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PART III
VOLUNTARY MEASURES IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
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Introduction
hapters 13-20 focus on the private sector and the use of new tools to
influence the behavior of corporations. The most prominent of these
new approaches, and the focus of seven of the eight chapters, are volun-
tary agreements undertaken either between firms and governments or among
firms without direct government participation. These voluntary agreements
take many forms, varying in who participates, how they are organized, and
what is expected of participants. Indeed, one contribution of the chapters in
this section is that they map the diverse terrain that falls under the general
heading of voluntary agreements, contrasting different forms with each other
and examining the relationship between voluntary measures and command-
and-control regulation.
We should note at the outset that the scope of our examination is focused on
the United States. Although several chapters draw on the experience of other
nations and Harrison reviews some Canadian programs similar to the most visible
U.S. programs, the majority of the discussion is based on the U.S. experience.
As we argue in Chapter 20, the time has come to develop more comparative
analyses of voluntary measures. But we limit our scope to the United States in
part because there is more research on U.S. initiatives than on those in any other
nation (though this is changing quickly) and because we hope that the analyses
presented here will be of value to those designing and evaluating voluntary
programs in the United States. In addition, because of the unusual legal and
policy context in the United States, particularly the major role of adversarial
processes in environmental policy, the relevance of other countries' experiences
to the U.S. case should not be taken for granted. A robust comparative literature
can provide useful guidance to policy, but until that literature emerges and this
215
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INTRODUCTION
issue of transferability across political systems is thought through, the U.S. expe-
rience provides the best guidance to the design of U.S. programs. The introduc-
tion of a comparative literature on voluntary agreements is beginning to appear
(tenBrink, 2002~.
Three themes emerge across the chapters that follow. One is the potential
for firms to "free-ride." A firm that does not participate in a voluntary program
when many of its peers in the same industry do might receive many of the public
relations and goodwill benefits of the program without the costs of reducing
environmental impact. Or a firm may sign on, but do little to change its behav-
ior. The problem of free-riders, or more generally the contrast between altruism
and narrowly self-interested behavior, is a central topic for the social sciences
and is frequently engaged in the analyses that follow. A second common theme
is that firms are embedded in networks of suppliers, customers, investors, and
competitors, and also embedded in the communities where they are located.
These networks are very consequential for a firm's decisions with regard to
environmental protection, as will be noted repeatedly in this section. The third
theme is that voluntary programs have indirect effects on organizational culture
and practices as well as more direct effects on targeted environmental impacts.
In the long term, these changes in firms may be even more important than short-
term reductions in environmental impact.
The section begins with a survey by Mazurek (Chapter 13) of the kinds of
voluntary agreements that have been brokered among individual firms, industry
associations and the U.S. federal government. She reviews what has been learned
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Green Lights, 33/50,
and Project XL programs. These are the largest voluntary programs in the United
States. Some suggest they are also among the most successful. They are cer-
tainly the most carefully examined. But as will be evident throughout this
section, careful research on who participates in voluntary agreements, why they
participate, what participants do, and what the overall effects are is just begin-
ning to emerge. There are more questions at this point than careful scholarship
to answer the questions.
Nash (Chapter 14) examines the causes and effects of voluntary codes of
environmental conduct that are established by networks and formal associations
of private firms. These include the American Chemistry Council's Responsible
Care initiative and related efforts by other parts of the chemical industry, as well
as programs by the National Paint and Coatings Association, the American
Petroleum Institute, the American Forest & Paper Association, and the American
Textile Manufacturers Association. Her analysis considers who adopts such
codes, how effective they have been, and what factors might enhance or retard
their impact.
Herb, Helms, and Jensen (Chapter 15) focus on another form of "new
tool" community "right-to-know" (RTK) policies. In the United States the
most important RTK effort is the Toxics Release Inventory, which requires man-
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VOLUNTARY MEASURES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
217
ufacturing plants to report to the federal government their environmental releas-
es of toxic chemicals. The EPA in turn, makes this information available to the
public. The TRI is not a voluntary program compliance is mandatory. But, as
Herb and colleagues argue, it can lead to changes in organizational behavior as a
part of increased awareness of the firms themselves, the public, and even the
investment community.
Harrison (Chapter 16) considers the problem of evaluating voluntary pro-
grams, drawing on both U.S. and Canadian examples. She notes that the first
assessments offered of programs may not adequately control for factors other
than the voluntary program that might have led to firms reducing their environ-
mental impact. Accurate assessment of programmatic impacts will require care-
ful thinking about the proper measures of program effects, about the appropriate
basis for comparison, and about the many factors that can influence corporate
environmental behavior. Fortunately, problems of evaluation methodology are
not unique to voluntary programs. A substantial and sophisticated literature on
program evaluation can provide guidance to future research on this topic.
As noted, voluntary codes are subject to the problem of free-riders and
require coordinated action among a network of actors. Furger (Chapter 17)
draws on the theories of collective action and networks as well as on case studies
to develop hypotheses regarding why firms might participate in voluntary codes.
He also argues that some aspects of voluntary agreements that have been subject
to criticism that they are too vague or generic and reduce accountability may
be features essential for their long-term effectiveness.
Prakash (Chapter 18) examines both external and internal factors that may
facilitate or retard effective participation in voluntary measures. The theory of
collective goods provides a basis for hypothesizing about the incentive structure
faced by firms. Prakash reminds us that whatever other motivations may weigh
in corporate decision making, profits and the balancing of economic costs and
benefits always will be important.
Randall (Chapter 19) adds to this discussion by considering the role of gov-
ernment that influences participation in voluntary measures. As rational actors,
firms will anticipate government actions, and voluntary measures may be adopt-
ed to avoid regulations that are perceived as more onerous. He reviews some
recent theoretical analyses that elucidate the effects that monitoring, enforce-
ment, and other factors can have on compliance with voluntary and regulatory
measures and offers some tentative conclusions.
In the final chapter of this section, Dietz (Chapter 20) extracts some themes
and lessons from the other chapters. It is clear that care must be taken in evalu-
ating voluntary measures and that sophisticated tools exist to aid in this task.
Understanding participation in voluntary measures will require an integrated ap-
proach to corporate behavior that takes account of strategic rational action, the
networks in which firms are embedded, and the multiple actors and concerns
involved in making organizational decisions. Finally, although this volume
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INTRODUCTION
focuses on the United States, it is clear that further work must become increas-
ingly comparative both because such comparisons facilitate understanding of
voluntary measures within the United States and because corporate action and
voluntary measures are increasingly global in scope.
Voluntary measures are seen by many as an exciting new approach to envi-
ronmental policy. The chapters that follow review the best research available on
voluntary measures. To some who support voluntary measures, these chapters
may be sobering. The experiments to date may not have accomplished as much
as is sometimes claimed. But there is a hopeful message that is even more
important. Both practical experience and theory provide a much broader reper-
toire of ideas for designing environmental policy than was the case a decade ago.
Furthermore, the chapters in this section demonstrate that a community of re-
searchers is emerging who are providing the scientific basis for understanding
voluntary policies so that new initiatives can build on both practical experience
and rigorous analysis.
REFERENCE
tenBrink, P.
2002 Voluntary Environmental Agreement: Process, Practice, and Future Use. Shefield,
Eng.: Greenleaf Publishing.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
voluntary agreements
