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Appendix POPULATION DYNAMICS AND POLITICAL STABILITY Eugene A. Hamme] and Erik D. Smith University of California, Berkeley

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PART I Theory 1. Introduction. ~ this appendix we argue that high rates of population growth may lead to political instability. Because recent political events have led us to focus on the Muslim world, we pay particular attention to it.2 The argument has several parts: . ~ . High growth rates lead to high ratios of youth to economic producers. These ratios burden any economy, especially weak ones. I . ~ . ~ . The resources of the state are insufficient to educate youth properly so that they must take menial and unsatisfying jobs if those are even available. I. I.2. The opportunities for employment are insufficient to absorb the 'youth bulge." . ~ .3. Unemployment leads to delayed adulthood, delayed marnage, and frustration. . ~ .4. Large family sizes lead to parental unde~vestment in children, to high ratios of younger versus older siblings, and to consequent political rebelliousness. I.2. To explore these issues we must first define some basic demographic concepts. Readers who arefamiliar with or wouldprefer not to deal with these technicalities but go to the main argument should skip to Section 3. After a general examination of the relationship between population growth, population st~uctwe, and political instability, we analyze in Part Il individual-level data Mom Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)3 to test some of the theoretical ideas

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about the relationship between fertility, ethnic and religious identity, and several measures of socioeconomic status (SES). 2. Demographic concepts. 2. ~ . Age structure. The age structure of a population is the count of persons by age, typically shown in the customary categories of 0, 1-4, 5-9, . . . 95-99..., where these intervals are closed on the bottom and open on the top. Age O includes persons Dom birth until the instant before the first birthday, I-4 includes those Mom the first birthday until the instant before the fifth, and so on. The age structure is often graphically presented as an age pyramid, one side showing the distribution for females, the other for males, thus encapsulating both the age and the sex structure of the population. The detailed distnbution by age is often sllmmanzed in the "depen(lency ratios." The child or young-age depenclency ratio is usually the ratio of persons 0-14 to those 15-64, while the elderly or old- age dependency ratio is usually that of persons 65 and older to those ~ 5-64. The underlying assumption is that persons 15-64 are producers while those below and .. above that range are consumers. Of course, actual practices and labor market conditions may affect the typical age range of "producers" and what proportion of them (especially according to sex) are actually pro~ucing.4 Note that at the individual level an analog to the child dependency ratio is the number of living children per mother, or per couple, with similar caveats about producers argot consumers.s 2

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2.2. Population dynamics. Apart Tom migration, populations are subject to change in size through birth and death. For the moment we consider only "closed" populations, that is, populations with no migrational inflows or outflows. There are no such populations reliably known (other than the population of the entire worId), but the concept is useful analytically. Obviously, in any population, if the number of births in some time period is the same as the number of deaths, the population does not change in size. If births exceed deaths it prows if deaths , O , exceed births, it shrinks. More generally we may say that if the crude birth rate (births per thousand persons) equals the crude death rate (deaths per thousand persons), the population does not change in size, and if one rate exceeds the other. the population changes accordingly. These concepts lead to the definition of three kinds of populations. 2.2.~. Stable populations are those in which the birth and death rates have not changed, or at least have not changed appreciably in a long time. A fundamental idea is that a population with a particular schedule of mortality (the probability of death by age) underlying its crude death rate, and with a particular level of fertility, will have a charactenstic alla unchanging age structure. This is easy to see intuitively. A given rate of fertility will produce a certain number of births; each of these enters the population at age zero. As these persons age, year by year' some and eventually all axe removed from the population by mortality. Since they are removed at a particular rate at each age, the age pyramid is sculpted to a particular shape by the mortality schedule. Since, in each year that some set of persons born ? -

