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8-7 However, the evidence in the case of the semiconductor innovations is that the innovating country holds a definite advantage over its imitators. NATIONAL POLICIES FOR SCIENCE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY Introduction Every living organism or institution must accommodate itself to change in order to survive. The first law of every living organism or institution is its own self-preservation. Change results from stresses that can be generated either internally or externally, or some combination of both. - What present stresses, internal and external, on the United States are involved with materials? What additional actions would be appropriate in delaing with them? - What future stresses involving materials can be foreseen? What actions can be taken now to prevent such foreseen future stresses from developing or to make them tolerable when they occur? - What posture and what organizational arrangements can be adopted to increase the effectiveness and flexibility of response to unforeseen and unforeseeable stresses? Thousands of years ago, man made the unconscious decision to employ technology. This decision, which has turned out to be progressive and irreversible, has set in motion an enormous series of consequences. Man lives today in a world which he has largely shaped by the use of technology. From the time of man's first use of technology, and progressively thereafter, experience has shown that by rational expedients using either trial-and-error or cause-and-effect reasoning, man could improve his compatibility with his environment. The main purpose of technology is to improve the compatibility of man's relationship with his environment. The purpose of applied research, then, is to develop ways of further improving this compatibility. Social organi- zation is a form of technology and shares its general purpose. It has three important characteristics: (1) it attempts to specify the relationships among its components, which is why it is called a "system"; (2) it enables the concerted achievement of tasks beyond the capacity of its individual human components; and (3) its lifetime is independent of the life span of its human components. All human institutions, like biological organisms, experience aging. Unlike biological organisms, however, social organisms are capable of being rejuvenated. Rejuvenation is measured by the improved viability of such institutions - whether governments, churches, businesses, universities, or families - in tolerating, reducing, or overcoming internal and external stresses. Stresses cause changes in the environment and in the compatibility of the organism for institution) with it. Adaptability to change is the hallmark of viability. One distinguishing characteristic of man is that he consciously employs technology to improve his environmental compatibility, more often than not by the use of institutions organized for this purpose. The most highly-

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8-8 developed method for achieving the desired compatibility is by the conversion or consumption of materials to produce articles, like clothes and houses, or effects, like warmth and light. Without the institutions that provide and process materials, the present structure of society could not endure. Most institutions would collapse. Most men would perish. The elaborate structure of present day society, not only in the United States but worldwide, rests ultimately on a materials base and on the institutions that employ materials. Whether or not this condition is a "good thing" is irrelevant; it is a fact, the result of an irreversible process, and mankind must make the best of it. Every nation can be considered to have a strategy for the materials field. It may be to develop a rigid and comprehensive five-year plan, or it may be to ignore the issue and let events take their natural course, or somewhere in between Either way, consciously or by default, a strategy has been chosen. Some might believe that national strategies in the materials field are carefully thought out as sectors in the broader strategies for science and engineering as a whole and that these, in turn, are logically redated to generally-agreed national goals or policies. It is much more likely, though, that where materials strategies exist, they have been only loosely related to broader science policies, if at all. That the world is involved in a period of accelerating change and compe- tition -- in economics, politics, art, philosophy, management, science and engineering, technology assessment, etc. -- few will question. And the exigencies of change and competition are forcing the delineation of national policies for science and engineering either deliberately and directly, or inadvertently and indirectly. Likewise, policies for the materials field are emerging. In this section we attempt to indicate how strategies in the materials field may vary among different countries, reflecting differences in national goals and conditioning influences. National Goals A pluralistic society rarely has consensual goals except in reaction to some external threat (e.g., war, trade competition, waning national influence) or some internal danger (e.g., depression, insurrection, environ- mental degradation). Lacking such challenges, each man tends to go his own way. However, in an increasingly crowded and turbulent world, possessing weapons of great destructive power, increasingly reliant on technologies of ever greater potency, consuming more materials and energy and generating more products, with more and more interactions among nations and peoples, the question arises as to whether the United States can safely enjoy in the future the luxury of an unplanned strategy for materials. Before one can begin to think about a national strategy for materials, there needs to be a clear statement of broader national aspirations, both as to internal conditions and as to the nation's role in the world of

