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1 Introduction Manufacturing has changed dramatically over the past 200 years, from simple production lines, to complex assembly lines, and finally to the advanced manufacturing of the late 20th century. Technological advances such as computers and broadband communications have enabled new methods of manufacturing that are more efficient and less costly. However, concurrent with these enabling advances in technology, market conditions have changed. Customers are demanding more, including high-quality products with custom-designed features and short delivery times. Research that previously gave U.S. manufacturers a market edge is now available globally, resulting in increased competition. Although U.S. manufacturing was seen by many as an outmoded economic sector in the 1 980s, it experienced a resurgence in the 1 990s (NACFAM, 20011. To continue to perform well in the current climate, manufacturers must be able to quickly innovate, design, and produce the "right product right" the first time. Modeling and simulation (M&S) technologies are important tools for achieving these goals. While commercial manufacturers deal with economic competition, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) deals with capability to deter and defeat potential adversaries. When DOD decision makers perceive a gap in military capability, planners and strategists evaluate whether or not the perceived gap is real, keeping in mind that a misjudgment could be catastrophic. If the gap is determined to be real, additional military capability is needed, and concepts for new weapons systems must be generated and evaluated. However, detailed design, development, Production of prototypes, and testing of new conceptual systems are slow 11
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12 MODELING AND SIMULA TION IN MANUFACTURING and costly processes, with no guarantee that new systems will perform as expected. DOD decision makers are faced with determining the existence and extent of potential gaps in military capability without engaging in actual conflicts, and with determining the effectiveness and total cost of competing concepts for new weapons without evaluating prototypes and testing in the field. Risks faced by these decision makers are high. M&S technologies represent important potential for decreasing these risks and for decreasing the cost and time needed to produce a new weapons system. MODELING AND SIMULATION IN MANUFACTURING AND ACQUISITION "Manufacturing" can be broadly defined as the process and entities required to create, develop, deliver, and support products (NRC, 1 998c). "Acquisition" is a term that encompasses more than manufacturing. Acquisition is broadly defined in defense applications as including the processes of developing concepts for new systems, assessing effectiveness in the field, designing and manufacturing, and training in use, in addition to financial management and other contract-related financial functions that the term implies in the commercial sector. The term "system" (defense system or weapons system) and, increasingly, "system-of-systems" is today commonly used in referring to products and/or equipment that include a combination of hardware and software essential for the functioning, for example, of aircraft, tanks, ships, and many commercial products, although systems of completely mechanical or completely software components should not be neglected. "Systems engineering" refers to a disciplined process involving determination of needs, exploration of concepts for systems satisfying those needs, concept selection, design, and specification setting. A "model" is a mathematical, logical, physical, or procedural representation of some real or ideal system, and "modeling" is the process of developing a model. A software "simulation" is the implementation of a mathematical model in executable form and the execution of that model over time. Models of interest in this study are mainly mathematical models and executions in computer software. Taken together, "modeling and simulation" (M&S) refers to the broad discipline of creating, analyzing, implementing, and using models and simulations. ' This committee uses the term "M&S" technologies to refer to the collective set of modeling methods, computational techniques, simulation interoperability approaches, verification and validation methods, networking technologies, collaboration aids, and standards that are or may be employed in the development and use of models and simulations.
