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1
Introduction
Manufacturing has changed dramatically over the past 200 years,
from simple production lines, to complex assembly lines, and finally to the
advanced manufacturing of the late 20th century. Technological advances
such as computers and broadband communications have enabled new
methods of manufacturing that are more efficient and less costly. However,
concurrent with these enabling advances in technology, market conditions
have changed. Customers are demanding more, including high-quality
products with custom-designed features and short delivery times. Research
that previously gave U.S. manufacturers a market edge is now available
globally, resulting in increased competition. Although U.S. manufacturing
was seen by many as an outmoded economic sector in the 1 980s, it
experienced a resurgence in the 1 990s (NACFAM, 20011. To continue to
perform well in the current climate, manufacturers must be able to quickly
innovate, design, and produce the "right product right" the first time.
Modeling and simulation (M&S) technologies are important tools for
achieving these goals.
While commercial manufacturers deal with economic competition,
the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) deals with capability to deter and
defeat potential adversaries. When DOD decision makers perceive a gap in
military capability, planners and strategists evaluate whether or not the
perceived gap is real, keeping in mind that a misjudgment could be
catastrophic. If the gap is determined to be real, additional military
capability is needed, and concepts for new weapons systems must be
generated and evaluated. However, detailed design, development,
Production of prototypes, and testing of new conceptual systems are slow
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MODELING AND SIMULA TION IN MANUFACTURING
and costly processes, with no guarantee that new systems will perform as
expected. DOD decision makers are faced with determining the existence
and extent of potential gaps in military capability without engaging in
actual conflicts, and with determining the effectiveness and total cost of
competing concepts for new weapons without evaluating prototypes and
testing in the field. Risks faced by these decision makers are high. M&S
technologies represent important potential for decreasing these risks and
for decreasing the cost and time needed to produce a new weapons system.
MODELING AND SIMULATION IN
MANUFACTURING AND ACQUISITION
"Manufacturing" can be broadly defined as the process and entities
required to create, develop, deliver, and support products (NRC, 1 998c).
"Acquisition" is a term that encompasses more than manufacturing.
Acquisition is broadly defined in defense applications as including the
processes of developing concepts for new systems, assessing effectiveness
in the field, designing and manufacturing, and training in use, in addition
to financial management and other contract-related financial functions that
the term implies in the commercial sector. The term "system" (defense
system or weapons system) and, increasingly, "system-of-systems" is
today commonly used in referring to products and/or equipment that
include a combination of hardware and software essential for the
functioning, for example, of aircraft, tanks, ships, and many commercial
products, although systems of completely mechanical or completely
software components should not be neglected. "Systems engineering"
refers to a disciplined process involving determination of needs,
exploration of concepts for systems satisfying those needs, concept
selection, design, and specification setting.
A "model" is a mathematical, logical, physical, or procedural
representation of some real or ideal system, and "modeling" is the process
of developing a model. A software "simulation" is the implementation of a
mathematical model in executable form and the execution of that model
over time. Models of interest in this study are mainly mathematical
models and executions in computer software. Taken together, "modeling
and simulation" (M&S) refers to the broad discipline of creating,
analyzing, implementing, and using models and simulations.
' This committee uses the term "M&S" technologies to refer to the collective set of modeling
methods, computational techniques, simulation interoperability approaches, verification and
validation methods, networking technologies, collaboration aids, and standards that are or
may be employed in the development and use of models and simulations.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
dod acquisition
INTRODUCTION
TABLE 1-1 Breakdown of Activities and Phases in the New Defense
Acquisition Frameworka
13
Activities
Phases
4.7.2 Pre-systems acquisition
4.7.3 Systems acquisition
4.7.4 Sustainment
4.7.2.1 User need activities
4.7.2.2 Material acquisition requirement questions
4.7.2.3 Technological opportunity activities
4.7.2.4 Analyze alternatives and develop concepts
and technologies
4.7.3.1 General
4.7.3.2 Begin development and develop and
demonstrate systems
4.7.3.3 Commitment to low-rate production and
produce and deploy systems
4.7.4.1 Sustain systems
4.7.4.2 Evolutionary sustainment
4.7.4.3 Dispose of systems
a Source: DOD (2002). Available at
14
MODELING AND SIMULATIONINMANUFACTURING
l Technic Management
ice
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_
Planning Asssssrnent Control
Process Proms Pf~eSS
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Technical Evaluation
Syst~ns Reqllin3ments Systems End-Proclucts
Analysis Nfalidat'~n Wrifi~tim Val'd.at~on
P=ce" Process Proosss Pieces';
ills
Figure 1-1 Processes for an engineering system. Source: EIA (1999).