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8-9 nations. With regard to the first, there should be a concept -- or at least some reasonable assumptions -- concerning the standard of living, the philosophy of industrial growth, the optimal level of population, and the relative importance of all these as compared with environmental quality and its preservation (or restoration). There should be an assumption as to the desired rate of change in technology, bearing in mind the current attempts to evaluate new technology before adopting it. As to the second, questions need to be resolved as to the nation's determination to influence global diplomacy, to effect changes in the economies of developing countries, to achieve specific patterns of international trade, to respond to the economic and technological prospects of the principal competing nations, to advance the United States at the expense of other nations or as a part of a general program of international advance, to aim at universal superiority in science, technology, and industrial achievement or to choose areas in which our superiority in resources gives us an automatic precedence, leaving other nations to surpass us in field where they are potentially stronger. Is it politically feasible to make these decisions? Is it economically feasible not to do so? What will the other nations be doing in the meantime? Thus, a nation's science or materials strategy is not formed in a vacuum, but is always a derivative -- intended to advance some more funda- mental national purpose (such as the items in Table 8.3~. A statement of national purposes is never complete because there are always additional things for somebody to want. It is never good for all time because (a) external stresses generate new aims, (b) new things become possible, and (c) new people with different desires get to be in charge. The most durable goals are those fixed by geography (England's desire to be "mistress of the seas"), or deep-seated human traits (reduce taxes, improve health standards), or persistent enthusiasms (historically, nationalism has been one of these), or economics (reduce unemployment), or compelled by historical evolution (eliminate racial discrimination), cultural (renew blighted urban areas), behavioral (reduce crime), convenience (improve highways), or even esthetic (eliminate advertising signs along the highways). In the implementation of a national strategy or achievement of a national goal, size of country has much to do with effectiveness. Japan has demon- strated this repeatedly, in achieving optimal use of land, birth control, and rate of new capital formation. Denmark, when the U.K. turned to New Zealand for beef and cattle, converted to the production of bacon, eggs and milk in a remarkably short time. Switzerland has shown a fine ability to maintain high standards of quality of exports. The degree of authoritarianism exercised by a country may be important in goal management. In Nazi Germany, a high level of efficiency was observable in the classification of household wastes at the source. In the USSR, in the 1920's, new capital formation in basic industries proceeded rapidly, while needed wheat was exported to earn foreign exchange. Some salient national goals, as they appear to us for various countries are indicated in Table 8.3. In relating national strategies for materials to these national goals there are several "conditioning variables" that have to be taken into account: first and foremost, the national geography, including the pattern of available natural and human resources; second, the

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8-10 TABLE 8.3 Some Salient National Goals (1950-1970) National Goals ~rl 5 ) a) C' X X X == X X ? ? x x u' a Z u, c: ~rl 0 ~ u) 0 u' erl ~rl o U] ~rl ~rl U. U) ~rl General Science and Technology Preeminence Science Preeminence Technology Preeminence Economic Growth Exclude Economic Influence of Some Other Nations Increase Diplomatic Influence Enlarge Military Strength Catch Up Technologically With An Adversary Environment Quality Improve Terms of Trade Raise Living Standards Reduce Unemployment Control Inflation Reduce Extent of Government Intervention Increase Extent of Government Intervention Improve Internal Economic Balance x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x l

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8-11 economic system; third, the historical evolution of the societal patterns; fourth, the general educational level of the population, including its level of scientific and technological sophistication; fifth, the availability of investment capital, and accompanying propensity to invest in relevant technologies for research and development, and for the production and fabri- cation of materials, sixth, the extent and character of restraints and encouragements imposed by the national government; and seventh, the propen- sity for war-making of the nation. Perhaps no positive and definite national goal or strategy would be acceptable to the United States for materials (or any other aspect of national culture) except in reaction to some internal or external stress. However, the emergence of such a stress often cannot be predicted. The viability of any nation depends on its adaptability to conditions of stress. Accordingly, a guide-line for U.S. strategy might be to strive toward a general condition of flexibility so that when stresses appear they can be tolerated or overcome. National Strategies and Tactics in the Materials Field In the United States, no agency appears to have responsibility for the total job of formulating materials policy or goals for the materials geld e Thus, it is not surprising that there is no well-formed strategy for achiev- ing national goals in the materials field, including materials science and engineering. Bits and pieces of materials strategy are done in many places but always aimed at limited, partial, or even conflicting objectives. The purpose of a strategy is to provide guidelines for fulfilling of a purpose, for achieving a goal, for concentrating national energies to some end. A strategy signifies first, a determination of present posture; second, a definition of an ideal or preferred future posture; and third, a broad design of how to progress from the present to the future posture. With respect to MSE there has been expressed no purpose, no goal, no end, and therefore no setting of priorities among the components of strategy. Consequently, one can expect to find a variety of strategies and tactics in operation. One can also expect to find a variety of strategies among various countries according to the role of materials in their respective economies, as exemplified in Table 8.4. That the formulating of a materials strategy involves a highly complex set of policy issues can be gauged by the following examples of questions that might have to be resolved first. 1. What is to be the time span of the planning? 2. How is policy planning to be coupled with implementation? 3. How can we best combine incrementalism with the "5-year plan" approach? 4. Is it possible to decide in advance whether to employ the principle versus the case law approach? 5. How salient is the problem of materials to political decisionmakers? 6. If the United States is in competition with other nations, what should be the terms of the competition? Should we compete across the board, or selectively?

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8-12 U. Cal o A' a) Marl U U U ~ ~ U Z ~ o u o U ~ ~ u: ~ En u: ~ Al Marl CO ~ 3 sol o U. Al o C: U' Al sol o o o o . - u ,- . - . oo EN U: Pi o U) o C) o sol =~9 U] ~ 3 Al o Pa ~ o 4- do U] To ~ U] sol o u] o ~rl u ~ 0 U) 1 0 N E~ 0 ~ ~ . U] s~ o . - r9 rl ~rl ~o z a C) ~rl s~ 1 ~ u, ~ a s~ ~ S~ ~ O .,1 ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ o .- ~ ~ ~ ~s ~ U. C) o U) U. o C~ .- ~ ~ 1 1 o -9 ~ ~ U ,~ a ,, ~ U) ~g o C~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 =~ c) a, ~rJ o u' c. ~ a, ~ s~ ^= o c) o . - cn ~rl a) c) s~ s~ ~o 1 1 s~ cn O s~ ~ 1 e~ " u] ~ o ~9 c: ~ uD ~ ~ s~ c) .,1 u) s~ ~ o ~ E~ a) 1 = U)'-,1 U s~ ~rl a,, == ~= c] o z ~ ~ ~ o a s~ u] ~rl 0 1 u ~s e C) .- ~rl . - ~rl V,

