13
Essential Partners in a National Strategy: States and Cities, Industry, and Universities

The federal government must take the lead in the national counterterrorism effort, but effective use of existing technologies, research and development activities, and deployment of new approaches to mitigating the nation’s vulnerabilities will depend critically on close cooperation with other entities. This chapter briefly addresses some of the key issues in the federal government’s relationships with the cities and states, private industry, and the universities.

STATES AND CITIES

The immediate effects of terrorist attacks are felt at the local level, so state, county, and municipal governments will be the first responders and must manage the immediate crisis and longer-term recovery. Thus much of the financial burden for preparing for attacks falls to these regional institutions. If the federal government is to provide much of the information and technologies they require, a more collaborative relationship between federal agencies and local and state governments will be needed. For example, first responders organized at the local level will be the customers for some of the technologies developed and deployed through the nation’s counterterrorist efforts.

Only a few federal agencies are experienced at working with state and local governments, but their knowledge and experience can be leveraged as part of the solution. FEMA, which has been assigned a lead role in coordinating the federal government’s interactions with first responders all over the country,1 has a preex-

1  

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2002. Statement of Bruce Baughman, Office of National Preparedness, FEMA, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, U.S. House of Representatives, April 11. Available online at <http://www.fema.gov/library/baughman041102.htm>.



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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism 13 Essential Partners in a National Strategy: States and Cities, Industry, and Universities The federal government must take the lead in the national counterterrorism effort, but effective use of existing technologies, research and development activities, and deployment of new approaches to mitigating the nation’s vulnerabilities will depend critically on close cooperation with other entities. This chapter briefly addresses some of the key issues in the federal government’s relationships with the cities and states, private industry, and the universities. STATES AND CITIES The immediate effects of terrorist attacks are felt at the local level, so state, county, and municipal governments will be the first responders and must manage the immediate crisis and longer-term recovery. Thus much of the financial burden for preparing for attacks falls to these regional institutions. If the federal government is to provide much of the information and technologies they require, a more collaborative relationship between federal agencies and local and state governments will be needed. For example, first responders organized at the local level will be the customers for some of the technologies developed and deployed through the nation’s counterterrorist efforts. Only a few federal agencies are experienced at working with state and local governments, but their knowledge and experience can be leveraged as part of the solution. FEMA, which has been assigned a lead role in coordinating the federal government’s interactions with first responders all over the country,1 has a preex- 1   Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2002. Statement of Bruce Baughman, Office of National Preparedness, FEMA, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, U.S. House of Representatives, April 11. Available online at <http://www.fema.gov/library/baughman041102.htm>.

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism isting relationship with many of these groups in the context of disaster response efforts. The Department of Transportation undertakes many programs in conjunction with state and local transportation agencies, and it would be sensible to broaden these relationships to encompass homeland security work in the transportation field. However most agencies are not prepared to accommodate the wide variety of fairly distinct requirements the states and cities will have in technology-based preparations for terrorist incidents.2 This problem is often exacerbated by perceived conflicts between the interests of the cities and those of the states, and the difficulties inherent in overlapping jurisdictions.3 A great deal more work must be undertaken to bring cities, counties, and states into effective partnership in the federal government’s counterterrorism efforts. It is a federal responsibility to contribute to the research and development work necessary to enable new counterterrorism technologies to be tested and relevant standards to be set. However, local governments must be involved from the very beginning, so that the design of standards and the development of procedures are informed by the experience and insight of the first responders. Cooperation and coordination will be needed at the state and local levels to facilitate participation in the federal programs and to allow the results of these programs to be effectively disseminated and utilized. Many relevant counterterrorism standards and protocols (such as decontamination guidelines for anthrax) are yet to be determined, and professional associations (e.g., the National Fire Protection Association) and associations for state or local governments (e.g., the U.S. Conference of Mayors) must be identified and engaged so that productive interaction between federal agencies and front-line users can proceed.4 As potential standards and protocols are developed, they will have to be tested in pilot programs in various municipalities and the results shared nationwide. In addition to effectively utilizing the results of federal programs, it will be important for states to support their own programs, guided by information from the federal level. Some states have offices that allocate state resources to re- 2   OMB’s Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2001, includes agency-by-agency discussions (in Part 5) on coordination. Most of them center on how an individual agency coordinates with other federal agencies. However, some agency discussions—such as those for FEMA, HHS, DOE, and EPA—do mention state coordination efforts as well. There is no systematic treatment, however, on how federal R&D for counterterrorism—as managed overall—is coordinated with any state-level R&D. Governor Tom Ridge, the current Director of the Office of Homeland Security, has stated that he is responsible for a national strategy to combat terrorism, meaning it is one that embraces all levels of government as well as the private sector. 3   In addition to city and state governments, county-level institutions (such as sheriff’s departments) and special-purpose authorities (such as port authorities handling air and sea facilities) also may have responsibilities for emergency preparation and response. 4   For example, the federal government has worked effectively with national police associations on standards for bulletproof vests.

