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The Drama of the Commons 2 Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability Arun Agrawal This chapter focuses on the large body of empirical work on common property. Its objective is delineate some of the most significant accomplishments of this literature, discuss some of its continuing deficiencies, and highlight shifts in research approaches and methods that can help address existing weaknesses. In an enduring achievement, scholars of common property have shown that markets or private property arrangements and state ownership or management do not exhaust the range of plausible institutional mechanisms to govern natural resource use. But the documentation and theoretical defense of this insight has rested chiefly on the analysis and examination of hundreds of separate case studies of successful common-pool resource governance. Each such study has generated different conclusions about what counts in “successful” resource management. The multiplicity of causal variables, and the lack of attention to how the observed effects of these variables depend on the state of the context, has created significant gaps in explanations of how common property institutions work. Addressing these gaps will require important shifts in how scholars of commons conduct their research. Such a shift is important because common property institutions continue to frame how natural resources are governed in many countries throughout the world. In addition, national governments in nearly all developing countries have turned to local-level common property institutions in the past decade as a new policy thrust to decentralize the governance of the environment. This shift in policy is no more than a belated recognition that sustainable resource management can never be independent of sustainability of collective human institutions that frame resource governance, and that local users are often the ones with the greatest stakes in sustainability of resources and institutions. But until as late as the 1970s, writ-
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The Drama of the Commons ings about common property endowed their object of study with an antiquated flavor. Portrayals of the most famous example, the English Commons and their enclosures (Ault, 1952; Baker and Butlin, 1973; Thirsk, 1966; Yelling, 1977), suggested, if only by implication, that common property is a curious holdover from the past that was destined to disappear in the face of trends toward modernization.1 To many observers, placing common property in the historical past seemed so obvious as to be natural. The most sustained theoretical engagement with community and communal forms of life, occurring as it did toward the end of the nineteenth century, gave further credence to the idea that the disappearance of norms of community and forms of communal life is an integral if perhaps regrettable part of progress. Theorists of the time, among them Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, Ferdinand Tonnies, and Max Weber, wrote about the effects of industrialization on existing social arrangements, and gave theoretical expression to their observations. The dire tone many of them adopted as they theorized their concerns about the future of community came to constitute further evidence confirming an implicitly teleological theory of social change where communities and communal arrangements that governed social interactions inevitably would disappear over time.2 Similarly, the ethnographic work of many anthropologists sometimes described cooperative arrangements for managing rural resources, or resources owned by indigenous peoples. It implicitly implied that such arrangements lay outside modern life. If historical studies of community located common property in the past, contemporary work by anthropologists located the commons in nonmodern, nonwestern societies. Undoubtedly, sophisticated ethnographic analysis has contributed immensely to the current state of our knowledge about how common property institutions work. But it has also hinted despite itself, simply by virtue of its subject matter, that common property may be no more than the institutional debris of societal arrangements that somehow fall outside modernity.3 Therefore, it would be fair to say that for much of the twentieth century, the dominant theoretical lenses that have framed how social scientists view peasants and rural life have helped distort analytical vision so as to impart to community and communal forms of sociality only residual vigor, a transitional existence, and an exotic attraction. Economic and political power have been seen to rest on an urban-industrial social organization and the simultaneous eclipse of rural life. It should scarcely surprise that those writing about postcolonial states found them undertaking policies that would undermine rural communities by promoting fast-paced development and rapid urbanization (Bates, 1981). The effects of emerging and spreading market relations similarly were seen to assist the vast movement of history by promoting the pursuit of individual self-interest or contractual obligations, and destroying community ethic and customary rules.4