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INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1 Breakdown of Activities and Phases in the New Defense Acquisition Frameworka 13 Activities Phases 4.7.2 Pre-systems acquisition 4.7.3 Systems acquisition 4.7.4 Sustainment 18.104.22.168 User need activities 22.214.171.124 Material acquisition requirement questions 126.96.36.199 Technological opportunity activities 188.8.131.52 Analyze alternatives and develop concepts and technologies 184.108.40.206 General 220.127.116.11 Begin development and develop and demonstrate systems 18.104.22.168 Commitment to low-rate production and produce and deploy systems 22.214.171.124 Sustain systems 126.96.36.199 Evolutionary sustainment 188.8.131.52 Dispose of systems a Source: DOD (2002). Available at
14 MODELING AND SIMULATIONINMANUFACTURING l Technic Management ice ;~ _ Planning Asssssrnent Control Process Proms Pf~eSS Acquisition ' ,uPPiV ,,, Supply Process ~quis~tion ,_ Proms Sawn Des on ∑ ~óc ___ ~cq~`s'ben Request Requirement Det'~it'~n P=c85S Solution C~tinition Process _ . .- _ _ . . _ Implementation Process Transition to IJse Process Technical Evaluation Syst~ns Reqllin3ments Systems End-Proclucts Analysis Nfalidat'~n Wrifi~tim Val'd.at~on P=ce" Process Proosss Pieces'; ills Figure 1-1 Processes for an engineering system. Source: EIA (1999). Salem Primed EIA 632 presents 13 key top-level processes in five category groups: ( 1) Technical Management, (2) Acquisition and Supply, (3) System Design, (4) Product Realization, and (5) Technical Evaluation. The Acquisition and Supply group of processes corresponds to the Pre-Systems Acquisition activities of Table 1-1; System Design and Product Realization correspond to Systems Acquisition activities; and, while there is no direct mapping from EIA 632 onto the Sustainment activities of Table 1-1,
INTRODUCTION requirements in these areas feed as input to requirements documents that are produced as part of the overall planning process at the EIA 632 top level. In all phases, M&S is indicated as a vital tool to aid in getting the right things right the first time. Although there is strong parallelism between commercial product development and manufacture and defense systems acquisition, defense systems face a number of additional, inherent challenges. Since DOD must be able to deploy forces anywhere in the world, systems must be designed to function effectively over a broad spectrum of environmental conditions. In addition, these systems must be supported in areas of the world with little or no support infrastructure. They must function while adversaries are attempting to destroy, degrade, jam, and exploit them. Frequently there are several generations of a system in the field concurrently, resulting in a need for backward compatibility among generations of systems. Infrequent replacement of systems results in pressure to add a wide range of new technologies into new equipment, which can result in design specifications that are beyond underdeveloped manufacturing capabilities to produce. It is clear that models and simulations are making inroads into science, business, engineering, entertainment, and defense, with applications in weather forecasting, stock-performance forecasting, transportation and infrastructure planning, animated films, and combat simulations, among many others. Recent books describe M&S technologies as changing the way in which natural science perceives complex systems (Cast), 1997) and the manner in which forward-thinking companies are using simulation to stay competitive (Schrage, 1999~. However, for M&S to be maximally effective in aiding concept selection, detailed design and specification, and verification of complex systems and enterprise-level operations, a broad range of capabilities will be needed beyond those available in current M&S technologies. An M&S environment capable of enterprise-level and system-of-systems-level modeling and simulation must be able to rapidly incorporate many diverse models of physical, social, financial, and political components, each with its own data needs and formats, and produce in a timely fashion simulation results in a form accessible both to machines and people, for aid in risk management and decision making. In 1998, the National Research Council (NRC) published the findings of a study on challenges to be faced by the global manufacturing community within the next 20 years. M&S technologies can be applied toward the solution of each of the identified challenges, including the need to achieve concurrency in all manufacturing operations; the need to integrate human and technical resources; the need to transform information instantaneously into knowledge for effective decision making; the need to 15
