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EXPERIENCE IN COPING WITH EFFECTS OF RADIATION ACCIDENTS: LESSONS FOR SOCIETY

L.A.Bolshov, I.I.Linge, I.L.Abalkina

Nuclear Safety Institute

Coping with the levels and severity of ecological problems on the threshold of the third millennium demands more effective measures. It is obvious that elaboration of such measures is more than a technical or economic task. It is also a problem of an adequate social response to the problems caused by previous development activities of society. Both lack of perception of ecological problems by Russian society and lack of readiness for effective efforts towards their resolution were characteristic less than ten years ago. Certainly, the main reason is the total social upheaval of recent years. However, the fact that ecological problems were often a screen for political and economic decisions is an important factor. Experience in overcoming the effects of the Chernobyl accident proves this point.

This experience also shows the impact of information on public perceptions of ecological problems. A divergence between an artificial information image and the real problem may cause an incorrect base for decision-making. As a result, society appears to be facing new problems. So, it is necessary to emphasize the role of ecological organizations in informing and educating the society.

CHARACTERISTICS OF RADIATION HAZARD AWARENESS

Experience from radiation accidents, and especially the accident at the Chernobyl plant, has shown the impact of information on the population, both for individuals and for society, in comparison with the impact of radiation. On



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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop EXPERIENCE IN COPING WITH EFFECTS OF RADIATION ACCIDENTS: LESSONS FOR SOCIETY L.A.Bolshov, I.I.Linge, I.L.Abalkina Nuclear Safety Institute Coping with the levels and severity of ecological problems on the threshold of the third millennium demands more effective measures. It is obvious that elaboration of such measures is more than a technical or economic task. It is also a problem of an adequate social response to the problems caused by previous development activities of society. Both lack of perception of ecological problems by Russian society and lack of readiness for effective efforts towards their resolution were characteristic less than ten years ago. Certainly, the main reason is the total social upheaval of recent years. However, the fact that ecological problems were often a screen for political and economic decisions is an important factor. Experience in overcoming the effects of the Chernobyl accident proves this point. This experience also shows the impact of information on public perceptions of ecological problems. A divergence between an artificial information image and the real problem may cause an incorrect base for decision-making. As a result, society appears to be facing new problems. So, it is necessary to emphasize the role of ecological organizations in informing and educating the society. CHARACTERISTICS OF RADIATION HAZARD AWARENESS Experience from radiation accidents, and especially the accident at the Chernobyl plant, has shown the impact of information on the population, both for individuals and for society, in comparison with the impact of radiation. On

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop the one hand, the impact comes from perception of radiation hazard; and on the other, it is a result of a mechanism of social aggravation. Let us consider in brief the reasons and peculiarities of perceptions of radiation hazard. The starting point of radiation awareness as danger was the creation of nuclear weapons, the bombing of Japan, and large-scale nuclear weapons testing. One of the main reasons for formation and strengthening of extremely tense and unequal perceptions of radiation hazards has been the arms race, which for one-half a century has involved all nuclear countries (from the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR in the late forties to India and Pakistan at the end of the nineties). Still, opposition to nuclear activities in general is a reason too. Ionizing radiation is considered to be not only dangerous for health, but also an inevitable hazard for future generations. Many factors have affected the perception of ionizing radiation. They are: secrecy, which has surrounded nuclear weapons production everywhere; international campaign drives for elimination of nuclear weapon testing; new types of production (H-bomb, N-bomb) in certain countries; international alarm over the danger of expansion of nuclear weapons; intensive attention to radiation effects on human health and the environment. Thus, a strong base exists for a special perception of radiation hazards in everyday life. It is seriously aggravated due to peculiarities of man-made accidents and catastrophes. Society more easily withstands natural disasters even if they have huge effects. This has been proven with quick revival of regions suffering from earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes, even if the danger of repeated disasters remains very high. In case of a man-made disaster, the first social reaction is to search for a reason and for culprits. The higher the level of responsibility, the harsher the social perception of the catastrophe. Thus, accidents and disasters at state-controlled factories appear to be the most serious for their social effects. Also, radiation accidents are certainly characterized with harsher social effects because it is the State which controls the use of radiation activities and especially nuclear energy activities. We can see great differences in social attitudes to accidents and disasters. One is characterized by an adequate response including the following stages: defining the scope of a catastrophe and precise classification of victims; searching for reasons and culprits; paying compensatory damage, mainly, by insurance systems; punishing the responsible bodies (a producer, an operating organization); and identifying reasons (construction, organization, human factors) in order to prevent repetition of the accident. Such accidents include fires and traffic incidents. Society has adapted to traffic accidents in spite of the number of victims. Loss of life of dozens, hundreds, and thousands of people in train wrecks, car crashes, and shipwrecks does not cast doubt on their necessity. It means the society regards such hazards as socially acceptable.