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8-13 U] a) o so a,1 z = o a) so o En ~ En CO ~ ~ En CO so o ~ o 4 o V .,1 so ,, o X lo, o PA - o _' . oo En U' furl so o ~ . U] no ~ 1 to al c' ~ a) do d d it o CO o ,1 cut O a s~ a, u] o -c c) ,! , s~ ~ ~ ~ b 1 ~rl O aJ ~ ~ ~ d c) ~ ~ a,1 U a, ~rl u' a O .~ 1 u' a ~ o ,1 cn 0 ~ ~ ~ o~ o ~ o C. ~rl o U. ~rl U] a a) z a, C) ~rl 1 . ~ cn o ~ S~ C) o >: P4 1 ~2) ~, a,1 0 a = c) ~ ~1 .,1 co C~ C) ~rl a~l u] c' - .1 1 1 ' = - - c) o u) ~o erl ~: 1 O.rl ~ ~ S~ ~ C. ~ e"' ~ ~ 4 C) S~ ~ ~ c'- ~ ~ cn U) a, U] ~ ~ ~ :m 1 0 S~ ~ ~n : d ~ O ~ ~ : - ~rl ~ ~ ~ .- S~: ~ O ~ o:O cn 0 a) ~ c~ - : u' b0 ,1 ~ O U, O ~ C) c) ~ o cO a ~rl o c) C. d E: 1 aJ ~ ~ o ~ U' ,1 ~ _, ~ C) .H 1 1 ~q Cd ~ e~ rO .~l U] ~1 3 ~1 ce a ~ ~ ^ O ~ ~ . - ~: U) ~n

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8-14 7. In our reliance on R&D, what should be the allocation of effort among industry, Government, the Universities, and Government support of other? 8. What is the role of the Government in ensuring the coupling of research with the commercial exploitation of research results? 9. How formally should needs and goals of materials R&D be defined~' 10. what mechanisms are needed to ensure specific programs toward goals? ll. How can adequate trained manpower be assured for all materials programs? -- And for all functions, such as data management, planning, research design, prod ect evaluation, performance of research., development of research products, industrial materials management, and education for all of these? 12. How can a reasonable degree of stability be. achieved (and is it desirable?) in the placement of manpower in materials functions? 13. Aside from problems of stability of manpower, and expeditious support of promising new lines of inquiry, how important is level of funding Ce..g., in relation to GNP or some such standards? 14. Is balanced research (including stimulation of lagging areas) more im- portant than total level of effort? 15. When broad national objectives are decided on that invo.lye. some improYe- ment in materials technology, should the emphasis boon to.tal.r.esearch and development coverage of all approaches.to the problem, or.on careful selection of high probability pay-off, or on short-.Yersus long~range. solutions? .. 16. What degree of effort should be applied to secur~ng.solutio~s abroad, or reinventing the wheel at home? - 11. How can flexibility of response to changing enyironment...c.~.g.' materials availabilities and costs, new kinds of. hardware, problems.of.disposal and recycling, etc.), be preserved in the face of high capital invest- ment in obsoleting technologies., large.cor.por.ate organizations, and elaborating regulations of.Government? 18. If dollars are the constraint, should research.- especially applied research - be aimed at maximum return in areas yielding dollar profits, or correcting areas of greatest weakness at least.cost in.dollars for R&D? 19. Has the U.S. been wasteful of research resources by concentrating on the! "exotic" aerospace and related research ef forts yielding a thigh-cost, high-reliability, low-production product? 20. How important for strategy planning is.the.forecasting of.technology - determini.ng what is technically feasible, economically practicable, socially desirable, and environmentally tolerable? 21. Is it necessary to ask: What are we.giYing up in order to preserve whatever it is that wetre preserving? What are the opportunities for trying something quite new, and what would that require us to give up? Techniques or tactics employed to implement a national materials strategy are virtually infinite in scope. To begin with, the strategies themselves -- and variations of them -- are innumerable.. They might include such as-- A posture of materials in preparation f.or.national..def..ens.e.emergency; A national program of materials conservation in.peacetima; A strategy of concentration on high-.technolog.y materials;

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8-15 A strategy of abundant materials for rapid economic expansion; A strategy of low-cost, high-level production of goods for export; A strategy of national simplification in materials usage; (Etc.) Then, within any single strategy, the tactical implementation could take countless forms, either in parallel or as alternative options. For example, a nation adopting a strategy of preparedness for war might: Stockpile reserves of imported materials; Stockpile materials in semifinished form (e.g., aluminum ingot); Devise patterns of materials substitution; Write conservation orders; Establish a system of priorities and allocations; Formulate a controlled materials plan; Set up salvage depots; Construct specialized metals-recovery plants; Adjust tax policies to enable accelerated plant amortization; Establish overseas purchasing missions; Review mining activities to optimize output in the short run; Stimulate private corporate materials-conservation plans; (Etc.) A strategy of peacetime conservation of materials could involve such tactical options as: Government action (tariff, etc.) to overprice materials; Subsidy to minimize tailings losses; Household scrap segregation; Government pilotplanting of conservation practices and waste recycling systems; Encouragement of use of renewable resources; Research in utilization of most abundant materials; Tax imposed on "wasteful practices;" Subsidy to encourage marginal salvage operations; Federal quality standards for consumer goods; Increased emphasis on sound maintenance practice in consumer durable (Etc.) Some types of tactics and their perceived status in various countries are indicated in Table 8.5. Before concluding these general introductory remarks, it should be noted that just as every different kind of materials strategy implies a different set of implementing tactics, so too each set of implementing tactics implies a different set of ad hoc organizational arrangements. To begin with, there are many conceptual approaches to the management process. For example: Voluntarism Incentive approach Legal authority Confiscation Government operation Corporate-government consortium Legally-backed industry codes Etc. A; 1'"