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism search and other science and technology activities, while in other states it is not clear who within the state has responsibility and authority for initiating research and development activities to meet specific needs. Representatives of state research and development programs have to be identified and brought into relationships with the federal government through institutional arrangements such as those of the Technical Support Working Group. Recommendation 13.1: The OSTP intergovernmental panel for coordination of S&T by the federal and state governments should be charged with developing effective federal-state linkages for the exchange of information to support the funding, performance, and evaluation of S&T related to counterterrorism. INDUSTRY The nation has reassessed its overall vulnerability to terrorism since the events of 9/11, but the nature of the risk to any single company or even industry is very difficult to predict, much less quantify. Yet the private sector is where much of the activity to increase national preparedness against terrorism must occur. Companies will be the developers of new security technologies and, because they own and operate many of the potential targets within the critical infrastructures, will also be among the users and beneficiaries of new approaches and products. Companies make a considerable investment in research and development activities (industry financed two-thirds of such activities in the United States in 2000). For the United States to take advantage of the significant scientific and technical expertise residing in the private sector, and to overcome the market disincentive for single firms to invest in improving their security, the federal government must explore creative and flexible ways to motivate industry to develop and adopt counterterrorism technologies. For the government and private sector to work together on increasing homeland security, effective public–private partnerships and cooperative projects must occur. There are many models for government–industry collaboration—cooperative research and development agreements, the NIST Advanced Technology Program, and the Small Business Innovative Research program, to cite a few. And a more expansive patent policy, as in the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, is critical in providing private sector incentives. Other ways to encourage industry’s participation in the drive to protect the nation from terrorism include mandating involvement through federal regulation, providing government subsidies or tax relief, and exploiting insurance markets. Codes and standards promulgated through various professional organizations or through local regulations, perhaps in close cooperation with federal agencies such as NIST, may also encourage the implementation of technologies that can enhance public protection. Overall, a new pattern of public-private partnership—