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop The other extreme is rare man-made accidents. Social attitudes toward them are much more intricate and sharp. These include radiation and chemical accidents. The initial reaction of populations to information about such accidents, and first of all, those involving radiation, is concern about their own health and the health of their progeny. The circle of victims is uncertain. Soon the State is blamed for giving permission for the activity that caused the catastrophe. A mechanism of social aggravation starts to work. With the help of the mass media and organizations interested in public attention or recognition, the situation is dramatized. In its turn, the mass-media dramatization intensifies concern of the community and extends the circle of “victims.” It can cause different social effects up to radical changes of public attitudes toward science and certain activities. Let us briefly outline those people and organizations that can take an active part in this aggravation scheme. First are local authorities and political figures. They seem to be quite sincere and have different reasons (from a desire to increase state compensation to an interest in receiving public attention). Nevertheless, a lack of comprehension, a reluctance in obtaining official data from specialists, and a logic of opposition inevitably make them dramatize the post-accident situation. In conditions of high information capabilities of local authorities and greater public confidence in them in comparison with the State as a whole, their influence on the population is very profound. For example, in 1991 after adoption of both republic (Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia) and all-union laws, areas eligible for benefits and compensation increased. Authorities asked for their regions to be added to the list of radiation pollution areas. The only exception was Krasnodar Territory, where some resorts were polluted. The local authorities preferred to decontaminate polluted areas on their own rather than lose the image of the resorts. The second group that is able and ready to take part in the social aggravation process includes ecological and anti-war organizations. The orientation of their reaction inevitably results from their usual stance because dramatization of accidents proves the correctness and significance of their previous activity. The movements of victims of radiation accidents play a certain role too. The members are inclined, on the one hand, to preserve their victim status and collect corresponding compensation and benefits and on the other hand, to mythologize about their participation in radiation accidents. The third group of people that can play a very dramatic role in the aggravation of consequences includes cultural workers, artists, and intellectuals. A custom of identifying oneself as the nation’s conscience together with the stereotype of the radiation impact can often increase the psychological after-effects. For example, after the Chernobyl accident cultural workers offered to discuss not only the danger of the burial of Chernobyl victims, but also the impossibility of burying them in “contaminated” land. Both problems (except in

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop a few unique cases) had no sense at all, but they strongly influenced the community. The same problems with burial of radioactive accident victims took place in Goiania (Brazil, 1988) as the local population sharply protested. Cultural workers also try to change professional terms. For example, radiation pollution, which means appearance of harmful (in this case radioactive) substances in the soil, is changed to radioactive contamination (saturation with pathogens) or even more dramatically to health damage of the area. In the case when a radiation accident takes place under conditions of economically successful activity, organizations and groups using alternative technologies can also participate in dramatizing the situation. It would be mistake to exaggerate the role of these factors after atomic plant accidents, but a number of cogent arguments are raised in arguing against atomic and for thermal power. The role and activity of the above mentioned groups can change at different stages after a radiation accident. Thus, cultural workers always deal with the problem for a short period. Ecological organizations usually act for a longer time, independent of any positive results of their activity. For example, campaigns conducted to collect money to send children for rest from the moderate climate conditions of central Russia to the south in the Crimea or Cuba give doubtful results. The reason for money collection is to support children who were exposed to radiation, but often healthy children benefit. So, information after the Chernobyl accident resulted in the following characteristics of radiation hazard awareness: Radiation hazard is associated only with industrial business (power plant, defense industry), with all other sources of radiation hazard (natural sources, medicine) posing little hazard. Radiation hazard is excessively high in comparison with other hazards. Only the State is responsible for measures to decrease risk. The current policy of risk reduction is insufficient. None of these statements is true. Natural sources and medicine are the main part of radiation hazard (see Table 1). The share of radiation accidents and man-made sources in overall radioactivity is negligibly small even on territories with nuclear plants. But in dealing with problems of radiation hazard, the mass media say nothing or little about the facts. Proven ways to reduce risks, such as staying out of the sun or avoiding radon impacts, do not receive attention. As a result, the greater part of the population is not only ignorant of radiation hazard, but they also do not want to take even simple prevention measures. One can even state that the present Russian community is like a “zombie” on the whole problem of radiation hazard and the Chernobyl consequences. Most people repeat the mass media stereotype and equate radiation hazard to Chernobyl.

