erty” regimes in cooperatives, condominiums, and even corporations; all these models entail a mix of self-government with the supervision of larger legal institutions. Meanwhile, recent proposals for allocating TEA quotas to communities also incorporate liberalizing reforms for these common property institutions (Rieser, 1997; Rose, 2000).

It may be that the future of CBMRs, with their many environmental strengths, indeed lies in this more liberal direction. What remains to be seen is whether greater liberalization and openness is compatible with the very social practices that give rise to CBMRs’ environmental strengths.

NOTE

1  

P. Seabright (1993:114) also has discussed the various designations given to common property institutions and resources.

REFERENCES

Acheson, M. 1975 The Lobster Gangs of Maine. Hanover, NH.: University Press of New England

1987 The lobster fiefs revisited: Economic and ecological effects of territoriality in the Maine lobster industry. Pp. 37-68 in The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources, B.J. McCay and J.M. Acheson, eds. Tucson: University of Arizona Press .

Ackerman, B.A., and R.B. Stewart 1988 Reforming environmental law: The democratic case for market incentives. Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 13:171-199.

Agrawal, A., and J. Ribot 1999 Accountability in decentralization: A framework with South Asian and West African Cases. The Journal of Developing Areas 33:473-502.

Anderson, T.L., and J.B. Grewell 1999 Property rights solutions for the global commons: Bottom up or top down? Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 10:73-101.


Banner, S. 1999 Two properties, one land: Law and space in nineteenth-century New Zealand. Law and Social Inquiry 24:807-852.

Berkes, F. 1987 Common-property resource management and Cree Indian fisheries in subarctic Canada. Pp. 66-91 in The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources, B.J. McCay and J.M. Acheson, eds. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

1995 Indigenous knowledge and resource management systems: A native Canadian case study from James Bay. Pp. 99-109 in Property Rights in a Social and Ecological Context: Case Studies and Design Application, S. Hanna and M. Munasinghe, eds., Washington, DC: World Bank.

Bosselman, F.P. 1996 Limitations inherent in the title to wetlands at common law. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 15:247-337.



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