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OCR for page 37
Appendix
POPULATION DYNAMICS AND POLITICAL STABILITY
Eugene A. Hamme] and Erik D. Smith
University of California, Berkeley
OCR for page 38
PART I
Theory
1. Introduction. ~ this appendix we argue that high rates of population growth may
lead to political instability. Because recent political events have led us to focus on
the Muslim world, we pay particular attention to it.2 The argument has several parts:
. ~ . High growth rates lead to high ratios of youth to economic producers. These
ratios burden any economy, especially weak ones.
I . ~ . ~ . The resources of the state are insufficient to educate youth properly so that
they must take menial and unsatisfying jobs if those are even available.
I. I.2. The opportunities for employment are insufficient to absorb the 'youth
bulge."
. ~ .3. Unemployment leads to delayed adulthood, delayed marnage, and
frustration.
. ~ .4. Large family sizes lead to parental unde~vestment in children, to high
ratios of younger versus older siblings, and to consequent political
rebelliousness.
I.2. To explore these issues we must first define some basic demographic concepts.
Readers who arefamiliar with or wouldprefer not to deal with these
technicalities but go to the main argument should skip to Section 3. After a
general examination of the relationship between population growth, population
st~uctwe, and political instability, we analyze in Part Il individual-level data Mom
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)3 to test some of the theoretical ideas
OCR for page 39
about the relationship between fertility, ethnic and religious identity, and several
measures of socioeconomic status (SES).
2. Demographic concepts.
2. ~ . Age structure. The age structure of a population is the count of persons by age,
typically shown in the customary categories of 0, 1-4, 5-9, . . . 95-99..., where
these intervals are closed on the bottom and open on the top. Age O includes
persons Dom birth until the instant before the first birthday, I-4 includes those
Mom the first birthday until the instant before the fifth, and so on. The age
structure is often graphically presented as an age pyramid, one side showing the
distribution for females, the other for males, thus encapsulating both the age and
the sex structure of the population. The detailed distnbution by age is often
sllmmanzed in the "depen(lency ratios." The child or young-age depenclency
ratio is usually the ratio of persons 0-14 to those 15-64, while the elderly or old-
age dependency ratio is usually that of persons 65 and older to those ~ 5-64. The
underlying assumption is that persons 15-64 are producers while those below and
..˘
above that range are consumers. Of course, actual practices and labor market
conditions may affect the typical age range of "producers" and what proportion
of them (especially according to sex) are actually pro~ucing.4 Note that at the
individual level an analog to the child dependency ratio is the number of living
children per mother, or per couple, with similar caveats about producers argot
consumers.s
2
OCR for page 40
2.2. Population dynamics. Apart Tom migration, populations are subject to change in
size through birth and death. For the moment we consider only "closed"
populations, that is, populations with no migrational inflows or outflows. There
are no such populations reliably known (other than the population of the entire
worId), but the concept is useful analytically. Obviously, in any population, if
the number of births in some time period is the same as the number of deaths, the
population does not change in size. If births exceed deaths it prows if deaths
, O ,
exceed births, it shrinks. More generally we may say that if the crude birth rate
(births per thousand persons) equals the crude death rate (deaths per thousand
persons), the population does not change in size, and if one rate exceeds the
other. the population changes accordingly. These concepts lead to the definition
of three kinds of populations.
2.2.~. Stable populations are those in which the birth and death rates have not
changed, or at least have not changed appreciably in a long time. A
fundamental idea is that a population with a particular schedule of mortality
(the probability of death by age) underlying its crude death rate, and with a
particular level of fertility, will have a charactenstic alla unchanging age
structure. This is easy to see intuitively. A given rate of fertility will
produce a certain number of births; each of these enters the population at age
zero. As these persons age, year by year' some and eventually all axe
removed from the population by mortality. Since they are removed at a
particular rate at each age, the age pyramid is sculpted to a particular shape
by the mortality schedule. Since, in each year that some set of persons born
?
-
OCR for page 41
(a birth cohort) increases in age and is diminished by mortality, some next
cohort is born in exact proportion to the total, the pyramid retains its shape.
2.2. ~ . ~ . If the crude birth and death rates are equal, the population does not
change in size. Such a stable population is called "stationary."
2.2. ~ .2. If the crude birth and death rates are unequal, the population does
change in size, but since the population is stable, as defined above, the
age structure does not change.
