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I. INTRODUCTION The cornerstone of the present Air Force Base eve] Automation System (BLAS) is the set of equipment being purchased from the Sperry Corporation to replace the old UNIVAC 1050-~l and Burroughs 3500/3700/4700 computers.* This five billion dollar capital replacement program, known as the Phase {V Program, is the largest computer acquisition ever undertaken by the Air Force. It will support over 100 major air bases and approximately 265 smaller locations worldwide. Under this approach, the Air Force has sought to transfer the software for the Automated Data Systems (ADSs) that had run on the old systems to the new Sperry 1100/60 systems, while providing processing support that at least equals that which was provided before Phase {V. The implementation phase has been underway since January 1983, when Sperry was awarded an eight-year contract, which includes provisions for two additional (optional) six-year contract extensions. The Air Force is proceeding with full-scale implementation and presently expects to have the initial installations completed by mid-1986, or about ten years after the planning for Phase IV was initiated by Headquarters, United States Air Force (HQ USAF). Although the Committee decided early in this study not to dwell too heavily on the events that led to award of the Phase IV contract or on any past problems during implementation, some knowledge of the key events is helpful in understanding the present strategy.** Phase IV has had a trou- bled past, as reflected in the close scrutiny of and subsequent interaction with the U. S. House of Representatives' Government Operations Committee tHGOC), the General Accounting Office (GAO), the General Services Administration (GSA), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). * The evolution of the BLAS is summarized in Figure ~ on page 4. ** For a summary of Air Force planning leading to the Phase IV Program, see Applendix A of the predecessor Committee's report, Modernizing the U. S. Air Force Base Level Automation System, National Academy Press, Washington, DeCe, 1981e For further detail, see IIPhase IV Reports Air Force Teleprocessing Center (now Standard Information Systems Center), Gunter Air Force Station, Alabama, January 1985.

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For example, the HGOC, based on the GAO's findings and recommendations, recommended in December 1979 that the program be cancelled, due to perceived problems with the cost (slightly over six billion dollars), the amount of hardware being planned for each base, and the acquisition approach. The Air Force, in concert with GSA, was able to resolve this problem early in 1980 by redirecting the Phase IV Program in several significant ways. This included agreement to reduce the total number of systems from 227 to 157, consolidate data processing functions to a greater extent than previously envisaged, cut manpower authorizations by at least 250 positions, and conduct base-level functional analyses to determine longer range requirements and improvements. In addition to reducing the cost of the program by one billion dollars, the redirection enabled the Air Force to continue program development. In December 1980, contracts were awarded to the Burroughs and Sperry UNIVAC (now Sperry) Corporations to begin the software transition phase and to demonstrate corporate capability to successfully implement the Phase IV Program. After Sperry was awarded the implementation contract in January 1983, a schedule was developed calling for the first transition of the supply system workload previously resident in the UNIVAC 1050-~] to Phase IV (Sperry ll00/60) in August 1983. However, because of workload increases, inefficient (transitioned) software, and inadequate hardware configurations, the first implementation/conversion (~/C) was delayed until April 1984. Similar delays were encountered during the transfer of workload previously resident in the old Burroughs equipment. Thus the program was delayed in its development and in its implementation. Between the time that Phase IV was conceived and the present, there have been major changes in technology as well as in base-]eve] capacity requirements. Phase IV central processing units were originally conceived of as the principal processors to support the common support functions of the canonical Air Force base. In the intervening years, however, a number of important developments have occurred: 0 During the time that the Phase {V baseline was rigidly controlled, demand has grown to Potentially exceed the capacity of the Sperry ll00/60. O The Air Force has entered into a number of standard requirements contracts* which make it feasible to decentralize processing to a greater extent than previously envisaged. * These are competitively awarded, indefinite-deilvery, mandatory source of-supply contracts (schedules) to specify such things as a l6-bit micro- computer; a 32-bit mu1tistation supermicrocomputer; and an advanced mini- computer, respectively. Air Force organizations with budget authority and internal approval may purchase equipment from these schedules without further procurement activity. 2

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o System architecture and Air Force philosophy have shifted away from a monolithic, centralized time-sharing facility and relative- ~y dumb terminals. The shift has been made toward a decentralized architecture for which the Sperry ll00/60 fills the role of a host for a central data base and a communications controller, while an array of microprocessors and minicomputers permit more decentral- ized data entry and processing, with local area networks to tie the configurations together. The communications environment has changed. DoD will now rely on the Defense Data Network (DDN) for its long haul communications. On-base communications will become all-digital. The unit cost of communications is declining much less rapidly than that for compu- tation. In the last few years the automation industry has taken giant steps forward in the production of hardware and software with greatly improved capabilities and relatively lower prices. Air Force users have capitalized on this and a number of efforts are underway to obtain new machines for use in functional applications. As knowledge and understanding of the benefits and availability of automation have become more widespread among the users, requirements for additional ADSs have been developed, placing a greater potential workload on the base-level automation environment, including the Phase IV systems.* Some of the functional area applications are being incrementally improved beyond the capability achieved by merely converting the old software to Phase IV. A prime example is the Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS). In consideration of these significant developments, the Committee has focused its efforts on measures to enable the Air Force to develop a future management strategy for the effective and efficient implementation of data automation within its worldwide base-1eve] automation environment. * The number of present and projected automated data systems, or ADSs, for the wing/base/squadron level is nearing ~0, as reflected in Appendix A.

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