|
Items in cart [0] |
Questions? Call 888-624-8373 |
| Copyright © 2009. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Terms of Use and Privacy Statement |
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 106
Bioterrorism: A View from the Side
Oleg S. Morenkov *
Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Cell Biophysics
I work as head of a group at the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of
Cell Biophysics in Pushchino, one of the leading biological research centers of
Russia. My work there has been associated with the study of the regulation of
monoclonal antibody synthesis by hybridized cells. I have a Ph.D. in molecular
biology and a doctor of science degree in virology, and my dissertation focused
on the antigen structure of the glycoproteins of the Aujeszky's disease (pseudo-
rabies) virus and the development of serological methods for diagnosing this
disease. The Aujeszky's disease virus is a porcine alphaherpesvirus and causes
widespread disease in many types of animals, but not in humans. At present, my
work is devoted to the study of molecular mechanisms of interaction of the
Aujeszky's disease virus with cell plasma membranes.
My research work has never had and does not now have any relation to the
development of biological weapons. I have never been involved in the problem
of bioterrorism. Furthermore, I have not even taken an interest in this problem.
Recently I was invited to make a presentation at a Russian-American semi-
nar on bioterrorism, to look at the threat of bioterrorism to Russia and the world
from the viewpoint of a virologist who has never had any relation to the develop-
ment of biological weapons, from the standpoint of a scientist living in Russia
who is well acquainted with the current status of biology in Russia. I was invited
to present my own subjective views on this problem, and I accepted.
Thus, the report that I am presenting is a view of bioterrorism from the side,
the view of a nonspecialist in this field who has never been connected with
* Translated from the Russian by Kelly Robbins.
106
OCR for page 107
BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
107
biological weapons, the view of a virologist living in Russia and possessing a
certain amount of special knowledge.
Any scientific-technical progress leads to the development of not only posi-
tive, but also negative technologies. This leads to improvements not only in the
means of supporting life, but also in the means of destroying it. The development
of chemistry led to the creation of explosive and poisonous substances, of phys-
ics to nuclear weapons, and of biology to biological weapons.
Biological weapons will undoubtedly be very attractive to terrorists of the
twenty-first century. In the opinion of specialists, it is already pointless to ask
the question, Will terrorist acts be committed using biological weapons? Instead,
we face the questions, When will it happen? How can the consequences of such
terrorist acts be minimized? How can we reduce the probability that terrorists
will use biological weapons?
It seems that bioterrorism is an evil we will have to encounter in the near
future, and the entire world community will have to fight it with united efforts.
In my view, the attractiveness of biological weapons for modern terrorists is
determined by the following points:
1. We are currently seeing the explosive development of biological science,
medical biotechnology, and pharmacology. Increasing numbers of people are
working in these fields, and they have the knowledge and qualifications neces-
sary for developing and manufacturing bioweapons. There are also increasing
numbers of laboratories and biological and pharmacological production facilities
that have the conditions necessary for the production of biological weapons.
2. There is free access to information concerning the manufacture of bio-
weapons (the culture of viruses and microorganisms, the production of toxins,
etc.~. Access to this sort of information has become much simpler with the devel-
opment of the Internet. Even with minimal specialized knowledge, such infor-
mation is fairly easy to find.
3. The manufacture of biological weapons is relatively easy and cheap. If
one has the appropriate strain of a pathogenic virus or microorganism, the patho-
gen can be cultivated in sufficient quantities without any particular problems in
any laboratory possessing facilities for work under sterile conditions. Such con-
ditions are easy enough to create, even at home.
4. The problem of obtaining a pathogenic strain of a microorganism or virus
is also solvable, although it might appear to be one of the most difficult problems
for bioterrorists. A pathogen might be obtained by bioterrorists by illegal means
from laboratories or production facilities where these microorganisms or viruses
are being studied or where the corresponding vaccines or test kits are being
manufactured. A pathogenic viral or microbial strain could be transferred to
bioterrorists by another terrorist group. The important point to remember is that
at present, international borders are completely open for the movement of patho-
genic strains of microorganisms and viruses. This could happen in the form of an
OCR for page 108
108
HIGH-IMPACT TERRORISM
ordinary letter or sheet of paper containing a dried drop of a pathogenic strain.
Viruses can be transported in the form of a dried nucleic acid, which presents
absolutely no danger to the person transporting the virus. Once at the destination,
cells are transfected with the nucleic acid, and the full-fledged virus multiplies.
Thus, a pathogenic strain could be obtained in one place and biomass produced
from it in somewhere else, even in another country. If bioterrorists were to
develop their own strain using current molecular biological methods, it would
require substantial expenditures, and at present I believe this to be unlikely,
although possible.
