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OCR for page 102
Bioterrorism: Threat and Response
Michael L. Moodie
Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute
Since the sarin gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subway in March
1995, the United States has been debating the dangers and risks posed by the
potential use by terrorists of chemical and biological weapons. With respect to
biological weapons in particular, a debate has ensued as to how serious those
risks are. Some analysts argue that the threat has been "hyped." Others contend
that it is severe and imminent. However, neither argument, as publicly articu-
lated, is all that helpful for decision makers who confront hard choices about
planning, programming, and allocating resources to address the biological weap-
ons threat.
Emphasizing the potential impact of biological agents that might be weap-
onized produces vulnerability assessments that suggest virtually limitless dan-
gers. Focusing on only the most horrendous events, however, overwhelms any
estimates of their likelihood. But the possibility of occurrence the likelihood-
is a critically important factor in planning efforts. It does little good to engage in
elaborate preparations for an event that is not likely to happen to the exclusion of
addressing those contingencies that are likely.
On the other hand, it is not necessarily the case that the future will resemble
the past. The historical record, however, provides scant evidence on which to
make hard judgments. Faced with a paucity of data, one cannot be confident that
looking at history will alert us in advance to what will happen in the future.
A strong argument can be made that the threat of bioterrorism will increase.
Several reasons account for this heightened concern. Interest in bioterrorism is
increasing because it has become less expensive, it is highly destructive, and it is
psychologically devastating.
Over the next several years, the world will witness incredibly rapid and
102
OCR for page 103
BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
103
profound changes in biology and biotechnology. These advances could have a
major influence on prospects for bioterrorism. Biological weapons are based on
a technology that is now almost 70 years old. Yet remaining obstacles are not
trivial. Genetic modification, biomolecular engineering, and enhanced biopro-
duction technologies may make it easier for terrorists to overcome barriers that
have inhibited acquisition of biological weapons in the past.
Terrorism of the future will be in response to broad trends such as globaliza-
tion, accelerating interconnectedness, and population dynamics, but it is also
likely to entail narrow psychological elements from marginalization to "techno-
rage" to revenge for real or imagined wrongs. As motivations move away from
the traditionally political, the special mindsets of terrorists become more impor-
tant. A refined understanding of the threat of bioterrorism demands special atten-
tion to these distinctive mental topographies. Equally important is the require-
ment to understand how these unique psychologies interact with circumstances,
capabilities, and opportunities to take potential terrorists down particular paths,
including the one that leads to bioterrorism.
Classic terrorists used violence like a volume control knob (to use Brian
Jenkins's term) to generate fear in order to extract political concessions. New
terrorists do not calculate thresholds of pain and tolerance in society, or they
seek to exceed them, uninhibited by the need to shape behavior, unmotivated to
spare innocents. They are less interested in concrete political goals and more
motivated to win an immediate reward emotional or physical or to achieve a
long-term goal.
The structure of terrorist organizations is changing also. Today terrorist
groups are more transnational, network-based entities, rather than traditional hi-
erarchies.
Traditional arguments for methods of dealing with terrorism are insuffi-
cient. Neither the "laid-back" approach nor the one that hypes the threat is ade-
quate. Both define the threat too narrowly by focusing on only a single factor.
What is needed is a multifactor threat assessment.
Factors to consider are the actors, agents, operational requirements, and
targets. Each of these categories is divided into many subcategories; for exam-
ple, actors could be from traditional political groups, religious radical groups,
individuals acting alone, or the right wing. Agents could include anthrax, plague,
smallpox, and so forth. Some combinations of factors could produce dramatic
results; others may produce no results at all. It is essential, therefore, to trace
how the factors interrelate. Only by doing so can one make a determination of
which outcomes are most and least likely. This focus on relationships and inter-
actions of factors creates "plausible threat envelopes."
As a terrorist seeks higher casualties with biological weapons, fewer paths
are available to achieve that objective. Those that remain are more difficult.
Therefore, the degree of risk declines as the level of desired casualties increases,
insofar as the threat becomes less likely.