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism with a more sophisticated and balanced use of incentives, regulatory coercion, and voluntary agreement—is needed. Recommendation 13.2: To maximize industry involvement in research on counterterrorism technologies and in their deployment, broad government– industry dialogue on a variety of topics is needed. These include counterterrorism research agendas, implementation of technologies, antitrust exemptions, indemnification, the role of regulation and subsidies, government procurement and acquisition rules, dual-use technologies, codes and standards, and policies related to insurance. The purpose of the dialogue is to inform law, regulation, and the federal research strategy, and OHS should identify for each industrial sector a suitable forum for this dialogue. Effective government–industry communication in a number of sectors will be vital for responding to the vulnerabilities and developing the solutions identified earlier in this report. For example, the pharmaceutical industry will be a critical component of the national strategy to protect against bioterrorism, the IT industry will be a key player in any plan to improve cybersecurity, and the energy industry could be a significant beneficiary of new technologies. An example of how government–industry dialogue and cooperation can bring significant benefits to both groups and to the public can be seen in the Health Effects Institute, a successful co-funded partnership between the EPA and industry. Before implementing new approaches, the federal government must understand how incentives and regulations might drive behavior and consider how changes in laws might affect international competitiveness. In some sectors, private investment in counterterrorism technologies may actually provide a competitive advantage. The committee did not have the opportunity or the expertise to fully explore the myriad options for government policy in these areas, but it briefly discusses below some relevant issues in four areas: commercial value for counterterrorism technologies, indemnification from legal risks, select antitrust exemptions, and government procurement and acquisition rules. Commercial Value for Counterterrorism Technologies Most firms are highly competitive and operate with narrow profit margins; they are understandably reluctant to make major investments against unknown risks if their competitors are not doing the same. Trying to compel industry to reduce its vulnerabilities to catastrophic terrorism through massive subsidies or draconian regulations is neither an efficient nor a politically viable approach. A more effective approach is to give the private sector the widest possible latitude for innovation and, where appropriate, to design R&D strategies in which commercial uses and security uses of technologies rest on a common base of investment. Companies then have the potential to address vulnerabilities while increasing the robustness of public and private infrastructures against unintended

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism and natural failures, improving the reliability of systems and quality of services, and, in some cases, increasing productivity. In the military, this approach is called a dual-use strategy, and it will be essential to increasing capability rapidly and moving toward technologies that will ultimately be affordable to implement. Opportunities for dual-use solutions may not be as rare as one might suppose. For example: Technology developed to protect and monitor the food supply against intentional contamination by terrorists may also be useful for improving our ability to catch and respond to unintentional contamination caused by bacteria, spoilage, or processing errors. Sensor and filtering technologies designed to protect buildings against chemical attack will be useful in monitoring building ventilation systems for other types of pollution and for improving indoor air quality, and may also allow more efficient control of these systems. Techniques to detect biological infections prior to clinical symptoms would help slow outbreaks of all infectious diseases, not just those introduced into the population maliciously. A security system concept for shipping containers whereby shippers certified as having secure loading facilities are granted faster passage through key megaports has a variety of possible collateral benefits, including a decline in the use of containers for the movement of contraband and an increase in the overall efficiency of the shipping system. Improved security architecture and cryptography that can protect SCADA systems and other critical infrastructures, such as telecommunication systems, would enhance commercial security (i.e., reduce cybercrime) and help protect privacy. More robust network architectures could increase the reliability of important systems. Technologies already developed for responding to natural hazards (e.g., earthquake, flood, hurricane, wind, and fire) could be adopted for homeland security and counterterrorism efforts. Low-cost electronic accelerators developed as sources of radiation for detection of nuclear or explosive materials could also be used to replace intense radioactivity sources currently used in commerce and medicine. Biometric identification technologies could be useful for commercial security, and authentication methods could facilitate e-commerce. Homeland security is a national concern, but it does not necessarily represent a large business opportunity. The size of the market for counterterrorism technologies is ill defined, and the identity of customers is unclear. Unlike in the defense industry, the federal government is not the sole, or even primary, customer; potential users include private companies, first responders at the state and local levels, and a large variety of federal government agencies. The broader the

