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SECTION 4
THE ACQUISITION COST OF A UHF DBS-A SYSTEM-SERYICE
Estimating the financial and economic future is at least as difficult
and tentative an undertaking as predicting the future of technological
development and the listening interests of radio broadcasting audiences.
But it seems reasonable to predict that the cost of providing the services
described here, in the manner outlined, can be rationally estimated to
within a factor of 2X or so, and that is sufficiently instructive to serve
the purposes of this paper.
The Surf ace Segment
The potent) al market i s enormous. Several hundreds of mi l l i ons of
spacewave receivers eventually could be expected to be purchased to replace
those now in use to receive shortwave programs. Purchases also should be
induced not only by the increased reliability, quality, and clarity of
signal reception compared with today's shortwave services, but also by the
ability to listen to many more program channels broadcast by the governments
of countries all over the world, and perhaps by the prospect of listening to
commercial broadcasting--altogether, a global initial purchase market of
$10-billion.
Thus, were the communications industry to believe that deployment of one
or more space segments was in the offing, the industry could be expected
to meet the development, production, marketing, distribution, and sales
costs of the required new receivers. The purchase price of a Standard
Service spacewave receiver need be no more than a few tens of dollars, i.e.,
the retail price of today's handheld and kitchen table AM and FM receivers
The only novel features would be accurate and stable channel tuning, a
low-noise front end and a different looking small antenna. So, even though
the cost to produce, install, and use the surface segment of the overall
system would be greater than the space segment by at least an order of
magnitude, there would be good reasons to expect that its users would be
able to, and would, make such a large overall investment; that providing the
receivers would require little that would be novel to the communications
industry; and, indeed, that there would be a great economic incentive for
the industry to do so rapidly.
The Soace Seument
The present U.S. Federal Government Advanced Communications Technology
Satellite (ACTS) and its anticipated rural mobile, satellite-to-satellite
optical, surface-to-1 2-mile-high aerostat powered platform (HAPP), Milstar
and Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) R&D programs, and commercial DBS-TV
development programs, should inferentially underwrite the bulk of the basic
technological developments needed for space segment transmitters, switches,
and space power sources, and the exploration of the operational
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characteristics of dynamically programmable, multichannel, multibeam,
geostationary, UHF, SHE, and EHF transmitters.22
The U.S. civilian Space Station, inclusive of both lower orbit Orbital
Maneuvering Vehicles (OMV's) and higher, even encompassing geostationary
orbit (GEO), Reuseable Orbital Transfer Vehicles--ROTV's, the Hubble space
telescope, the Space Industries, Inc., "space factories," and the SD] R&D
programs (and, quite possibly a new surface-LEO booster, a geostationary
space "platform," and Lunar and/or Mars exploration programs)), in
conjunction with use of the Shuttle fleet, and European Space Agency
programs such as Columbus, would inferentially underwrite the development of
in-space infrastructure. This support would allow large and sophisticated
space structures to be assembled and tested in low-Earth-orbit (LEO), the
development of economical satellite servicing assets and operations, and
significant reduction in the unit cost of surface-to-LEO and surface-to-GEO
space transportation. The existence and use of such permanent,
sophisticated, in-space infrastructure, including technicians, will speed
the introduction of advanced space communications technology and lower its
unit costs generally by easing the conduct of in-space development programs
and allow for the repair and updating of operating in-space assets.
The assumption is made that four separate space segments would be
required to provide adequate surface coverage on a worldwide basis (two for
North, Central, and South America, and the eastern Pacific Ocean; two for
Europe, Africa and Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the western Pacific Ocean).
It is important to appreciate that this number would constitute a
quasi-production run of essentially identical spacecraft (although the
number of beams and their pointing directions would vary
satellite-to-satellite as would the pointing direction of the
satellite-to-satellite optical or millimeter wave program transfer circuits,
etc.~. This would allow significant production learning curve efficiencies
to be obtained and allow the total acquisition program engineering financial
costs to be spread over a multiple satellite procurement.