16 MODELINGANDSIMULATIONINMANUFACTURING reduce production waste; the need to be able to reconfigure manufacturing enterprises rapidly and responsively; and the need to develop innovative manufacturing processes and products. In addition, M&S technologies were identified as part of severa] strategic technology areas, including the following: adaptable, integrated readily reconf~gurable equipment, processes, and systems; innovative processes for designing and manufacturing new materials and components; system synthesis, modeling, and simulation for all manufacturing operations; technologies to convert information into knowledge for effective decision making; and software for intelligent collaboration systems. Finally, enterprise simulation and modeling was identified as an important breakthrough technology (NRC, 1 998c). In 1999, the NRC published a report envisioning the needs of defense manufacturing in the year 2010 and later. The report cited the following four areas as being priorities for research and development (R&D): (1) efficient sustainment of weapons systems, (2) modeling and simulation- based design tools, (3) leveraging of commercial resources, and (4) cross- cutting defense-unique production processes. Focus areas described for modeling and simulation R&D were these: promoting the development of models of defense products, manufacturing processes, and life-cycle performance; developing algorithms for design trade-offs that optimize life-cycle costs; developing enhanced and easily usable parametric models that facilitate design trade-offs at the conceptual stage; and initiating the development of product databases that will permit simulation at various levels of resolution (NRC, 1999a). These two reports (NRC, 1998c, 1 999a) clearly highlight the importance of M&S technologies in meeting the future needs of both defense and commercial manufacturing. Because of rapidly changing environments in modeling and computing technology, it is difficult to portray the true state of M&S today. In its research, however, the committee found that M&S for large systems is yet to come. Much current modeling is in the form of "silo" solutions to local problems, with many issues impeding the use of models developed in one arena in simulations in other arenas. As discussed in this report, development is needed in all areas of M&S. NEW CHALLENGES FOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION In order to set the context for the study, the committee first sought to understand DOD's long-term needs regarding acquisition. In the rest of this chapter, trends affecting the defense acquisition process are identified and analyzed, and long-term acquisition needs are identified.
INTRODUCTION 17 On the basis of a review of DOD and other documents and the expertise of its members, the committee identified six interrelated trends that are likely to affect DOD's long-term acquisition needs: (1) the international security environment, (2) strategic vision, (3) resources, (4) institutional initiatives (5) military systems, and (6) commercial technology (see Figure 1-2~. The committee's analysis was a qualitative assessment of needs relevant to the 2020 time frame. Trend analyses have proven to be an effective means of projecting needs for a system that is in relative equilibrium. However, since the September 1 1, 2001, terrorist attacks, it is clear that the defense establishment is facing a major discontinuity. This analysis therefore sought to identify trends that were likely to persist in the face of this discontinuity, and those areas where substantial long-term changes in direction were likely to occur in response to the perceived threat environment. The International Security Environment Since the conclusion of the Cold War, DOD has addressed a broad range of conflict operations, including homeland defense in response to the terrorist attack of September 1 1, 2001; major theater war, such as Desert - to - ' McCoy E~ - now ' ~~$ ∑ ~m~ ~ Octets "medial ~rech~b~y I' _. ,'C - beg I' \ / , . ... ...... Acqu~sl't'c~n INS , .... .. ~ ~` M11~'~ ~ o~C ~ System -I _ ~ \ . . .. $trat - ~e Yawn ~ Joim Ajax ∑ h,l.1~ Tm - , oDR~1 / .' . . Ir~tll~or~l InWativff .~ ~;7 : lPT. ~ _ . ~ ~ .~0 ~ ~ Figure 1-2 Six interrelated trends likely to affect DOD acquisition needs.