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The Drama of the Commons These background beliefs about peasants, communities, rural life, and their future have had quite specific implications for environmental conservation. As a number of analysts have pointed out, dominant beliefs structuring environmental policies until as late as the 1980s held that markets and states were the appropriate institutional means to address externalities stemming from the public goods nature of resources. Many scholars have held that only through a recourse to these institutional arrangements would it become possible to promote sustainable resource use.5 Many still do. However, discussions over what kind of institutional arrangements account for sustainable resource use have undergone a remarkable change since the mid-1980s. The shift has occurred in part as a response to developments in the field of noncooperative game theory (Falk et al., this volume:Chapter 5; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Schotter, 1981; Sugden, 1984, 1989), but more directly as a result of the explosion of work on common property arrangements and common-pool resources (Berkes, 1989; McCay and Acheson, 1987; National Research Council, 1986; Ostrom, 1990). New understandings of resource institutions take common property as a viable mechanism to promote sustainable resource management. The work of scholars of common property has thus forced home a much-needed corrective to general policy prescriptions of privatization. This achievement cannot and should not be underrated. Scholars of common property, by shifting the focus of their investigations toward the analytical and structural elements that comprise successful management of the commons, have been in the vanguard of the bearers of the message that the commons and the community are an integral and indispensable part of contemporary efforts to conserve environmental resources. They have rewritten the text on how the environment should be governed. Scholarship on common property spans many disciplines. Anthropologists, resource economists, environmentalists, historians, political scientists, and rural sociologists among others have contributed to the flood of writings on the subject. More recent empirical work on the commons draws significantly from theories of property rights and institutions.6 It also uses many other approaches eclectically, including political ecology and ethnography. Using detailed historical and contemporary studies, writings on the commons have shown that resource users often create institutional arrangements and management regimes that help them allocate benefits equitably, over long time periods, and with only limited efficiency losses (Agrawal, 1999a; McKean, 1992a; Ostrom, 1992). Much of this research typically has focused on locally situated small user groups and communities.7 Of course, not all users of common-pool resources protect their resources successfully. Outcomes of experiences of commons management are highly variable. Documentation of the performance of regimes of local resource management provides us with many cases of successful local management of common-
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The Drama of the Commons pool resources. In light of this knowledge, scholars and policy makers are less likely to propose central state intervention, markets, or privatization of property rights over resources as a matter of course. Rather, many scholars examine the conditions under which communal arrangements compare favorably with private or state ownership, even on efficiency criteria, but especially where equity and sustainability are concerned. Other scholars of commons and some institutional theorists question the familiar trichotomy of private, communal, and state ownership and instead focus more directly on underlying rights and powers of access, use, management, exclusion, and transferability that are conferred through rules governing resources.8 The work initiated and carried out by scholars of common property parallels important developments in the world of policy making and resource management. Governments in more than 50 countries, according to a recent survey on national forestry policies (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1999), claim to be following new initiatives that would devolve some control over resources to local users. In synthesizing the extensive empirical work that has occurred over the past two decades, this chapter draws on rich descriptions of particular cases, comparative studies, and insights from works on social scientific methods to suggest how it might be possible to develop plausible causal mechanisms to link outcomes with causal variables. An enormous experimental and game theoretic literature also has begun to inform our understanding of how humans act under different incentive structures (see Falk et al., this volume:Chapter 5; Kopelman et al., this volume:Chapter 4). But the most valuable resources for this chapter are studies whose conclusions are based on explicit comparisons using relatively large samples of cases (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom et al., 1994; Pinkerton, 1989; Pinkerton and Weinstein, 1995; Sengupta, 1991; Tang, 1992). The exact definitions of terms such as efficiency, equity, or sustainability that characterize outcomes related to common-pool resource management are beyond the scope of this chapter.9 However, it might be useful to indicate that by “sustainability on the commons,” I primarily have in mind the durability of institutions that frame the governance of common-pool resources. Such a general view of sustainability is justified because few studies of the commons provide rigorous measures of their dependent variables. To use a strict definition of sustainability, therefore, is likely to make comparisons across studies difficult. At the same time, it must be admitted that most writings on the commons implicitly define successful institutions as those that last over time, constrain users to safeguard the resource, and produce fair outcomes.10 The next section begins by focusing on three comprehensive attempts to produce theoretically informed generalizations about the conditions under which groups of self-organized users are successful in managing their commons dilemmas.11 These studies are Wade ( 1994), Ostrom (1990), and Baland and Platteau (1996).12 I examine the robustness of their conclusions by comparing them with findings that a larger set of studies of the commons has identified.
