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Notes ~ For analyses of scenarios that might lead to nuclear war, see Allison et al. (Allison, G. T., Carnesale, A., and Nye, J. S., Jr. 1985. Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War. New York: W. W. Norton), Kahn (Kahn, H. 1964. Thinking About the Unthinkable. New York: Avon; Kahn, H. 1984. Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s. New York: Simon & Schuster), Beres (Beres, L. R. 1980. Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press), and Cox (Cox, A. M. 1982. Russian Roulette: The Superpower Game. New York: Times Books). 2 For a more detailed account ofthis tension, see George et al. (George, A. L., Hall, D., and Simons, W. 1971. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Boston: Little, Brown) and George (George, A. L. 1984. Crisis manage- ment: The interaction of political and military considerations. Survival XXVIt5, September-October]:223-2341. 3 For a fuller account of the U.S. decision to intervene in Korea, see Paige (Paige, G. 1968. The Korean Decision. New York: Free Press) and George and Smoke (George, A. L., and Smoke, R. 1974. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press, Chapter 6~. A more recent crisis that also involved misjudgment about which interests an adversary considered vital resulted in the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 (see Lebow, R. N. 1985. Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The origins of the Falklands War. In R. Jervis, R. N. Lebow, and J. G. Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press). 4 Classic accounts of deterrence theory have been presented by Schelling (Schelling, T. C. 1960. The Strategy of Conpict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; Schelling, T. C. 1966. Arms and influence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press), Kautmann (Kauf- mann, W. W.1956. The requirements of deterrence. In W. W. Kaufmann, ea., Military Policy and National Security. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), Russett (Russett, B. 1963. The calculus of deterrence. Journal of Conpict Resolution 7:97-109), and Snyder (Snyder, G. 1961. Deterrence and Defense. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). A brief summary of the central propositions of deterrence theory has been presented by George and Smoke (1974, Deterrence, Chapter 3J. 5 For a detailed account of the role of beliefs and perceptions in nuclear policy decisions, see Jervis (Jervis, R. 1984. The Illogic of 37

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38 NOTES American Nuclear Strategy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press). The nature of strategic stability has been discussed in more detail by Schelling (1966, Arms and Influence) and Rathjens (Rathjens, G. 1969. The dynamics of the arms race. Scientific American 2204:15-251. 6 More detail on the impact of technology on strategic stability can be found in Perry (Perry, W. J. 1982. Technological prospects. In B. Blechman, ea., Rethinking the U.S. StrategicPosture. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger). 7 Most of the material in this section and the accompanying figures are taken from the presentation by Edward Warner, The Rand Corpo- ration, at the seminar "Crisis Management in the Nuclear Age" held at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., April 1986. ~ See U.S. Congress, Senate (U.S. Congress, Senate. 1963. Staffing Proced ures and Problems in the Soviet Union. Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Committee on Government Opera- tions. 88th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 25~. 9 On the difficulties of information processing in bureaucracies, see Wilensky (Wilensky, H. 1967. Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry. New York: Basic Books) and Downs (Downs, A. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown). For examples in the context of an international crisis, see Allison (Allison, G. T. 1971. Essence of Decision. Boston: Little, Brown, pp. 11~123) and Sagan (Sagan, S. 1985. Nuclear alerts and crisis man- agement. International Security 9:99-1391. For a general account of how such problems are involved in breakdowns of control in complex technical systems, see Perrow (Perrow, C. B. 1984. Normal Accidents: Living With High Risk Technologies. New York: Basic). The relevance of these points to decision making in the NSC has been noted by Richard Beal, who ran the crisis management systems and planning office in the White House in the early 1980s (see Smith, R. J. 1984. Crisis management under strain. Science 225:907-9091. is Classic general accounts of bureaucratic politics can be found in Lindblom (Lindblom, C. E. 1965. The Intelligence of Democracy. New York: Free Press) and Neustadt (Neustadt, R.1960. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York: John Wiley & Sons). For applications to international relations, see Halperin (Halperin, M. H., with Clapp, P., and Kanter, A. 1974. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, Chapters 8 and 9) and George (George, A. L. 1980. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, Chapter 6~; for applications to an international crisis, see Allison (1971, Essence of Decision, Chapters 5 and 6~. ii On the bureaucratic causes of information distortion, see Halperin (1974, Bureaucratic Politics, Chapter 9~. For this example, see Sorenson

