ceed on other systems as well—the antithesis of what is desired for implementing trustworthiness. Moreover, today’s dominant computing and communications environments are based on hardware and software that were not designed with security in mind; consequently, these systems are not difficult to compromise, as discussed in previous chapters.

There is, therefore, some tension between homogeneity and trustworthiness. Powerful forces make technological homogeneity compelling . . ., but some attributes of trustworthiness benefit from diversity. . . . On the other hand, a widely used trustworthy operating system might be superior to a variety of nontrustworthy operating systems; diversity, per se, is not equivalent to increased trustworthiness.

Technological convergence may also be realized through the market dominance of a few suppliers of key components, with monopoly as the limit case when technological homogeneity is dictated by the monopolist. However, the number of suppliers could grow as a result of the diffusion of computing into embedded, ubiquitous environments; the diversification and interoperability of communications services; and the continued integration of computing and communications into organizations within various market niches.



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