Salem
Primed
EIA 632 presents 13 key top-level processes in five category groups:
( 1) Technical Management, (2) Acquisition and Supply, (3) System
Design, (4) Product Realization, and (5) Technical Evaluation. The
Acquisition and Supply group of processes corresponds to the Pre-Systems
Acquisition activities of Table 1-1; System Design and Product Realization
correspond to Systems Acquisition activities; and, while there is no direct
mapping from EIA 632 onto the Sustainment activities of Table 1-1,
INTRODUCTION
requirements in these areas feed as input to requirements documents that
are produced as part of the overall planning process at the EIA 632 top
level. In all phases, M&S is indicated as a vital tool to aid in getting the
right things right the first time.
Although there is strong parallelism between commercial product
development and manufacture and defense systems acquisition, defense
systems face a number of additional, inherent challenges. Since DOD
must be able to deploy forces anywhere in the world, systems must be
designed to function effectively over a broad spectrum of environmental
conditions. In addition, these systems must be supported in areas of the
world with little or no support infrastructure. They must function while
adversaries are attempting to destroy, degrade, jam, and exploit them.
Frequently there are several generations of a system in the field
concurrently, resulting in a need for backward compatibility among
generations of systems. Infrequent replacement of systems results in
pressure to add a wide range of new technologies into new equipment,
which can result in design specifications that are beyond underdeveloped
manufacturing capabilities to produce.
It is clear that models and simulations are making inroads into
science, business, engineering, entertainment, and defense, with
applications in weather forecasting, stock-performance forecasting,
transportation and infrastructure planning, animated films, and combat
simulations, among many others. Recent books describe M&S
technologies as changing the way in which natural science perceives
complex systems (Cast), 1997) and the manner in which forward-thinking
companies are using simulation to stay competitive (Schrage, 1999~.
However, for M&S to be maximally effective in aiding concept selection,
detailed design and specification, and verification of complex systems and
enterprise-level operations, a broad range of capabilities will be needed
beyond those available in current M&S technologies. An M&S
environment capable of enterprise-level and system-of-systems-level
modeling and simulation must be able to rapidly incorporate many diverse
models of physical, social, financial, and political components, each with
its own data needs and formats, and produce in a timely fashion simulation
results in a form accessible both to machines and people, for aid in risk
management and decision making.
In 1998, the National Research Council (NRC) published the findings
of a study on challenges to be faced by the global manufacturing
community within the next 20 years. M&S technologies can be applied
toward the solution of each of the identified challenges, including the need
to achieve concurrency in all manufacturing operations; the need to
integrate human and technical resources; the need to transform information
instantaneously into knowledge for effective decision making; the need to
15
16
MODELINGANDSIMULATIONINMANUFACTURING
reduce production waste; the need to be able to reconfigure manufacturing
enterprises rapidly and responsively; and the need to develop innovative
manufacturing processes and products. In addition, M&S technologies
were identified as part of severa] strategic technology areas, including the
following: adaptable, integrated readily reconf~gurable equipment,
processes, and systems; innovative processes for designing and
manufacturing new materials and components; system synthesis, modeling,
and simulation for all manufacturing operations; technologies to convert
information into knowledge for effective decision making; and software
for intelligent collaboration systems. Finally, enterprise simulation and
modeling was identified as an important breakthrough technology (NRC,
1 998c).