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(a birth cohort) increases in age and is diminished by mortality, some next cohort is born in exact proportion to the total, the pyramid retains its shape. 2.2. ~ . ~ . If the crude birth and death rates are equal, the population does not change in size. Such a stable population is called "stationary." 2.2. ~ .2. If the crude birth and death rates are unequal, the population does change in size, but since the population is stable, as defined above, the age structure does not change. 2.2. I.3. The combination of crude birth and dead rates yields a population growth rate, which remains constant through the so long as the birth and death rates are stable. 2.2.2. By obvious contrast, unstable populations will have shining age distnbutions. Typically, unstable populations will change in size, for example, through a crisis of mortality induced by warfare or disease, or through a sudden change in fertility, as ~ a "baby boom." It is possible, of course, for a population to experience simultaneously a change In fertility and a precisely offsetting change in mortality, so that the population remains the same in size, even though it changes in age structure. We would not expect to see such precisely offsetting fertility and mortality shifts very open. Indeed, a crisis sending mortality up will commonly send fertility down, and boom times will do the opposite. Fertility changes generally have more dramatic effects on age structure than do proportionally equivalent mortality changes, although they have equivalent and opposite effects on population size. This is because mortality changes are usually spread across s 6 4

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i many age groups, whereas fertility changes impact only the youngest (newborns). 2.3. Population dynamics and stable age distributions. Stable populations typically have different age structures, depending on the combination of their fertility and mortality rates. These Carl be appreciated intuitively. Let us imagine a stationary population in which no one dies until age ~ 00, at which point everyone cties. The population pyramid will be a rectangle. Every year, the same number of people are born, every year everyone gets one year older, and when they reach 100, they disappear. The age pyramids of countries like Japan and those of Western Europe now approach this rectangular shape.6 Fertility is low and not changing much (if we ignore the immigrants). Infant and child mortality are low, so that a very high proportion of newborns survive to be adults. Adult mortality is also low until the advanced ages. Now imagine a population in which fertility is higher but mortality is not concentrated just at the highest ages. The base of the pyramid will be broader, because more people are born, and they will be subtracted starting at an earlier age. The higher the level of fertility, compared with mortality, the broader is the base of the pyramid and, importantly, the higher is the rate of growth. The age pyramids of rapidly growing countnes, such as those of the Middle East or South Asia or ADica, show this broad-based shape. Figure ~ shows some contrasting age pyramids, including one that is projected; these are described in Section 3. s 5

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3. Two consequences of age structures. Some readers will have skipped to this point. Age structures of different shapes imply consequences for the people in them. There are two levels at which such consequences are felt: the society in general and the family in particular. 3. ~ . Figure ~ shows some sample population pyramids graphs of the age structure of populations according to sex, for the United States, Japan, and Gaza in 2002, and one projected for Japan in 2050.7 The United States has relatively low mortality at all ages and a moderate fertility rate and has a rate of natural increase of 0.6 percent per year. By 2002 these had produced an age pyramid that was approaching a columnar or rectangular shape. Relatively few people are born, proportional to the whole population, and mortality is rare until after about age 55. Because the United States has a high immigration rate, the shape of the pyramid is affected by migrants, however. Since most of these migrants are in the working ages, they swell the pyramid in those ages. To the extent that migrants have high fertility, they swell the bottom of the pyramid. The bulge around age 40-50 in the U. S. pyramid is the result of the baby boom of the 1950s. In Japan, the shrinkage at the low ages is the result of declining fertility. By 2050 fertility in Japan is projected to fall sufficiently, and old-age mortality is projected to improve so much that the growth rate will be close to zero, with the age structure resembling a triangle with the apex pointing downward.8 By contrast, fertility is so high in Gaza in 2002 and mortality sufficiently low- that the annual rate of increase is 3.7 percent, alla the shape of the pyramid is the reverse of what Japan's will be in 2050. The Gaza type of age pyramid is typical 6

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of countries growing at a high rate. Egypt, Libya, the Sudan, the Western Sahara, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, the Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are all growing at more than 2 percent per year.9 The mean growth rate for North Africa and the Middle East is 2. ~ percent, implying a doubling time of 33 years. The doubling time for the population ofthe Palestinian Terntones is 19 years.~ 3.2. To appreciate some general societal effects of age structures, think of a population as consisting not only of people but also of opportunities to be fully functioning adults roughly speaking, "jobs" or the opportunity to marry. Our discussion is simplistic, but we offer it to paint a stark picture of how population age structure might affect the life chances of individuals. Imagine that these opportunities to become and progress as adults exist for persons aged 20-65. They are vacated as the incumbents die or retire and are successively vacated and filled as persons age upward in the opportunity structure and age structure simultaneously. At the lowest level (age 20) they are filled as those who were 19 last year become 20 this year. Ideally, the number of opportunities vacated by 20-year olds becoming 2 ~ is equal to the number of persons aged ~ 9 who survive to be 20. If their number is greater than the number of vacancies, some will be unemployed. At typical ages for manage, some wit] be unmarried. These younger people will have to wait until an opportunity opens up. In the meantime, they may experience frustration. The greater the disparity between a larger, younger age group and the next older and smaller age group, the greater is this disparity between number of potential incumbents and number of opportunities. 7