2.2. I.3. The combination of crude birth and dead rates yields a population
growth rate, which remains constant through the so long as the birth
and death rates are stable.
2.2.2. By obvious contrast, unstable populations will have shining age
distnbutions. Typically, unstable populations will change in size, for
example, through a crisis of mortality induced by warfare or disease, or
through a sudden change in fertility, as ~ a "baby boom." It is possible, of
course, for a population to experience simultaneously a change In fertility
and a precisely offsetting change in mortality, so that the population remains
the same in size, even though it changes in age structure. We would not
expect to see such precisely offsetting fertility and mortality shifts very
open. Indeed, a crisis sending mortality up will commonly send fertility
down, and boom times will do the opposite. Fertility changes generally have
more dramatic effects on age structure than do proportionally equivalent
mortality changes, although they have equivalent and opposite effects on
population size. This is because mortality changes are usually spread across
s
6
4
OCR for page 42
i
many age groups, whereas fertility changes impact only the youngest
(newborns).
2.3. Population dynamics and stable age distributions. Stable populations typically
have different age structures, depending on the combination of their fertility and
mortality rates. These Carl be appreciated intuitively. Let us imagine a stationary
population in which no one dies until age ~ 00, at which point everyone cties. The
population pyramid will be a rectangle. Every year, the same number of people
are born, every year everyone gets one year older, and when they reach 100, they
disappear. The age pyramids of countries like Japan and those of Western
Europe now approach this rectangular shape.6 Fertility is low and not changing
much (if we ignore the immigrants). Infant and child mortality are low, so that a
very high proportion of newborns survive to be adults. Adult mortality is also
low until the advanced ages. Now imagine a population in which fertility is
higher but mortality is not concentrated just at the highest ages. The base of the
pyramid will be broader, because more people are born, and they will be
subtracted starting at an earlier age. The higher the level of fertility, compared
with mortality, the broader is the base of the pyramid and, importantly, the higher
is the rate of growth. The age pyramids of rapidly growing countnes, such as
those of the Middle East or South Asia or ADica, show this broad-based shape.
Figure ~ shows some contrasting age pyramids, including one that is projected;
these are described in Section 3.
s
5
OCR for page 43
3. Two consequences of age structures. Some readers will have skipped to this point.
Age structures of different shapes imply consequences for the people in them. There
are two levels at which such consequences are felt: the society in general and the
family in particular.
3. ~ . Figure ~ shows some sample population pyramids graphs of the age structure
of populations according to sex, for the United States, Japan, and Gaza in 2002,
and one projected for Japan in 2050.7 The United States has relatively low
mortality at all ages and a moderate fertility rate and has a rate of natural increase
of 0.6 percent per year. By 2002 these had produced an age pyramid that was
approaching a columnar or rectangular shape. Relatively few people are born,
proportional to the whole population, and mortality is rare until after about age
55. Because the United States has a high immigration rate, the shape of the
pyramid is affected by migrants, however. Since most of these migrants are in
the working ages, they swell the pyramid in those ages. To the extent that
migrants have high fertility, they swell the bottom of the pyramid. The bulge
around age 40-50 in the U. S. pyramid is the result of the baby boom of the
1950s. In Japan, the shrinkage at the low ages is the result of declining fertility.
By 2050 fertility in Japan is projected to fall sufficiently, and old-age mortality is
projected to improve so much that the growth rate will be close to zero, with the
age structure resembling a triangle with the apex pointing downward.8 By
contrast, fertility is so high in Gaza in 2002 and mortality sufficiently low-
that the annual rate of increase is 3.7 percent, alla the shape of the pyramid is the
reverse of what Japan's will be in 2050. The Gaza type of age pyramid is typical
6
OCR for page 44
of countries growing at a high rate. Egypt, Libya, the Sudan, the Western
Sahara, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, the Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
Syria are all growing at more than 2 percent per year.9 The mean growth rate for
North Africa and the Middle East is 2. ~ percent, implying a doubling time of 33
years. The doubling time for the population ofthe Palestinian Terntones is 19
years.~°
3.2. To appreciate some general societal effects of age structures, think of a
population as consisting not only of people but also of opportunities to be fully
functioning adults roughly speaking, "jobs" or the opportunity to marry. Our
discussion is simplistic, but we offer it to paint a stark picture of how population
age structure might affect the life chances of individuals. Imagine that these
opportunities to become and progress as adults exist for persons aged 20-65.
