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Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for the National Security Emergency Preparedness
Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for National Security Emergency PreparednessA Report Prepared by the
Committee on Review of Switching, Synchronization and Network Control in National Security Telecommunications
Board on Telecommunications and Computer Applications
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems
National Research Council
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C.
1989
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Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for the National Security Emergency Preparedness
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Frank Press is president of the National Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Robert M.White is president of the National Academy of Engineering.
The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Samuel O.Thier is president of the Institute of Medicine.
The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Frank Press and Dr. Robert M.White are chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.
The project is supported by Contract No. DCA100–87–C–0069 between the National Communications System and the National Academy of Sciences.
Available from:
Board on Telecommunications and Computer Applications
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems
National Research Council
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20418
Printed in the United States of America
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Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for the National Security Emergency Preparedness
COMMITTEE ON REVIEW OF SWITCHING, SYNCHRONIZATION AND NETWORK CONTROL IN NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS
JOHN C.McDONALD, Chairman,
CONTEL Corporation,
PAUL BARAN,
METRICOM
FLOYD BECKER,
University of Colorado
CULLEN M.CRAIN,
The Rand Corporation
HOWARD FRANK,
Network Management Inc.
LEWIS E.FRANKS,
University of Massachusetts
PAUL E.GREEN, JR.,
International Business Machines Corporation
ERIK K.GRIMMELMANN,
AT&T Bell Laboratories
E.FLETCHER HASELTON,
Teknekron Infoswitch Corporation
AMOS E.JOEL, JR., Executive Consultant
DONALD KUYPER,
GTE Operating Group*
RICHARD B.MARSTEN,
VITRO Corporation
DAVID L.MILLS,
University of Delaware
LEE M.PASCHALL,
American Satellite Company (retired)
CASIMIR S.SKRZYPCZAK,
NYNEX Corporation
Senior Adviser
JOHN C.WOHLSTETTER,
CONTEL Corporation
Staff
WAYNE G.KAY, Study Director
KAREN LAUGHLIN, Administrative Coordinator**
LOIS A.LEAK, Administrative Assistant
*
Resigned August 1988.
**
Until July 1988.
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Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for the National Security Emergency Preparedness
BOARD ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER APPLICATIONS
CHARLES W.STEPHENS, Chairman,
TRW Electronics & Defense Sector (Retired)
JORDAN J.BARUCH,
Jordan Baruch Associates, Incorporated
DANIEL BELL,
Harvard University
HERBERT D.BENINGTON,
UNISYS Defense Systems
CARL J.CONTI,
International Business Machines Corporation
DAVID J.FARBER,
University of Pennsylvania
JAMES L.FLANAGAN,
AT&T Bell Laboratories
ROBERT Y.HUANG,
TRW Space Technology Group (Retired)
JOHN C.McDONALD,
CONTEL Corporation
WILLIAM F.MILLER,
SRI International
ALAN J.PERLIS,
Yale University
HENRY M.RIVERA,
Dow, Lohnes and Albertson
ERIC E.SUMNER,
AT&T Bell Laboratories
GEORGE L.TURIN,
University of California at Berkeley
KEITH W.UNCAPHER,
Corporation for National Research Initiatives and University of Southern California
ANDREW J.VITERBI,
Qualcomm, Incorporated and University of California at San Diego
WILLIS H.WARE,
The RAND Corporation
Staff
JOHN M.RICHARDSON, Director*
RICHARD B.MARSTEN, Director**
ANTHONY M.FORTE, Senior Staff Officer
BENJAMIN J.LEON, Senior Staff Officer
BERNARD J.BENNINGTON, Visiting Fellow
CARLITA M.PERRY, Administrative Associate
KAREN LAUGHLIN, Administrative Coordinator
LOIS A.LEAK, Administrative Assistant
LINDA JOYNER, Administrative Secretary
*
Director from January 1988.
**
Director until January 1988.
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Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for the National Security Emergency Preparedness
Preface
This report concludes a multifaceted study conducted by the National Research Council’s (NRC) Committee on Review of Switching, Synchronization and Network Control in National Security Telecommunications. The committee, established at the request of the Manager, National Communications System (NCS), had its first meeting in November 1986. Phase I of the committee’s work involved evaluating the NCS Nationwide Emergency Telecommunications Service (NETS), which is one of three programs to improve survivability in national security emergency preparedness (NSEP) telecommunications capabilities mandated by presidential order in National Security Decision Directive NSDD-97. NETS, the largest in scope of the programs, is intended to provide survivable switched voice and data communications. The committee worked on an accelerated schedule during this phase, holding meetings every month. They concluded their work with a formal briefing to the NCS Manager and his staff in April 1987. The committee’s interim report, Nationwide Emergency Telecommunications Service for National Security Telecommunications, was published in August 1987 and fulfilled Task 1 of the NCS study requirements.