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop TABLE 1 Irradiation of Population in Some Regions (1998) Regions of Russian Federation Irradiation from Natural Sources, % Medical Irradiation, % Irradiation from Global Fall-out and Radiation Accidents, % Industrial Irradiation, % Chernobyl area         Bryansk Oblast 51.9 37.3 10.8 0.01 Kaluga Oblast 74.9 24 0.9 0.18 Oryol Oblast 64 32.7 3.3 0.03 “Mayak” area         Sverdlovsk Oblast 58.7 39.5 1.7 0.14 Chelyabinsk Oblast 74.5 24.7 0.6 0.24 Active power plants         Voronezh Oblast 62.4 36.9 0.6 0.11   Source: Analytical memorandum “State of Radiation Safety of the Russian Federation in 1998,” Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation. SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF DECISION-MAKING Every large ecological problem, especially a radiation accident, is a unique event with a number of particular features. Therefore, scientific research and necessary scientific support take on special significance in the decision-making process that concerns safety measures and elimination of after-effects. Nevertheless, as shown later, many decisions have been made without scientific support or contrary to scientific recommendations. Let us consider a number of examples showing the role of science in reduction of the Chernobyl consequences. Table 2 deals with dates of decisions (by the government or authorized ministry) on safety measures for the first five years after the accident and some characteristics of these measures, including their scientific validity. They are divided into five groups according to the type of decision:

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop Sanitary code and regulations (S) approved by the Chief Sanitary Doctor of the Soviet Union or a republic Executive decrees concerning certain settlements (ED), usually decrees of supreme public authorities Government decrees and orders concerning recommendations and instructions on working procedures, departmental guides, and instructions (DG), usually dealing with regulations and instructions according to the characteristics of the radiation environment Conceptual (C) decisions of Soviet National Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP), later Russian NCRP, for the main intervention levels and their need in corresponding legislation and administrative decrees Legislative decrees (L) on execution of certain measures by executive organs or determination of intervention levels TABLE 2 Scientific and Technical Reasons (STR) for Safety Measures and for Informing Population after Chernobyl Accident Item Date Type of Decision Decision on Safety Measures STR Yes/ No Affected Population (Thousand People) 1. 04/26/86 ED Reactor A-plant access restriction Yes   2. 04/26/86 ED Iodine prophylaxis for population of the town of Pripyat Yes 32 3. 04/27/86 ED/S Evacuation of Pripyat population Yes 46 4. 05/01/86 ED Evacuation of population from 30 km zone Yes 115 5. 05/02/86 ED Decree on Iodine prophylaxis No 0 6. 05/05/86 ED Decree on Iodine prophylaxis No 400 7. 05/06/86 S Restriction on I131 content in foodstuffs Yes 3,000 8. 05/10/86 ED Decree on evacuation of children from Kiev No 1,000 9. 05/12/86 S-ADL Definition of annual dose limit (100mSv) Yes 270