They are vacated as the incumbents die or retire and are successively vacated and
filled as persons age upward in the opportunity structure and age structure
simultaneously. At the lowest level (age 20) they are filled as those who were 19
last year become 20 this year. Ideally, the number of opportunities vacated by
20-year olds becoming 2 ~ is equal to the number of persons aged ~ 9 who survive
to be 20. If their number is greater than the number of vacancies, some will be
unemployed. At typical ages for manage, some wit] be unmarried. These
younger people will have to wait until an opportunity opens up. In the meantime,
they may experience frustration. The greater the disparity between a larger,
younger age group and the next older and smaller age group, the greater is this
disparity between number of potential incumbents and number of opportunities.
7
OCR for page 45
Thus, in rapidly growing populations, one might expect slower advancement,
delays in marriage because of delays in becoming economically self-sufficient,
sexual frustration, and the social and political consequences thereof. Of course,
as we note below, societies have numerous opportunities—social, cultural, and
economic to ameliorate such conditions. We only wish to suggest their
existence.
The demographic engine in a rapidly growing population is also on a runaway
course. Every year there are increasing numbers of persons entering their
reproductive period, who produce (at high rates) children who will produce even
more children at similar rates. At the same time, as each age group (say, the 19-
year-olds) ages upwards, their numbers exceed those of the persons one year
older. Mortality is not high enough to bring their numbers down to what the next
oldest were last year; the fertility engine has increased them. In the Palestinian
Territories, 10.4 percent of the male population is aged ~5-]9, and about 8.9
percent is aged 20-24. The difference is ~ .5 percent. We can think of this
difference as a demographically induced crude "unemployment" rate the
difference between new aspiring workers and the jobs occupied by the next older
group. By contrast, if the growth rate were zero, the proportions in those age
groups would have been about 6.81 percent and 6.78 percent, respectively.l2 The
difference due to mortality alone would thus be only about 0.03 percent (when
growth is zero). The excess of males aged 15-19 in the rapidly growing
population described, compared with the number in the stationary population,
8
OCR for page 46
Hi:
amounts to ~ .47 percent of the population (about 9,000 men in the Palestinian
Tewtor~es, for example). It is produced by fertility-dr~ven expansion alone.
This is 9,000 young men who have poor prospects of employment, because they
exceed by 9,000 the number of jobs vacated by the 20-24 year olds (if indeed all
of those have jobs), or marriage, because they cannot support a family. This
situation continues proportionally at each successive age ~oup.~3
Of course, the situation is more complex.~4 Where unemployment is high, wages
fall, and more people may be hired at a lower ware (if there is work). If
employment rises' more money is earned and spent' and the economy itself
expands. Nevertheless the basic thrust of the simple model is compelling.
Figure 2a shows the level of unemployment that might be anticipated at the
boundary between age groups ~5-19 and 20-24 according to Me preceding
arguments, if the mortality pattern were that of the mode! life table noted above,
with expectation of life at birth about 71 years for males. This is not an untypical
level for many countries of the Near East. The figure shows the excess of
persons in each age group 15-19 compared with the next higher group across
ages 20-24 for growth rates of 0, 0.005, 0.020, and 0.035. The disparity is about
0.03 percent at zero growth but about 1.7 percent at a growth rate of 3.5 percent
per year. Figure 2b shows the total "unemployment" disparity across the ages
15-64. The total disparity is 1.85 percent at zero growth and is accounted for
entirely by mortality as the population ages across the span. The gross dispanty,
discounting mortality, is by definition O at zero growth but about 9 percent at a
9
OCR for page 47
growth rate of 3.5 percent per year. The net disparity at that point is over 7
percent (amounting to 16,000 adult males in Gaza, for example). Of course, this
disparity is in addition to arty other unemployment level that may prevail for
purely economic or political reasons.
3.3. There are several ways in which such problems can be ameliorated.
3.3. ~ . One way is to lower the population growth rate. Increased levels of
mortality will have that effect, either by more rapidly emptying positions in
the opportunity structured or by diminishing the number of younger persons
trying to move into them, or both. increasing mortality is not a policy
option, although as Malthus observed, it is often an outcome. Lowenng
fertility is a policy option, although it is vigorously opposed by some
segments of the political spectrum in the United States and elsewhere
including ethnic groups that fee} the need to keep their numbers high.
Nevertheless, programs to lower fertility especially in poor countries have
had beneficial effects over the past 50 years or so. It is important to observe
that fertility has declined quite rapidly in some parts of the Muslim world.