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The Drama of the Commons Many of the conclusions of scholars of common property closely match theoretical generalizations in the literature on collective action and institutional analysis.13 But just as institutional analysts and theorists of collective action provide inferences that are sometimes in tension, scholars of common property also highlight outcomes and causal connections that often run counter to each other. One significant reason for divergent conclusions of empirical studies of commons is that most of them are based on the case study method. The multiplicity of research designs, sampling techniques, and data collection methods present within each study can be welcomed on the grounds that a hundred flowers should bloom; it also means that careful specification of the contextual and historical factors relevant to findings, systematic tests of findings, and comparisons of postulated causal connections have been relatively few. In analyzing the mostly case study-based empirical literature on the commons, the following section focuses on some of the typical problems of method that plague many studies of self-organized resource management institutions. I suggest that studies of the commons need to be especially attentive to areas in which case analysis is deficient, explicitly highlight the objectives of their studies, and explain the advantages of adopting a case study approach. The subsequent section proposes possible complementary methods and areas of emphasis for further research on common property.14 The main argument of the paper is that existing studies of sustainable institutions around common-pool resources suffer from two types of problems. The first is substantive—many scholars of commons have focused narrowly on institutions around common-pool resources. Such a focus on institutions is understandable in light of the objective of showing that common property arrangements can result in efficient use, equitable allocation, and sustainable conservation. But it comes at a cost. The cost is the lack of careful analysis of the contextual factors that frame all institutions and that affect the extent to which some institutions are more likely to be effective than others. The same institutional rules can have different effects on resource governance depending on variations in the biophysical, social, economic, and cultural contexts. Because existing studies of commons are relatively negligent in examining how aspects of the resource system, some aspects of user group membership, and the external social, physical, and institutional environments affect institutional durability and long-term management at the local level, we need new work that considers these questions explicitly (but see Lam, 1998; Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom et al., 1994; and Tang, 1992). The second problem relates to methods and is more fundamental. Given the large number of factors, perhaps as many as 35 of them (see the next section), that have been highlighted as being critical to the organization, adaptability, and sustainability of common property, it is fair to suggest that existing work has not yet fully developed a theory of what makes for sustainable common-pool resource management. Systematic tests of the relative importance of factors important to sustainability, equity, or efficiency of commons are relatively uncommon (but see Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, this volume:Chapter 3 and Lam, 1998).
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The Drama of the Commons Also uncommon are studies that connect the different variables they identify in causal chains or propose plausible causal mechanisms. Problems of incomplete model specification and omitted variables in hypothesis testing are widespread in the literature on common property. These problems of method often characterize even those writings that claim to address problems of substance.15 Therefore, it is likely that many conclusions from case studies of common-pool resource management and even from comparative studies of the commons are relevant primarily for the sample under consideration, rather than applying more generally. Of course, there are good reasons for the existence of these problems in studies of sustainability on the commons. Some of these reasons have to do with difficulties of data availability and collection, regional and area expertise of those who study the commons, disciplinary allegiances, and the tendency in single case studies to select instances of successful common-pool resource management. But these reasons do not obviate the need for a more viable and compelling theory of common-pool resource management. Such a theory is even more important today because of the increasing number of policy experiments in commons management that are under way. These policy experiments, and their vast human and territorial coverage, make it imperative that scholars of the commons squarely confront two critical questions: (1) Which of the lessons learned from current studies are sufficiently reliable to help diagnose institutional malfunctioning?; and (2) How can studies of common property contribute reliably to greater equity and justice in the implementation of revised institutional arrangements? ANALYSES OF SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF COMMON-POOL RESOURCES Of the significant number of comparative studies on the commons, I have chosen the book-length studies by Wade ( 1994), Ostrom (1990), and Baland and Platteau (1996). Two of them, by Wade and Ostrom, appeared more than a decade ago, and can be seen as the advance guard of a veritable flood of new writings on the commons that have put an end to the notion that common property is a historical curiosity. The main positive lessons I derive by comparing these authors are how they show that under some combinations of frequently occurring conditions, members of small groups can design institutional arrangements that help sustainable management of resources. They go further and identify the specific conditions that are most likely to promote local self-management of resources. Not only that, they use theoretical insights to defend and explain the empirical regularities they find. It would be fair to say that each of the three books is a careful and rigorous conversation between theory and empirical investigation because of their attention to theoretical developments at the time of writing, their effort to relate theory to the cases they examine, and their contributions to common property theory.