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Thus, in rapidly growing populations, one might expect slower advancement, delays in marriage because of delays in becoming economically self-sufficient, sexual frustration, and the social and political consequences thereof. Of course, as we note below, societies have numerous opportunitiessocial, cultural, and economic to ameliorate such conditions. We only wish to suggest their existence. The demographic engine in a rapidly growing population is also on a runaway course. Every year there are increasing numbers of persons entering their reproductive period, who produce (at high rates) children who will produce even more children at similar rates. At the same time, as each age group (say, the 19- year-olds) ages upwards, their numbers exceed those of the persons one year older. Mortality is not high enough to bring their numbers down to what the next oldest were last year; the fertility engine has increased them. In the Palestinian Territories, 10.4 percent of the male population is aged ~5-]9, and about 8.9 percent is aged 20-24. The difference is ~ .5 percent. We can think of this difference as a demographically induced crude "unemployment" rate the difference between new aspiring workers and the jobs occupied by the next older group. By contrast, if the growth rate were zero, the proportions in those age groups would have been about 6.81 percent and 6.78 percent, respectively.l2 The difference due to mortality alone would thus be only about 0.03 percent (when growth is zero). The excess of males aged 15-19 in the rapidly growing population described, compared with the number in the stationary population, 8

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Hi: amounts to ~ .47 percent of the population (about 9,000 men in the Palestinian Tewtor~es, for example). It is produced by fertility-dr~ven expansion alone. This is 9,000 young men who have poor prospects of employment, because they exceed by 9,000 the number of jobs vacated by the 20-24 year olds (if indeed all of those have jobs), or marriage, because they cannot support a family. This situation continues proportionally at each successive age ~oup.~3 Of course, the situation is more complex.~4 Where unemployment is high, wages fall, and more people may be hired at a lower ware (if there is work). If employment rises' more money is earned and spent' and the economy itself expands. Nevertheless the basic thrust of the simple model is compelling. Figure 2a shows the level of unemployment that might be anticipated at the boundary between age groups ~5-19 and 20-24 according to Me preceding arguments, if the mortality pattern were that of the mode! life table noted above, with expectation of life at birth about 71 years for males. This is not an untypical level for many countries of the Near East. The figure shows the excess of persons in each age group 15-19 compared with the next higher group across ages 20-24 for growth rates of 0, 0.005, 0.020, and 0.035. The disparity is about 0.03 percent at zero growth but about 1.7 percent at a growth rate of 3.5 percent per year. Figure 2b shows the total "unemployment" disparity across the ages 15-64. The total disparity is 1.85 percent at zero growth and is accounted for entirely by mortality as the population ages across the span. The gross dispanty, discounting mortality, is by definition O at zero growth but about 9 percent at a 9

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growth rate of 3.5 percent per year. The net disparity at that point is over 7 percent (amounting to 16,000 adult males in Gaza, for example). Of course, this disparity is in addition to arty other unemployment level that may prevail for purely economic or political reasons. 3.3. There are several ways in which such problems can be ameliorated. 3.3. ~ . One way is to lower the population growth rate. Increased levels of mortality will have that effect, either by more rapidly emptying positions in the opportunity structured or by diminishing the number of younger persons trying to move into them, or both. increasing mortality is not a policy option, although as Malthus observed, it is often an outcome. Lowenng fertility is a policy option, although it is vigorously opposed by some segments of the political spectrum in the United States and elsewhere including ethnic groups that fee} the need to keep their numbers high. Nevertheless, programs to lower fertility especially in poor countries have had beneficial effects over the past 50 years or so. It is important to observe that fertility has declined quite rapidly in some parts of the Muslim world. The classic levels, after World War IT, were high. The total fertility rate (TFR) (roughly speaking, the number of children a woman could expect to bear if she lived out her reproductive span) was around 6.16 It has fallen to 2.3 ire Tumsia,l7 3.1 in Algena, 3.5 in Egypt, 2.5 in Deb anon and Turkey, but remains high at 6.8 in the Western Sahara, 5.9 in the Palestinian Temtories, 5.7 in Saudi Arabia, and 7.2 in Yemen. Note, however, that in an increasing population, continually increasing numbers of women enter their ? 10