18 MODELING AND SIMULA TION IN MANUFACTURING Storm; smaller-scale contingencies, such as the air war over Serbia, operations other than war, such as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and the implementation and stabilization forces in Bosnia; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, such as earthquake relief in Turkey. DOD anticipates a continuation of this broad range of operations into the future, with several significant variations (OSD, 20019. First, DOD is increasingly concerned that potential adversaries may adopt asymmetric strategies and tactics that pose a major challenge to the United States such as the recent hijacking of commercial aircraft and the dispersal of biological agents. Outside the United States, this could include the use of anti-access and area denial strategies intended to complicate response to a crisis. For example, if adversaries were to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or enhanced-high-explosive weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them precisely, the United States would be discouraged from deploying substantial forces within range of those systems. In addition, if potential adversaries are able to take rapid and aggressive action against their neighbors, the time to decide whether to commit forces and the time to deploy them are reduced. Finally, uncertainty regarding the location of future conflicts has grown, resulting in questions regarding the resources required to transport U.S. forces to trouble spots in a timely manner (OSD, 2001~. The United States is still identifying the appropriate response to these threats. Coping with transnational terrorism will require a long-term, coordinated response across diplomatic, informational, military, and economic domains. In the short term, the armed services are seeking additional resources to support increased situational awareness, enhanced force protection, and improved command and control (Inside the Navy, 2001~. To deal with the emerging theater threat, the United States is planning to acquire a new generation of systems that can stand off beyond the range of adversary weapons, be deployed to the theater more rapidly, and be adaptable to the operational theater of interest. In particular, these systems must be interoperable with those of ad hoc coalition allies. Strategic Vision Although the severity of the threat to the U.S. homeland was not fully appreciated by DOD prior to September 1 l, 2001, there was sensitivity to the other trends described above. In response, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the individual armed services recently formulated linked strategic visions (see Box 1-l). The CJCS published Joint Vision 2020 (CJCS, 2000a), which built on the foundations established in Joint Vision 2010 (CJCS, 1996~. Joint Vision 2010 identified four operational concepts to be enabled by information
INTRODUCTION superiority: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. Joint Vision 2020 goes on to emphasize interoperation with others (e.g., multinational forces, interagency groups, and nongovernmental organizations) and treating information operations as an essential capability. The armed services are in the process of transforming themselves to support Joint Vision 2020. The U.S. Army is undergoing a force transformation, via the Interim Brigade Combat Team and the Future Combat Systems, to enhance its deployability, sustainability, lethality, and survivability (CJCS, 2000b). The objective ofthese initiatives is to achieve fill-spectrum warfare dominance, using the capabilities of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) as its principal force multiplier. The U.S. Air Force is focusing on the creation of a new expeditionary aerospace force featuring enhanced responsiveness and global reach (CJCS, 2000b). This objective is enabled by the implementation of enhanced reach-back capability, (e.g., the projection of a small footprint in the theater of operation, supported by substantial resources in sanctuary Mom potential attack) and the implementation of advanced collaborative tools, such as the "virtual building" paradigm. A virtual building is an integrated suite of collaboration tools that geographically distributed 19 Box 1-1: Linked Vision Strategies Joint Vision 2010, a conceptual template for America's Armed Forces, will channel the vitality and innovation of personnel and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. Joint Vision 2020 builds upon and extends the conceptual template established by Joint Vision 2010 to guide the continuing transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces. From Vision to Experimentation ∑ Joint Vision 2010 (1996) ∑ Concept for Future Joint Operations (1997) ∑ 21St Century Challenges and Desired Operational Capabilities (1997) ∑ Joint Warfighting Experimentation Program established, USACOM (JFCOM) as executive agent (1998) ∑ Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (1998) CJCSI 3170, Requirements Generation System (1999) ∑ JFCOM Joint Experimentation Campaign Plans (1999 and 2000) Joint Vision 2020 (2000)
20 MODELING AND SIMULATION IN MANUFACTURING participants can use to interact (exchanging voice, data, video, and applications) as if they were in the same room. The tools allow for the creation of several "rooms" on several "floors" where access can be restricted to the appropriate individuals (Spellman et al., 1997; Shiozawa et al., 1999; Jeffrey and McGrath, 2000~. The U.S. Navy is pursuing a strategic vision underpinned by the concept of network-centric warfare (CJCS, 2000b). The transition from the current platform-centered approach requires the convolution of new technology, doctrine, concepts of operation, and training. This network- centered focus is aimed at promoting enhanced mission effectiveness through shared awareness and self-synchronization of the force. The U.S. Marine Corps issued a strategic vision (CJCS, 2000b) in which it assessed the innovative use of C4ISR to support small unit operations and urban warfare. More recently, the Secretary of Defense issued the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR states that "the new defense strategy is built around the concept of shifting to a 'capabilities-based' approach to defense" (OSD, 2001, p. 13~. While it may not be possible to identify specific future adversaries, it is feasible to anticipate these adversaries' capabilities. The QDR commits DOD to initiatives that will transform the department in order to address the capabilities of these future adversaries. These strategic visions are driving the need for acquisition of military systems, requiring resources for direct acquisition of systems, techniques to acquire militarily useful systems more quickly, and expertise to select appropriate systems and integrate them with existing systems in a rapidly changing environment. The joint and armed services initiatives demand that the acquisition process be flexible enough to support a major transformation and restructuring of forces. Consistent with the tenets of network-centric warfare, the acquisition process must both accommodate convolution and anticipate and facilitate the periodic insertion of new technology into military systems. From a product perspective, Joint Vision 2020 and the QDR emphasize the need to acquire systems able to interoperate with the systems of other participants. To cope with the anti- access and area denial threats, the QDR identifies key capabilities, including advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces and systems (OSD, 2001, p. 141. In addition, the service concepts are explicit on the need to acquire systems that are operationally effective using fewer people, that are more easily deployed with a smaller footprint in a theater, and with reduced needs for logistics support.