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The Drama of the Commons They all use a large body of empirical materials to test the validity of the theoretical insights they garner. Although the three books embody very different approaches to empirical comparative research, and rely on very different kinds of data, their concern for being empirically relevant and holding theory accountable to data is evident. For this paper, one of the most appealing aspects of their argument is that after wide-ranging discussion and consideration of many factors, each author arrives at a summary set of conditions and conclusions he or she believes to be critical to sustainability of commons institutions. Together, their conclusions form a viable starting point for the analysis of the ensemble of factors that account for sustainable institutional arrangements to manage the commons. But a discussion of their conclusions and some of the implications of their work also demonstrates that their propositions about sustainability on the commons need to be supplemented. Because there is no single widely accepted theory of what makes common property institutions sustainable, it is important to point out that differences of method are significant among these three authors. Wade relies primarily on data he collected from South Indian villages in a single district. His sample is not representative of irrigation institutions in the region, but at least we can presume that the data collection in each case is consistent. To test her theory, Ostrom uses detailed case studies that other scholars generated. The independent production of the research she samples means that all her cases may not have consistently collected data. But she examines each case using the same set of independent and dependent variables. Baland and Platteau are more relaxed in the methodological constraints they impose on themselves. To motivate their empirical analysis, they use a wide-ranging review of the economic literature on property rights and the inability of this literature to generate unambiguous conclusions about whether private property is superior to regulated common property. But to examine the validity of their conclusions, they use information from different sets of cases. In an important sense, the “model specification” is incomplete in each test (King et al., 1994). Wade’s (1994) important work on commonly managed irrigation systems in South India uses data on 31 villages to examine when it is that corporate institutions arise in these villages and what accounts for their success in resolving commons dilemmas.16 His arguments about the origins of commons institutions point, in brief, toward environmental risks as being a crucial factor. But he also provides a highly nuanced and thoughtful set of reasons about successful management of commons. According to Wade, effective rules of restraint on access and use are unlikely to last when there are many users, when the boundaries of the common-pool resource are unclear, when users live in groups scattered over a large area, when detection of rule breakers is difficult, and so on (Wade, 1988:215).17 Wade specifies his conclusions in greater detail by classifying different variables under the headings of resources, technology, user group, noticeability,
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The Drama of the Commons relationship between resources and user group, and relationship between users and the state (1988:215-216).18 The full set of conditions that Wade considers important for sustainable governance are listed in Box 2-1. In all, Wade finds 14 conditions to be important in facilitating successful management of the commons he investigates.19 Most of his conditions are general statements about the local context, user groups, and the resource system, but some of them are about the relationship between users and resources. Only one of his conditions pertains to external relationships of the group or of other local factors. BOX 2-1 Facilitating Conditions Identified by Wade Resource system characteristics Small size Well-defined boundaries Group characteristics Small size Clearly defined boundaries Past successful experiences—social capital Interdependence among group members (1 and 2) Relationship between resource system characteristics and group characteristics Overlap between user group residential location and resource location High levels of dependence by group members on resource system Institutional arrangements Locally devised access and management rules Ease in enforcement of rules Graduated sanctions (1 and 3) Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration of resources External environment Technology: Low-cost exclusion technology State: Central governments should not undermine local authority SOURCE: Wade (1988).
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The Drama of the Commons Studies appearing since Wade’s work on irrigation institutions have added to his list of factors that facilitate institutional success, but some factors have received mention regularly. Among these are small group size, well-defined bounds on resources and user group membership, ease in monitoring and enforcement, and closeness between the location of users and the resource. Consider, for example, the eight design principles that Ostrom (1990) lists in her defining work on community-level governance of resources. She crafts these principles on the basis of lessons from a sample of 14 cases where users attempted, with varying degrees of success, to create, adapt, and sustain institutions to manage the commons. A design principle for Ostrom is “an essential element or condition that helps to account for the success of these institutions in sustaining the [common-pool resources] and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to the rules in use” (1990:90). She emphasizes that these principles do not provide a blueprint to be imposed on resource management regimes. Seven of the principles are present in a significant manner in all the robust commons institutions she analyzes. The eighth covers more complexly organized cases such as federated systems. Although Ostrom lists eight principles, on closer examination the number of conditions turns out to be larger. For example, her first design principle refers to clearly defined boundaries of the common-pool resource and of membership in a group, and is in fact listed as two separate conditions by Wade. Her second principle, similarly, is an amalgam of two elements: a match between levels of restrictions and local conditions, and between appropriation and provision rules. Ostrom thus should be seen as considering 10, not 8, general principles as facilitating better performance