|
Items in cart [0] |
Questions? Call 888-624-8373 |
| Copyright © 2009. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Terms of Use and Privacy Statement |
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 267
New Opportunities for
Bilateral Cooperation
Glenn E. Schweitzer
National Research Council
During the workshop, we considered many suggestions for future coopera-
tion between governments, between academies, and between individual spe-
cialists. I will highlight a few of the suggestions that seem to offer particularly
promising themes for such cooperation. Of course, successful cooperation will
depend on the level of enthusiasm of our specialists and the interest of sponsors.
But there is no doubt that we have addressed some of the most important issues
that will confront our two countries, and indeed the world, during the next de-
cade and longer.
First, in accordance with the suggestion of Academician Velikhov, we have
provided a number of publications about high-impact terrorism to the Institute of
Nuclear Safety, which in cooperation with other institutes will take the first steps
in providing an information center for future interacademy activities in this field.
We will try to obtain additional copies of these documents for other interested
organizations, and we look forward to receiving similar documents concerning
related developments in Russia. Of course we should try to modernize this infor-
mation exchange quickly from exchanges of hard copies of documents to ex-
changes of electronic databases. We hope to be able to report progress in this
area in the near future.
Also of special interest is the recommendation of Academician Velikhov to
establish a standing interacademy committee that can serve as an umbrella for
discussions among American and Russian specialists on many of the topics that
have been considered. He undoubtedly will expand on this proposal in the dis-
. · ~
cusslon penoa.
Turning to the specific themes of the workshop, there clearly is a consider-
able difference in American and Russian understanding of the term "terrorism."
267
OCR for page 268
268
HIGH-IMPACT TERRORISM
We do not want to engage in an endless debate over definition. Yet further
discussion of the types of activities that are considered by specialists in the two
countries as terrorism will undoubtedly be helpful in avoiding misunderstand-
ings. Of special interest is the intersection of terrorism and organized crime. This
is not simply a question of definition, but it is especially important to improve
understanding of how terrorists and criminal organizations fit together and how
they operate in separate domains.
Although much of our focus has been on the technical aspects of terrorism,
we must give continuing attention to the legal dimensions of efforts to thwart
terrorism international legal regimes and also national legislative and regulato-
ry frameworks. While our academies are not the best organizations to analyze all
aspects of the legal underpinnings of counterterrorism efforts, surely as we ad-
dress specific forms of terrorism the legal frameworks should be carefully con-
sidered alone with the many technical economic social and political dimen-
slons.
~ r-
A number of participants underscored the importance of discussions of the
policy issues as well as sorting out technical aspects of the threats, detection of the
threats, and appropriate responses. Such discussions that bring together science
and policy would seem to be a particularly appropriate role for our academies.
Our Russian colleagues have made several detailed suggestions for major
. . . . .
cooperative Naves:
· A working group of American and Russian specialists to address a range
of currently neglected issues affecting the likelihood of radiological terrorism,
with the purpose of such deliberations being to stimulate actions by the Russian
and U.S. governments and by the International Atomic Energy Agency to
strengthen international capabilities to combat this threat;
· A joint experiment to test the vulnerability of electrical and electronic
connections to electromagnetic pulsed power attacks; and
Development of scientific guidance for the establishment of an interna-
tional center at Vector near Novosibirsk to investigate the epidemiological, diag-
nostic, and treatment aspects of outbreaks of infectious diseases.
.
Other suggestions of themes for joint efforts that were set forth by American
and Russian specialists and that are based on preliminary analyses by the spe-
cialists include the following:
· Studies of the many dimensions of information security, including the
clarification of the importance and scope of national strategies to improve pro-
tection of critical networks and the identification of areas where international
cooperation should be strengthened;
· Assessments of the types of potential terrorist threats directed at facilities
that produce or store dangerous industrial chemicals;
OCR for page 269
FUTURE TRENDS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
269
· Development of methodologies for evaluating engineering and other se-
curity enhancements that will reduce the vulnerability of a broad range of indus-
trial facilities (e.g., nuclear power plants, gas pipelines, airports, metallurgical
plants);
· Consultations of experts on the technical aspects of both marking and
tagging of explosives, including record-keeping requirements for taggants and
the associated costs;
· Development of new concepts for more cost-effective destruction of poor-
ly secured chemical weapons stockpiles in Russia;
Investigations of the feasibility of terrorist groups' assembling radiologi-
cal weapons and methods for preventing and detecting such activities;
· Consideration of the technical details of discriminating between natural
outbreaks of diseases and the acts of bioterrorists as well as consideration of the
preparations for dealing with the consequences of a bioterrorism attack;
· Studies of methods for prevention and early detection of animal diseases
and for determining the cause of disease outbreaks;
· Studies of the role of the mass media in terrorism situations and in shap-
ing public attitudes toward terrorism; and
· Joint activities aimed at adapting to the Russian environment the Ameri-
can experience in training specialists to deal with terrorism, in developing orga-
nizational mechanisms for coordinating activities of many organizations in pre-
venting and responding to terrorist attacks, and in using forensic techniques to
assist in the search for the instigators of terrorist acts.
.
The foregoing themes are just the beginning of a long list of topics that are
clearly of interest to our academies, and the list will undoubtedly grow and be
continuously refined. There are of course more ambitious schemes that should
be considered by our governments, such as proposals for joint investigations of
incidents and joint training exercises. But my comments have been limited large-
ly to interacademy cooperation. Of course, the academies must narrow the list
and select several areas where they can indeed have an important impact on
international security.
In conclusion, I would like to underscore two important points that have
been raised by participants. First, any work undertaken in this field must avoid
giving terrorists important technical information that could facilitate their efforts
to turn hostile intentions into destructive actions. Second, our academies have
strong capabilities to provide conceptual approaches and sound methodologies
for addressing terrorism concerns; and they can make recommendations to gov-
ernments. However, it is the government ministries and departments, and not the
academies, that must translate general approaches to counterterrorism into ac-
tions at specific facilities, at our borders, and indeed throughout our societies.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
russian specialists