INTRODUCTION 21 Resources Trends regarding funding, people, and time to field systems will substantially affect DOD's acquisition needs. In the area of funding, the consequences of the newly launched war on terrorism imply that prior estimates of available resources for defense are no longer accurate. The QDR states that new, increased estimates of funding are being developed and that DOD's efforts to realize internal efficiencies must not be relaxed, as any increased funding will be urgently needed to meet new defense demands (OSD, 2001, p. 48~. Over the past decade, a substantial decrease in DOD personnel has occurred. As noted in the QDR, one consequence of the decrease is that "DOD has not sufficiently emphasized efforts to bring talented young civilian personnel into the Department to develop them to fill leadership positions. This has been particularly true with respect to young people with the skills needed to address emerging science and technology needs" (OSD, 2001, p. 9~. Although the trend for DOD personnel is ambiguous in light of recent events, several important personnel-related trends are likely to persist. First, DOD will probably remain committed to reducing all of its headquarters staffs by 15 percent from the Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 baseline (OSD, 2001, p. 52~. Second, new systems will most likely have substantially reduced crew sizes, in some cases up to 50 percent smaller. As a consequence, skill sets of individual crewmembers will have to increase. In order to respond to rapidly emerging, unexpected threats, the acquisition process will probably have to be more flexible and responsive. New acquisition paradigms, such as evolutionary acquisition, are projected to reduce the time needed to acquire and field a core system. However, it is highly likely that conventional DOD acquisition times will remain substantially higher than characteristic commercial acquisition times and technology timescales. These resource trends will affect DOD's acquisition needs in a number of ways. First, reductions in headquarters staffs will necessitate acquisition processes that require fewer personnel. Second, the need to periodically upgrade systems with high commercial content will strain the acquisition system. Integrating properly validated and verified M&S into the upgrade cycle can reduce the time required for each of those processes. Third, dealing with new threats, such as counterterrorism efforts, will probably consume many of the additional resources added to the DOD budget. The DOD acquisition system will therefore face pressure to minimize the total cost of ownership despite increased budgets. Fourth, the desire to reduce costs, personnel, and time while maintaining or increasing effectiveness will make it necessary to reuse key tools and data across
. 22 MODELING AND SIMULATION IN MANUFACTURING phases of a program and across program lines. It will therefore be necessary to create and sustain an acquisition infrastructure, including an M&S infrastructure. DOD acquisition personnel could use M&S to predict the cost-effectiveness of potential solutions, thereby reducing the need to produce and test expensive hardware prototypes. Institutional Initiatives DOD modified key policies and principles that govern the acquisition of major systems in 2000 (OUSD/AT&L, 2000~. Five overall needs were identified, including the need to (1) achieve interoperability; (2) rapidly and effectively transition from science and technology to products (e.g., using time-phased requirements and communications with users and industry); (3) rapidly and effectively transition from acquisition to deployment and fielding (e.g., by employing evolutionary acquisition, performing integrated test and evaluation, and encouraging competition); (4) implement integrated and effective operational support (e.g., employing a tote] systems approach in order to optimize total system performance and to minimize total ownership costs; transforming logistics); and (5) implement effective management techniques. The latter included the use of tailored acquisition strategies, the use of cost as an independent variable to permit trade-offs between cost and usefulness of systems, continued efforts toward the goal of simulation-based acquisition, stimulation of innovation and continuous improvement, the streamlining of organizations, and the maintenance of a professional workforce. After the recent terrorist attacks, the need for greater agility in the acquisition of urgently required capabilities was highlighted. DOD has therefore solicited innovative ideas to combat terrorism that can go from concept to development and fielding in 12 to 18 months (DOD, 200lb). These institutional initiatives require several improvements in the acquisition process. The desire to achieve and maintain interoperability requires early and continuing commitment to several orchestrated activities. These include development of common standards, protocols, and data definitions; agreed-upon concepts of operation; testing and evaluation to ensure that agreed-upon actions have been implemented properly; and configuration management of systems to assure proper management of evolutionary changes. Moreover, techniques such as use of integrated product teams are needed to ensure the requisite dialogue among all stakeholders. Finally, it remains to be seen whether existing institutional processes are capable of supporting the extremely short time lines identified in the DOD counterterrorism solicitation. institutional initiatives imply the need for a spectrum of shared, reusable, and tailorable tools and data. These include tools to relate system performance to military worth,