of commons institutions over time (see Box 2-2). A second aspect of the design principles, again something that parallels Wade’s facilitating conditions, is that most of them are expressed as general features of long-lived, successful commons management rather than as relationships between characteristics of the constituent analytical units or as factors that depend for their efficacy on the presence (or absence) of other variables. Thus, principle seven suggests that users are more likely to manage their commons sustainably when their rights to devise institutions are not challenged by external government authorities. This is a general principle that is supposed to characterize all commons situations. The principle says that whenever external governments do not interfere, users are more likely to manage sustainably. In contrast, principle two suggests that restrictions on harvests of resource units should be related to local conditions (rather than saying that the lower [or higher] the level of withdrawal, the more [or less] likely would be success in management). Thus, it is possible to imagine certain resource and user group characteristics for which withdrawal levels should be high, and where setting them at a low level may lead to difficulties in management. For example, when supplements to resource stock are regular and high, and user group members depend on resources significantly, setting low harvesting levels will likely lead to unnecessary rule infractions. Thus
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The Drama of the Commons BOX 2-2 Ostrom’s Design Principles Resource system characteristics Well-defined boundaries Group characteristics Clearly defined boundaries (1 and 2) Relationship between resource system characteristics and group characteristics None presented as important Institutional arrangements Locally devised access and management rules Ease in enforcement of rules Graduated sanctions Availability of low-cost adjudication Accountability of monitors and other officials to users (1 and 3) Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration of resources External environment Technology: None presented as important State: Central governments should not undermine local authority Nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance SOURCE: Ostrom (1990). principle two covers a wider range of variations across cases, but at the cost of some ambiguity. In contrast, principle seven is more definite, but it is easy to imagine situations where it is likely not to hold. Finally, most of Ostrom’s principles focus primarily on local institutions, or on relationships within this context. Only two of them, about legal recognition of institutions by higher level authorities and about nested institutions, can be seen to express the relationship of a given group with other groups or authorities. Baland and Platteau (1996), in their comprehensive and synthetic review of a large number of studies on the commons, follow a similar strategy as does Ostrom (1990). Beginning with an examination of competing theoretical claims by scholars of different types of property regimes, they suggest that the core argument in favor of privatization “rests on the comparison between an idealized fully efficient private property system and the anarchical situations created by open access” (Baland and Platteau, 1996:175). Echoing earlier scholarship on the com-
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The Drama of the Commons mons, they emphasize the distinction between open access and common property arrangements and suggest that when private property regimes are compared with regulated common property systems (and when information is perfect and there are no transaction costs), then “regulated common property and private property are equivalent from the standpoint of the efficiency of resource use” (Baland and Platteau, 1996:175, emphasis in original).20 Furthermore, they argue, the privatization of common-pool resources or their appropriation and regulation by central authorities tends to eliminate the implicit entitlements and personalized relationships that are characteristic of common property arrangements. These steps, therefore, are likely to impair efficiency, and even more likely to disadvantage traditional users whose rights of use seldom get recognized under privatization or expropriation by the state.21 Their review of the existing literature from property rights and economic theory leads them to assert that “none of the property rights regimes appears intrinsically efficient” and that the reasons for which common property arrangements are criticized for their inefficiency can also haunt privatization measures. Where agents are not fully aware of ecological processes, or are unable to protect their resources against intruders, or their opportunity costs of degrading the environment are low,22 state intervention may be needed to support both private and common property (Baland and Platteau, 1996:178). In the absence of clear theoretical predictions regarding the superiority of one property regime over another, they argue in favor of attention to specific histories of concrete societies, and explicit incorporation of cultural and political factors23 into analysis. Only then might it be possible to know when people cooperate, and when inveterate opportunists dominate and make collective action impossible. After a wide-ranging review of empirical studies of common-pool resource management, and focusing on several variables that existing research has suggested as crucial to community-level institutions, Baland and Platteau arrive at conclusions that significantly overlap with those of Wade and Ostrom. Small size of a user group, a location close to the resource, homogeneity among group members, effective enforcement mechanisms, and past experiences of cooperation are some of the themes they emphasize as significant to achieve cooperation (Baland and Platteau, 1996:343-345). In addition, they highlight the importance of external aid and strong leadership.24 As is true for Ostrom, several of the factors they list are actually a joining together of multiple conditions. For example, their third point incorporates what Wade and Ostrom would count as four different conditions: the relationship between the location of the users and the resources on which they rely, the ability of users to create their own rules, the ease with which rules are understood by members of the user group and are enforced, and whether rules of allocation are considered fair. Some of their other conditions also signify more than one variable. Therefore, instead of 8 conditions, Baland and Platteau should be seen as identifying 12 conditions (see Box 2-3).