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8-16 TABLE 8.5 Techniques for Implementing National Goals (Subjective Views) I. Education A. Broadly based B. Decentralized C. Elitist D. Centralized E. Content emphasizes phys. sci. F. Import teachers G. Export teachers H. Planned academic cohorts to meet forecast requirements Industry-subsidized training to meet requirements Other (specify), etc. II. Science A. High level of effort in the national budget Expanded effort, year by year C. Rely on imports of information from outside x D. Exploit international consortia _ E. Freedom of science F. Total excellence Emphasis on areas of expected high early pay-off H. Selected areas in relation to highest professional com- petence I. Emphasis on fields involved in international competition - J. Other (specify), etc. for Materials rem U) U] 3 X x x

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III. Technology A. Buy technology from other countries B. Government investment in technology C. Reliance on private industry D. Emphasis on basic industry improvement E. Emphasis on improvement of "prestige" fields of technology F. Emphasis on military potency G. Emphasis on fields involving local comparative advantage H. Emphasis on fields of high international economic competition 8-17 TABLE 8.5 (Cont'd) erl . [:4 ~ m 1- ~ _ _ X _ . _ _ ~ Al _ . X U] Sol a) by _ X _ ~ _ X U] U) X X X X X X X X X t x x I. Other (specify), etc. _ _ x ~ _ x ~ IV. Materials Acquisition A. Seek new sources abroad B. Rely on established markets C. Develop domestic sources D. Resort to conservation measures E. Other x (specify), etc. x

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8-23 research and design organizations in each industry created or adapted advanced technology and channeled it to the Soviet factories. The number of scientists employed in such R&D was always far greater than the number employed by the Academy system. Another element in the U.S.S.R. science system, as it emerged during the 1930's, was the network of higher educational institution, 817 of them by 1940 which, with a few exceptions, did not feature significant research, but were responsible for the mass training of engineers and others to man the expanding industries. The rise of the complex structure of the Academy and industrial R&D, and the attempt to "plan science," made the Soviet Union a pioneer country in the history of science policy. In the post-war period, with the impact of the "research revolution," the Soviet government has been faced with a number of major problems in endeavouring to devise a comprehensive national science policy along with the instruments to put such policy into effect. In some important respects, the U.S.S.R. is technologically one of the two world super-powers. Largely as a result of the size and quality of her defense and aerospace industries, she is the only serious rival to the U.S. both as a military power and as a competitor in the space race. In certain other industries, such as iron and steel and machine-tools, the U.S.S.R. also commands a high level of technical performance. These achievements have been supported by successful R&D in modern weapons, including ICBM's and military aircraft, in space technology, in nuclear energy, and in various branches of engineering. In all these cases, planning, a priorities system, and a high degree of centralization of R&D have facilitated coordination and concentration of effort and thus enabled the deliberate translation of research findings into production. The Soviet Union has, however, been able to reach this high technical level only in a few priority fields. In the computer and chemical industries, and in almost all consumer products, the U.S.S.R. is well behind the U.S., and in some major sectors she is less advanced than the industrial countries of Western Europe. Two main groups of factors appear to have contributed to the relatively poor application of the results of research in the U.S.S.R. The first stems from the traditional system of economic planning. By the late 1950ts, the central planning arrangements which emerged 30 years earlier to facilitate the rapid introduction of advanced technology were tending to restrict further innovation. Planning was production-oriented. The success of both factories and ministries was primarily judged by their ability to carry out their set production plans, within cost constraints. This led ministries to skimp on the resources allocated for experimental work; if these could be squeezed, more would be available for extending basic production facilities. Similarly, factory managements tended to resist innovations proposed by research establishments, because any major change in the pattern of output would disrupt the flow of production, and so the diffusion of existing innovations were slowed down. The second group of factors inhibiting innovation lay in the very strong organizational barriers between the different phases of the research- production sequence. These operated at several levels:

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8-24 (1) Planning of research, development, pre-production and production of a new product, outside the priority projects, are not adequately integrated; (2) The research institutes of the Academies of Sciences which are responsible for most fundamental research, are organizationally quite separate from industrial R&D, and the system is tilted so as to give the latter preference and priority; (3) The strong barriers between military and civilian R&D are not con- ducive to "spin-offs;" (4) Industrial R&D is divided among a number of ministries between which administrative barriers prevent easy communication; (5) Within each ministry, the administrative separation from the face tories of the large research institute and its attendant design bureaus inhibit the introduction of new products and processes. Some further insights into the problem of technology transfer from the basic-science institutes to the R&D institutes within the industrial minis- tries in the U.S.S.R. are provided by the following statements published in Pravda: Science and the Acceleration of Technical Progress Pravda, March 31, 1970, p. 6 A single question was put by the editors of Pravda to a group of physicists from a number of different cities in the country: "What, in your opinion, should be done to increase the con- tribution of Soviet science to accelerated scientific and technical progress?" The replies of the participants of this informal round table are given below. The Scope of Research I. N. Frantsevich, Director of the Institute of Problems of the . Science of Materials, Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. "The primary stimulus to scientific and technical progress is to be found in the kind of long-rang fundamental scien- tific research, the practical significance of which may at first not appear particularly evident. Let us cite a typical example. About 40 years ago the dislocation theory was developed. The prevailing view, during the initial states of its refinement, held that it was extremely unlikely that this theory would ever contribute significantly to a solution of the essential problems of materials science. In fact, the very existence of the dislocation itself was regarded with considerable skepticism. Today this theory is at the very heart of solutions to a wide range of practical tasks. "No less important is the ability to guide successful concrete ideas through to their large-scale practical implementation. An instructive example of this kind of follow-through can be seen in the work of the outstanding Ukrainian scientist Ye. 0. Paton and his associates in their development of the automatic flux welding method into a full-fledged scientific methodology.

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8-25 "The departmental breakdown of work projects into the twin cate- gories of long-term and applied-engineering should not be absolute. It is not administrative association with a particular branch or department, but personnel that is the determining factor in an organi- zation's creativity. It is very important that, wherever expedient, every institute have the resources to see its theoretical scientific developments through to practical fruition. To this end it is necessary, in our opinion, that organizations involved in scientific research be able to call upon well-equipped design offices, prototype production facilities, and -- if its staff is working on some radically-new technical innovation -- an adequate team of instructors capable of giving on-the-spot production assistance at plants and factories. "The main thing, in our view, is that the theoretical as well as the practical people become as involved as possible and play a more active role in the solution of these engineering and physical problems." Avoid Lost Time V. M. Tuchkevich, Director of the Physical-Technical Institute, . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Corresponding Member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. "According _ ~ ~ to our system, the implementation of any new scientific idea passes through a number of successive stages: the laboratory -- the branch institute -- the plant. And quite often the idea runs into obstacles at each stage. "If the concept originated in the laboratory of an academic institute or higher institute of learning, it is by no means always possible to demonstrate its appropriateness or practical feasibility in a reasonably short time. This is because not every laboratory has the equipment necessary to this end. "Regarding the second stage, at the Scientific Research Institute, it may happen that the technical people there are not interested in developing an 'outside-originated' idea. Often it is a matter of months before both sides can reach an agreement on all aspects of the technology and design. "Finally, there is the terminal stage, the plant. Here, based on the equipment and tooling presently available at the plant, the engineering staff will occasionally revise the technology and, in some cases, even the design. The result, still further delay. "It does not follow that even series production of a new item necessarily means practical acceptance of that item. In fact, simply because it has been produced, a component or instrument does not automatically become useful to a customer if the equipment for which it has been designed is not yet in production. This was the case, to cite one example, of the high-power semiconductor tubes developed at our institute. For two years the plant manufacturing these tubes was working, you might say, for the 'shelf.' The situation changed only with the appearance of the rectifier units for electrolysis and electric trains. In a word, lack of coordination and guidance in the efforts of

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8-26 numerous research agencies, branch institutes, and production facilities poses a major obstacle to the practical implementation of many scientific achievements. "It would appear that in many instances important national economic problems might best be solved by abandoning this step-by-step processing of new ideas. In our opinion, task forces might be set up, which would continue their work only until the completion of a specific project. These task forces should include representatives from all interested organizations and agencies, from the Academy of Sciences to the plant level. "Quite instructive, in this regard, is the experience we gained in the development of the semiconductor current-frequency converter. To meet this task, we established a task force which included staff workers from our institute and from the Power Institute, along with plant-level technical personnel. The entire work, from the conceptual stage to production of a pilot model, was accomplished in a very short time." In Cooperation with Engineers E. D. Andronikashvili, Director of the Institute of Physics, Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Georgian SSR. "The rate of scientific-technical progress is affected by a variety of factors. One of the principal deficiencies in many scientific establishments is insufficient attention to the development of new experimental methodologies for the discovery and analysis of natural phenomena. "At our institute we developed spark chambers, of the streamer and wide-gap type, which are now used with all accelerators. Another kind of instrument was designed for work in the area of high-energy physics - a discharge-condensation chamber, capable of competing, in a number of applications, even with the familiar hydrogen bubble chamber. We have proposed original methods for studying the strength characteristics of metals and alloys at low temperatures and have built sensitive microcalorimeters to permit the formulation and solution of utterly new problems in the area of biomacromolecular physics. "Unfortunately, the instrument-manufacturing industry has shown little interest in the production of these new devices. To cite a specific case, our institute worked on the development of an apparatus which, based on the behavior of a radioactive signal throughout a production cycle, would signal the manganese concentration in the raw material, in the concentrates, and in the ferroalloys. What was the -result? Far less time was required for the R&D phase of the project than for the introduction of a prototype model at one of the Chiatura concentrating mills. "It often happens that the practical implementation of scientific developments is left to scientists who do not understand the production aspects of the problem, or to engineers who are not familiar with the principles underlying the new machine or equipment. We have already