5. Bioweapons are effective in very small doses. The ease of concealing the
presence and use of bioweapons, the lack of external evidence at the moment of
their use, and the relative ease of their production make it highly unlikely that
they could be found and suppressed.
6. Biological weapons make it possible to carry out both individual terrorist
acts and mass infections of people, animals, and plants.
7. In my view, the task facing bioterrorists is substantially easier than that
faced by the developers of military bioweapons for use under battle conditions.
An act of bioterrorism is unexpected. No one is taking countermeasures against
it, and it is carried out openly, aimed at unprepared and unprotected people. I
believe that the demands made of bioweapons by bioterrorists are significantly
lower than the demands made of military bioweapons. Considered ineffective
under battle conditions, bioweapons could be very attractive for bioterrorists.
Bioterrorists have no need to resolve the problem of stabilizing biological agents
or cultivating enormous quantities of them. Even "nonmilitarized" pathogens are
sufficient for carrying out an act of bioterrorism.
8. At present, there is practically no technology for protecting against bio-
weapons that would make it possible to detect and identify a pathogenic micro-
organism or toxin before it began taking effect. Thus, the fact that an act of
bioterrorism had been committed could be discovered only after the victims
began to get sick and the illness was identified, which could take a fairly long
time, during which a large number of people, animals, or plants could already
have become infected.
9. A difficult point in uncovering a case of bioterrorism is the fact that after an
outbreak of a certain disease is discovered, it is very hard to say anything about the
etiology of the disease. Therefore, if the act of bioterrorism is not of a demonstrative
nature and is not announced by the bioterrorists themselves, it is no simple
matter to confirm that the premeditated spread of a pathogen has taken place. This is
especially true with regard to the spread of diseases affecting animals and plants.
10. Society is neither technically nor psychologically ready for cases of
bioterrorism.
Therefore, the relative simplicity of producing biological weapons, the prac-
tical invulnerability of the perpetrators, and the possibility of the spread of dis-
OCR for page 109
BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
109
ease on a huge scale obviously make biological weapons one of the most attrac-
tive tools for terror in the twenty-first century.
All types of bioterrorism are dangerous, whether based on political, crimi-
nal, religious, or economic reasons or carried out by mentally ill people. In these
various cases, the terrorists are pursuing different goals:
· Criminal bioterrorism will obviously be aimed at specific people or
groups of people with the aim of eliminating or blackmailing them; that is, it will
be of a localized nature.
.
Religious fanatics, separatists, and mentally ill people could probably be
attracted by the demonstrative aspect of bioterrorism. Bioterrorism of this type
could obviously be of a localized nature or could take the form of a wide-scale
terrorist act, which, with good planning on the part of the extremists and the
necessary equipment and supplies, could lead to large numbers of victims.
· Bioterrorism could become a means of resolving political problems and
destabilizing countries, especially those with already unstable political systems
and economies. Terrorist acts involving the widespread release of dangerous
human pathogens (smallpox, anthrax) in crowded areas could potentially lead to
huge numbers of human casualties and enormous economic costs involved in
dealing with the consequences, which could destabilize the situation in a coun-
try. This type of bioterrorism is technically the most difficult and requires the
dispersion of pathogens in aerosol form. It is necessary to solve numerous tech-
nical problems to carry out such an act of terrorism (stabilization of the bioag-
ents, development of a dispersal system, etc.), and it requires a long development
period and large investments of money. In the opinion of a number of experts,
such a wide-scale act of bioterrorism is unlikely in the near future, if it is not
purposefully sponsored by a government that could provide terrorist groups with
the finished technology for manufacturing bioweapons.
.
Neither can one underestimate economic bioterrorism (the spread of dis-
eases affecting animals and plants). This might serve as a means of waging a
competitive economic struggle (including on a scale involving competition be-
tween countries). In such a case, certain agricultural sectors could suffer enor-
mous losses, which could lead to destabilization of the countries affected. In the
majority of cases, the very fact that such an act of bioterrorism had been carried
out could go unnoticed if it is not announced by the terrorists themselves.
In my view, the main factor restraining the spread of bioterrorism is the lack
up to now of a sufficiently wide-scale successful act of bioterrorism receiving
worldwide attention. Two or three successful acts of bioterrorism, regardless of
the country in which they occurred, could change the orientation of terrorists
throughout the world and encourage them to actively seek capabilities for using
biological weapons for criminal purposes.
OCR for page 110
110
HIGH-IMPACT TERRORISM
What, in my view, are the special characteristics of the situation in Russia
with regard to bioterrorism?
.