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NOTES 39 (Sorenson, T. C. 1965. Kennedy. New York: Harper & Row), Halperin (1974, Bureaucratic Politics, pp. 48, 16~168), and Wyden (Wyden, P. 1979. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York: Simon & Schuster). i2 For an account of ThomPson's role, see Abel (Abel, E. 1966. The Missile Crisis. Philadelphia: Lippincott). is Sick (Sick, G. 1986. All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran. New York: Viking Penguin, p. 354~. id The experimental research establishing the perseverance and po- larization of beliefs in the face of new data is summarized by Ross and Anderson (Ross, L., and Anderson, C. A. 1982. Shortcomings in the attribution process: On the origins and maintenance of erroneous social assessments. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, eds. Judgment and Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. New York: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, pp.144-1511. For accounts of how that tendency operates in organizations responsible for foreign policy decision making, see Jervis (Jervis, R. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Chapter 4) and Lebow (Lebow, R. N. Between Peace and War: The Nature of Interna- tional Crisis. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.153- 169). is From the presentation by McGeorge Bundy, New York University, at the seminar "Crisis Management in the Nuclear Age" held at the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., April 1986. i6 However, there is much evidence in the psychological literature to demonstrate that others do not see us as we see ourselves, and that the differences are systematic. See Monson and Snyder (Monson, T. C., and Snyder, M.1977. Actors, observers, and the attribution process: Toward a reconceptualization. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 13:89- 111) for a review. For applications to international crises, see Jervis (1976, Perception, pp. 67-76), Lebow (1981, Between Peace and War, Chapter 6), and Jervis et al. (1985, Psychology and Deterrence). i7 See Kennedy (Kennedy, R. 1969. Thirteen Days. New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 24-26), Hilsman (Hilsman, R. 1967. To Move a Nation. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday), and George and Smoke (1974, Deter- rence, pp. 477~811. i~ For accounts of misjudgment and misperception in past interna- tional crises, see Jervis (1976, Perception, pp. 67-76), Lebow (1981, Between Peace and War, Chapter 6), and Jervis et al. (1985, Psychology and Deterrence). i9 See Smith (1984, Crisis management). 20 From the presentation by McGeorge Bundy, see note 15. 21 Chairman's Special Study Group (Chairman's Special Study Group. April 1982. The Organization and Functions of the JCS. Technical Report, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C., April). 22 Allison (1971, Essence of Decision, pp. 131-132~.

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40 NOTES 23 George (George, A. L. 1986. The impact of crisis-induced stress on decision-making. In F. Solomon and R. Q. Marston, eds., The Medical Implications of Nuclear War. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press). 24 On Stalin, see Mikoian (Mikoian, A. I. 1985. V pervye mesiatsy velikoi otechesvennoi voiny. Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, Number 6), Erickson (Erickson, J. 1983. The Road to Stalingrad. London: Weiden- feld and Nicolson, pp. 125-126), and Voronov (Voronov, N. N. 1984. In S. Bialer, ea., Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, p. 2101; on Eden, see Thomas (Thomas, H. 1967. The Suez War. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books); on Rabin. see Brecher (Brecher, M., with Geist, B. 1980. Decision in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press). 25 Some general summaries of psychological research on stress effects on performance have been given in Easterbrook (Easterbrook, J. A. 1959. The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of behavior. Psychological Review 66:183-201), Janis and Mann (Janis, I. L., and Mann, L. 1977. Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conpict, Choice, and Commitment. New York: Free Press), and Krech and Crutchfield (Krech, D., and Crutchfield, R. S. 1964. Anxiety and cognition In Cognition: Theorv. Research and Promise. New York: , ~, Harper ~z; ~ow). tor a discussion of the issue in the context of an international crisis, see Holsti (Holsti, O. R. 1987. Crisis Decision Making. Paper prepared for The Committee on Contributions of Be- havioral and Social Science to the Prevention of Nuclear War, National Research Council); in relation to the handling of nuclear weapons, see Abrams (Abrams, H. L. 1986. Sources of human instability in the handling of nuclear weapons. In F. Solomon and R. Q. Marston, eds., The Medical Implications of Nuclear War. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press). 26 Janis and Mann (1977, Decision-Making) have reviewed the psy- chological literature on coping with stress and identify conditions conducive to this sort of maladaptive response. 27 This "groupthink" phenomenon is explored by Janis (Janis, I. L. 1982. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fias- coes. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin). 28 From the presentation by McGeorge Bundy, see note 15. 29 See, for example, Jervis et al. (1985, Psychology and Deterrence). This interpretation is a continuing subject of dispute in particular historical instances, as can be seen in the debate between Orme (Orme, J. 1987. Deterrence failures: A second look. International Security 114:96-124) and Lebow (Lebow, R. N. In press. Deterrence failure revisited. International Security). 30 A general source is Whiting (Whiting, A. S. 1960. China Crosses