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Table 12a Turkey Muslims and Non-Musl~ms Model Turkey: Muslims and Non-Muslim . ~ . ~ . R Square Adjusted R Square i''' ' ' ' ' 1'~~'lll~~' ' ' ''' ' ' Lear ~ ~ ~~ h1''''''""''"" '' ' ' ' '' '~^'-''~' ''' ' -'' ' '' it' " ....... ......................... . ........ . R ................. ...................... , ~ Model Summary ..... . ....................... .... .... ............................. . . ............ ............... .................. . .. ,$l,~ ......... Std. Error of the Estimate .......... ........... .492(a) .242 .241 ~ . . ~ ~ ... ~ .................. . ~ ~ ......... 1.50129813 ...... i " .~ ~ ..... .. a Predictors: (Constant), Currently Worldug for Cash, dummy: MUSLIM, Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born Children, dummy: URBAN, Years of Primary Education, Years of Higher . ...... ,,, . . , _ , ., ~ . ........ : ,., ,, ,, ..... :.:: , .: ' !!.! ..,Y~ .. !' ' ' '' ' .' :' '' ' ' '' ' ' '- - ~.V _~..~ A .~ ~ ANOVA(b) ... ,., . ~.~ ~ . . .............................................. , .. ......... .. ` ~ . , .~ ~ Model Sum of Squares ,,, .......... .... ............. 4067.017 .... . . ........ ....... .. . 12727.751 16794.768 .. ~ ... ........ .. ........ ................... . df ....... .. ......... ...... .. ....... ............................ . 9 ...... ... . . . . . ... . 5647 5656 Mean Square ......................... .............. ............... . 451.891 F ............. ............ ............ .. , . 200.493 . . . ...... ....... . . .. ... ... .. . . .. . sing. ......... ............. ... ...... ~ .... Turkey: Muslims and Non-Muslims ~ ~ I ~ ,.~. ~ . a Predictors: (` Constant), Curd ally Working fop Cash, donkey ~ :USLIM, Differs ace between Ind: vidual and Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born Children, dummy: URBAN, Years of Primary Education, Years of Higher Education, dummy: East, Simple SES Percentile, Years of Secondary Education Regression ~ ; ........ ~ ..... ......... ..... A, ~ . Residual .. I.. ........................................ Total .000(a) .. . .. . . . .. .... ..... . . .. . ... .. . 2.254 b Dependent Variable: dependent3 Difference Fertility Coefficients(a) ......... .. ...................... .... . .......... . .................... . .. .... . .... - ...... i........... .............................. .. ... .. .... ~ ....... i...... A............. - i..... if..... In................ . .............................. Standardiz Unstandardized ed Coefficients Coefficient s t , . , .. . ... ............ . ............ .. ..... .. ................ ... ....... ........... . ~ A ... .................. .~ .... ~ . ................. .~. Mode! ~ B T Enror7 Beta ~ f ........... . ........ . .... ........ . c~ .. ......... w ~.^ . ~ ~ an. . ~ c~ ~ ~~ .......... _ _ _ ~ . (Constant) .878 .080 11.011 .... . ........... ........................ . ................................ _ _ _ .......................... dummy: MUSLIM 3.404E-02 .068 ~ .006 .502 dummy: URBAN -.256 .046 -.070 -5.610 ,......,~................ - ..................................~........ ..............................,........ . , . . ................. .......................... ~ .... .~................... ......................................... Regional dummy: East .997 .054 .228 18.408 Turkey: Years of Primary Education -.180 .010 -.221 -17.279 ................... .......................................... .............................................. . ... ... ...................~.. .................... ..... ..................... ... . ............................~.~ . ..... ....~..~.... . . Mus. alms Years of Secondary Education -5.699E-02 .019 -.050 -2.993 MusInns ~ Years of Higt r Education | 7.3~7E-02 ~ .042 | .028 | I .764 Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born 3.092 .156 .232 19.884 Children ~ ala ~ - . - Fir- -- ~ _ ~ ~~ ........, _ ~ ~ . .. ,.,...~........ S i m p l e S E S P e r c e n t i l e - 2 . 6 8 7 1 : - 0 3 . 0 0 1 - . 0 4 5 - 3 . 4 5 5 .............. ... ,........ ...... ....,.,......................... . .......,..................... ... .......... _ ..................... .............. ... ..................,.. ..... ............................ Currentl Workine for Cash -.230 .058 -.049 -3.961 a Dependent Variable: dependents: Difference Fertility , ,,,,,,.,., - -.- ' -- - - - ~ ~~ d''10~ 1~'''' '1'' '' ' ' ' '~~ ' ' '''' ~ ~'''''1'/""''~:~'::'~ ' ''' ' ' I:li :': '::' ' '.:_'__ U.ll~ Ad_ . Slg. ...~.....-.......~.-. .000 __ .616 .000 .000 .000 ....--.................. .003 .078 .000 .... ..~...~..... .001 __ .000 _