In Russia, there are a large number of institutes and production facilities
of a biological, medical, and pharmacological nature. Many of them are in a
difficult financial position and sit half empty, rented out to private firms. The
laboratory facilities of such institutes and plants could potentially be used by
bioterrorist groups to cultivate pathogenic viruses and microorganisms.
· Russia has a large number of specialists virologists, microbiologists,
molecular biologists with the skills sufficient to be used by bioterrorists for
making and developing bioweapons. Some of these specialists are still working
in their professional fields and often live on the verge of poverty. Some of them
were retrained and now work in other sectors. Here I would like to emphasize
that the majority of these specialists were never associated with the development
of bioweapons under the old program and are (or were) working on basic or
applied science.
Given the poor situation of many scientists working in biology, there is a
potential danger that they will be used by criminal elements or terrorist organiza-
tions, including those from third countries, in the manufacture of bioweapons. A
pathogen can be obtained from any country. There is a potential danger that
these pathogens could also be acquired in Russia itself through people with
access to pathogenic strains of microorganisms or viruses (for example, people
involved in related scientific research or in the production of vaccines or diag-
nostic tests). For a certain amount of compensation, specialists could cultivate
biomass, possibly without even guessing which microorganism or virus they
were cultivating.
Russian biologists also could potentially be used by bioterrorists in the de-
velopment of bioweapons. Despite the difficult situation in Russian science,
biological scientists, especially those working in the area of basic science, con-
tinue to maintain their high status and to conduct world-class research. Take, for
example, a recently published study by Australian researchers that attracted
worldwide notice. These researchers cloned the interleukin-4 gene in mouse pox
virus and, as a result, unexpectedly obtained a virus substantially more virulent
than the initial strain. It is highly probable that cloning such a gene in human
smallpox virus could lead to the appearance of a terrible bioweapon. In my view,
it would be no particular problem to repeat this work or to insert the interleukin-
4 gene in another virus. The work used standard molecular biology methods.
Such work could be carried out in many Russian biological institutes, as well as
in American universities. Terrorists might plan their work in such a way that one
team of specialists clones the virus sequence and another the interleukin gene, a
third group makes the recombinant virus, and a fourth tests the virus on animals.
None of the researchers could even guess the aim of the work.
OCR for page 111
BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
111
· The next important point concerns Russia's lack of modern detection
equipment and the associated methodology, thus complicating the possibility of
finding pathogenic agents before the moment of their use.
· Russian medical institutions are not prepared to work under conditions
that would be produced by bioterrorist actions. Judging from the literature, this
problem is also a concern in the United States. There are no specialists trained
for such cases, no modern diagnostic methods or equipment for pathogen identi-
fication, and no stockpiles of the appropriate vaccines and antibiotics.
In this regard, however, it should be noted that an expert analysis of the
current level of preparedness of other countries for acts of bioterrorism shows
that, at present, not a single country in the world is fully prepared to take ade-
quate actions in such a situation. A well-planned and successfully conducted
wide-scale act of bioterrorism in any country would unavoidably lead to heavy
casualties (or enormous damage to agriculture). The scope of the consequences
will depend on the preparedness of the government, both technical and econom-
ic, for terrorist acts of this nature.
Given Russia's economic weakness and its poor technical preparedness for
dealing with the consequences of bioterrorism, a wide-scale bioterrorist attack
carried out on Russian soil would in high likelihood produce an unfavorable
scenario that might lead to a large number of casualties, social tension, and a
destabilization of the situation.
Thus, Russia finds itself in a situation characterized on the one hand by
favorable conditions for terrorist groups to make or even develop bioweapons
and on the other hand by a lack of preparedness to counter a bioterrorist act if it
is committed. In taking all of this into account, it seems to me that Russia could
potentially become one of the top places for the manufacture of bioweapons by
terrorists (including bioterrorism from other countries). Russia could also be-
come one of the main proving grounds for the testing of bioweapons in terrorist
or criminal actions. This cannot be permitted. Having organized the production
of bioweapons or having successfully carried out a bioterrorist act in Russia,
where it is now easier to do, terrorists will move on to other countries as well.
Russia must become part of the international system for countering bioter-
rorism. Given Russia's economic problems, it needs help to create an effective
system for combating bioterrorism. This is in the interests of the entire world
community.
In order to fight bioterrorism, the international community needs to resolve
a three-part problem:
1. Society must recognize the seriousness and reality of the problem of
bioterrorism. Society has not yet recognized this fact. I fear that society will have
to encounter bioterrorism face to face in order to recognize the scale of the
danger fully. In this situation, scientists must play the role of experts, who must
OCR for page 112
2
HIGH-IMPACT TERRORISM
convince governments and society as a whole of the need to take appropriate
measures.