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NOTES 41 the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War. New York: Macmillan). An interpretation in terms of misperception is given by Lebow (1981, Between Peace and War, Chapter 61. For an alternative interpretation, see Orme (1987, Deterrence failures). 31 For a fuller discussion of the security dilemma and the ways it can create and compound misinterpretations, see Jervis (1976, Perception and Misperception, Chapter 3) or Snyder (Snyder, J. L.1985. Perceptions of the security dilemma in 1914. In R. Jervis, R. N. Lebow, and J. C. Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 153-1791. 32 Kennedy (1969, Thirteen Days); George and Smoke (1974, Deter- rence). 33 Bracken (Bracken, P. 1983. The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, p. 721. 34 Allison (1971, Essence of Decision, p. 139~. 35 See, for example, Blechman and Hart (Blechman, B. M., and Hart, D. M. 1982. The political utility of nuclear weapons: The 1973 Middle East crisis. International Security 7:132-1561. 36 The material in this section is taken from the presentation by John Steinbruner, The Brookings Institution, at the seminar "Crisis Man- agement in the Nuclear Age" held at the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., April 1986. More detailed accounts of the command and control of nuclear weapons in both their technical and organizational aspects have been written by Blair (Blair, B. 1985. Strategic Command and Control. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution), Bracken (1983, The Command and Control of NuclearForces), and Carter et al. (Carter, A. B., Steinbruner, J. D., and Zracket, C. A., eds. 1987. Managing Nuclear Operations. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution). 37 The doctrine of flexible response holds that U.S. forces should be prepared to fight at various levels of force with a variety of weapons. This doctrine clearly multiplies the number of necessary decisions compared with the doctrine of assured destruction, in which only one option, the nuclear option, must be considered. 38 From the presentation by John Steinbruner; see note 36. 39 Blair (1985, Strategic Command and Control, pp.234-238) discusses the pressures on U.S. strategists to plan for launching retaliatory strikes before attacking missiles hit. Soviet strategic doctrine has also included plans to launch retaliatory strikes "on warning" of an attack (Freedman, L. 1983. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 267-2681. See also Carter et al. (1987, Managing Nuclear Operations). 40 Talbott (Talbott, S. 1984. Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Adminis- tration and the Stalemate in Arms Control. New York: Knopf, pp. 34- 351; National Academy of Sciences (National Academy of Sciences.

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42 NOTES 1985. Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, p. 1101. 4i From the presentation by John Steinbruner; see note 36. 42 Ibid. 43 A more detailed presentation of the requirements of crisis man- agement can be found in George (1984, Crisis management). Some of the material in this section came from the presentation by McGeorge Bundy; see note 15. 44 From the presentation by McGeorge Bundy, see note 15. For a different reading of Kennedy's meaning, see Allison (1971, Essence of Decision, p. 1) and Sorenson (1965, Kennedy, p. 7051. 45 For more detailed treatments of the subject of coercive diplomacy, see George et al. (1971, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy) and Snyder and Diesing (Snyder, G. H., and Diesing, P. 1977. Conpict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in Inter- national Crises. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, especially Chapter 31. 46 On the potential role of arms control in easing the security dilemma, see Kahan (Kahan, J. 1975. Security in the Nuclear Age. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, pp. 303-305~. 470n clarifying commitments, see Lebow (1981,Between Peace and War, pp. 97) or George and Smoke (1974, Deterrence, Chapter 191. Note, however, that nations sometimes increase the scope of their deterrent policies by keeping their commitments ambiguous, see Schelling (1966, Arms and Influence). On the difficulty policymakers experience from time to time in determining U.S. interests in advance of a crisis, see George (George, A. L. 1983. Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, pp. 387-389~. 48 Talbott (1984, Deadly Gambits). 49 Nye (Nye, J. 1985. Nuclear risk reduction measures and U.S.- Soviet relations. In B. Blechman, ea., Preventing Nuclear War: A Realistic Approach. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press). 50 Ury (Ury, W. 1985. Beyond the Hotline. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin). 5i Weinberger (Weinberger, C. 1983. Report to the Congress by Sec- retary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on Direct Communication Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 11. fReprinted in B. Blechman, ea., Preventing Nuclear War: A Realistic Approach. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 198311. 52 Williams (Williams, W. J.1985. Expanding the U.S.-USSR military dialogue. In B. Blechman, ea., Preventing Nuclear War: A Realistic Approach. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press). 53 Blechman (1985, Preventing Nuclear War); Ury (1985, Beyond the Hotline). 54 New York Times. May 6, 1987. "Accord reported to ease war risk."

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NOTES 43 55 Comments of David Jones at the seminar "Crisis Management in the Nuclear Age" held at the National Academy of Sciences, Washing- ton, D.C., April 1986. 56 Ibid. 57 From the presentation by McGeorge Bundy; see note 15. 58 There have been efforts to do this, both within and outside govern- ment. Much of the government-sponsored work has been reviewed by Andriole and Young (Andriole, S. J., and Young, R. A. 1977. Toward development of an integrated crisis warning system. International Studies Quarterly 21 [March]:107-150~.

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