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6 Workshop Session 5: Implementation Issues Original Equipment Manufacturers' Perspectives Session 5 focused on the issues affecting the implementation of commercial standards in defense procurement from the perspective of OEMs. ADOPTING COMMERCIAL MATERIALS AND PROCESSING STANDARDS IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AT GE AIRCRAFT ENGINES Robert Schafrik, of General Electric (GE) Aircraft Engines, spoke of the benefits of and barriers and challenges to implementing commercial specifications for DoD applications. He pointed out that since commercial technology is often available immediately, its use could significantly shorten overall system development time and thus give the military an advantage by allowing a needed system to be fielded quickly. The DoD emphasis on using commercial specifications requires a commercial minc3-set in which DoD relies to a greater extent on the commercial marketplace and their contractors' engineering capabilities. A direct implication is that only available technology can be specified, so performance may have to be traded off somewhat to realize cost and schedule targets. Commercial specifications are derived from experience, so their use allows DoD to leverage a wide application and experience base, further reducing its technology risk. A constraint to DoD use of commercial specifications is that DoD systems typically have an operational lifetime greater than 25 years, while commercial specifications typically are updated periodically, such as every 5 years. However, DoD cannot afford to employ niche materials and processes since the narrow application base will gentler this strategy increasingly costly. In those instances in which use of niche materials is essential to DoD, there may be a role for the Title III program to broaden the application base to the commercial uses. Many OEMs operate in the global marketplace, where the industry standard may be an international standarcl. There is a need for easier, quicker acceptance of international standards in DoD applications. In the past, DoD prepared and controlled military specifications. But the situation has now changed, since commercial stanciarcts are prepared and controlled by commercial entities. It is imperative that DoD, in the course of adopting commercial standards, not insist on complex modification to the commercial specification to address a special DoD requirement. Standard development organizations (SDOs) must support industries' need to reduce product development times. For example, the engine development cycle for GE 27

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28 Impact of Acquisition Reform or DoD Materials and Processes Specifications and Standards Aircraft Engines is currently 24 months, with a goal of 18 months. This rapid product development cycle is in contrast to the lengthy, multiyear times typically required to develop consensus N(]LSS. or. Schafrik issued the following challenge: Establish a goal to reduce NGS development time to 6 months (1 year maximum). He pointed out that an area of concern expressed by several engineers who had briefed the NRC/NMAB Committee on Aging of U. S . Air Force Aircraft (Aging of U. S. Air Force Aircraft. Final Report, NMAB-488-2, published by the National Academy Press in 1997) was that many acquisition programs, in the rush to comply with the intent of acquisition reform guidelines, did not include the needled MiTSpecs in their procurement packages, and no commercial specifications existed to take their place. For example, corrosion control plans were not required. The consequence was that maintenance personnel across the Services were handed a difficult, expensive task when the equipment was fielded; this result clearly was not the intent of acquisition reform. A better approach to institutionalizing commercial specifications within DoD is clearly necessary. Word-for-word conversion of military documents was a reasonable approach given the circumstances and timeline imposed on the DoD organizations by acquisition reform. But obviously, trading a rigid MiTSpec for a rigid! commercial specification falls short of achieving the potential advantages of commercial specifications. These converted documents are now coming due for revision during the normal SDO review cycle. The revisions wit1 probably generate a substantial workload for such organizations. Dr. Schafrik said he was concerned that they will be hard pressed to deal with this workload without improving productivity (e.g., increased use of e-maiTs and meetings conducted via the Internet) and striving to reduce the time for the revision process. GE Aircraft Engines has made good use of the single process initiative (SPI) block chances to simnlifv contract requirements and implement commercial technolo~v. However, review and approval of block changes is often lengthy, sometimes stretching beyond 1 year. Speeding up the approval (or disapproval) process couicl facilitate the introduction of commercial technology for DoD applications. Preparing and adopting commercial specifications truly represents a partnership between industry and the DoD; "we all sink or swim together." Contractors must understand and manage the contract cletaiTs to remove unnecessary requirements and support commercialization opportunities. Dr. Schafrik pointed out that, in the past, the DoD's Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program within the three Services was a leader in developing commercial specifications for new materials and processes. He also said that a current Air Force ManTech program, the Engine Supplier Base Initiative Casting Sector, was an excellent example of what could be achieved with industry working together uncler government oversight to clevelop specifications common for the entire industry sector. For instance, each OEM had developed nondestructive testing (NI)T) specifications basest on corporate best practices, requiring the investment casting suppliers to support a number of different NDT procedures, all aimed at achieving the same goal. As a result of the Engine Supplier Base Initiative, common NDT specifications were agreed to by the OEMs, reducing the cost and cycle time for NDT operations within the supply chain. Without the ManTech program, this change probably would not have happened since the impact to anv one program is not significant enough for the change to have been made.