In 1999, the NRC published a report envisioning the needs of defense
manufacturing in the year 2010 and later. The report cited the following
four areas as being priorities for research and development (R&D): (1)
efficient sustainment of weapons systems, (2) modeling and simulation-
based design tools, (3) leveraging of commercial resources, and (4) cross-
cutting defense-unique production processes. Focus areas described for
modeling and simulation R&D were these: promoting the development of
models of defense products, manufacturing processes, and life-cycle
performance; developing algorithms for design trade-offs that optimize
life-cycle costs; developing enhanced and easily usable parametric models
that facilitate design trade-offs at the conceptual stage; and initiating the
development of product databases that will permit simulation at various
levels of resolution (NRC, 1999a). These two reports (NRC, 1998c, 1 999a)
clearly highlight the importance of M&S technologies in meeting the
future needs of both defense and commercial manufacturing.
Because of rapidly changing environments in modeling and
computing technology, it is difficult to portray the true state of M&S today.
In its research, however, the committee found that M&S for large systems
is yet to come. Much current modeling is in the form of "silo" solutions to
local problems, with many issues impeding the use of models developed in
one arena in simulations in other arenas. As discussed in this report,
development is needed in all areas of M&S.
NEW CHALLENGES FOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION
In order to set the context for the study, the committee first sought to
understand DOD's long-term needs regarding acquisition. In the rest of
this chapter, trends affecting the defense acquisition process are identified
and analyzed, and long-term acquisition needs are identified.
INTRODUCTION
17
On the basis of a review of DOD and other documents and the
expertise of its members, the committee identified six interrelated trends
that are likely to affect DOD's long-term acquisition needs: (1) the
international security environment, (2) strategic vision, (3) resources, (4)
institutional initiatives (5) military systems, and (6) commercial
technology (see Figure 1-2~. The committee's analysis was a qualitative
assessment of needs relevant to the 2020 time frame. Trend analyses have
proven to be an effective means of projecting needs for a system that is in
relative equilibrium. However, since the September 1 1, 2001, terrorist
attacks, it is clear that the defense establishment is facing a major
discontinuity. This analysis therefore sought to identify trends that were
likely to persist in the face of this discontinuity, and those areas where
substantial long-term changes in direction were likely to occur in response
to the perceived threat environment.
The International Security Environment
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, DOD has addressed a broad
range of conflict operations, including homeland defense in response to the
terrorist attack of September 1 1, 2001; major theater war, such as Desert
- to - ' McCoy
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Figure 1-2 Six interrelated trends likely to affect DOD acquisition needs.
18
MODELING AND SIMULA TION IN MANUFACTURING
Storm; smaller-scale contingencies, such as the air war over Serbia,
operations other than war, such as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and
the implementation and stabilization forces in Bosnia; and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, such as earthquake relief in Turkey. DOD
anticipates a continuation of this broad range of operations into the future,
with several significant variations (OSD, 20019. First, DOD is
increasingly concerned that potential adversaries may adopt asymmetric
strategies and tactics that pose a major challenge to the United States such
as the recent hijacking of commercial aircraft and the dispersal of
biological agents. Outside the United States, this could include the use of
anti-access and area denial strategies intended to complicate response to a
crisis. For example, if adversaries were to acquire chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or enhanced-high-explosive weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them precisely, the United States
would be discouraged from deploying substantial forces within range of
those systems. In addition, if potential adversaries are able to take rapid
and aggressive action against their neighbors, the time to decide whether to
commit forces and the time to deploy them are reduced. Finally,
uncertainty regarding the location of future conflicts has grown, resulting
in questions regarding the resources required to transport U.S. forces to
trouble spots in a timely manner (OSD, 2001~.
The United States is still identifying the appropriate response to these
threats. Coping with transnational terrorism will require a long-term,
coordinated response across diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic domains. In the short term, the armed services are seeking
additional resources to support increased situational awareness, enhanced
force protection, and improved command and control (Inside the Navy,
2001~. To deal with the emerging theater threat, the United States is
planning to acquire a new generation of systems that can stand off beyond
the range of adversary weapons, be deployed to the theater more rapidly,
and be adaptable to the operational theater of interest. In particular, these
systems must be interoperable with those of ad hoc coalition allies.