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Table 12b Turkey Muslim Only Model Summary . __ R - ~ - I ,,, . . R Square Adjusted R Square i Model I = l (Selected) I _ _ 3 . ,.~ ~ ................... . ~ ................ ,~, .d ................... .. . ,~ Onl ~ .502(a) .252 f .251 .. , . l,` , , . ~ _ , ~ w '''"' ''' ''' ''''':'''''''111~#' '' . ~ ,, ~ , ,,~ ~.~ ,. a, de _.,.~ a Predictors: (Constant), Currently Working for Cash, Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Bom Children, dummy: URBAN, dummy: East, Years of Higher Education, Years of Primary Education, Simple SES Percentile, Years of Secondary Education Std. Error of the Estimate 1.49384723 ............................ ........................................ . d ANOVA(b,c) Sum of df Sanares ......... ........................ ....................... .............................................. ~ ~ . .. . .. ~ ............ ... , ... .................................................................... 3820~453 .- 8 1 1347.582 ~ . . 5085 15168.035 5093 . ~ .. ~ . . ,,,,~,,,,,,, A,,,., ........ . . .w.. ..... .... . Model Mean Square ''''"''1 1'~-'"'"'~"-"-'-'''''' ''"'-'1!~ 477.557 ..... . ................ .. ... .... ... ... . 2.232 ... . . ,~., .. ... , ~ .... F ,......................................................... 213.999 .... . ............ ........ ..... .. . sign. . ...................................................... ............ .OOO(a,) . . ...... . . . .................................. . Turkey: Muslims Only Regression ............ . . . .. ........... Residual .......................................... ......... .. Total . .... .. ............... ...... .. ... . a Predictors: (Constant), Currently Working for Cash, Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born Children, dummy: URBAN, dummy: East, Years of Higher Education, Years of Primary Education, Simple SES Percentile Years of Secondary Education ". , ~ ". - . ,, , . . .. - ~ . ~ ~ ., ,.,, ,. ....... b Denendent Vanable: dependents: Difference Fertilitv c Selecting only cases for which dummy: MUSLIM = 1 . . ...................... .. .... ....... . ...... ..................... ............................. . ......... .. ........ Coefficients(a b) . ... , , ............. ................................. ................... . . ~ . . . ........... ................... ............... . .... ........................ . Model Turkey: Muslims Only (Constant) ..................................... ....... ............. ................ .................... , ........... Ada, . dummy: URBAN .............................. ...... =. . . ............... . . ........... ...... ....................... ....... Regional dummy: East ......... .. _ ........................... .............. .. ......... . ............................. .............. . Years of Primarv Education ... . . . . . ~ .. .... ... . ..~ ... .......... . . .. .. Years of Secondary Education .... ........ . .. . ~ . ~ ..... . _ ... ............ ~ ...... Years of Higher Education ~ d ~ - - - 1~ 1 ' ' ''111 ~11 #1~' - ~ Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born Children Simole SES Percentile Currently Working for Cash T .. .. ... . a, . `G .......... ........ .. ................ . ................ .. .. . Unstandardized Coefficients . ......... ...................~............................ .936 ..................... .. ................... ...... -.266 . .. ...... ................. .... .986 .........................~ ........ ........ ~ ... -.183 ~ ~ ... . ..... -5.728E-02 .. . ..... . . ... . . . ... 8.320E-02 Am'''''''''' '''' 11 3.159 -2.709E-03 ~ ..............................................~... ~ Std. ElTor ..... . . ....... ~ .............. .063 ~.~ .048 .. . ............................ .055 .011 .020 . ~ ..... ...... . .043 .... .,, ,! ~ ............... .lUJ .............. i.... ........ .001 !..........,,,,,,_,,, _ l -.243 .061 ,........... ........... ..... ___ i ... .......... Standardized Coefficients Beta _ ,.... . .~.................................. . ...... ,,,.,,....~.'1''~''''''''''''"'~1'~''''''''''i11 -.071 ........ ..................... ....................~........ ~~ .~JaJ .. a... ........... ........... ,.,.......~.,......... ., - ., -.223 ..............., ... .. . . ~ . .............. .. .. . .... -.051 .,, .., ..................... .... ........... ~ .. ~ ... . .032 ...... . ............. ......... ~ ....... I. .... .234 .... ~ .....~.~................... . ...............,... ~ -~045 ,...... .. . ........................ ... .... ... I........ -.051 ... .. ............. .............. .. . .. . . ..... . . . . . .............. 14.872 ''''''''''' 111~11'''''''''''''''' -5~525 ....~......... .......................... 17.969 ...... .. .... -16.542 . .................... ~ . . ... _ . -2.933 ........ ............. I..... ..... 1.935 19.141 ....... ,.. .~ .... .... ............... -3~316 ...................... . ................. -3.957 ........... ........... ........ sig. .000 .000 .000 _i .000 .003 .053 ..................... .000 _ a000 a Denendent Vanable: dependents: Difference Fertility ............... ..^ . ..... ~ ... _ .. ... . . . . .............. ...... ~ . . ......... . ................ ~ ......, ............ ~ . . .................. .. .... ... . ....... ... .... .... . ...... a... .. .............. _............ ................. ..... . ................ b Selecting only cases for which dummy: MUSLIM - 1 ~ ....................~.~.......~ ......... ......... ................... .. .. .............................. ..................................................... .. . .. . . .. .... .............. A.. ....................,...........~.................