OCR for page 104
104
HIGH-IMPACT TERRORISM
Few terrorist organizations have the necessary combination of size, resourc-
es, skills, facilitative ethos (willingness to experiment and accept failure), or
appropriate organizational capacity to achieve mass casualties. Traditional agents
capable of inflicting mass casualties are difficult either to acquire, cultivate, and
produce or to disseminate effectively. Likely targets do not necessarily facilitate
mass casualty outcomes given the other requirements for conducting an effective
attack against them, including technical knowledge (e.g., of airflows in large
arenas) or operational skills (surveillance, finance, planning).
We do not know at what point the response system will become overbur-
dened and stressed to the point of collapse. This point is probably not very
difficult to reach. Therefore, while events that produce casualties in the tens of
thousands are unlikely, lesser contingencies even those with casualty levels in
the hundreds are likely to have major consequences, not least of which will be
a severe psychological impact.
Terrorism analysis tends to exclude actors allied with foreign governments
in times of conflict because such actions are considered acts of war. This is
shortsighted for several reasons:
· The consequences are no different.
· State-sponsored entities are among the few actors who could assemble
the requisite skills and materials to conduct a successful attack.
· A particular U.S. concern is pursuit of "asymmetric strategies" by hostile
states.
Among the actors who now define contemporary terrorism, those who might
be most attracted to use of biological weapons include the following:
· Non-state actors inspired by religious ideals,
· Groups from the extreme political right wing,
· Actors with millennial world views combined with notions of "cleans-
ing" society through violence,
Transnational networks less constrained by central authority, and
Radical single-issue groups.
A bioterrorism attack could take an almost infinite variety of forms. There-
fore, a "one-size-fits-all" approach to response will not work. Rather, an effec-
tive response must be built around a flexible package of capabilities that can be
"mixed and matched" according to circumstances.
In dealing with bioterrorism, effective health responses are especially criti-
cal. This means, in particular, better disease surveillance, monitoring, reporting,
and epidemiology.
Shaping an effective response to bioterrorism will be neither easy nor cheap.
Many players must be integrated into a genuinely strategic approach that is
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BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
105
based on a range of sometimes complex capabilities. An effective response re-
quires demanding planning requirements, many actors from many agencies, ongo-
ing training, complex communication capabilities, and organizational adaptability.
The Department of Justice Cities Program is intended to promote training in
the 120 largest metropolitan areas in the United States. Its approach emphasizes
"training the trainers." The program, however, tends to focus on law enforce-
ment and emergency management, and it often stresses a chemical scenario rath-
er than a biological one.
The Department of Defense support role takes many forms, including in-
volvement from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseas-
es, Naval Medical Research Institute, Chemical/Biological Incident Response
Force, and National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support
Teams. Some elements, however, are controversial. The plan to create National
Guard WMD Civil Support Teams, for example, has prompted a debate about
just what such units could contribute to response capabilities, particularly in a
biological event.
As argued, the health dimension of a bioterrorism response capability is
especially important. The United States has a number of its leading public health
assets focused on enhancing capabilities in this area, such as the Department of
Health and Human Services (National Medical Response Teams for WMD and
the Metropolitan Medical Response Systems); the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, with a focus on the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Program; and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
Responding to bioterrorism has created the following policy lessons:
· Draconian measures are not warranted;
· U.S. budgets are generally moving in the right direction;
· Cataloging and covering vulnerabilities is a fool's errand; a better alter-
native is to set priorities and work incrementally;
· Choose things desirable to do anyway, particularly in terms of enhancing
the public health infrastructure;
Do things that make a difference in time of crisis; and
Do not focus on a short-term fix; make long-term solutions a priority.
A constant dynamic exists between terrorists and those who fight them. The
relationship is constantly in flux, and it is difficult to define precisely at any one
point in time. There is certainty only if we do nothing, and it is the certainty that
we will lose. Risk is unavoidable; the challenge is to reduce it to a manageable
level.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
effective response