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop Item Date Type of Decision Decision on Safety Measures STR Yes/ No Affected Population (Thousand People) 10. 05/15/86 S Territory zoning according to dose limit (1, 3, 5, 20 mR per hour) Yes <100 11. 05/16/86 S Restriction on radioactivity in foodstuffs Yes   12. 05/29/86 ED Central Committee of CPSU and Council of Ministers decree about decontamination efforts in Ukraine and Belarus territories affected by radiation pollution No 250 13. 05/30/86 S Dose rate and radiation content in foodstuffs Yes 200 14. 05/30/86 DG Recommendations for safety measures in agricultural sector Yes   15. 08/22/86 ED Definition of so called zone of stringent control (ZSC) according to Cs137 content in soil (15 Ci per sq. km) Yes 240 16. 04/23/87 S Definition of annual dose limit for the second year after the accident as 30 mSv Yes <100 17. 08/12/87 ED Expanding ZSC, taking also into account social factors No 240+40 18. 12/15/87 S Restrictions on Cs134 and Cs137 content in foodstuffs Yes   19. 05/23/88 DG Restrictions on Cs134 and Cs137 in soil and products Yes   20. 07/18/88 S Definition of annual dose limit for the third year after the accident 25 mSv Yes <100 21. 09/13/88 ED Expanding ZSC No 280+6.0 22. 10/06/88 S Restrictions on Cs134 and Cs137 content in foodstuffs Yes  

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop Item Date Type of Decision Decision on Safety Measures STR Yes/ No Affected Population (Thousand People) 23. 11/22/88 K Acceptance of NCRP concept of total lifetime extra dose limit equal to 350 mSv Yes   24. 05/24/89 and 10/05/89 ED Resettlement according to radiation dose per life criterion Yes 5.8 25. 12/30/89 ED Expanding ZSC No   26. 01/26/90 ED Benefits for increased Cs content in milk No 200 27. 03/16/90 ED Resettlement according to radiation dose per life criterion Yes 2.3 28. 09/28/90 ED Zoning according to Cs137 content in soil 1, 5, 10, 15, 30 Ci per sq. km No 260 29. 03/11/91 ED Enhancement of list of settlements with benefits for increased Cs content in milk No   30. 02/19/91 DG Recommendations for safety measures in agricultural sector Yes   31. 04/08/91 K Restriction for extra exposure dose to 1 to 5 mSv per year No   32. 05/15/91 L Zoning criteria (Cs in soil and ADL) and benefits No   33. 12/28/91 ED Zoning of polluted territories of Russia according to the Law No 2.3 million As Table 2 shows, many decisions concerning the safety of hundreds of thousands of people (items 5 and 12) or intervention in the lives of millions of people (items 28, 29, 32, and 33) were adopted contrary to the results of scientific analysis and assessment. Document analysis concerning these decisions allows us to find many other circumstances essentially distorting the purpose of the realized safety measures. Derived intervention levels were often used for making decisions on expanding the area of appropriating counter-measures. A so-called “social factor” was often taken into account in decision-making, forcing the expansion of an area of appropriate counter-measures.

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop The scientific and technical validity of the decisions is based on conclusions made by radiation safety specialists, which engender society’s confidence. A number of actions inconsistent with the real danger made by political groups, the mass media, and others proved that a biased distrust of specialists appeared during the first month after the accident. The situation improved a little by the middle of summer 1986. Then the crucial decision-making process was completed, based on scientific and technical validity, while a number of incorrect decisions were revised. By the end of 1988, a large amount of data was collected for long-term radiation prognosis of polluted areas. Moreover, real opportunities for all safety measures were realized, as well as limiting negative consequences for the population that resulted in restrictions. The environment became better in some polluted areas. In these circumstances the Soviet NCRP suggested its 35-rem concept of total lifetime extra dose limit equal to 350 mSv (hereinafter, the concept of safe habitation). Practical realization of the concept provided for very limited resettlement of the most polluted settlements and significant lessening of restrictions in other areas. Nevertheless it did not work due to a number of social reasons. Beginning in 1988, a great number of articles on the Chernobyl problem were published simultaneously with the development of “glasnost” policies. The mass media adopted strictures on the concept of safe habitation. In 1989, taking into account the complex political situation in the country and in fact impeaching the credibility of its own specialists, the Government of the Soviet Union made an official request to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for coordination of an “international examination of the concept of safe habitation in the areas contaminated with radioactivity after the Chernobyl accident developed in the USSR and an assessment of effectiveness of measures for public health protection within these areas.” As a result, the International Chernobyl Project (ICP) started in the spring of 1990. An independent international advisory commission of 19 members was organized under the chairmanship of the outstanding scientist Dr. I.Shigematsu, Director of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation in Hiroshima. Two hundred independent experts from 23 countries and seven international organizations took part in the project. Fifty scientific groups visited the USSR. Laboratories from several countries including Austria, France, and the USA helped to analyze and assess the data. Initial information on the ICP was favorably reported. However, after the news that ICP members considered the measures in progress as quite adequate, the mass media changed their opinion on the project. Dozens of publications blamed the ICP members for trying to hide the radiological consequences of the accident for the sake of the international “nuclear Mafia.” The resulting documents of ICP contained sharp criticism of both implemented and planned safety measures. They were formulated as follows:

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop “The International Advisory Commission noted that the adopted and planned long-term measures, though guided by good intentions, exceeded the strict requirements of radiation protection. Resettlement and foodstuff restriction measures are unsuitable from the standpoint of radiation safety. Nevertheless, any relaxation of the current policy almost certainly would give a negative effect due to the high level of stress and alarm of residents in contaminated areas and their current expectations. It is agreed, however, that social and political factors should be taken into account, so responsible and competent authorities should make the final decisions. In any case, future changes should not lead to stricter restriction criteria. “More specific criteria reducing foodstuff restrictions would be preferable to resettlement, taking into account all the social and economic factors connected with public health. Further application of the restrictions for use of local foodstuff products in the polluted areas means a significant worsening of quality of life for some people. The only way to avoid it is to resettle them to such regions where they could live in their previous manner if it is possible. Comparatively high criteria for foodstuff restrictions might have aggravated these problems…” One could think the ICP results might close a debate concerning the possibility of habitation of polluted areas. In fact, the USSR Government planned a number of actions in June-August 1991, including meetings of socially active citizens with executive and legislative authorities. Large sections of the public should have been acquainted with the ICP results. However, the situation in the country became worse; events of August 1991 resulted in the USSR’s collapse and prevented both practical realization and the acquaintance of the general public with the ICP advice. As a result, the governments of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine in fact rejected both points: the NCRP suggestion of limited resettlement and the ICP view that rejected any resettlement. Thus, neither the opinions of national specialists nor the views of leading international experts were taken into account. On the contrary, populist decisions resulted in significant economic and social waste. ROLE OF POLITICAL FACTORS AND THEIR EFFECTS Public discontent was stirred up by some persons who made a political, administrative, and public career based on the Chernobyl accident and incited the authorities to change their previous decisions. Since specialists did not support this revision, they were just excluded from the decision-making process. Subsequent measures were realized according to soil pollution criteria instead of dose criteria, which are the only correct criteria for radiation safety. Just after the accident, soil pollution might be justified by lack of radiation data. Further, “territory pollution density” criteria should be used only for agriculture

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop purposes. However, the adoption of dose principles is an important component of radiation accident reduction. This component was lost in the Chernobyl accident reduction effort. By 1990 more than 500,000 people received different benefits because of the Chernobyl accident. By 1991 it turned out that many people were interested in further expanding the so-called radioactive contaminated zones. These circumstances caused problems in realizing rational ideas of developing a Unified Program of radiation accident reduction (as well as adopting the law on social protection of victims). The following persons insisted on using radiological principles in determination of radioactive contaminated zones: A few specialists in the radiation protection sphere, including those who had encountered public opposition. A number of outstanding scientists recognizing the role of radiation and other hazards in life. Some economists versed in the necessary costs. Active supporters of maximum expansion of the radioactive contaminated zones were: Republic authorities of Ukraine and Belarus and Russian regional administrative elites interested in financial and material support from government funds. Numerous mistaken public figures who did not anticipate negative results of their activity, though they connected their political fortunes with the consequences of the accident. Due to unclear positions of the politically weak Moscow Government, almost all demands of the Republics were completely fulfilled. They resulted in the broadest interpretation of radioactive contaminated zones. The so-called zone with privileged social-economic status with lower pollution density border at 1 Ci per sq. km. was of fundamental importance. This zone with its numerous benefits did not correspond to any radiological criteria. It should be mentioned that the authors of the decision concerning this zone did not know that more than 30 percent of the territory where the pollution density exceeded 1 Ci per sq. km. was situated outside the USSR (Table 3). It is necessary to stress that there were no claims for damage nor indemnities for health injuries in the majority of foreign countries impacted by the Chernobyl accident.