The classic levels, after World War IT, were high. The total fertility rate
(TFR) (roughly speaking, the number of children a woman could expect to
bear if she lived out her reproductive span) was around 6.16 It has fallen to
2.3 ire Tumsia,l7 3.1 in Algena, 3.5 in Egypt, 2.5 in Deb anon and Turkey, but
remains high at 6.8 in the Western Sahara, 5.9 in the Palestinian Temtories,
5.7 in Saudi Arabia, and 7.2 in Yemen. Note, however, that in an
increasing population, continually increasing numbers of women enter their
?
10
OCR for page 110
Table 12a
Turkey
Muslims and Non-Musl~ms
Model
Turkey: Muslims
and Non-Muslim
. ~ . ~ .
R Square
Adjusted R Square
i''' ' ' ' ' 1'~~'lll~~' ' ' ''' ' ' Lear ~ ~ ~~ h1''''''""''"" '' ' ' ' '' '~^'-''~' ''' ' -'' ' '' —it' "
....... ......................... . ........
.
R
................. ...................... , ~
Model Summary
..... . ....................... .... .... ............................. . . ............
............... .................. . .. ,$l,~ .........
Std. Error of the
Estimate
.......... ...........
.492(a)
.242
.241
~ . . ~ ~ ... ~ .................. . ~ ~ .........
1.50129813
...... i " .~ ~ ..... ..
a Predictors: (Constant), Currently Worldug for Cash, dummy: MUSLIM, Difference between Individual and
Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born Children, dummy: URBAN, Years of Primary Education, Years of Higher
.
...... ,,, . . , _ , ., ~ . ........ : ,., ,, ,, ..... :.:: , .: ' !!.! ..,Y~ .. !' ' ' '' ' .' :' '' ' ' '' ' ' '- - ~.V _~..~ A .~ ~
ANOVA(b)
... ,., . ~.~ ~ .
. .............................................. , .. ......... .. ` ~ . , .~ ~
Model
Sum of
Squares
,,, .......... .... .............
4067.017
.... . . ........ ....... .. .
12727.751
16794.768
.. ~ ... ........ .. ........ ................... .
df
....... .. ......... ...... .. ....... ............................ .
9
...... ... . . . . . ... .
5647
5656
Mean Square
......................... .............. ............... .
451.891
F
............. ............ ............ .. , .
200.493
. . . ...... ....... . . .. ... ... .. . . .. .
sing.
......... ............. ... ...... ~ ....
Turkey:
Muslims and
Non-Muslims
~ ~ I ~ ,.~. ~ .
a Predictors: (` Constant), Curd ally Working fop Cash, donkey ~ :USLIM, Differs ace between Ind: vidual and
Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born Children, dummy: URBAN, Years of Primary Education, Years of Higher
Education, dummy: East, Simple SES Percentile, Years of Secondary Education
Regression ~
; ........ ~ ..... ......... ..... A,
~ .
Residual
.. I.. ........................................
Total
.000(a)
.. . .. . . . .. .... ..... . . .. . ... ..
.
2.254
b Dependent Variable: dependent3 Difference Fertility
Coefficients(a)
......... .. ...................... .... . .......... . .................... . .. .... . .... - ...... i........... .............................. .. ... .. .... ~ ....... i...... A............. - i..... if..... In................ . ..............................
Standardiz
Unstandardized ed
Coefficients Coefficient
s t
, . , .. . ... ............ . ............ .. ..... .. ................ ... ....... ........... . ~ A ... .................. .~ .... ~ . ................. .~.
Mode! ~ B T Enror7 Beta ~ f
........... . ........ . .... ........ . c~ .. ......... w ~.^ . ~ ~ an. . ~ c~ ~ ~~ ..........
_ _ _ ~ .
(Constant) .878 .080 11.011
.... . ........... ........................ . ................................ _ _ _ ..........................
dummy: MUSLIM 3.404E-02 .068 ~ .006 .502
dummy: URBAN -.256 .046 -.070 -5.610
,......,~................ - ..................................~........ ..............................,........ . , . . ................. .......................... ~ .... .~................... .........................................
Regional dummy: East .997 .054 .228 18.408
Turkey: Years of Primary Education -.180 .010 -.221 -17.279
................... .......................................... .............................................. . ... ... ...................~.. .................... ..... ..................... ... . ............................~.~ . ..... ....~..~....
. .