Strategic Vision
Although the severity of the threat to the U.S. homeland was not fully
appreciated by DOD prior to September 1 l, 2001, there was sensitivity to
the other trends described above. In response, the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the individual armed
services recently formulated linked strategic visions (see Box 1-l). The
CJCS published Joint Vision 2020 (CJCS, 2000a), which built on the
foundations established in Joint Vision 2010 (CJCS, 1996~. Joint Vision
2010 identified four operational concepts to be enabled by information
INTRODUCTION
superiority: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional
protection, and focused logistics. Joint Vision 2020 goes on to emphasize
interoperation with others (e.g., multinational forces, interagency groups,
and nongovernmental organizations) and treating information operations as
an essential capability.
The armed services are in the process of transforming themselves to
support Joint Vision 2020. The U.S. Army is undergoing a force
transformation, via the Interim Brigade Combat Team and the Future
Combat Systems, to enhance its deployability, sustainability, lethality, and
survivability (CJCS, 2000b). The objective ofthese initiatives is to achieve
fill-spectrum warfare dominance, using the capabilities of command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) as its principal force multiplier.
The U.S. Air Force is focusing on the creation of a new expeditionary
aerospace force featuring enhanced responsiveness and global reach
(CJCS, 2000b). This objective is enabled by the implementation of
enhanced reach-back capability, (e.g., the projection of a small footprint in
the theater of operation, supported by substantial resources in sanctuary
Mom potential attack) and the implementation of advanced collaborative
tools, such as the "virtual building" paradigm. A virtual building is an
integrated suite of collaboration tools that geographically distributed
19
Box 1-1: Linked Vision Strategies
Joint Vision 2010, a conceptual template for America's Armed Forces, will
channel the vitality and innovation of personnel and leverage technological
opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. Joint
Vision 2020 builds upon and extends the conceptual template established by
Joint Vision 2010 to guide the continuing transformation of the U.S. Armed
Forces.
From Vision to Experimentation
· Joint Vision 2010 (1996)
· Concept for Future Joint Operations (1997)
· 21St Century Challenges and Desired Operational Capabilities (1997)
· Joint Warfighting Experimentation Program established, USACOM
(JFCOM) as executive agent (1998)
· Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (1998)
CJCSI 3170, Requirements Generation System (1999)
· JFCOM Joint Experimentation Campaign Plans (1999 and 2000)
Joint Vision 2020 (2000)
20
MODELING AND SIMULATION IN MANUFACTURING
participants can use to interact (exchanging voice, data, video, and
applications) as if they were in the same room. The tools allow for the
creation of several "rooms" on several "floors" where access can be
restricted to the appropriate individuals (Spellman et al., 1997; Shiozawa et
al., 1999; Jeffrey and McGrath, 2000~.
The U.S. Navy is pursuing a strategic vision underpinned by the
concept of network-centric warfare (CJCS, 2000b). The transition from the
current platform-centered approach requires the convolution of new
technology, doctrine, concepts of operation, and training. This network-
centered focus is aimed at promoting enhanced mission effectiveness
through shared awareness and self-synchronization of the force. The U.S.
Marine Corps issued a strategic vision (CJCS, 2000b) in which it assessed
the innovative use of C4ISR to support small unit operations and urban
warfare.
More recently, the Secretary of Defense issued the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR). The QDR states that "the new defense strategy is
built around the concept of shifting to a 'capabilities-based' approach to
defense" (OSD, 2001, p. 13~. While it may not be possible to identify
specific future adversaries, it is feasible to anticipate these adversaries'
capabilities. The QDR commits DOD to initiatives that will transform the
department in order to address the capabilities of these future adversaries.
These strategic visions are driving the need for acquisition of military
systems, requiring resources for direct acquisition of systems, techniques
to acquire militarily useful systems more quickly, and expertise to select
appropriate systems and integrate them with existing systems in a rapidly
changing environment. The joint and armed services initiatives demand
that the acquisition process be flexible enough to support a major
transformation and restructuring of forces. Consistent with the tenets of
network-centric warfare, the acquisition process must both accommodate
convolution and anticipate and facilitate the periodic insertion of new
technology into military systems. From a product perspective, Joint Vision
2020 and the QDR emphasize the need to acquire systems able to
interoperate with the systems of other participants. To cope with the anti-
access and area denial threats, the QDR identifies key capabilities,
including advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike, and
transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces and systems (OSD, 2001,
p. 141. In addition, the service concepts are explicit on the need to acquire
systems that are operationally effective using fewer people, that are more
easily deployed with a smaller footprint in a theater, and with reduced
needs for logistics support.