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism potential applications and benefits of new technologies, the greater the likelihood that the market will support their production and reward their developers. Indemnification In many cases, up-front cost may not be the only factor holding industry back from investing in counterterrorism-related areas. Firms may also be unwilling to undertake certain efforts unless they are indemnified against the considerable risks involved. A prime example is the research, development, manufacture, and distribution of new pharmaceuticals to be used against biological agents. These activities contain many risks, and indemnification provisions may be necessary to overcome what are otherwise seen as formidable obstacles. The development and distribution of vaccines needed to protect against diseases that no longer exist (or are unlikely to occur naturally), such as smallpox, is a particularly well-documented example. (This problem of orphan vaccine development is discussed in Chapter 3.) Similar concerns have been raised in the context of secure transportation systems for cargo. Intermodal cooperation all along the logistics chain is needed, but many participants would probably opt out if their participation would expose them to substantial liability in the event of system failure. Another area where liability is a potential issue is in vulnerability analysis. To make decisions based on the relative likelihood of various terrorist events, the government must understand where weaknesses lie in private-sector systems and products. But, absent some form of indemnification, many firms will be reluctant, for legal reasons, to share with government their proprietary knowledge of their own vulnerabilities. Antitrust Exemptions It is possible that current antitrust regulations could inhibit the necessary development of counterterrorism technologies. For example, it might be in the nation’s interest to allow all the firms in an industry (such as electricity generation or chemical manufacturing) to confer on how they might most economically make modifications so that the critical and often interoperable infrastructure they operate can be protected. Unless the companies are able to share this information, it could be difficult for the industry to reach agreement with government on public and private investment in appropriate research and development and work on needed standards. Thus, supervised antitrust exceptions may be needed in a variety of industries. Government has passed limited antitrust exemptions before—e.g., in the energy crises of the 1970s. And bills are currently being considered to provide similar exemptions to support work on critical infrastructure protection and to

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism support the development of new vaccines. In the former area, the exemption is for “gathering and analyzing critical infrastructure information in order to better understand security problems related to critical infrastructure and protected systems, and interdependencies of critical infrastructure and protected systems, so as to ensure the availability, integrity, and reliability of critical infrastructure and protected systems.”5 In the biotechnology area, the objective is to facilitate cooperation on precompetitive research to support the development of new vaccines for combating various bioterrorist threats.6 Government Procurement and Acquisition Rules Some of the disincentives for private investment have their origin in the government’s own acquisition rules and regulations, which are not designed to provide the speed of procurement or the flexibility that will be needed for development and continuous improvement of counterterrorism technologies. The required procedures are time-consuming, and the bureaucracy is daunting, especially for small companies (where much of the nation’s innovation occurs). The grants selection process in use at many agencies presents similar issues: The applications take months to solicit, write, and process, and the overall portfolio tends to emphasize low-risk proposals. This situation particularly discourages researchers in dynamic fields like biotechnology. A study should be conducted, in collaboration with Congress, on whether and how these regulations might be streamlined when the high-priority needs of counterterrorism conflict with them. OSTP, through PCAST, might explore this issue and determine how such a study might be conducted. Prior reports have also recognized how daunting the government’s acquisition process can be, and they have suggested that it might be appropriate for procurement to be simplified when in pursuit of urgent national goals.7 The committee notes that while improving the ability of the government to access the best research and technology available in the private sector (and at universities) is very important, so too is enabling agencies to make good deci- 5   The Critical Infrastructure Information Security Act of 2001 (S. 1456). This act defines “critical infrastructure” broadly to include essential physical and cyberbased systems and services, including telecommunications (voice and data transmission and Internet), electrical power, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply, and emergency services (including medical, fire, and police services). 6   The Tauzin bill, Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act of 2001, H.R. 3448, at Section 401. 7   The Hart-Rudman Commission (2001) (at xiii) recommended reforms to security-related procurements, including: “Establish and employ a two-track acquisition system, one for major acquisitions and a ‘fast track’ for a modest number of potential breakthrough systems, especially those in the area of command and control.”