Mus. alms Years of Secondary Education -5.699E-02 .019 -.050 -2.993
MusInns ~ Years of Higt r Education | 7.3~7E-02 ~ .042 | .028 | I .764
Difference between Individual and
Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born 3.092 .156 .232 19.884
Children ~ ala ~ - . - Fir- -- ~ _ ~ ~~ ........, _ ~ ~ . .. ,.,...~........
S i m p l e S E S P e r c e n t i l e - 2 . 6 8 7 1 : - 0 3 . 0 0 1 - . 0 4 5 - 3 . 4 5 5
.............. ... ,........ ...... ....,.,......................... . .......,..................... ... .......... _ ..................... .............. ... ..................,.. ..... ............................
Currentl Workine for Cash -.230 .058 -.049 -3.961
a Dependent Variable: dependents: Difference Fertility
, ,,,,,,.,., - -.- ' -- - · — - - ~ ~~ d''10~ 1~'''' '1—'' '' ' ' ' '—~~ ' ' '''' ~ ~'''''1'/""''~:~'::'~ ' ''' ' ' ·I:li :': '::' ' '.:_'—__ U.ll~
Ad_
.
Slg.
...~.....-.......~.-.
.000
__
.616
.000
.000
.000
....--..................
.003
.078
.000
.... ..~...~.....
.001
__
.000
_
OCR for page 111
Table 12b
Turkey
Muslim Only
Model Summary
. __
R
- ~ - I ,,, . . R Square Adjusted R Square i
Model I = l (Selected) I _ _ 3
. ,.~ ~ ................... . ~ ................ ,~, .d ................... .. . ,~
Onl ~ .502(a) .252 f .251
.. , . l,` , , . ~ _ , ~ w '''"' ''' ''' ''''':'''''''111~#' '' . ~ ,, ~ , ,,~ ~.~ ,. a, de _.,.~
a Predictors: (Constant), Currently Working for Cash, Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of
Dead to Ever-Bom Children, dummy: URBAN, dummy: East, Years of Higher Education, Years of Primary
Education, Simple SES Percentile, Years of Secondary Education
Std. Error of the
Estimate
1.49384723
............................ ........................................ . d
ANOVA(b,c)
Sum of df
Sanares
......... ........................ ....................... .............................................. ~ ~ . .. . .. ~ ............ ... , ... ....................................................................
3820~453 .- 8
1 1347.582 ~ . . 5085
15168.035 5093 .
~ .. ~ . . ,,,,~,,,,,,, A,,,., ........ . . .w.. ..... .... .
Model
Mean Square
''''"''1 1'~-'"'"'~"-"-'-'''''' ''"'-'1!~
477.557
..... . ................ .. ... .... ... ... .
2.232
... . . ,~., .. ... , ~ ....
F
,.........................................................
213.999
.... . ............ ........ ..... .. .
sign.
. ...................................................... ............
.OOO(a,)
. . ...... . . . .................................. .
Turkey:
Muslims
Only
Regression
............ . . . .. ...........
Residual
.......................................... ......... ..
Total
. .... .. ............... ...... .. ... .
a Predictors: (Constant), Currently Working for Cash, Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of Dead
to Ever-Born Children, dummy: URBAN, dummy: East, Years of Higher Education, Years of Primary Education,
Simple SES Percentile Years of Secondary Education
". , ~ ". - . ,, , . . .. - ~ . ~ ~ ., ,.,, ,. .......
b Denendent Vanable: dependents: Difference Fertilitv
c Selecting only cases for which dummy: MUSLIM = 1
. . ...................... .. .... ....... . ...... ..................... ............................. . ......... .. ........
Coefficients(a b)
. ... , , ............. ................................. ................... . . ~ . . . ........... ................... ............... . .... ........................
.
Model
Turkey:
Muslims
Only
(Constant)
..................................... ....... ............. ................ .................... , ........... Ada, .
dummy: URBAN
.............................. ...... =. . . ............... . . ........... ...... ....................... .......
Regional dummy: East
......... .. _ ........................... .............. .. ......... . ............................. .............. .
Years of Primarv Education
... . . . . . ~ .. .... ... . ..~ ... .......... . . .. ..
Years of Secondary Education
.... ........ . .. . ~ . ~ ..... . _ ... ............ ~ ......
Years of Higher Education
~ d ~ —- - - — 1~ 1 ' ' ''111 ~11 #1~' · · - ~
Difference between Individual and Average
Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born Children
Simole SES Percentile
Currently Working for Cash
T .. .. ... . a, . `G .......... ........ .. ................ . ................ .. .. .