2. Society must build a system of barriers to block acts of bioterrorism and
reduce the likelihood of their being carried out.
3. In case an act of bioterrorism is nevertheless carried out, society must
build a system of effective measures that will make it possible to minimize the
consequences of these terrorist acts. Since preventing terrorist acts is very diffi-
cult, it seems to me that minimizing their consequences should be a top priority.
I will not discuss issues pertaining to the organization of an international
system for countering bioterrorism. This is a difficult and complex problem
involving a number of fields in which I am not a specialist. I will convey a few
more thoughts concerning the potential use by bioterrorists of individual Russian
biologists in the manufacture or development of bioweapons on the orders of
bioterrorists. It seems to me that the poverty of Russian biological science is the
fundamental reason creating the preconditions for the potential use of Russian
biologists by bioterrorists for criminal purposes. World-class specialists earn
salaries of $50 to $100 per month. It is hard to maintain your dignity when you
are poverty stricken. In order to earn money, scientists take various side jobs not
connected with their basic scientific activities cloning, sequencing, cultivating
biomass, or obtaining recombinant viruses for those who pay them. In doing so,
they often have no interest in exactly what they are doing or for what purpose or
whom they are doing it. One of the many side jobs being done by Russian
scientists could turn out to be an element of work to develop or manufacture a
bioweapon. As I have already emphasized, specialists could carry out this work
without even having a clue.
In my view, the most effective means of resolving this problem is support
for Russian biology on the part of the world community, in particular the United
States of America. I would like to stress that serious attention needs to be paid to
support not only for military science, but also for peaceful biological science not
associated with bioweapons. From the standpoint of potential involvement in the
manufacture or development of bioweapons, civilian virologists or molecular
biologists are even more attractive to bioterrorists than are military specialists,
given the weak control and monitoring research work carried out in civilian
biological institutes in comparison with military organizations. I believe that the
substantial expansion of the system for grant support of Russian biological sci-
ence, especially basic biology, and of the system for joint Russian-American
projects in biology will be beneficial to both sides and would promote the inte-
gration of Russian biology into the world scientific community. In this regard,
Russian-U.S. cooperation is possible in the area of basic biological research and
in the joint development of means for detecting and diagnosing potential patho-
gens or toxins that could be used by bioterrorists, as well as means of preventing
and treating diseases caused by these pathogens. The more active involvement of
OCR for page 113
BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
113
Russian biologists in joint research projects would undoubtedly reduce the prob-
ability of their potential use by bioterrorists.
Without a doubt, the development of biological science and biotechnology
that we are currently observing will lead in the near future to outstanding funda-
mental discoveries affecting our understanding of the functioning of certain genes
in microorganisms, mechanisms of pathogenesis, and the interaction of viruses
with the immune systems of animals. This will make it possible to combat hu-
man, animal, and plant diseases more effectively. On the other side of the coin,
these discoveries will also lead unavoidably to the appearance of new artificially
constructed microorganisms and viruses with greater virulence than the initial
strains, pathogens not recognized by the immune system, modified toxins with a
high degree of stability, and so forth. At present, bioterrorism based on the use of
the latest achievements in molecular biology appears unlikely due to the need for
large expenditures and highly skilled specialists associated with terrorist groups.
However, within the next few years it could present a colossal problem for the
modern world.
In conclusion, I would like to focus attention once again on certain state-
ments included in my report:
1. The relative ease of making biological weapons, the practical invulnera-
bility of the perpetrators, and the possibility of the outbreak of disease on a
gigantic scale obviously make biological weapons one of the most attractive
tools for terror in the twenty-first century.
2. In connection with the poverty-stricken position of Russian biology, Rus-
sia possesses favorable conditions for terrorist groups, including terrorist groups
from third countries, to make or even develop biological weapons. In this regard,
Russia could potentially become one of the top sites for the manufacture of
biological weapons by terrorists. Active targeted support for Russian biological
science by the world community, and primarily by the United States of America,
would undoubtedly promote the elimination of these negative tendencies.
3. The main factor restraining the spread of bioterrorism is the lack up to
now of a sufficiently wide-scale successful act of bioterrorism receiving world-
wide attention, regardless of the country in which such an act might occur. An
unfavorable situation has developed in Russia, and it might become one of the
main proving grounds for the testing of bioweapons in terrorist or criminal ac-
tions. This cannot be permitted, because the successful staging of an act of
bioterrorism on Russian soil might serve as the starting point for the further
spread of bioterrorism. It is essential that an international system for countering
bioterrorism be created and that Russia be actively involved in this system.
OCR for page 114
Representative terms from entire chapter:
terrorist acts