INTRODUCTION costing tools to provide credible estimates of total cost of ownership for innovative acquisition processes, virtual M&S to support the stakeholder dialogue, and activities to enhance the credibility of tools and data. U]timate]y, these tools and data must be shared between government and industry and reused. Military Systems In the short term, important initiatives are underway that could 23 u]timate]y have long-term ramifications for systems acquisition. To immediately support effective engagement of time-critical targets in Central Asia, the United States has begun to operate preliminary versions of unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs). If this proves to be operationally effective, it could signa] an increased role for UCAVs in DOD's mix of systems and increased reliance on acquiring quick-reaction capabilities. Over the longer term, DOD is thinking in teens of acquiring the flu]] system-of-systems needed to perform critical operations. If the capability to perform the operation is to be realized, the acquisition process must transcend the immediate system and address new doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. This was underscored by the U.S. Army's recent efforts to digitize its heavy forces through Task Force XXI (Krygiel, 1999~. Task Force XXI demonstrated two important acquisition needs: first, the significance of convolving the system-of-systems with continual dialogue among all major stakeholders; and second, the need for a virtual M&S testbed to enable this dialogue. In the case of Task Force XXI, this was implemented through a central technical simulation facility (Krygiel, 19994. Commercial Technology Over the past decade, DOD's use of commercial products has increased substantially. This trend is projected to continue, particularly in the area of C4ISR systems. In addition, information technology is becoming increasingly globalized, with India and Israel becoming world leaders in software development and Finland and Sweden at the leading edge of wireless communications. This globalization of information technology is providing potential adversaries with the building blocks needed to create capable C4ISR systems. Thus, a future adversary could obtain high-resolution overhead imagery from commercial providers; long- haul robust communications from commercial providers of satellite and cellular communications; and precise positioning, navigation, and time information from globally available sources such as the Global Positioning
24 MODELINGANDSIMULATIONINMANUFACTURING System. The terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001, attack communicated using e-mails and cellular phones, honed their aviation skills using commercial simulators, and employed the Internet to collect some information used to plan the attacks. These trends result in additional needs for defense acquisition. In view of the increased reliance on commercial products, the ramifications of using these commercial products must be dealt with. First, a commercial product cycle is generally much faster than the current DOD acquisition cycle (18 months versus 15 years). Second, commercial software products generally do not undergo the same rigorous testing and evaluation process that typical DOD products do. Third, producers of commercial products generally limit the documentation that they provide and rarely offer access to source code. Even though attention to security is increasing in commercial computer applications, commercial software may still not be designed to levels of security that will satisfy military needs. Finally, in buying commercial products, DOD has little or no control over the evolution of the product. It is not unusual for different versions of the same product to be noninteroperable. When a company discontinues a product, it frequently also discontinues support for that product. It is important that DOD understand the capabilities and limitations of the commercial products that either DOD or an adversary might employ. Summary The committee summarized the long-term needs of defense acquisition by grouping them in three areas: (1) new approaches for the acquisition process, to meet needs related to the way in which future systems are acquired; (2) new approaches for systems, to meet needs related to the systems that will be acquired; and (3) new approaches for tools, to meet needs related to the tools required by the acquisition process to produce the desired systems. New Approaches for the Acquisition Process The future DOD acquisition process must be characterized by a trusted government-industry relationship. This relationship must include the appropriate sharing of tools and data. In addition, mechanisms are needed to facilitate dialogue among all participants in the life cycle of a system. In the area of homeland defense, this will require enhanced dialogue among all of the government stakeholders. integrated product teams appear to be one useful mechanism to support that dialogue. The increasing trend toward globalization of industry presents an additional