Unstandardized
Coefficients
. ......... ...................~............................
.936
..................... .. ................... ......
-.266
. .. ...... ................. ....
.986
.........................~ ........ ........ ~ ...
-.183
~ ~ ... . .....
-5.728E-02
.. . ..... . . ... . . . ...
8.320E-02
Am'''''''''' '''' 11
3.159
-2.709E-03 ~
..............................................~... ~
Std.
ElTor
..... . . ....... ~ ..............
.063
~.~
.048
.. . ............................
.055
.011
.020
. ~ ..... ...... .
.043
.... .,, ,! ~ ...............
.lUJ
.............. i.... ........
.001
!..........,,,,,,_,,, _ l
-.243 .061
,........... ........... ..... ___ i
... ..........
Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
_
,.... . .~..................................
. ......
,,,.,,....~.'1''~''''''''''''"'~1'~''''''''''i11
-.071
........ ..................... ....................~........
~~
.~JaJ
.. a... ........... ........... ,.,.......~.,......... ., - .,
-.223
..............., ... .. . . ~ . .............. .. .. . ....
-.051
.,, .., ..................... .... ........... ~ .. ~ ... .
.032
...... . ............. ......... ~ ....... I. ....
.234
.... ~ .....~.~................... . ...............,... ~
-~045
,...... .. . ........................ ... .... ... I........
-.051
... .. ............. .............. ..
. .. . . ..... . . . . . ..............
14.872
''''''''''' 111~11''''''''''''''''
-5~525
....~......... ..........................
17.969
...... .. ....
-16.542
. .................... ~ . . ...
_ .
-2.933
........ ............. I..... .....
1.935
19.141
....... ,.. .~ .... .... ...............
-3~316
...................... . .................
-3.957
........... ........... ........
sig.
.000
.000
.000
_i
.000
.003
.053
.....................
.000
_ a000
a Denendent Vanable: dependents: Difference Fertility
............... ..^ . ..... ~ ... _ .. ... . . . . .............. ...... ~ . . ......... . ................ ~ ......, ............ ~ . . .................. .. .... ... . ....... ... .... .... . ...... a... .. .............. _............ ................. ..... . ................
b Selecting only cases for which dummy: MUSLIM - 1 ~
....................~.~.......~ ......... ......... ................... .. .. .............................. ..................................................... .. . .. . . .. .... .............. A.. ....................,...........~.................
OCR for page 112
Table 12c
Turkey
Non-Muslims Only
Model Summary
. .................... ........................... ., .
............. ........... ....................... , . ............. ......................... .
.-
.... ................ ................................................. ~ . ........... ~ — ....................................
Model 0 (Selected)
. ~ ~ ................................ . ~
Turkey: Non- .395(a)
Muslims Only
........................................ , - ,,,, . ~., ,I,h,,. .......... ,,, ,, .....................
a Predictors: (Constant), Currently Working for Cash' Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of
Dead to Ever-Born Children, dummy: URBAN, dummy: East, Years of Primary Education, Years of Higher
Education, Simple SES Percentile, Years of Secondary, Education
................... ' ' . ' ' ' .......... ' ' _ ~ ._ ,~V~.~,, ' ......... : i " ..! ~ ' . ' A ~ ~ ... ,, ..,, ~ ,"~. .......... Hi. ` ! ...............
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
. ~ ~
.156
.144
1.57305598
_ ........... it . ........ is . ~
Sum of
Squares
. , ~
.
253.701
. . . I ., .
1370.876
.
1624.577
ANOVA(b c)
. ~..~ ~ , . ~ , , -,, , ,,,
df Mean Square F
.,,, . ~ . ~ w ~ ~.~0 . &
8 31.713 12.816
554 2.475 _
.. ................................... - ...... ....... .... ...... ..................... ,~ .~ ~ ~ . ~ .....................
562
......................................... ............ . ................... . ~ su. .......................... it ~ ~ ~
Model
. ~ .......
. .
Turkey: Non-
Muslims
Only
_ .
a Predictors: (Constant), Currently Working for Cash, Difference between Individual and Average Ratio of Dead
to Ever-Born Children, dummy: URBAN, dummy: East, Years of Primary Education, Years of Higher Education
Simple SES Percentile Years of Secondary Education
b Dependent Vanable: dependents: Difference Fertility
a ~ ~ of. I .. .......... . . ~ . . ..~ . . . . . ..... . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . ~
c Selecting only cases for which dummy: MUSLIM = 0 ~~ ~ ~ ,,_llIed.~ . ~~ ~
.... .......... - . , , _ , , ... - In,,.