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism sions about what to acquire. It is vital that they be well positioned to utilize tools, like testbeds and standards, that allow the evaluation of research results and new products. The ultimate goal, after all, is acquiring and deploying effective technologies for countering terrorism.8 UNIVERSITIES Terrorism will be a threat to U.S. security for the foreseeable future, and as defenses improve, terrorists’ abilities to circumvent them will also improve. It is essential that we balance the short-term investments in technology intended to solve problems that are defined today with a longer-term program in fundamental science designed to lay foundations for future threats that we cannot presently define. These long-term programs require the engagement of the nation’s research universities. In addition to providing a locus for creative research, universities also play a unique role in support of counterterrorism by educating and training students who will become the next generation of informed and engaged citizens, scholars in all disciplines, and professionals and leaders in all fields (including, of course, science and engineering) who will help us face the tremendous challenge of making the nation safer. Universities can also be a source of local expertise and are often well placed to bridge the gap between federal programs and the needs of state and city governments. State university systems in particular are an important asset for the nation, and with only a modest amount of additional faculty training, these universities could serve as a source of advice and assistance in emergency-response situations (e.g., labs to provide analytical capabilities in a biological or chemical attack, or technical support and forensics in a cyberattack). Thus, both in the application of existing ideas and the discovery of new ones, the government will need to strengthen its partnership with the nation’s research universities. Yet there are a cluster of challenges confronting universities, from a declining number of students in the sciences and engineering to the tension between openness and national security on sensitive research topics, that could prove obstructive. Below, the committee discusses some areas in which the universities have essential contributions to make to counterterrorism efforts and outlines some of the more critical challenges to their ability to make those contributions. 8   For example, when introducing a bill that included FAA exemption from certain procurement regulations, Senator McCain said, “Although we acknowledge that procurement reform is important, even essential, that alone does not do enough. Without changing the basic mission and structure of the organization, procurement reform would merely be a way of allowing an agency to make bad purchasing decisions even faster.” (Statements of Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions (Senate, September 13, 1995), at 2.)

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism Examples of Critical Long-Term Research Needs The delay between basic discoveries in science and their transformation into working technologies relevant to national security can be many years.9 However, the current technological strength of the United States is based on past investment and successes in research, and continued flexible and creative programs in fundamental science and engineering disciplines can not only create new technical solutions, but also provide new ways to use existing technologies. Below is a list of examples of areas in which basic research can be expected to produce results with far-reaching implications for counterterrorism efforts. While these examples include problems that may not be soluble within 5 or 10 years, the set is representative of the type of fundamental challenges that are facing researchers today. Understanding the mechanisms of human pathogenesis, response, and healing. The four classes of weapons of greatest concern in counterterrorism are nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological. To the extent that we can blunt the injuries caused by these weapons, we help to limit the impact of terrorism. All four produce pathologies that we understand incompletely or not at all. In addition, new weapons (e.g., new types of pathogens, new ways of using chemical to cause harm, electromagnetic weapons) may be designed by terrorists in the future and could pose yet more complicated problems. If we can understand the fundamental mechanisms of human pathology, self-defense, and self-repair, we will be in a much stronger position to respond quickly and effectively to new threats. (See Chapter 3.) Sensors networks. A great deal of research on sensor technologies is already under way. However, for research in this area to be useful—that is, for it to provide results that eventually lead to products that can be deployed for counterterrorism and other applications—the selection of sensor capabilities must be informed by systems research on the building of effective sensor networks. Work in this area will require a better understanding of the performance characteristics of individual sensors in real-world environments, of how groups of sensors or different types of sensors can complement each other, and of how outputs from sensors can be productively analyzed to provide information to users. Once the criteria for sensor performance are in hand, many fields, including chemistry, biology, physics, computer science, and electrical engineering, can contribute to the development of more effective sensor networks. Researchers in basic science have some unique opportunities here; for example, increased understanding of the superior olfactory capability of some animals could be used to improve the capabilities of manufactured sensors. (See Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 11.) 9   Quantum mechanics was formulated in 1925; radar and the atom bomb were developed 15 and 20 years later.