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Table 12c Turkey Non-Muslims Only Model Summary . .................... ........................... ., . ............. ........... ....................... , . ............. ......................... . .- .... ................ ................................................. ~ . ........... ~ .................................... Model 0 (Selected) . ~ ~ ................................ . ~ Turkey: Non- .395(a) Muslims Only ........................................ , - ,,,, . ~., ,I,h,,. .......... ,,, ,, ..................... a Predictors: (Constant), Currently Working for Cash' Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born Children, dummy: URBAN, dummy: East, Years of Primary Education, Years of Higher Education, Simple SES Percentile, Years of Secondary, Education ................... ' ' . ' ' ' .......... ' ' _ ~ ._ ,~V~.~,, ' ......... : i " ..! ~ ' . ' A ~ ~ ... ,, ..,, ~ ,"~. .......... Hi. ` ! ............... R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate . ~ ~ .156 .144 1.57305598 _ ........... it . ........ is . ~ Sum of Squares . , ~ . 253.701 . . . I ., . 1370.876 . 1624.577 ANOVA(b c) . ~..~ ~ , . ~ , , -,, , ,,, df Mean Square F .,,, . ~ . ~ w ~ ~.~0 . & 8 31.713 12.816 554 2.475 _ .. ................................... - ...... ....... .... ...... ..................... ,~ .~ ~ ~ . ~ ..................... 562 ......................................... ............ . ................... . ~ su. .......................... it ~ ~ ~ Model . ~ ....... . . Turkey: Non- Muslims Only _ . a Predictors: (Constant), Currently Working for Cash, Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born Children, dummy: URBAN, dummy: East, Years of Primary Education, Years of Higher Education Simple SES Percentile Years of Secondary Education b Dependent Vanable: dependents: Difference Fertility a ~ ~ of. I .. .......... . . ~ . . ..~ . . . . . ..... . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . ~ c Selecting only cases for which dummy: MUSLIM = 0 ~~ ~ ~ ,,_llIed.~ . ~~ ~ .... .......... - . , , _ , , ... - In,,. Recession ....... . Residual ' ' ~ '' ' ' ' 1 ~ '' . ._ _. Total .... , ........... , - ....... .. ..... Big, ............... ...................................... .000(a) . ....... .. . .. . . . . 4 . . .. . . Coefficients(a~b) 1 1 Turkey: Non- Muslims Only 1 6 .... ,,,,-. . . . . . . . ........... ,,~ Model . . . ............ . ................. ..................................... . ... ............. ..... ..... . .................. ........ a .... , ......................... ................. ........... .......... . Standardiz Unstandardized ed Coefficients Coefficient ... .. ........................... s B ~ EStdor | Beta ~ .737 .163~ . -.173 .145 . -.051 .. . . 1.229 .3S4 .137 . -~ -.161 ~.032 -.209 . -3.248E-02 .085 ~-.02 1~ . -8.073E-02 .182 ~ -.023 . . . .. , 2.597 .470 .219 .........................._........... ......................~............ ...................~....... -2.662E-0~ 3 .003 .... ~ 0.45. . -.131 .183 -.029 ~ . - ' ~ 1~ ~ 'TO I_d Ii ~ 1 . . .... _ .. a Dependent Able. dependent3: D Florence Per il b Selecting only cases for Reich dummy: MUSLIM = 0 . . (Constant) . ~ ....... .. ...,. ~ ..................................... ............. ... ... ............................. ........ ............ dummy: URBAN .... ........... - ........ .................................... ........................................ .......... ........................... Regional dummy: East .......... A........ ..................... ................. - ............ ".................................... ~............................ ........................ Years of Primary Education . .. .... ......~. . . A... .~...... .. ......... .... . . ..... .... . .. . ... . Years of Secondary Education . .... . ............... _ ....... . . ....,.... ............. .. . .. . ....... ... . . .... Years of Higher Educahon Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born Children ..... .... ... . .. ~ .. ~ .. ~ ............ ~ ........ ......... . .......... . .......... ....................... ~ .... .... .... Simple SES Percentile .. .. ... - a.. ............................... . ......... - . . ............ .............. a................ ............ ........................ .~ . Charred ~ for Cash t Sig. .... ..... 4.517 ... ........ ............~.. . . -1.192 .......~.... ............... ~ _ 3.468 .................................. -5.124 _ ~ = -.383 ~ a_ -.4 ... ............... .... ... ........ ~ . . 5.531 ..............~.......... ....... -1.045 .......~..~..~............... d,,,., in. ~ . -. / 10 234 ........................... .001 ...........................~.... .000 . . ... ... .658 ..... . . ".... .000 .474 75 ?