INTRODUCTION
21
Resources
Trends regarding funding, people, and time to field systems will
substantially affect DOD's acquisition needs. In the area of funding, the
consequences of the newly launched war on terrorism imply that prior
estimates of available resources for defense are no longer accurate. The
QDR states that new, increased estimates of funding are being developed
and that DOD's efforts to realize internal efficiencies must not be relaxed,
as any increased funding will be urgently needed to meet new defense
demands (OSD, 2001, p. 48~.
Over the past decade, a substantial decrease in DOD personnel has
occurred. As noted in the QDR, one consequence of the decrease is that
"DOD has not sufficiently emphasized efforts to bring talented young
civilian personnel into the Department to develop them to fill leadership
positions. This has been particularly true with respect to young people with
the skills needed to address emerging science and technology needs"
(OSD, 2001, p. 9~. Although the trend for DOD personnel is ambiguous in
light of recent events, several important personnel-related trends are likely
to persist. First, DOD will probably remain committed to reducing all of its
headquarters staffs by 15 percent from the Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 baseline
(OSD, 2001, p. 52~. Second, new systems will most likely have
substantially reduced crew sizes, in some cases up to 50 percent smaller.
As a consequence, skill sets of individual crewmembers will have to
increase.
In order to respond to rapidly emerging, unexpected threats, the
acquisition process will probably have to be more flexible and responsive.
New acquisition paradigms, such as evolutionary acquisition, are projected
to reduce the time needed to acquire and field a core system. However, it is
highly likely that conventional DOD acquisition times will remain
substantially higher than characteristic commercial acquisition times and
technology timescales.
These resource trends will affect DOD's acquisition needs in a
number of ways. First, reductions in headquarters staffs will necessitate
acquisition processes that require fewer personnel. Second, the need to
periodically upgrade systems with high commercial content will strain the
acquisition system. Integrating properly validated and verified M&S into
the upgrade cycle can reduce the time required for each of those processes.
Third, dealing with new threats, such as counterterrorism efforts, will
probably consume many of the additional resources added to the DOD
budget. The DOD acquisition system will therefore face pressure to
minimize the total cost of ownership despite increased budgets. Fourth, the
desire to reduce costs, personnel, and time while maintaining or increasing
effectiveness will make it necessary to reuse key tools and data across
.
22
MODELING AND SIMULATION IN MANUFACTURING
phases of a program and across program lines. It will therefore be
necessary to create and sustain an acquisition infrastructure, including an
M&S infrastructure. DOD acquisition personnel could use M&S to predict
the cost-effectiveness of potential solutions, thereby reducing the need to
produce and test expensive hardware prototypes.
Institutional Initiatives
DOD modified key policies and principles that govern the acquisition
of major systems in 2000 (OUSD/AT&L, 2000~. Five overall needs were
identified, including the need to (1) achieve interoperability; (2) rapidly
and effectively transition from science and technology to products (e.g.,
using time-phased requirements and communications with users and
industry); (3) rapidly and effectively transition from acquisition to
deployment and fielding (e.g., by employing evolutionary acquisition,
performing integrated test and evaluation, and encouraging competition);
(4) implement integrated and effective operational support (e.g., employing
a tote] systems approach in order to optimize total system performance and
to minimize total ownership costs; transforming logistics); and (5)
implement effective management techniques. The latter included the use of
tailored acquisition strategies, the use of cost as an independent variable to
permit trade-offs between cost and usefulness of systems, continued efforts
toward the goal of simulation-based acquisition, stimulation of innovation
and continuous improvement, the streamlining of organizations, and the
maintenance of a professional workforce. After the recent terrorist attacks,
the need for greater agility in the acquisition of urgently required
capabilities was highlighted. DOD has therefore solicited innovative ideas
to combat terrorism that can go from concept to development and fielding
in 12 to 18 months (DOD, 200lb).