INTRODUCTION 25 challenge. If future U.S. defense acquisitions include greater involvement of non-U.S. firms, cultural, legal, and security issues could pose obstacles to desired levels of sharing and dialogue. In the short term, there is a perceived need to support exceptionally compressed time lines (i.e., 12 to 18 months) to acquire innovative counterterrorism capabilities. In the long term, many of the trends cited reinforce the need for systems to evolve during their life cycles. This is true at both the individual system level and the system-of-systems level. At the individual system level, there is a need to field useful core capabilities more rapidly (i.e., within a few years instead of within 15 to 20 years). Subsequently, increments must be fielded on timescales that reflect the technology generation rate, lessons learned from prior use, and the ability to assimilate new capabilities. At the system-of-systems level, DOD needs to cope with the asynchronous nature of the acquisition of individual systems and to facilitate the co evolution of those systems with all of the dimensions of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. While not part of the system-of- systems, as defined conventionally by DOD or by this report, there are many business and program dimensions of both the DOD acquisition process and of industry functions (e.g. supply chains and manufacturing scheduling where simulation is a tool to improve defense systems. Many existing legacy systems of the armed services have substantial interoperability deficiencies among themselves as well as with external organizations. In order to ameliorate these deficiencies, new processes are needed, supported in part by simulation environments that promote and facilitate interoperability. In addition, each of the services is in the midst of transformation efforts consistent with Joint Vision 2020. These transformations should be harmonized so that they are mutually supportive (OSD, 2001~. The Joint Forces Command will also play a key role in this process through its joint experimentation activities. These and other joint exercises serve as an important integrating environment for warfighting simulations. At the system level, better processes are needed in order to identify and manage the different sources of acquisition risk. New Approaches for Systems The systems and systems-of-systems that DOD will acquire in the 2020 time frame must provide value in several dimensions. First, they must have superior performance qualities at the product level (e.g., provide state-of-the-art technological attributes). In addition, they must have the desired functional performance to produce military worm (e.g., an "identification of friend or foe" system supporting air defense must be able to identify foes positively and unambiguously at operationally useful
26 MODELING AND SIMULATION IN A1ANUFAC TURING ranges) and measures of mission effectiveness (e.g., for an air defense system-of-systems, it must achieve operationally acceptable rates of attrition of the adversary's aircraft). Given the expected competition for funds among DOD accounts, it is vital that the services acquire systems that minimize total cost of ownership while satisfying a number of other needs. First, these systems must be acquired on schedules that are adequately synchronized so that overall operational needs are achieved in a timely fashion. Second, the acquisition process must be sensitive to a number of personnel needs, given the continuing limit on the number of DOD personnel and their projected skill levels. New systems must require reduced numbers of people to operate and maintain them, and must be easier to be trained on and to operate. Third, military systems must manifest a host of properties that are often summarized under the rubric "ilities." These properties include achieving and maintaining desired levels of interoperability; minimizing demands on resources for transportability and deployability; providing desired levels of operational suitability and adaptability; achieving acceptable levels of lethality; providing acceptable survivability; manifesting requisite levels of reliability, supportability, and sustainability; exhibiting economical and simple disposability at the end of the life-cycle. New Approaches for Tools In order to satisfy these process and product needs, DOD must create credible integrated acquisition environments that can be employed across acquisition phases and programs. To minimize the burden on industrial developers, effective M&S tools should be applicable to acquisitions of any service. These integrated acquisition environments can be envisioned as a pyramid of standards and protocols, underlying collaborative technologies, community utilities/infrastructure, and program-focused applications (see Figure 1-3~. The standards and protocols of interest subsume many of the standards associated with modern software systems, the exchange of product model data, and simulation interoperability standards. The community has embraced several standards in each of these areas, including common object request broker architecture (CORBA) for modern software standards; product data exchange using the standard for the exchange of product model data (PDES/STEP); and the high level architecture (HLA) for simulation interoperability. However, implementation of these standards is in its infancy, and their performance and robustness must be enhanced. In addition, standards to bridge domains must be developed, for example, linking PDES/STEP data in HLA object model form.
