the event of a terrorist bombing. The full benefits of the program will be realized, however, only if the results are widely disseminated and necessary improvements implemented. The process described by the committee would use existing institutional infrastructure (i.e., building code and standards-writing organizations, professional and technical organizations, universities, and research centers) to disseminate knowledge. Technology transfer for this purpose falls within DTRA’s mission and the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program could readily adapt the model already developed and used by the earthquake engineering com-

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation munity. Issues exist regarding the security of sensitive information, but the committee believes that they are resolvable and should not become an impediment to the effective and timely transfer of information. Widespread implementation of blast-resistant construction, however, presents a more formidable issue—particularly for the private sector. All building decisions, whether in the public or private sector, are strongly influenced by cost in relation to the marketplace. Discussions at the committee’s workshop confirmed that most commercial building owners view the threat from terrorist bombing as minimal for normal commercial occupancies. Consequently, there is little incentive on the owner’s part to authorize any additional funds for blast resistance. Blast-resistant construction, however, can also provide protection against natural hazards such as earthquakes and extreme wind events, for which there are building code requirements. Features typically added to improve blast resistance, such as reinforcing splices that increase ductility, impact-resistant glazing, and restraints on nonstructural elements, will improve building performance during earthquakes and extreme wind events as well. As part of a multihazard mitigation strategy, improved blast resistance may add only a marginal cost, or even no cost. An even stronger case can be made for applying blast-resistant features to existing buildings. A significant cost of seismic retrofit, for example, is preparing the structure for rehabilitation, and this would present an excellent opportunity to add blast-resistant features at the same time. In fact, many seismic retrofit techniques such as wrapping concrete columns with carbon fiber material or securing fixtures and appurtenances to prevent them from causing injury are essentially the same as techniques for improving blast resistance. An important element of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program technology transfer strategy should be to identify and highlight any common approaches that address a broad range of hazards. In this way, cost barriers to achieving improved blast resistance can be reduced. Discussions at the November 2000 workshop were quite clear in emphasizing that more information should be made available to the nonspecialist in blast engineering. The committee believes that dissemination of up-to-date information is needed at all levels so that architects, engineers, and owners can be more informed in their general advice, approaches to design, and owner decision making. The committee recognizes buildings as systems of their components and knows that no decision affecting performance is trivial. Thus, it does not intend to imply that a design decision for a blast-resistant door, for example, is less important than that affecting the structural frame. However, the project architect or engineer who designs a building that presents little risk of being attacked should possess enough knowledge of the issues to be able to discuss options intelligently with the

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation owner and identify the need (if any) for a more knowledgeable blast consultant. The committee believes that if information is made broadly available, professional ethics and individual responsibility should provide adequate control over its appropriate application in practice. Overall, the committee believes that the key to effective technology transfer for improved blast resistance is commitment to the process. The knowledge base either exists or can be developed. Applying it effectively will require continuous interaction between the various stakeholders to exchange information on needs, approaches, and solutions. The infrastructure for these interactions also exists and can be adapted to the needs of the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program. What is required, and strongly recommended by the committee, is the necessary commitment of time and resources by DTRA and other relevant agencies to enable technology transfer for mitigation of blast effects. Without such a commitment the committee is concerned that a unique opportunity to reap the benefits of valuable and costly research will be lost. REFERENCES BMAG (Blast Mitigation Action Group). 2000. BMAG. Available online at <http://bmag.nwo.usace.army.mi>. California Seismic Safety Commission. 1992. Architectural Practice and Earthquake Hazards. Sacramento, Calif.: California Seismic Safety Commission. Clinton, William Jefferson. 1995. Presidential Executive Order 12977, Interagency Security Committee. Washington, D.C.: The White House. COSEPUP (Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy). 1992. The Government Role in Civilian Technology: Building a New Alliance. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. DTRA (Defense Threat Reduction Agency). 2001. Mission Statement. Available online at <http://www.dtra.mil>. FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). 1998. 1997 Bomb Summary. FBI Bomb Data Center, General Information Bulletin 97-1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). 1997. National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Guidelines for Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings and Commentary. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency. Lee, G.C., and Dargush, A.S. 1995. Engineering concept to application: Experiences of NCEER. In Research Transformed into Practice: Implementation of NSF Research, James Colville and Amde M. Amde, eds. New York, N.Y.: ASCE Press. McGuire, W. 1995. Inelastic analysis and design of steel frames—A case in point. In Research Transformed into Practice: Implementation of NSF Research, James Colville and Amde M. Amde, eds. New York, N.Y.: ASCE Press. Noland, J.L., and Kingsley, G.R. 1995. U.S. coordinated program for masonry building research: Technology transfer. In Research Transformed into Practice: Implementation of NSF Research, James Colville and Amde M. Amde, eds. New York, N.Y.: ASCE Press. NRC (National Research Council). 1995. Protecting Buildings from Bomb Damage: Transfer of Blast-Effects Mitigation Technologies from Military to Civilian Applications. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

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Protecting People and Buildings from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation NRC. 2000. Blast Mitigation for Structures: 1999 Status Report on the DTRA/TSWG Program. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Roeder, Charles W. 1995. Guidelines for seismic rehabilitation of older steel buildings. In Research Transformed into Practice: Implementation of NSF Research, James Colville and Amde M. Amde, eds. New York, N.Y.: ASCE Press. U.S. Army. 1990. Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions. TM 5-1300. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army. U.S. Army. 1993. Security Engineering. TM 5-853-1. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army.* U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and Defense Special Weapons Agency. 1997. Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons Effects. TM 5-855-1/ AFPAM 32-1147(I)/NAVFAC P-1080/DAHSCWEMAN-97. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.* *   Distribution of this document is restricted to U.S. government agencies and their contractors, and the document may not be readily available to the general public.