Recommendation 13.4: OSTP, in collaboration with the OHS and other federal security authorities, should initiate immediately a dialogue between federal and state government and the research universities on the balance between protecting information vital to national security and the free and open way in which research is most efficiently and creatively accomplished. This dialogue should take place before enactment of major policy changes affecting universities as research and educational institutions.
Based on this interaction and on an understanding of the risks and rewards of conducting key scientific and technological research in an open environment, OSTP—in cooperation with OHS and other security agencies—should work out principles on which specific policies, both for government and the universities, can be based.
Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information. 2002. In the Public Interest, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., June 12.
Knezo, Genevieve J. 2002. Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Actions on Research, Development, and Higher Education, Congressional Research Service, April 8. Available online at <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31354.pdf>.
Office of Management and Budget. 2001. Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, August. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/nsd_annual_report2001.pdf>.
National Science Board, National Science Foundation. 2002. Science and Engineering Indicators—2002, Volume 1, NSB-02-1, Arlington, Va., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Available online at <http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/start.htm>.
National Science Board, National Science Foundation. 2002. Science and Engineering Indicators—2002, Volume 2, NSB-02-2, Arlington, Va., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Available online at <http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/start.htm>.
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission, Phase III). 2001. Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15.
form such work at affiliated institutions, such as private laboratories or hospitals (e.g., MIT faculty could work at Lincoln Laboratory or Draper Laboratory; see MIT report In the Public Interest [Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information, 2002], p. iv). Academic scientists could also form collaborations with researchers in national laboratories, not-for-profit institutions, or industrial laboratories in order to contribute to classified projects without involving students.