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I. INTRODUCTION
The cornerstone of the present Air Force Base ·eve] Automation System
(BLAS) is the set of equipment being purchased from the Sperry Corporation
to replace the old UNIVAC 1050-~l and Burroughs 3500/3700/4700 computers.*
This five billion dollar capital replacement program, known as the Phase {V
Program, is the largest computer acquisition ever undertaken by the Air
Force. It will support over 100 major air bases and approximately 265
smaller locations worldwide. Under this approach, the Air Force has sought
to transfer the software for the Automated Data Systems (ADSs) that had
run on the old systems to the new Sperry 1100/60 systems, while providing
processing support that at least equals that which was provided before
Phase {V. The implementation phase has been underway since January 1983,
when Sperry was awarded an eight-year contract, which includes provisions
for two additional (optional) six-year contract extensions. The Air Force
is proceeding with full-scale implementation and presently expects to have
the initial installations completed by mid-1986, or about ten years after
the planning for Phase IV was initiated by Headquarters, United States Air
Force (HQ USAF).
Although the Committee decided early in this study not to dwell too
heavily on the events that led to award of the Phase IV contract or on any
past problems during implementation, some knowledge of the key events is
helpful in understanding the present strategy.** Phase IV has had a trou-
bled past, as reflected in the close scrutiny of and subsequent interaction
with the U. S. House of Representatives' Government Operations Committee
tHGOC), the General Accounting Office (GAO), the General Services
Administration (GSA), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
* The evolution of the BLAS is summarized in Figure ~ on page 4.
** For a summary of Air Force planning leading to the Phase IV Program,
see Applendix A of the predecessor Committee's report, Modernizing the
U. S. Air Force Base Level Automation System, National Academy Press,
Washington, DeCe, 1981e For further detail, see IIPhase IV Reports Air
Force Teleprocessing Center (now Standard Information Systems Center),
Gunter Air Force Station, Alabama, January 1985.
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For example, the HGOC, based on the GAO's findings and recommendations,
recommended in December 1979 that the program be cancelled, due to
perceived problems with the cost (slightly over six billion dollars), the
amount of hardware being planned for each base, and the acquisition
approach. The Air Force, in concert with GSA, was able to resolve this
problem early in 1980 by redirecting the Phase IV Program in several
significant ways. This included agreement to reduce the total number of
systems from 227 to 157, consolidate data processing functions to a
greater extent than previously envisaged, cut manpower authorizations by
at least 250 positions, and conduct base-level functional analyses to
determine longer range requirements and improvements. In addition to
reducing the cost of the program by one billion dollars, the redirection
enabled the Air Force to continue program development.
In December 1980, contracts were awarded to the Burroughs and Sperry
UNIVAC (now Sperry) Corporations to begin the software transition phase
and to demonstrate corporate capability to successfully implement the
Phase IV Program. After Sperry was awarded the implementation contract in
January 1983, a schedule was developed calling for the first transition of
the supply system workload previously resident in the UNIVAC 1050-~] to
Phase IV (Sperry ll00/60) in August 1983. However, because of workload
increases, inefficient (transitioned) software, and inadequate hardware
configurations, the first implementation/conversion (~/C) was delayed
until April 1984. Similar delays were encountered during the transfer of
workload previously resident in the old Burroughs equipment. Thus the
program was delayed in its development and in its implementation.
Between the time that Phase IV was conceived and the present, there
have been major changes in technology as well as in base-]eve] capacity
requirements. Phase IV central processing units were originally conceived
of as the principal processors to support the common support functions of
the canonical Air Force base. In the intervening years, however, a number
of important developments have occurred:
0 During the time that the Phase {V baseline was rigidly controlled,
demand has grown to Potentially exceed the capacity of the Sperry
ll00/60.
O The Air Force has entered into a number of standard requirements
contracts* which make it feasible to decentralize processing to a
greater extent than previously envisaged.
*
These are competitively awarded, indefinite-deilvery, mandatory source
of-supply contracts (schedules) to specify such things as a l6-bit micro-
computer; a 32-bit mu1tistation supermicrocomputer; and an advanced mini-
computer, respectively. Air Force organizations with budget authority
and internal approval may purchase equipment from these schedules without
further procurement activity.
—2—
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o System architecture and Air Force philosophy have shifted away
from a monolithic, centralized time-sharing facility and relative-
~y dumb terminals. The shift has been made toward a decentralized
architecture for which the Sperry ll00/60 fills the role of a host
for a central data base and a communications controller, while an
array of microprocessors and minicomputers permit more decentral-
ized data entry and processing, with local area networks to tie
the configurations together.
The communications environment has changed. DoD will now rely on
the Defense Data Network (DDN) for its long haul communications.
On-base communications will become all-digital. The unit cost of
communications is declining much less rapidly than that for compu-
tation.
In the last few years the automation industry has taken giant steps
forward in the production of hardware and software with greatly improved
capabilities and relatively lower prices. Air Force users have capitalized
on this and a number of efforts are underway to obtain new machines for use
in functional applications. As knowledge and understanding of the benefits
and availability of automation have become more widespread among the users,
requirements for additional ADSs have been developed, placing a greater
potential workload on the base-level automation environment, including the
Phase IV systems.* Some of the functional area applications are being
incrementally improved beyond the capability achieved by merely converting
the old software to Phase IV. A prime example is the Core Automated
Maintenance System (CAMS).
In consideration of these significant developments, the Committee has
focused its efforts on measures to enable the Air Force to develop a future
management strategy for the effective and efficient implementation of data
automation within its worldwide base-1eve] automation environment.
* The number of present and projected automated data systems, or ADSs, for
the wing/base/squadron level is nearing ~0, as reflected in Appendix A.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
automation environment