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Figure captions: Figure 1 Contrasting population pyramids Figure 2a Percent unemployed at age 15-19/20-29 at different growth rates Figure 2b Sum of interage group disparities 1 5-64 ('unemployment") Figure 3a Distnbution of 131 countries by proportion of population that is Muslim Figure 3b Lorenz curve of Muslim population Figure 4 Standardized recession coefficients by country by variable Figure 5 Standardized regression coefficients by variable by country 76

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FIGI~E 1 ContrastiIlg population pyramids MALE United States: ~B82 AGE , , ~ . ~, ~ . i4 12 iO 8 ., ]. . ~ . . ,~ ~ 4 FEd0LE 80-64 75-75. 70-~g, 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49: 40-44- 35-39 30-~4 25-29 20-24 1o~i9~ Population (in ~illions) Source: U.S. Cen~us Bureau' International Osta Base. ...... _ , ~ . . . 8 10 12 14 H~LE J~p~n: 2082 AGE FEN9LE 4 3 1 145_49' 120-3 20-~` la-l. -I 5-9 1 , 0-4 0 0 Population (in pillions) Source: U.S. Census Buresu, International Osta Base. M9LE J~p~n: 2058 AGE .. _ __ ~ _ ~_ - _ _ ~ _ ..: '. . :~_ ~ a_ _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 ~ _1. 1 __ _ - 1 _ 9 ~ ~_ ~1 ~ _ ~1 ~ ~ ~ _ l ~ . .' ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ ~ _ .,~ ~ _1 ~ ; ~ ~ _ ~X ~ _~_s ...] ~ _ ~ 1 _ _s _s 1 ~ _ ~ __ _ _ l ~ _ ~ __ ~ 1 __ _ ~ ~ 1 ~ _ 1 _ l l ~ ~ ~ __ ~ 1 __ ~ ~ _ I - ~ 1 ~ l ~ 1 Cl , , ! ._ 6 5 4 3 ~ ~ ~ 80-84 765Oo_~ 55-59 4535_45f 12i5-2l4 10-14 0-4 . 1~ 1 0 ~ 1 ~ 3 Population ( in rni l l ions) SourCe: U.S. Census Buresu, International Osta Base. FEN~LE , , 1 4 5 ~ 1 3 77

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Gala Strip: 2092 MOLE AGE FEMALE r 175_79[ . 6g-6* ~45~53 41113g-38 - 11 i1128-24 1115-19 ~ l~iO-i4 I_. _ l ~ ~ 7~__ ~ A; n ~ ~ 1 1 __ _ 15~ 7 ~ ~ 1 1 1 ~. 1 i. 0-4 _ 200 150 100 50 0 0 50 100 150 200 Population (in thousands) Source: U.S. Census Bureau' International Oata Base. 6 9 78