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Workshop Session 5. Implementation Issues Original Equipment Manufacturers ~ Perspectives 29 As did other speakers, Dr. Schafrik noted that the attrition of experienced engineers owing to retirement, among other things, is a serious concern for which a preventative strategy is needecI. He thought that one benefit of companies sending people to SDO meetings was that less-experienced engineers could gain knowledge and perspective by participating with others who are active and experienced in the same technology area. BOEING IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMERCIAL SPECIFICATIONS Keith Porter, of the Boeing Company, spoke of five areas that are barriers to the implementation of commercial standards by industry. He stressed the need to reduce confusion associated with transition to commercial standards, and the need to maintain configuration control and technical integrity of products. First, notices canceling government specifications and standards are misinterpreted by industry as a technical supersession by NGSs. The DoD has stated that the actual intent of cancellation notices is to direct DoD (not industry personnel to the new standard for future contracts. Boeing has reacted with a policy (directed internally as well as externally to suppliers, customers, and subcontractors) that calls for using cancelled government specifications until Boeing Engineering has identified a suitable replacement. Replacement standards referenced by the cancellation notices may not be technically equivalent. Configuration management must be maintained. Boeing's ./ 1 0 0 _ selection of materials and processing specifications will, in all cases, be based on technical suitability and the business case. Existing contracts may require use of canceled government standards. These call-outs remain binding until contract modification is approved. There is a need to develop design allowables for commercial materials not currently used by the aerospace industry. Second, there are problems with conversion to NGSs. Industry has not been adequately informer! of the DoD's conversion plans. The Aerospace Industries Association EWPG has helped, but there are still awareness problems. A new feature in DoD's Acquisition Streamlining and Standardization Information System database is expected to help raise awareness sometime next year. Industry has SDO preferences bases! on subject matter. Not all SDOs are equal; some have more focus on users, some on manufacturers. Companies c30 not have the resources to support all SDOs. Non-word-for-word conversions are expensive and do not add value. Companies do not have the resources to review changes to all converted government standards at once. Thus, the burden of document maintenance is shifted to inclustry. Companies need to increase their support of SDOs. In adclition, some converted MiTSpecs have been inactivated, not canceled. The result is confusion and a proliferation of specifications (contrary to standardization). Third, the industry's transition to NGSs must be controlled and methoclical. Product design integrity must be maintained. Drawings and supersession lists must be updated. SPIs must be requested and approved. Decisions must be made about reprocurements. Fourth, a means of dealing with qualification and qualifier! products lists (QPLs) must be established. Many MilSpecs with QPLs are being converted to NGSs. The current situation is often very confusing. Mr. Porter showed an example of a MiTSpec

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30 Impact of Acquisition Reform on DoD Materials and Processes Specifications ant! Standards with a QPL that has been converted to an NGS. Over the course of about 3 years, many irregularities developed, including multiple QPLs for the same standard, multiple versions of the standard, and missing or conflicting pointers between documents. There is an urgent need for a qualification system adequate to support these converted standards. Mr. Porter stated that Boeing is looking toward industry-managed qualification to fill this void. Fifth, the use of NGSs increases cost to specification users. Military specifications are free. Users must purchase copies of NGSs. Large companies, such as Boeing, can mitigate these costs through negotiations with SDOs. There is a greater impact on small businesses and individuals. COMMERCIAL SPECIFICATIONS AT LOC~EED MARTIN: IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND A PROPOSED PLAN FOR NATIONAL STANDARDS Cecil Schneider, of Lockheec! Martin Aeronautics Company, focused on standards for composite materials fabrication. He spoke on the application of commercial specifications and a proposed plan for development of national standards for composites. The value of investing in standardization was emphasized. Lockheed Martin is almost completely using company specifications for composite materials (or tri-company specifications on the F-22 program). For test methods, commercial standards are used, and for design data, MIL-HDBK-17 is user! where data exist. A major problem with NGSs is timeliness. Industry does not have 4 or 5 years to build a consensus NGS set of materials specifications when developing a new product. Therefore, companies will continue to use company specifications. Lack of a suitable, approver! commercial specification when a program is initiated will always result in the use of company specifications. A plan was worked on in the early 1 990s for standardization of composite materials by an ad hoc committee and developed into the Aeronautics Materials and Manufacturing Technology Standarclization Plan. However, the plan has not been implemented owing to the lack of funding. Design allowables are required to conduct detailed (resign. One common specification for design allowable data is needed. The clevelopment of design aliowables data is time consuming and expensive and depends on multiple data sources such as material specification, process specification, test method, design and quality criteria, and analysis methods. Mr. Schneider presented an example of design-allowable data for the same material, which had been developed by four different programs and documented in over 25 specifications. Most of the data were not comparable. This is an extremely expensive and duplicative process compared with starting with a single common specification. Lack of standardization impedes the use of advanced materials on aircraft and other new applications. While commercial-grade materials demand has increased, no reinvestment capital is being generated. An integrated effort is neecled to focus both industry and government support and funding. Material specifications, test methods,

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PREPUBLICATION VERSION SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION used to detect behavior indicative of impending criminal or terrorist activities, although this raises concerns about profiling. 31 On the negative side, such analysis also enables invasions of personal privacy. The extent to which this occurs would depend heavily on the circumstances under which an individual can be compelled to present an ID, what information is retained, and which activities are tracked within the system (a topic explored above). Indeed, detecting a problem might only be possible in some instances through broad analysis. This would necessitate examining the behavior of many people who do not pose a riskmost human behavior involves law-abiding citizens pursuing Constitutionally protected activities in order to identify the few who do.24 24 For a discussion of some of the effects and implications of ubiquitous surveillance cameras, see the October 7, 2001, article by Jeffrey Rosen, "A Watchful State," New York Times Magazine.

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