These institutional initiatives require several improvements in the
acquisition process. The desire to achieve and maintain interoperability
requires early and continuing commitment to several orchestrated
activities. These include development of common standards, protocols, and
data definitions; agreed-upon concepts of operation; testing and evaluation
to ensure that agreed-upon actions have been implemented properly; and
configuration management of systems to assure proper management of
evolutionary changes. Moreover, techniques such as use of integrated
product teams are needed to ensure the requisite dialogue among all
stakeholders. Finally, it remains to be seen whether existing institutional
processes are capable of supporting the extremely short time lines
identified in the DOD counterterrorism solicitation. institutional initiatives
imply the need for a spectrum of shared, reusable, and tailorable tools and
data. These include tools to relate system performance to military worth,
INTRODUCTION
costing tools to provide credible estimates of total cost of ownership for
innovative acquisition processes, virtual M&S to support the stakeholder
dialogue, and activities to enhance the credibility of tools and data.
U]timate]y, these tools and data must be shared between government and
industry and reused.
Military Systems
In the short term, important initiatives are underway that could
23
u]timate]y have long-term ramifications for systems acquisition. To
immediately support effective engagement of time-critical targets in
Central Asia, the United States has begun to operate preliminary versions
of unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs). If this proves to be
operationally effective, it could signa] an increased role for UCAVs in
DOD's mix of systems and increased reliance on acquiring quick-reaction
capabilities. Over the longer term, DOD is thinking in teens of acquiring
the flu]] system-of-systems needed to perform critical operations. If the
capability to perform the operation is to be realized, the acquisition process
must transcend the immediate system and address new doctrine,
organizations, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. This
was underscored by the U.S. Army's recent efforts to digitize its heavy
forces through Task Force XXI (Krygiel, 1999~. Task Force XXI
demonstrated two important acquisition needs: first, the significance of
convolving the system-of-systems with continual dialogue among all major
stakeholders; and second, the need for a virtual M&S testbed to enable this
dialogue. In the case of Task Force XXI, this was implemented through a
central technical simulation facility (Krygiel, 19994.
Commercial Technology
Over the past decade, DOD's use of commercial products has
increased substantially. This trend is projected to continue, particularly in
the area of C4ISR systems. In addition, information technology is
becoming increasingly globalized, with India and Israel becoming world
leaders in software development and Finland and Sweden at the leading
edge of wireless communications. This globalization of information
technology is providing potential adversaries with the building blocks
needed to create capable C4ISR systems. Thus, a future adversary could
obtain high-resolution overhead imagery from commercial providers; long-
haul robust communications from commercial providers of satellite and
cellular communications; and precise positioning, navigation, and time
information from globally available sources such as the Global Positioning
24
MODELINGANDSIMULATIONINMANUFACTURING
System. The terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001, attack
communicated using e-mails and cellular phones, honed their aviation
skills using commercial simulators, and employed the Internet to collect
some information used to plan the attacks.
These trends result in additional needs for defense acquisition. In
view of the increased reliance on commercial products, the ramifications of
using these commercial products must be dealt with. First, a commercial
product cycle is generally much faster than the current DOD acquisition
cycle (18 months versus 15 years). Second, commercial software products
generally do not undergo the same rigorous testing and evaluation process
that typical DOD products do. Third, producers of commercial products
generally limit the documentation that they provide and rarely offer access
to source code. Even though attention to security is increasing in
commercial computer applications, commercial software may still not be
designed to levels of security that will satisfy military needs. Finally, in
buying commercial products, DOD has little or no control over the
evolution of the product. It is not unusual for different versions of the same
product to be noninteroperable. When a company discontinues a product, it
frequently also discontinues support for that product. It is important that
DOD understand the capabilities and limitations of the commercial
products that either DOD or an adversary might employ.