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8-27 submitted a proposal to the effect that in such cases mixed teams of alternating membership should be formed, to include scientific personnel and production-oriented engineers. As the work proceeds, the number of scientists in the group should decrease, while the number of production engineers, well acquainted with the prospective environmental conditions of the equipment under development increases. It is our belief that an approach of this kind would do much to meet the requirements of satisfactory scientific and technical progress." From Department to Shop I N. Pus tYnskiy, Department Chairman of the Tomsk Institute of ,~ . . . . Radio Electronics and Electronic Engineering. "Here is a letter we . recently received: 'In line with technical assistance procedures, we request that you send operating instructions for the PTU-8G "Teleglaz" industrial television system, as well as information regarding its cost, the manufacturing plant, and the enterprises at which it is presently in use.' The inquiry came to us from the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine. "Our reply was a factual one. Portable television systems which can be used to view the inside of pipes and various containers do exist. The PTU-8G is one such system; the letter "G" in the designation stands for "gornaya" ["mining"] (Translator's Note: The remaining letters "PTU" in the same designation are the initial letters of the Russian words for "portable television systemic. This tTeleglaz' [tTele-Eye'] can be inserted into a shaft 100 millimeters in diameter. "This system (it was shown at the YDNKh (Translator's Note: VDNKh - Exhibit of National Economic Achievements)) was developed by us on an order from, and with the assistance of, the Institute of Mining of the Siberian Branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Other similar devices have been used at aircraft factories, at chemical plants, and at the I. Y. Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute. This last rTele-Eye' of ours, the tenth of the series, is the smallest. Its pick-up camera is designed in the form of a metal cylinder 25 millimeters in diameter. The entire unit, with cable and remote receiver, will fit in a briefcase. It plugs into a normal power outlet and in the field is fed by a 12-volt storage battery. "With regard to the second part of the question, about the manufacturing plant, thus far there is, regrettably, no manufacturing plant, although our own in-house production facilities are limited and unable to satisfy even the internal demand. "What should be done? A system clearly delineating the various areas of responsibility should be set up; who is to propose new ideas, who is to carry out the research and development work, and who is to see to series production. All these activities must be subordinated to a single coordinated plan, with common incentives provided for everyone involved in the projected new item. And while in tale case of the branch institutes these problems are solved in accordance with the ; .<

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8-28 economic reform program - as indicated by the experience of the electrotechnical industry - effective lines of communication must also be sought for vuz-centered research organizations. "Today, in our opinion, the process of bringing a new item from the institute laboratory into actual production must still involve an intermediate step - an organization or firm capable of assigning and remunerating the work at its various stages of completion. We consider the establishment of such financially self-sustaining firms to promote the purposes of scientific and technical progress to be a measure of great timeliness." Japan Smaller than California with a useful area of only 30%, prostrated by total war just 30 years ago, Japan now challenges the world for supremacy in high-technology goods and services. So far, this challenge is economic -- but if their industrial power continues to grow, it is hard to see how they can avoid leadership in cultural, political and perhaps even military roles as well. Their economy is now third largest -- ahead of West Germany, France, Britain, and China. Even more remarkable is the GNP growth that they sustained for 20 years up to the impact of the "energy crisis." From their destitute drop due to World War II they grew in real terms annually at 97 in the fifties; more than 10% in the early sixties; and 12-14% in the late sixties. They rank first in shipbuilding, commercial vehicles, optics, and most consumer electronics -- they are a fast-growing second in computers, passenger cars, bulk steel, aluminum, copper' textile fibers, and petro- chemicals. Japan is poor in natural resources -- but with long low coastal areas, efficient shipping, and vigorous trading conglomerates, they command low- cost access to the raw materials of the world. They have been very active in forming congenial partnerships with developing countries to produce the materials needed by Japanese industry. Japan's success is not a recent phenomenon; the Meiji reformation began it a century ago. It is not just cheap labor; with their permanent security, housing, bonuses, education, and 10% annual-wage increase, they are passing some of the West Europeans. It is not just high exports; Japan exports less than 12% of its production -- only half that of Britain and Germany. Rather, Japan's success may be attributed to the efficient functioning of a special social system, all of whose parts act together for the common purpose of economic advancement. Perhaps "Japan, Inc." best describes their unique system. The goals of government, management, and labor are the same -- to become the leaders in world productivity. In this system, the government sets overall goals, plans and coordinates long-term strategy, and controls major investment. But the nation's corporations retain great tactical operational autonomy for achieving national goals, and they compete vigorously for profits with one another within Japan. To a remarkable extent, the entire system operates by consensus -- a sort of national participative management.