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop TABLE 3 Cs137 Radioactive Pollution of European Countries Caused by the Chernobyl Accident Country Country Size 103 sq. km Territory with Pollution Exceeding 1 Ci per sq. km, % Total Sum of Fall-out       PBq kCi Fall-out in Europe, % Austria 84 11.08 0.6 42.0 2.5 Belarus 210 43.50 15.0 400.0 23.4 Great Britain 240 0.16 0.53 14.0 0.8 Germany 350 0.32 1.2 32.0 1.9 Greece 130 1.24 0.69 19.0 1.1 Italy 280 1.35 0.57 15.0 0.9 Norway 320 7.18 2.0 53.0 3.1 Poland 310 0.52 0.4 11.0 0.6 Russia (European part) 3,800 59.30 19.0 520.0 29.7 Romania 240 1.20 1.5 41.0 2.3 Slovakia 49 0.02 0.18 4.7 0.3 Slovenia 20 0.61 0.33 8.9 0.5 Ukraine 600 37.63 12.0 310.0 18.8 Finland 340 19.00 3.1 83.0 4.8 Czech 79 0.21 0.34 9.3 0.5 Switzerland 41 0.73 0.27 7.3 0.4 Sweden 450 23.44 2.9 79.0 4.5 Whole Europe 9,700 20.75 64.0 1,700.0 100.0 The whole world     77.0 2,100.0   According to estimates of that period, 1.3 million people lived within the zones of radioactive contamination. By the middle of the 1990s, territories with a population of about seven million people were included in radioactive contaminated zones after numerous enlargements. The greater part of resources was spent for the largest zone by size and population that had privileged social-economic status. So, consistent with the law, zones based on Cs137 soil pollution density isolines of 1, 5, 15, and 40 Ci per sq. km. contributed to a tremendous dissipation of resources and took resources from some regions really needing help.

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The Role of Environmental NGOs: Russian Challenges American Lessons - Proceedings of a Workshop Unfortunately, the price of incorrect decisions included more than money for benefits and compensations. The psychological health of many people was damaged because they were officially considered as accident victims. Strange as it may seem, health control based on the law played a significant role here. Humane but abstract ideas gave negative results in specific circumstances during the last phase of the Chernobyl accident. Large resources were spent on health control using a list of possible health effects. First of all, it included thyroid gland cancers that were discovered during total screening. The law, in fact, required searches for any evidence of public health decline. This surely was found in situations of decreasing living standards and unfavorable demographic trends. But inhabitants of polluted regions linked in their mind health problems due to many reasons with radioactive effects. Some of the health workers who dealt with increased death rates and other effects as the living standard declined were especially sure of this relationship. It is necessary in this regard to stress that the polluted areas and regions did not differ from other regions of Russia according to the main demographic criteria. Standards for participating in programs for eliminating accident after-effects were established in too simplified a manner. They caused an unjustified increase in the number of participants. By spring 1989, when the most extensive work was fulfilled, the number of participants was estimated as 250,000 people. It was a large but realistic number; but several years later it increased more than three times to 800,000 people. A fundamental change of the basic structure of the Chernobyl law might be the only rational way out. But a serious change of public opinion toward radiation hazard and an increased ecological culture of the whole society is needed. It is possible only when there is societal confidence in scientists and specialists. One should stress the role of ecology organizations, which should base their activity on scientific arguments instead of propaganda stereotypes.

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