Summary
The committee summarized the long-term needs of defense
acquisition by grouping them in three areas: (1) new approaches for the
acquisition process, to meet needs related to the way in which future
systems are acquired; (2) new approaches for systems, to meet needs
related to the systems that will be acquired; and (3) new approaches for
tools, to meet needs related to the tools required by the acquisition process
to produce the desired systems.
New Approaches for the Acquisition Process
The future DOD acquisition process must be characterized by a
trusted government-industry relationship. This relationship must include
the appropriate sharing of tools and data. In addition, mechanisms are
needed to facilitate dialogue among all participants in the life cycle of a
system. In the area of homeland defense, this will require enhanced
dialogue among all of the government stakeholders. integrated product
teams appear to be one useful mechanism to support that dialogue. The
increasing trend toward globalization of industry presents an additional
INTRODUCTION
25
challenge. If future U.S. defense acquisitions include greater involvement
of non-U.S. firms, cultural, legal, and security issues could pose obstacles
to desired levels of sharing and dialogue.
In the short term, there is a perceived need to support exceptionally
compressed time lines (i.e., 12 to 18 months) to acquire innovative
counterterrorism capabilities. In the long term, many of the trends cited
reinforce the need for systems to evolve during their life cycles. This is
true at both the individual system level and the system-of-systems level. At
the individual system level, there is a need to field useful core capabilities
more rapidly (i.e., within a few years instead of within 15 to 20 years).
Subsequently, increments must be fielded on timescales that reflect the
technology generation rate, lessons learned from prior use, and the ability
to assimilate new capabilities. At the system-of-systems level, DOD needs
to cope with the asynchronous nature of the acquisition of individual
systems and to facilitate the co evolution of those systems with all of the
dimensions of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel, and facilities. While not part of the system-of-
systems, as defined conventionally by DOD or by this report, there are
many business and program dimensions of both the DOD acquisition
process and of industry functions (e.g. supply chains and manufacturing
scheduling where simulation is a tool to improve defense systems.
Many existing legacy systems of the armed services have substantial
interoperability deficiencies among themselves as well as with external
organizations. In order to ameliorate these deficiencies, new processes are
needed, supported in part by simulation environments that promote and
facilitate interoperability. In addition, each of the services is in the midst of
transformation efforts consistent with Joint Vision 2020. These
transformations should be harmonized so that they are mutually supportive
(OSD, 2001~. The Joint Forces Command will also play a key role in this
process through its joint experimentation activities. These and other joint
exercises serve as an important integrating environment for warfighting
simulations. At the system level, better processes are needed in order to
identify and manage the different sources of acquisition risk.
New Approaches for Systems
The systems and systems-of-systems that DOD will acquire in the
2020 time frame must provide value in several dimensions. First, they must
have superior performance qualities at the product level (e.g., provide
state-of-the-art technological attributes). In addition, they must have the
desired functional performance to produce military worm (e.g., an
"identification of friend or foe" system supporting air defense must be able
to identify foes positively and unambiguously at operationally useful
26
MODELING AND SIMULATION IN A1ANUFAC TURING
ranges) and measures of mission effectiveness (e.g., for an air defense
system-of-systems, it must achieve operationally acceptable rates of
attrition of the adversary's aircraft).
Given the expected competition for funds among DOD accounts, it is
vital that the services acquire systems that minimize total cost of
ownership while satisfying a number of other needs. First, these systems
must be acquired on schedules that are adequately synchronized so that
overall operational needs are achieved in a timely fashion. Second, the
acquisition process must be sensitive to a number of personnel needs,
given the continuing limit on the number of DOD personnel and their
projected skill levels. New systems must require reduced numbers of
people to operate and maintain them, and must be easier to be trained on
and to operate. Third, military systems must manifest a host of properties
that are often summarized under the rubric "ilities." These properties
include achieving and maintaining desired levels of interoperability;
minimizing demands on resources for transportability and deployability;
providing desired levels of operational suitability and adaptability;
achieving acceptable levels of lethality; providing acceptable survivability;
manifesting requisite levels of reliability, supportability, and sustainability;
exhibiting economical and simple disposability at the end of the life-cycle.
