tions and affect the evolution and persistence of different societal organizations. In another paper, Greif (1994b) examines the relationship of political institutions to economic growth. A more discursive discussion of political and social relations in the context of common-pool resources is presented by Cleaver (2000) and McCay and Jentoft (1998).

24  

The full list of factors they cite is summarized in Box 2-4. Their factors are the ones that are followed by “B&P.”

25  

For a review of experimental and game theoretic evidence on the same issues, see Kopelman et al. (this volume:Chapter 4) and Falk, et al. (this volume:Chapter 5).

26  

To a significant extent, my choice of these four broad categories to classify the conditions identified by Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and Platteau is motivated by the work carried out by Ostrom and her colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University since the mid-1980s on fisheries, forests, irrigation, and pastoral resources. For attempts to establish relationships among these different sets of variables, see discussions of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (Ostrom et al., 1994) developed by scholars at Indiana. See also Oakerson (1992) and Edwards and Steins (1998).

27  

An excellent example of a study that relates characteristics of resource systems to the viability of institutions to manage resources is Netting (1981), who focuses on scarcity and value of resources and the relationship of these two factors to whether common property institutions will endure. See also Thompson and Wisen (1994) for a similar case study from Mexico. Another study that examines common property arrangements, but focuses on environmental risks, is Nugent and Sanchez (1998).

28  

The same argument would hold for some forms of humanly created products—for example, greenhouse gases or industrial pollutants—that create externalities across many groups and jurisdictions.

29  

As a reviewer of this paper pointed out, movement of resources such as wildlife, and collecting and holding resources such as irrigation water, can be seen as mobility in space and time, and both aim to address fluctuations inherent in the production functions associated with the output from a resource system. Also, in one sense, markets provide individual producers with mobility across functionally specialized tasks.

30  

Indeed, as Ostrom points out, the impact of all the independent variables on sustainability of commons institutions can be depicted in terms of a cost-benefit calculus related to individual decision making.

31  

See also Bardhan (1993) on the role of scarcity, and Scherr et al. (1995).

32  

Although this paper does not focus on cultural contextual factors that may affect how local conservation and resource use processes unfold, such factors may also, in some instances, have important effects (Uphoff and Langholz, 1998).

33  

For a review of some of the writings on this subject, and for a test of the relative importance of population pressures, market pressures, and enforcement institutions on the condition of resources, see Agrawal and Yadama (1997). Regev et al. (1998) examine how market-related and technological changes may affect rates of harvest and resource use.

34  

In the absence of transaction costs related to exchange and political gains to be had from cornering the supply of scarce resources, no benefits could be derived from pooling. For a more familiar example of the redundancy of pooling institutions in the absence of transaction costs, think of insurance organizations. None of them would be necessary were pooling of individual-level risks to become pointless.

35  

Hechter (1987) discusses how new technology in the cable television industry determined excludability.

36  

The issue is not whether markets and capital availability have an effect today in comparison to the past. It is one of the degree or intensity with which market forces and capital availability have an impact at different time periods in specific places. Even if processes of globalization make the presence of money and capital more widespread, they do not accomplish it in any homogeneous fashion.



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