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism Extraction of understanding from large quantities of data. Intelligence gathering often depends on tracking very large numbers of people and very large flows of information (financial transfers, movements of people and goods) and searching for small cues suggesting hostile activities. A range of methods exists for collecting different types of information, but the ability to cross-reference or compare the different types and the ability to find the tiny amount of relevant information in this flood of data is still quite limited. The ability to use very large databases that will collect information over time and look for unexpected patterns (changes in behavior of individuals, formation of groups, patterns of training or purchasing) is an application of the broad subject of understanding and manipulating heterogeneous datasets. The fusion of applied mathematics and information technology required to build competence in this area will be immensely useful in intelligence and in a broad range of other areas. (See Chapters 5 and 11.) Human behavior and system design. The response of people to terrorist attacks is not well understood. Particularly useful would be a better understanding of how people react during and soon after an attack so that planning can be done on how to communicate warnings and other instructions during crises. Behavioral research is also needed so that appropriate, informed decisions about deployment of new counterterrorism technologies can be made. Whether a security system will be effective depends on how the system is used, by whom, and for what ends. If the primary purpose is deterrence, the needed technical capabilities of the system are different than if it is for warning of potential attacks or for controlling access to an area. The background of users could also vary widely (e.g., border security guards, first responders, or decontamination specialists), so user interfaces must also be based on the best human factors research. (See Chapters 9 and 11.) Understanding complex, adaptive systems. Our ability to predict and evaluate threats and vulnerabilities is often based largely on human intuition, and humans are limited in the amount of information that they can absorb and in their ability to deal with complex, highly nonlinear systems. New ways of understanding and modeling complex systems would have broad application in counterterrorism (including for intelligence gathering, cybersecurity, modeling the spread of diseases or contaminants, strengthening the energy system, and for defense applications) and in many other areas. Research in systems analysis and systems engineering, and new educational programs in these areas, are needed. (See Chapters 10 and 11.) Intelligent, adaptive power grid. The electrical supply system is a vital infrastructure vulnerable to cascading failures if important components of the power grid are damaged or destroyed. An intelligent, adaptive power grid would reduce vulnerability by providing the system with the ability to fail gracefully, which would help minimize damage to components and enable more rapid recovery of power. However, a deeper understanding of the failure mechanisms of the

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism grid are needed, and a wide array of new technologies would have to be developed before the power grid can be made more resilient. Many fields of science and engineering would have a role to play in building operations models and intelligence that could differentiate between a single component failure and concurrent or closely coupled serial failures and in developing systems for adaptive islanding, in which fast-acting sensors and controls are used to isolate parts of the grid. (See Chapter 6.) Replacing humans in hazardous situations. Robotics is a field where progress has been steady, but the ambitious goal of developing replacements for humans seems as far away now as it did 20 years ago. The understanding of biological systems is now affording some exceptionally interesting opportunities to mimic biological systems; imaginative concepts (linked “swarms” or “families” of robots or unmanned systems) suggest new ways to think about the potential and performance of highly versatile, nonliving systems. Success in this area would lead to assistants or replacements for humans in the hazardous circumstances that will be encountered in dealing with terrorism. (See Chapter 11.) Reliable computer code and secure computer systems. Buggy code underlies many reliability problems and computer security problems. No attempt to secure systems and networks can succeed if it does not take into account this basic fact. Dealing with buggy code is arguably the oldest unsolved problem in computer science, and there is no particular reason to think that it can be solved now by any sort of crash project. Two areas of research seem to be particularly important in a security context: security-oriented tools for system development and trustworthy system upgrades and bug patches. But a fundamental approach to computer security requires that new architectures and tools for their implementation that are provably secure must be the long-term basic research goal. (See Chapter 5.) In all of these areas, the immense basic research capability that resides in the nation’s universities will play a key role in advancing our understanding in critical disciplines. The committee does not suggest that these examples are the only or the most valuable contributions that a vital, decentralized, innovative research enterprise can make. This list is offered simply as a demonstration that the research communities involved in these and similar efforts have critical contributions to make in laying the groundwork for improvements in homeland security. In order that research programs may increase the pace of discovery and the effectiveness of new counterterrorism technologies, relevant communities will require information about what kinds of new capabilities would be of most value to the nation and support for performing the necessary fundamental research.