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FIG~E 2a Percent unemployed at age 15-19/20-29 at different growth rates ,.S I.6 l.4 I.2 a. 1 ~0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 o- r _ _ to U@.005 Growth Rates U@.020 t3~.03S FIGURE 2b Sum of interage group disparities 1 5-64 ("unemployment") 8 A 7 6 S $ 4 3 2 1 o a total disparity ~ net disparity . . 1 . 1 . _ -Led ~ _ ~ ~ _ ~ _ AIL _ _ ~ _ Or ~3 loll 82 ~ ,IL ~ AIL _ BL IIL 1 111 .1111 1 l 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 3. 1 1 3' ~ 1 ~ 3T 1 T 382 1 25 213 3 2,3 3 2 2 L 1 22 2 1 totUtS~ 0 toW15-64~.005 totU15~.02 totU15~4~.03S Growth Rate 79

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FIGURE 3a Dishibution of 131 countries by proportion of population that is Muslim 40 35 30 1 - ~_~ 10 5 o s . . ~ - I I I ~ I I ~ I r - 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Proportion Muslim 7 80

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FIGURE 3b Lorenz curve of Muslim population 1.00- 0.90 0.80 o . - :s 0.70 e - ~ 0.60 o o =0 0.50 o '> 0.40 - `~ 0.30- 0.20 0.10 r / J r J / I, , 1 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 Cumulative Proportion of Total World Population 81

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FIGI3RE 4 Standardized regression coefficients by country by variable 0.600 ~ 400 1 oboe -0.400 -0.600 6 1~ Urban 11111 Region 1133 PrimEd ID SecEd OHiEd Child Loss mSES EICash me 1 -. ,.;....E ~ . F F Egypt: Tunisia: All Turkey: Morocco: All India: Muslims Bangladesh: Palcistan: All Yemen: All Sud - : Muslins Only Muslims Muslins Only Muslirr~ Only Muslim Only Muslims Muslims Muslins Only Assumed Assumed Assumed Assumed Sample 82

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f FIGURE 5 Standardized regression coefficients by variable by country 2.000 - \.500 1.000 0.500 0.000 .SOO - -1 .000 1 __ ~ E I Egypt: Muslims Only 13 Turkey: Muslims Only E3 Tunisia: All Musluns Assumed O Morocco: All Muslims Assumed ~ India: Muslims Only El Bangladesh: Muslims Only ED Pakistan: All Muslims Assumed 113 Yemen: All Muslims Assumed llB Sudan: Muslims Only , i . . i. i B. ~ ~ ~,d,~,~ ~3 ~ . i I -) at, , ,, , , Am. . . _ ~ Hi l _ ~ 1 ~ 1 Urban Region PnmEd SecEd HiEd Child Loss SES Cash Variable 83