INTRODUCTION /~0tegra~d\ Acquisition \ / Environments (lAEs)\ 4+ Applications \ 34 Uti} itiesilntrastmctu:re \ \. 2. Underlying GoIIa~boralive TechncIog'es 1. Standards and Protocols \ Figure 1-3 Integrated acquisition environments, including standards and protocols, underlying collaborative technologies, community utilities/infrastructure, and program-focused applications. 27 Collaborative technologies include efforts to establish shared electronic workspaces that will permit parallel acquisition activities; develop customized software wrappers that facilitate the reuse of legacy code; and create groupware to facilitate the work of teams separated in time and space. Preliminary capabilities exist in all of these areas, but there is a need for development of a reliable, automated means to ensure security and privacy, make distributed heterogeneous databases interoperab]e, and implement automated negotiation/constraint management techniques (Ben- Shau] et a]., 1993; Klein, 1993) to detect and reconcile potential conflicts. Utilities and infrastructure subsume significant existing capabilities, such as high-capacity communications, data management tools, and sophisticated human/machine interfaces. In general, commercial developments in these areas should meet many of DOD's acquisitions needs. However, some needs in the areas of network security, directories, distributed design tools, concurrent design services, and distributed parts catalogues may not be met. Applications can be characterized by the class of tools (e.g., constructive, virtual, or dive M&S) and the functional discipline that employs the tool (e.g., performance analyses, program management, design and engineering, manufacturing, training, logistics, disposal). In genera], preliminary examples of many of these applications exist, particularly for certain classes of weapons systems, such as tactical aircraft.
28 MODELING AND SIMULA TION IN MANUFACTURING TABLE 1-2 Long-Tenn DOD Acquisition Needs Category of Need Specific Needs Acquisition process Strong government-industry relationship Compressed time lines Coevolution of systems-of-systems Interoperability of weapons systems Ability to identify acquisition risk Weapons systems Superior performance quality Superior military functional worth Minimized total cost of ownership Synchronized acquisition schedules Decreased use of personnel Enhanced U-ilities'' (interoperability, transportability, deployability, suitability, adaptability, lethality, sustainability, disposability) M&S tools Integrated acquisition environments to include: Standards and protocols Collaborative technologies Utilities and infrastructure Program-focused applications However, DOD needs improved, orchestrated applications in each functional area for the full spectrum of warfare. For example, there is a need for verified and validated families of M&S technologies to support the assessment of the mission effectiveness of new systems-of-systems. In addition, although computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing tools have improved dramatically, a new generation is needed that is more capable and characterized by enhanced interoperability. Overall, there is need for integration of all these layers of capability into effective acquisition environments that can be used throughout the life cycle to allow rapid collaborative development. These environments must be flexible enough so that individual program managers can tailor an environment to meet their individual acquisition needs. In addition, methods and practices, including improved composability, must permit creative additions to an acquisition environment to be readily adopted by other program managers to meet their needs. The process, product, and tool needs identified by the committee are summarized in Table ]-2.
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Representative terms from entire chapter: