this visit and his interactions with this student also became a matter of investigation.

THE 1998 DOE POLYGRAPH

The FBI investigations into Wen Ho Lee’s foreign contacts and activities began again in earnest in 1995 and culminated in a polygraph administered on December 23, 1998, by Wackenhut Security, contractors for DOE in Albuquerque, following an extensive interview of Lee by the FBI and DOE investigators. In the pretest interview, Lee made a “significant disclose” (p. 631), the details of which have been withheld in the released report. Both Lee (2001) and Stober and Hoffman (2001) report that Lee revealed a previously unreported 1988 meeting he had in his Bejing hotel room with Hu Side and Zheng Shaoteng, two Chinese nuclear weapons scientists. Zheng had asked Lee about the detonation system for the “primary” of the W88 warhead, and Lee claimed that he told Zheng that he did not know the answer.

The main polygraph examination asked Lee four relevant questions, ones that appear to be variations of the TES (Test of Espionage and Security) espionage question and focused toward specific activities (pp. 631-632):

  1. Have you ever committed espionage against the United States?

  2. Have you ever provided any classified weapons data to any unauthorized person?

  3. Have you had any contact with anyone to commit espionage against the United States?

  4. Have you ever had personal contact with anyone you know who has committed espionage against the United States?

According to the FBI report, Lee answered all of the questions “no” and the polygraph examiner concluded that Lee “was not deceptive when answering the questions above” (p. 632). The report raises concerns about the questions and the meaning of the term “espionage” and suggests that the post-test interview should have been more extensive, given that Lee had admitted in the pretest to being solicited in a 1988 hotel room encounter to provide classified information to an unauthorized individual.

But the real issue the report raises concerns the review of the charts and tape of the polygraph interview by DOE supervisors in January 1999. In that review, they determined that “the initial NDI [no deception indicated] opinion could not be duplicated or substantiated” and that they were “unable to render an opinion pertaining to the truthfulness of the examinee’s answers to the relevant questions of this test” (p. 645). In a



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