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8-29 An elaborate, generalized technology strategy was adopted by the Japanese, ideally conceived to exploit that nation's energy, cultural skills, and basic scientific resources, while overcoming the obstacles posed by geographical remoteness, dearth of home natural resources, and limited space. The strategy called for: -- Vigorous expansion in basic industries (e.g. surpassing U.S. in steel capacity by 1975 or so); -- Vigorous lining up of overseas mineral supplies (copper, chromium, etc.~; -- Establishing shipbuilding and shipping for transporting these supplies; -- Concentration on small-volume, high-value products (optics, solid- state devices, small vehicles); -- Importing rather than inventing technology; -- Highly selective, long-range basic research; -- Heavy emphasis on engineering education; -- Seeking out areas of high growth potential suited to their culture (such as marine resource recovery). Although the Japanese program has had astonishing success, the future is somewhat clouded by the polluting effect of all this progress on the environ- ment and by the nation's lack of primary energy sources. Global Technological Policy of Japan Japan provides the most sophisti- cated example of a national technological policy. Yet, Japan has no Ministry of Technology, not because technological policy is unimportant, but because it is probably too important to be entrusted to any particular body. One of its most vital and best-known agencies (and often initiator of technological policy) is MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry), whose jurisdiction extends over a large number of industrial sectors. Other agents are the Ministry of Transportation (which includes shipbuilding), the Ministry of Public Health, the Science and Technology Agency (which plays a major role in the imports and exports of technology), and the Foreign Investment Council. Thus, overall or global technological policy transcends both sectoral policies and departmental responsibilities. The originality of Japan is that there are such sectoral policies for almost all industries, whereas in other countries the number of sectoral policies is markedly smaller and more limited in scope; in fact, these policies in other countries are the exception rather than the rule and tend to address themselves essentially to the science-based industries. In Japan, technological policy covers not only the newer sectors such as computers and integrated circuits, but also the well-established industries such as petrochemicals, steel, heavy machinery, and automobiles. National technological policy seeks to assess and improve the overall level of technological sophistication of a country viewed in its totality. Components of the policy include international trade, imports and exports of technology, level of education, degree of technological independence, and the country's role in the world techno-economic system. Until recently, such policy in Japan has focussed primarily on the problem of catching up, tech- nologically and economically, with the most advanced countries. Now that Japan has essentially caught up, fresh objectives are (a) to maintain that

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8-30 which has been achieved, i.e., to push forward at a pace at least commensurate with that of other countries and (b) to try to solve social and technological problems which arise as a result of rapid technological development. Japan has developed a number of technological indicators which are similar in many respects to economic indicators upon which economic policies are built. Among the most important are: the balance of technological payments, the patterns of direct international investment, the directions of foreign trade, the volume of industrial production made on the basis of foreign technologies, the average size of industrial firms, and the produc-- tivity of industry. (By contrast, in most other countries, such data tend to be less refined, less reliable and comprehensive, and not available over sufficiently long periods. Likewise with science policy; while relatively good data exist on inputs into the science system -- e.g. R&D expenditures and manpower -- relatively little data exist on the outputs of these systems. Hence, it is then virtually impossible to measure the effectiveness of national science policies). The implementation of Japan's technological policies has relied essen- tially upon two tools, one external, the other internal. The external tool is the system of control of the access to enter national markets: imports of technology, licensing agreements between Japanese and foreign firms; direct investment by foreign companies and all foreign payments are tightly con- trolled by the government. The internal tool is the peculiar, and probably unique, partnership between private industry and government. This partner- ship reflects a congruence between the objectives of the government and those of private industry, a congruence synthesized in a common understanding of the national interest. Another feature of the Japanese system is the nature of the decision-making process -- a good decision is the one upon which all participants have agreed and not the one in which one point of view has gained the upper hand over the other. Some Particular Aspects of National Technological Policy A. The Concept of "Key Industries" -- In the U.S. and Europe, the science- based industries such as electronics, aerospace and nuclear power, have generally been regarded as key industries. In Japan, industries which are usually considered as highly traditional can also be regarded as key incus" tries. Thus, shipbuilding in Japan has been a major stimulus to the steel industry, the electronics industry (fully automated tankers), and the machine tool industry. This suggests that virtually any large industry can come to play the role of a key industry in a technological policy. B. Critical Size of Markets -- Western countries, particularly European, have tended to opt out of certain technologies which require large investments primarily because their vision of the potential market was too narrow, often being limited to the purely national market. It is increasingly clear that technological progress can be achieved only if markets are defined in world- wide terms. The Japanese experience suggests that the traditional definitions of critical size of market or investment rely too heavily on the data and experiences of the U.S. C. Investments in Fundamental Research -- Compared with other highly indus- trialized countries, Japan has until quite recently been spending relatively , :

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8-31 much less on fundamental research. (Japan has obtained only two Nobel prizes in science.) Yet, the successes of Japanese technology suggest that at a certain stage of its development (which Japan has probably just passed) a country can save on its fundamental research effort without endangering its technological and industrial strength. D. Balance Between Original Innovation and Imported Innovation - Most national science policies tend to concentrate upon the creation and diffusion of original innovation i.e., generated within the country itself. Scant attention is given to the fact that the overall process of innovation draws very heavily upon imported innovations, brought into the country through foreign firms, licensing agreements, transfer of scientists, personal con- tacts, and imitation. Japan is probably the only country where imported innovation is treated as a major dimension of technological policy. However, this poses some problems: How can imported innovation be made to stimulate rather than thwart the indigenous innovative efforts? How can a smooth transition be achieved from imported technology to indigenous technology? What are the most effective and cheapest means for bringing new technology into the country? E. Spin-off from Military Research - In the last 30 years a number of major technologies in the West have found their origin in military research. Japan has been spending little on military research but this does not seem to have affected, negatively, the competitiveness of its industries and the sophistication of its technology. F. Importance of Sociological Factors - The Japanese model suggests that if a technological policy is to be successful it must fit into the country's social and psychological patterns, a point that seems to have been largely overlooked or ignored in other countries. For example, European countries, in the belief that greater mobility of scientists and engineers would help diminish the technology gap, have tried to stimulate such mobility. The Japanese model shows, however, that a very low rate of mobility is no real impediment to innovation. It suggests that a technological policy should consider such factors as mobility or nonmobility as a specific national characteristic and, rather than try to modify it, seek to use it in a positive way, or at worst to accept it as one of the societal constraints on policy. Japan's Science Policy for the Seventies The Science and Technology Agency of the Prime Minister's Office has indicated the broad outlines of Japanese science policy for the 1910's. Five major influences are recog- nized: (1) the growing awareness of the adverse side effects of technology on environmental quality; (2) the problems of an expanding, information- oriented economy arid rising standard of living while dependent on overseas sources for raw materials; (3) the need for more mission-oriented R&D in concert with the promotion of basic science; (4) the need for more inter- disciplinary cooperation in order to solve society's increasingly-complex problems; and (5) the need for increased international cooperation in science and technology, if the economy is to continue expanding, with both developed and developing countries. A science policy is being developed in response to these influences. In contrast to earlier policies which aimed primarily at raising the technical