New Approaches for Tools
In order to satisfy these process and product needs, DOD must create
credible integrated acquisition environments that can be employed across
acquisition phases and programs. To minimize the burden on industrial
developers, effective M&S tools should be applicable to acquisitions of
any service. These integrated acquisition environments can be envisioned
as a pyramid of standards and protocols, underlying collaborative
technologies, community utilities/infrastructure, and program-focused
applications (see Figure 1-3~.
The standards and protocols of interest subsume many of the
standards associated with modern software systems, the exchange of
product model data, and simulation interoperability standards. The
community has embraced several standards in each of these areas,
including common object request broker architecture (CORBA) for
modern software standards; product data exchange using the standard for
the exchange of product model data (PDES/STEP); and the high level
architecture (HLA) for simulation interoperability. However,
implementation of these standards is in its infancy, and their performance
and robustness must be enhanced. In addition, standards to bridge domains
must be developed, for example, linking PDES/STEP data in HLA object
model form.
INTRODUCTION
/~0tegra~d\
Acquisition \
/ Environments (lAEs)\
4+ Applications
\
34 Uti} itiesilntrastmctu:re
\
\.
2. Underlying GoIIa~boralive TechncIog'es
1. Standards and Protocols
\
Figure 1-3 Integrated acquisition environments, including standards and
protocols, underlying collaborative technologies, community
utilities/infrastructure, and program-focused applications.
27
Collaborative technologies include efforts to establish shared
electronic workspaces that will permit parallel acquisition activities;
develop customized software wrappers that facilitate the reuse of legacy
code; and create groupware to facilitate the work of teams separated in
time and space. Preliminary capabilities exist in all of these areas, but there
is a need for development of a reliable, automated means to ensure security
and privacy, make distributed heterogeneous databases interoperab]e, and
implement automated negotiation/constraint management techniques (Ben-
Shau] et a]., 1993; Klein, 1993) to detect and reconcile potential conflicts.
Utilities and infrastructure subsume significant existing capabilities,
such as high-capacity communications, data management tools, and
sophisticated human/machine interfaces. In general, commercial
developments in these areas should meet many of DOD's acquisitions
needs. However, some needs in the areas of network security, directories,
distributed design tools, concurrent design services, and distributed parts
catalogues may not be met.
Applications can be characterized by the class of tools (e.g.,
constructive, virtual, or dive M&S) and the functional discipline that
employs the tool (e.g., performance analyses, program management,
design and engineering, manufacturing, training, logistics, disposal). In
genera], preliminary examples of many of these applications exist,
particularly for certain classes of weapons systems, such as tactical aircraft.
28
MODELING AND SIMULA TION IN MANUFACTURING
TABLE 1-2 Long-Tenn DOD Acquisition Needs
Category of Need Specific Needs
Acquisition process Strong government-industry relationship
Compressed time lines
Coevolution of systems-of-systems
Interoperability of weapons systems
Ability to identify acquisition risk
Weapons systems Superior performance quality
Superior military functional worth
Minimized total cost of ownership
Synchronized acquisition schedules
Decreased use of personnel
Enhanced U-ilities'' (interoperability, transportability,
deployability, suitability, adaptability, lethality,
sustainability, disposability)
M&S tools Integrated acquisition environments to include:
Standards and protocols
Collaborative technologies
Utilities and infrastructure
Program-focused applications
However, DOD needs improved, orchestrated applications in each
functional area for the full spectrum of warfare. For example, there is a
need for verified and validated families of M&S technologies to support
the assessment of the mission effectiveness of new systems-of-systems. In
addition, although computer-aided design and computer-aided
manufacturing tools have improved dramatically, a new generation is
needed that is more capable and characterized by enhanced
interoperability.
Overall, there is need for integration of all these layers of capability
into effective acquisition environments that can be used throughout the life
cycle to allow rapid collaborative development. These environments must
be flexible enough so that individual program managers can tailor an
environment to meet their individual acquisition needs. In addition,
methods and practices, including improved composability, must permit
creative additions to an acquisition environment to be readily adopted by
other program managers to meet their needs. The process, product, and tool
needs identified by the committee are summarized in Table ]-2.