Recession
....... .
Residual
· ' ' ~ '' ' ' ' 1 ~ '' . ._ _.
Total
.... , ........... , - ....... .. .....
Big,
............... ......................................
.000(a)
. ....... .. . .. . . . .
4
. . .. . .
Coefficients(a~b)
1 1
Turkey: Non-
Muslims
Only
1
6
.... ,,,,-. . . . . . . . ........... ,,~
Model
. . . ............ . ................. ..................................... . ... ............. ..... ..... . .................. ........ a .... , ......................... ................. ........... .......... .
Standardiz
Unstandardized ed
Coefficients Coefficient
... .. ........................... s
B ~ EStdor | Beta ~
.737 .163~ .
-.173 .145 . -.051
.. . . 1.229 .3S4 .137 .
-~ -.161 ~.032 -.209 .
-3.248E-02 .085 ~-.02 1~ .
-8.073E-02 .182 ~ -.023 .
. . .. ,
2.597 .470 .219
.........................._........... ......................~............ ...................~.......
-2.662E-0~ 3 .003 .... ~ 0.45.
. -.131 .183 -.029
~ . - ' ~ 1~ ~ 'TO I_d Ii ~ 1 ·— . . .... _ ..
a Dependent Able. dependent3: D Florence Per il
b Selecting only cases for Reich dummy: MUSLIM = 0
. .
(Constant)
. ~ ....... .. ...,. ~ ..................................... ............. ... ... ............................. ........ ............
dummy: URBAN
.... ........... - ........ .................................... ........................................ .......... ...........................
Regional dummy: East
.......... A........ ..................... ................. - ............ ".................................... ~............................ ........................
Years of Primary Education
. .. .... ......~. . . A... .~...... .. ......... .... . . ..... .... . .. . ...
. Years of Secondary Education
. .... . ............... _ ....... . . ....,.... ............. .. . .. . ....... ... . . ....
Years of Higher Educahon
Difference between Individual and
Average Ratio of Dead to Ever-Born
Children
..... .... ... . .. ~ .. ~ .. ~ ............ ~ ........ ......... . .......... . .......... ....................... ~ .... .... ....
Simple SES Percentile
.. .. ... - a.. ............................... . ......... - . . ............ ...——.........—.. a................ ............ ........................
.~ . Charred ~ for Cash
t Sig.
.... .....
4.517
... ........ ............~..
. .
-1.192
.......~.... ...............
~ _
3.468
..................................
-5.124
_ ~ =
-.383
~ a_
-.4
... ............... .... ... ........ ~
. .
5.531
..............~.......... .......
-1.045
.......~..~..~............... d,,,., —
in. ~ .
-. / 10
·
234
...........................
.001
...........................~....
.000
. . ... ...
·
.658
..... . . "....
.000
·
.474
75
?
OCR for page 113
Figure captions:
Figure 1 Contrasting population pyramids
Figure 2a Percent unemployed at age 15-19/20-29 at different growth rates
Figure 2b Sum of interage group disparities 1 5-64 ('unemployment")
Figure 3a Distnbution of 131 countries by proportion of population that is Muslim
Figure 3b Lorenz curve of Muslim population
Figure 4 Standardized recession coefficients by country by variable
Figure 5 Standardized regression coefficients by variable by country
76
OCR for page 114
FIGI~E 1 ContrastiIlg population pyramids
MALE
United States: ~B82
AGE
, , ~ . ~, ~ .
i4 12 iO 8
., ]. . ~ . . ,~
~ 4
FEd0LE
80-64
75-75.
70-~g,
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49:
40-44-
35-39
30-~4
25-29
20-24
1o~i9~
Population (in ~illions)
Source: U.S. Cen~us Bureau' International Osta Base.
...... _ , ~ . . .
8 10 12 14
H~LE
J~p~n: 2082
AGE
FEN9LE
4
3
1
145_49'
120-3
20-~`
la-l. -I
5-9 1
, 0-4
0 0
Population (in pillions)
Source: U.S. Census Buresu, International Osta Base.
