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The Drama of the Commons
cumpolar Protected Areas Network (CPAN) or, in other words, a linked system of parks, preserves, wildlife refuges, and so forth located in all the Arctic countries and organized to provide harmonized management for the entire system (CAFF, 1996). The success of this initiative depends first and foremost on the willingness and the ability of management agencies located within individual member states to collaborate effectively or, in other words, to manage protected natural areas on a coordinated basis. This is where problems begin to arise in connection with this intuitively appealing initiative.
Within some key countries—the United States is a good example—management authority regarding the areas involved resides with a number of distinct agencies (e.g., National Parks Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land Management) that are not in the habit of cooperating effectively with one another, much less with their counterparts in other countries (Clarke and McCool, 1996). In other countries—the Russian Federation is a prime example—economic and political problems are so severe at this time that little energy and few resources are available for international cooperation. This initiative does not require integrated management across national jurisdictional boundaries; coordinated or harmonized management practices carried out by relevant agencies within each country would suffice. Yet the complexities of institutional interplay between international programs and national practices raise serious questions about the prospects for CPAN.
Regimes for Marine Resources
Turning now to institutional interplay relating to marine resources in the Barents Sea and the Bering Sea, an even more complex pattern of institutional interplay comes into focus. In effect, the regimes that have emerged in these areas feature interactions between and among three differentiable sets of institutional arrangements: the global rules governing EEZs, the (sub)national regulatory systems that individual coastal states have put in place to govern activities within their individual EEZs, and several regional arrangements created to deal with situations in which the EEZs of individual states either adjoin each other (i.e., the relevant states are adjacent or opposite states) or leave pockets of high seas surrounded by national EEZs. Although the introduction of EEZs was justified in large measure as an institutional innovation required to manage the resources of large marine ecosystems on a sustainable basis, it soon became apparent that this reform created a range of new problems, quite apart from its consequences with regard to the treatment of preexisting problems.
Marine ecosystems do not conform to any legal or political boundaries, however ingenious the effort to delineate them may be. As a result, many states that acquired expanded jurisdiction over the harvesting of living resources in their individual EEZs soon found themselves confronted with a sizable collection of new problems relating to what have become known as straddling stocks (Stokke,