Another assumption is that the space segments would be designed and
constructed to be able to have their parts packed for surface-to-LEO
shipment aboard several Orbiters of the Shuttle fleet in a most compact and
efficient fashion so as to obtain the lowest price for the overall
shipment. Delivered to LEO over time, the parts would be off-loaded from
the Orbiters and temporarily stored on the Space Station. One-by-one they
22. See "Satellites and mobile phones: planning a marriage," Alex Hills,
IEEE Spectrum, pages 62-67; August, 1985. This article reviews NASA's
aspirations for an R&D program that would involve a large and
sophisticated space segment and small surface receivers to provide
two-way audio communications in low population density areas. The
space segment would have a large parabolic antenna, multiple spot
beams, a high DC power and would operate in the UHF spectrum region.
The receiver would have a low-noise front end and a modest antenna gain.
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would be assembled there by appropriate Space Station technicians, tested in
LEO, and then sent on their way outward to their intended final
geostationary orbital locations.23
Finally, each space segment might be able to take up its position on or
near a geostationary space focal point, or "platform," where they would
share basic services such as orbit adjustment engines, fuel, telemetry,
electrical power, basic stabilized structural framework, and visiting
maintenance crew quarters with other space platform occupants. Other such
occupants could be transceivers used for long-hau] trunk, mobile,
teleconferencing and DBS-TV communications; navigation and position-fixing
transceivers, increasingly sophisticated passive and active radiowave and
optical Earth-directed remote sensing instruments, and sophisticated
astronomy instruments. Whether or not this possibility occurs cannot be
clearly predicted now because NASA's geostationary space "platform"
aspirations are still in the study stage, not the commitment-to-develop
stage.
Within the context of these assumptions, a system's space segment would
cost roughly less than $200 million, as detailed below.
23. Perhaps it could go without saying that space-related economic
competitive drives in other countries as well as the U.S. could modify
such assumptions and lower the costs estimated here.
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Space Segment Cost Estimates--Major Components
Item
Cost
(mi1lions of U.S. dollars 1985)
.. Components
Antenna
DC powe r
Switch
Upper Stage
11 Busll
Power amplifiers, drivers, etc.
Insurance, per sate] ~ ite
Launch to LEO
4
~-
5.
In-orbit parts storage, assembly,
and test
Space segment surface feeder station
6. Surface signal monitoring network
TOTAL
20
30*
10
10
10*
20
10
40+
10
10
10
$180
* Both the cost of the DC power and the bus could be reduced by a factor of
2 or more for any DBS-A space segment that shared a geostationary space
"platform" with other space assets and services. For instance, a
geostationary DBS-A space segment would need a maximum of electrical
energy during the pre-workday AM hours and the post-workday PM hours,
while a long-haul trunk space segment needs the most electrical energy
during the work day.
+ The equivalent of half of a full shuttle flight at $80 million each.
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Each subsequent space segment would cost $160 million on this same
basis. Therefore, the total acquisition cost of the space segments of a
global system-service would be: $~80 + (3~$160) = 5660 million.
Considering both the judgements and approximations that had to be made in the
circuit power budget, expected learning curve savings, and the possible cost
savings that sharing geostationary services at space "platforms" would allow,
it seems reasonable to round off the total cost to 5500 million.
It should be reemphasized that the UHF space segment outlined here is a
truly sophisticated one that would challenge communications and space
engineers. While anticipated space-related technological developments offer
a clear promise that its operational and cost goals could be attained, a
relatively early regional system-service implementation could be initiated
with greater confidence with a less sophisticated space segment. If the
space segment antenna were scaled down from the 200-foot diameter suggested
to 60 feet, or a frequency in the upper UHF TV region employed rather than
the illustrative 2.5 GHz, then a system-service channel capacity reduction of
some BOX would ensue. This arrangement would still provide a very
respectable capacity for an initial service to be established within the next
decade; it would not present the technical challenge and risk posed by a
transmitter with lOX the antenna aperture area and lOX the number of
subtransmitters; and it would result in an initial financial cost estimate of
$30 to 50 million less for each satellite. Such a lower capacity initial
regional system-service could be acquired at a cost estimated to be $130 to
150 million, rather than the $~80 million estimated for a large capacity
system-service. An initial worldwide network of four such regional systems
for an estimated gross cost of $100 to 200 million less than that estimated
for the higher capacity system service.
Again, it should be noted that such early cost estimates, made before
detailed studies of service standards, system operating margins, overall
system-service sizing, actual development of sophisticated in-space antenna,
sub-transmitter and switch technology, and the actual installation and test
of in-space spacecraft assembly and service infrastructure (i.e., a civilian
Space Station), must be considered as preliminary and not accurate to more
than a factor of two.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
space segments