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism The Need to Sustain the Nation’s Scientific and Engineering Talent Base Realizing S&T’s potential for combating terrorism will require, among other things, sufficient numbers of talented men and women to pursue the necessary education and research. The Science and Engineering Indicators 2002 report10 documents a variety of factors that contribute to the declining U.S. ability to maintain a strong workforce in science and engineering. For example, the United States ranks 14th in the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded in the natural sciences and engineering (normalized by the number of 24-year-olds in each country). In 1975, the United States was in the top three. This decline in the supply of scientists and engineers is reflected in a growing dependence on noncitizens to fill many spaces in American graduate schools; since 1980 the percentage of doctoral degrees in the natural sciences and engineering awarded to noncitizens has increased dramatically. Meanwhile, the number of such doctorates being granted in Europe and Asia is growing rapidly. While some noncitizens remain in the United States, some return to their countries of origin, and U.S. industry is experiencing a shortage of qualified technical workers in certain key areas. Companies have been moving their production facilities offshore for a number of years, and industry research and development centers have begun to follow. Such a shift not only may affect the nation’s economic security but also may interfere with its ability to develop and produce critical technologies necessary for a long-term counterterrorism agenda. Expanding the number of American scientists and engineers is particularly important in light of the current uncertainty about the status of foreign students. If efforts to limit the number of potential terrorists in the United States result in severe immigration restrictions, the recruiting of foreign-trained scientists and engineers for graduate-student and other research positions might slow to a trickle, and an even more severe shortage of scientists and engineers in this country can be expected. In the 1950s, when militarily challenged by the Soviet Union, the United States enacted the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) to increase the availability of people trained in science, technology, foreign languages, and other key areas.11 Today, our nation is again facing a complex threat and will again need to draw upon a cadre of scientists and engineers to defend itself. Thus it is time to provide additional incentives and new science and engineering educational programs. 10   Available online at <http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/start.htm>. 11   The National Defense Education Act of 1958 was a direct result of the launch of Sputnik and the perceived increase in risk it implied for national security. NDEA provided support, from the late 1950s throughout the 1970s, for large numbers of students who became scientists and engineers. One result was that the number of Ph.D.’s awarded annually by U.S. colleges and universities rose from 8,600 in 1957 to 34,000 in 1973.

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism Recommendation 13.3: The committee is convinced that a human resource development program aimed at producing a sustained increase in baccalaureate and doctoral degrees granted in fields consistent with the government’s long-term priorities for homeland security research is needed. One factor that is affecting the supply of new scientists and engineers is the cost of education in this country—in some other countries, education is fully subsidized, while in the United States most students leave school with a considerable burden of debt. An effective human resource development program might use fellowships, forgivable loans, and opportunities for postdegree employment to allow talented students to embark on science and engineering careers unencumbered by heavy debt loads. This program should have clearly defined goals, expected outcomes, and accountability. One agency that might design and lead the program is NSF, and relevant fields would include all science and engineering disciplines and some areas of social sciences and humanities.12 This program, a call to young people by the government, would be consistent with the President’s national initiative emphasizing public service. It has the potential to draw on talented young people from all sectors of society, including elements of the population that have not participated in these fields in the past. Investing in Research in a Variety of Disciplines Since the mid-1990s, physical sciences and engineering have mostly been funded at levels equal to the rate of inflation or only slightly above it.13 The cumulative effect of years of relatively low investment is that the research base on which to build new science and technology initiatives of the kind discussed in this report is less than optimal. The current congressional embrace of the idea of providing significant increases to the NSF budget over the next few years is encouraging.14 However, to do justice to the various counterterrorism programs 12   In addition to providing human resources needed for S&T counterterrorism research and development, such a program could also increase the expertise available for other government counterterrorism activities (for example, the program could support students specializing in languages needed by intelligence communities). 13   Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy, National Research Council, 2001, Trends in Federal Support of Research and Graduate Education, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.; Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, 2001, Observations on the President’s Fiscal Year 2002 Federal Science and Technology Budget, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.; American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2001, AAAS Report XXVI: Research and Development FY 2002, Washington, D.C.; and American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2002, Congressional Action on Research and Development in the FY 2002 Budget, Washington, D.C. 14   See “House Science Subcommittee Hearing on NSF Doubling Bill,” FYI: The AIP Bulletin of Science Policy News, No. 60 (May 15, 2002). Available online at <http://www.aip.org/enews/fyi/2002/060.html>.