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8-32 level of industry and the economic level of the country, science policy for the 70's will be concerned with the betterment of human wellbeing. The following factors are being considered: (1) There must be more respect for man and his welfare. (2) Problems facing science have become exceedingly complex and call for collaboration among many disciplines and the interdisciplinary approach. (3) Basic science and applied technology must develop in harmonious collaboration. (4) Highly-original technology must be cultivated to meet changing situations at home and abroad and to meet social and economic needs -- particularly new technologies to be used in exchange for technologies from other advanced countries and new technologies (to ease Japan's high-density population problem) which are not readily available elsewhere. (5) To give due consideration to the relationships between science policy and other national policies. (6) To clarify and define the state's role in promoting science and tech- nology so that the state can play its role effectively -- e.g. accelera- ting R&D, promoting the spread of scientific and technical information, supporting scientific and technical talent, aiding developing nations. On the other hand the private sector is now more able to carry the R&D load in some sectors previously carried by the state. (7) To attach greater importance to international cooperation in science and technology to raise Japan's status -- particularly aid to developing nations and exchanges with other advanced nations. (8) To foster greater capacities and flexibilities for information processing to give faster response to social, economic, and technical changes. (9) To emphasize the view that the earth's material resources are finite. In line with the above guidelines, the following tactics for science and technology have been proposed: (1) To improve the quality of life: (a) Improve medical care. (b) Improve living conditions - food, diet, housing, etc. (2) To consolidate social and economic foundations and preserve the environ- ment: (a) Increase transport capacity -- e.g. 3D traffic systems. (b) Facilitate information processing and communications. (c) Secure and use more effectively sources of energy and materials. (d) Preserve the quality of the environment Ccontrol of pollution, etc.) (e) Prevent natural and man-made disasters and/or consequences. (3) To develop the economy efficiently: (a) Modernize agriculture, forestry, fisheries. (b) Modernize and rationalize manufacturing industry and foster new industry. Develop automation and emphasize brain-intens~e i~dus- tries. (4) To fulfill international obligations: (a) Assist developing nations. (b) Exchanges with advanced nations. (c) Participate in international agencies. (5) To develop the foundations of technology:

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8-33 (a) Support applied science both when the eventual applications are clear and when they are still hidden. (6) To promote basic science: (a) Cultivate the ground for later development of technology and to engage in the search for truth. The Implications of National Goals for Research Strategies Much of the post-war growth in research in countries such as France, Germany, and the U.K. seems to have stemmed from a conviction that there is a causal relation between investment in research and economic and social prosperity. Nations expanded their scientific resources and coupled them to more and more national programs as needs arose. Science policy, such as it was, developed as a superposition of these programs which were expected to have a stimulating national effect. Such a build-up was inevitably piece- meal and haphazard -- it lacked a systems approach. It is now increasingly evident that there has to be enhanced coordination among the departments and sectors responsible for conducting a nation's scientific and technological progress, but that coordination is not the same as central control. In relating scientific policies to national goals, there has to be a continuing dialogue between the scientific community and society at large. Out of this dialogue should come broad agreements as to allocation of resources among various programs and between basic and applied research. Instead of, for example, the government simply supporting basic research in the hope that corresponding support for applied research and technology will be taken care of in some vague manner by industry, a systems approach could lead to a more balanced distribution of resources. If the post-war period saw some over-emphasis on the support of basic research in various countries, there is now a danger of over-reaction: that relative to applied research, basic research will be supported too little. This danger becomes more acute in the face of changing national goals, multiplying national needs, and social pressures which are impinging on the scientific community in more ways than ever before. In this climate, the scientific community has to become increasingly adaptable and flexible. In addition, while national technological priorities may change with time, it is vital that a policy be maintained which gives the scientific community adequate opportunity for spontaneity in basic research. Compared with other scientific fields, the materials field is relatively fortunate in that important links can readily be perceived between basic research and appli- cations. On the other hand, the fruitfulness of the basic research may be significantly reduced if it is required to shape itself too strictly according to national priorities. Again, the overview or systems approach is called for on a national scale. In conclusion; "At a time when the necessary or possible objectives are particularly shifting and elusive, research policy cannot apportion fundamental research to a number of precise orientations; for lack of simple goals, the national demand for research cannot be defined in detail. In the last analysis, the quality and relevance of research