The committee reconvened in September 1987 to address the remaining tasks of reviewing and assessing synchronization, switching, and network control of the public switched network (PSN). The committee found that existing synchronization capabilities are likely
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Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for the National Security Emergency Preparedness
to be adequate to support NSEP telecommunications. An in-depth discussion of Issues in Digital Network Time and Frequency Synchronization is included in this report as Appendix B and fulfills Task 2 of the NCS study requirements. For Task 3 the committee was to review the inventory of switching installations for survivability of switching and control functions after nuclear attack, considering redundancy and alternative connectivity (see Appendix A for the complete Task 3 statement). However, for this task it was implicitly necessary to look to the future evolution of the network rather than merely to examine the current status. The future network is likely to be different from that of today because of changes in regulation, technology, competition, and customer demand. Accordingly, with the concurrence of the Deputy Manager of NCS, this report considers how the network may evolve by the year 2000, the drivers influencing its architecture and topology, and the vulnerabilities it may have.
The committee considered the implications of two opposing trends in network development: (1) a trend, driven by competition, toward the provision of many networks and (2) a trend, driven by economic forces, toward decreasing interoperability and restorability in emergencies.
The intended audience for this report is the NCS Manager and those who provide oversight to him. They include policy-level officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress. The report is also addressed to the providers of public and private telecommunications facilities, to the extent that NSEP telecommunications ultimately depends on their systems.
The committee appreciates the strong support and personal involvement of the NCS staff, especially Benham E.Morriss, Deputy Manager. We are also grateful to all who provided information and insights as to where the networks are likely to be in the year 2000. These estimates were highly valuable in helping the committee understand network trends and their NSEP implications.
The committee was ably supported by the NRC staff and the Director of the Board on Telecommunications and Computer Applications, Dr. John M.Richardson. In particular the committee thanks Wayne G.Kay, Consultant and Study Director, for his personal and professional commitment of excellence to the task. We also praise Karen Laughlin, of the staff, for her outstanding administrative effectiveness on our behalf. We also thank Lois A.Leak and Linda
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Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for the National Security Emergency Preparedness
Joyner, also of the staff, for their invaluable assistance. In addition, I want personally to thank my assistant, John Wohlstetter, for his able contributions. Finally, my personal thanks to each member of the committee for his time, perseverance, and dedication to this important study.
John C.McDonald
Chairman
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Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for the National Security Emergency Preparedness
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1
The Emerging Problem,
1
Recommendations,
2
1
INTRODUCTION
9
Current Programs,
10
The Committee’s Approach,
10
Some Conclusions,
11
Structure of the Report,
14
References,
15
2
NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVES TO DATE
16
Background,
16
Commercial Satellite Interconnectivity,
18
Commercial Network Survivability,
19
Nationwide Emergency Telecommunications Service,
20
References,
21
3
PUBLIC SWITCHED NETWORKS IN THE YEAR 2000
22
Regulation,
23
Technology,
23
Competition,
27
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Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for the National Security Emergency Preparedness
Customer Demand,
29
Summary,
31
References,
31
4
REGULATION
33
Jurisdiction,
34
Open Network Architecture,
35
Broadband Services,
37
Pricing,
38
Bypass,
39
Local Exchange Carrier Regulation,
40
Additional Nationwide Telecommunications Emergency Service and National Security Emergency Preparedness Considerations,
42
References,
45
5
TECHNOLOGY
46
Transmission,
47
Switching,
51
Integrated Circuit Technology,
53
Network Management,
55
Network Synchronization,
59
A Summary of Public Switched Network Vulnerability Trends,
60
Recommendations,
63
References,
65
6
COMPETITION
67
Exchange Telephone Services,
67
Cellular Mobile Radio,
68
Customer-Premises Equipment,
70
Value-Added Networks,
71
Databases,
72
Cable Television,
73
Innovative Services,
74
Recommendations,
74
References,
78
7
CUSTOMER DEMAND
80
Basic Technological Assumptions About the Environment in the Year 2000,
80
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Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for the National Security Emergency Preparedness
User Needs,
81
National Security Emergency PreparednessImplications,
87
Recommendation,
87
References,
88
APPENDIXES
A. Statement of Task,
89
B. Issues in Digital Network Time and Frequency Synchronization,
91
GLOSSARY
117
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