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The Drama of the Commons mobile shepherds through firmer delineation of boundaries to resources and exclusionary powers of communities. 47 A somewhat different but also very critical question of method is whether conclusions derived from one level of analysis or at a particular spatial/temporal level apply to other levels. Do inferences that are valid at the local level also apply to more macro-level phenomena? Although I do not address this question, both Berkes (this volume:Chapter 9) and Young (this volume:Chapter 8) examine it carefully. 48 Indeed, it should be clear that my discussion of potentially missing variables was aimed not just to highlight deficiencies of substance in these careful analyses, but even more to focus on a general problem of method that characterizes most studies of common property, and that these studies avoid to the extent possible. 49 For discussions of problems of bias that result from sampling on the dependent variable, see King et al. (1994) and Collier and Mahoney (1996). 50 Although cases should not be selected so as to include some instances of success and some of failure, because this is likely to introduce bias in sample selection (King et al., 1994), it should be kept in mind that if there is no variation in outcomes, then even if the selected cases vary on the factors that are deemed causally significant, the research will reveal little about the differing effects of hypothesized causes because outcomes are invariant in the selected sample. 51 The International Forestry Resources and Institutions Program at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, is in the middle of such an ambitious project. Members are just initiating analysis that may address some of the substantive and methodological criticisms voiced in this paper (see the collection of studies in Gibson et al., 2000). Even in this project, however, case selection can sometimes depend on availability of funding, an individual researcher’s interests, and the ease of establishing collaborative partnerships with research institutions in different countries. REFERENCES Abernathy, V. 1993 Population Politics: The Choices that Shape Our Future. New York: Plenum Press/Insight Books. Agrawal, A. 1999a Greener Pastures: Politics, Markets, and Community among a Migrant Pastoral People. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 1999b Community: Tracing the outlines of an enchanting concept. Pp. 92-108 in A New Moral Economy for India’s Forests? Discourses of Community and Participation, Roger Jeffrey and Nandini Sundar, eds., New Delhi: Sage Publications. 2001 State formation in community spaces? Decentralization of control over forests in the Kumaon Himalaya, India. Journal of Asian Studies 60(1):1-32. Agrawal, A., and C. Gibson 1999 Community and conservation: Beyond enchantment and disenchantment. World Development 27(4):629-649. Agrawal, A., and S. Goyal 2001 Group size and collective action: Third party monitoring in common-pool resources. Comparative Political Studies 34(1):63-93. Agrawal, A., and E. Ostrom 2001 Collective action, property rights, and decentralization in resource use in India and Nepal. Politics and Society. Agrawal, A., and J. Ribot 1999 Accountability in decentralization: A framework with south Asian and west African cases. Journal of Developing Areas 33(Summer):473-502.
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The Drama of the Commons Agrawal, A., and G. Yadama 1997 How do local institutions mediate market and population pressures on resources? Forest Panchayats in Kumaon, India. Development and Change 28(3):437-466. Alchian, A., and H. Demsetz 1972 Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review 62(December):777-795. Alexander, P. 1977 South Sri Lanka sea tenure. Ethnology 16:231-255. 1982 Sri Lankan Fishermen: Rural Capitalism and Peasant Society. Canberra: Australian National University. Arnold, J.E.M., and W.C. Stewart 1991 Common Property Resource Management in India. Oxford, Eng.: Oxford Forestry Institute, University of Oxford. Ascher, W. 1995 Communities and Sustainable Forestry in Developing Countries. San Francisco: ICS Press. Ascher, W., and R. Healy 1990 Natural Resource Policymaking in Developing Countries: Environment, Economic Growth, and Income Distribution. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Ault, W.O. 1952 Open Field Farming in Medieval England: The Self-Directing Activities of Village Communities in Medieval England. Boston: Boston University Press. Azhar, R. 1993 Commons, regulation, and rent-seeking behavior: The dilemma of Pakistan’s Guzara forests. Economic Development and Cultural Change 42(1):115-128. Baker, A., and R. Butlin 1973 Studies of Field Systems in the British Isles. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press. Baland, J., and J. Platteau 1996 Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press. 1999 The ambiguous impact of inequality on local resource management. World Development 27:773-788. Bardhan, P. 1993 Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development. World Development 21(4):633-639. Bates, R. 1981 Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1989 Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press. Bennett, A., and A. George 2001 Case Studies and Theory Development. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press. Berkes, F., ed. 1989 Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development. London: Belhaven Press. Berreman, G.D. 1963 Hindus of the Himalayas: Ethnography and Change. Berkeley: University of California Press. Blomquist, W., and E. Ostrom 1985 Institutional capacity and the resolution of a commons dilemma. Policies Studies Review 5(2):383-393.
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