with regard to matters pertaining to this arrangement, and in the emerging regime for the Arctic, where a dozen or more agencies want a say in what happens but none is able or willing to accept the role of lead agency (Osherenko and Young, 1989).
As this discussion makes clear, international regimes normally operate in social settings featuring substantial institutional heterogeneity among their members. What is more, those responsible for administering international regimes are seldom in a position to resort to what constitutes the normal procedure for handling interplay of this sort between national and subnational governments, a setting in which national governments ordinarily possess the ultimate authority to compel subnational governments to adjust their rules and procedures to ensure that they do not conflict with arrangements designed and implemented at the national level.14 The result is a mode of operation in which the rules of international regimes are framed in terms that are sufficiently generic to allow officials in individual member states considerable leeway in operationalizing them within their own jurisdictions. Up to a point, this is clearly desirable. National officials are not about to let the managers of international regimes dictate to them, and there is much to be said for allowing individual members to assimilate the rules of international regimes into their own systems in ways they deem appropriate.
The rise of what some observers now call transnational or even global civil society has begun to exert pressure on states to accept common standards in implementing the provisions of environmental regimes within their jurisdictions (Florini, 2000; Princen and Finger, 1994; Wapner, 1997). Nevertheless, the forces described in this subsection accentuate the hypothesis under consideration here to the effect that the consequences of international regimes will be determined in considerable part by the interplay between the regimes themselves and national practices prevailing in individual member states. Among other things, this should lead us to expect considerable variance in the performance of member states when it comes to fulfilling commitments made during processes of regime formation. This variance need not be critical to the overall performance of international regimes. In the case of equipment standards applicable to the construction of oil tankers, for example, the regime can operate effectively so long as a few key member states take the standards seriously (Mitchell, 1994). But in other cases, such as phasing out the production and consumption of ozone-depleting chemicals (French, 1997), it is apparent that it takes conformance on the part of all (or nearly all) to provide effective protection of the relevant natural systems.
To think concretely about the impact of this form of interplay on patterns of land use, consider the operation of the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) and the effort to create a Circumpolar Protected Areas Network in the Far North. ITTA, created initially in 1983 and substantially restructured in 1994, is