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism that are required, adequate and sustained support is urgently needed for the multiple agencies that provide fundamental knowledge on which emerging technologies will be based. Balancing the Needs of National Security with the Requirements for Productive and Creative Research An expanded concept of national security (i.e., the shift from confronting military forces overseas to protecting the homeland from terrorists), together with an expanded role for S&T in addressing ways to counter terrorism, raises some very difficult issues for the nation’s research enterprise. They need to be resolved before the nation can realize the contributions of S&T described in this report. In particular, because much of the research performed at universities will be essential for protecting the nation, there will be increasing pressure to keep critical knowledge out of the hands of people who might aid (or actually become) terrorists. In this environment, the federal government has already begun to express deep concerns about whether terrorists can take advantage of the open and international discussion of projects and results that characterizes university research. Scientists, on the other hand, worry that constraints on the free exchange of ideas may slow progress or even close down some fruitful areas of investigation altogether. This conflict between science and security is a difficult issue. More can be found on the topic in a recent Congressional Research Service report.15 This conflict always arises in wartime (including the Cold War), and universities and government have continually struggled to walk a fine line between protecting the nation’s security while also retaining the ability to conduct the free and open exchanges necessary to make rapid and creative scientific progress. Successful resolution of this conflict depends on careful analysis of exactly what information must be protected and what constraints least impair the universities’ effectiveness. Increased interaction between the government agencies responsible for security and the scientific community in universities and industry will enable the United States to come up with new and creative ways to defend itself and to outthink and outpace its enemies. The government should not place restrictions on research—such as limits on who performs research or who gets to share in the created knowledge—without first engaging in a thoughtful process that includes consultation with the universities and solid, case-by-case study of the risks vs. the benefits of open scientific investigation.16 15   Knezo, Genevieve J. 2002. Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Actions on Research, Development, and Higher Education, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., April 8. Available online at <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31354.pdf>. 16   The government should also consider alternative research models to allow university researchers to perform research with national security implications. Faculty (and possibly students) could per-

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Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism Recommendation 13.4: OSTP, in collaboration with the OHS and other federal security authorities, should initiate immediately a dialogue between federal and state government and the research universities on the balance between protecting information vital to national security and the free and open way in which research is most efficiently and creatively accomplished. This dialogue should take place before enactment of major policy changes affecting universities as research and educational institutions. Based on this interaction and on an understanding of the risks and rewards of conducting key scientific and technological research in an open environment, OSTP—in cooperation with OHS and other security agencies—should work out principles on which specific policies, both for government and the universities, can be based. REFERENCES Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information. 2002. In the Public Interest, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., June 12. Knezo, Genevieve J. 2002. Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Actions on Research, Development, and Higher Education, Congressional Research Service, April 8. Available online at <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31354.pdf>. Office of Management and Budget. 2001. Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, August. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/nsd_annual_report2001.pdf>. National Science Board, National Science Foundation. 2002. Science and Engineering Indicators—2002, Volume 1, NSB-02-1, Arlington, Va., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Available online at <http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/start.htm>. National Science Board, National Science Foundation. 2002. Science and Engineering Indicators—2002, Volume 2, NSB-02-2, Arlington, Va., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Available online at <http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/start.htm>. U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission, Phase III). 2001. Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15.     form such work at affiliated institutions, such as private laboratories or hospitals (e.g., MIT faculty could work at Lincoln Laboratory or Draper Laboratory; see MIT report In the Public Interest [Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information, 2002], p. iv). Academic scientists could also form collaborations with researchers in national laboratories, not-for-profit institutions, or industrial laboratories in order to contribute to classified projects without involving students.