M9LE
J~p~n: 2058
AGE
.. _ __ ~
_ ~_ - _
_ ~ _
..: '. . :~_ ~ a_
_ 1 _ 1 _
—1 ~ _1. 1 __
_ - 1 _ 9 ~
~_ ~—1 ~
_ ~—1 ~
~ ~ _ l ~
. .' ~ _ ~ ~
~ ~ _ ~ _
.,~ ~ _1 ~ ;
~ ~ _ ~X ~ _~_s
...] ~ _ ~ 1
_
_s
_s 1
~ _ · ~ __
_ _ l ~
_ ~ __
~ 1 __
_ ~ ~
1 ~
_
1 _
l l ~
~ ~ __
~ 1 __
~ ~ _ I
- ~ 1
~ l ~
1 Cl
, , ! ._
6 5 4 3 ~ ~ ~
80-84
765Oo_~
55-59
4535_45f
12i5-2l4
10-14
0-4 . 1~
1 0 ~ 1 ~ 3
Population ( in rni l l ions)
SourCe: U.S. Census Buresu, International Osta Base.
FEN~LE
, , 1
4 5 ~
1
3
77
OCR for page 115
Gala Strip: 2092
MOLE AGE FEMALE
r 175_79[ .
6g-6*
~45~53
41113g-38
- 11 i1128-24
—· 1115-19 ~
· l~iO-i4 I_. _
l ~ ~ 7~__ ~ A; n
~ ~ 1 1 __ _ 15~ 7 ~
~ 1 1 1 ~. 1 i. 0-4 _
200 150 100 50 0 0 50 100 150 200
Population (in thousands)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau' International Oata Base.
6
9
78
OCR for page 116
FIG~E 2a Percent unemployed at age 15-19/20-29 at different growth rates
,.S
I.6
l.4
I.2
a. 1
~0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
o- r
_ _
to
U@.005
Growth Rates
U@.020
t3~.03S
FIGURE 2b Sum of interage group disparities 1 5-64 ("unemployment")
8
A 7
6
S
$
4
3
2
1
o
a total disparity
~ net disparity
.
. 1 .
1
. _
-Led ~
_ ~
· ~
_ ~
_ AIL
_
_ ~
_ Or
~3 loll
· 82
~ ,IL
~ AIL
_ BL
IIL 1 111
.1111 1
l
1
~ 1 ~
1 ~
3. 1 1
3'
~ 1 ~
3T 1 T
382 1 25
213 3
2,3 3
2 2
L 1
22 2
1
totUtS~ 0 toW15-64~.005 totU15~.02 totU15~4~.03S
Growth Rate
79
OCR for page 117
FIGURE 3a Dishibution of 131 countries by proportion of population that is Muslim
40
35
30
1 - ~_~
10
5
o
s
.
.
~ - I I I ~ I I ~ I r
-
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Proportion Muslim
7
80
OCR for page 118
FIGURE 3b Lorenz curve of Muslim population
1.00-
0.90
0.80
o
. -
:s
° 0.70
·e
-
~ 0.60
o
o
=0 0.50
o
'> 0.40
-
`~ 0.30-
0.20
0.10
r
/
J
r
J
/
I, , 1
0.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Cumulative Proportion of Total World Population
81
OCR for page 119
FIGI3RE 4 Standardized regression coefficients by country by variable
0.600
~ 400
1 oboe
-0.400
-0.600
6
1~ Urban 11111 Region 1133 PrimEd ID SecEd
OHiEd Child Loss mSES EICash
me
—1 —
-.
,.;....E ~
.
F
F
Egypt: Tunisia: All Turkey: Morocco: All India: Muslims Bangladesh: Palcistan: All Yemen: All Sud - :
Muslins Only Muslims Muslins Only Muslirr~ Only Muslim Only Muslims Muslims Muslins Only
Assumed Assumed Assumed Assumed
Sample
82
OCR for page 120
f
FIGURE 5 Standardized regression coefficients by variable by country
2.000 -
\.500
1.000
0.500
0.000
.SOO -
-1 .000
1
__ ~
E I Egypt: Muslims Only
13 Turkey: Muslims Only
E3 Tunisia: All Musluns Assumed
O Morocco: All Muslims Assumed
~ India: Muslims Only
El Bangladesh: Muslims Only
ED Pakistan: All Muslims Assumed
113 Yemen: All Muslims Assumed
llB Sudan: Muslims Only
, i . .
i. i B.
~ ~ ~,d,~,~
~3
~ . i I
-) at,
, ,, , , Am.
.
. _ ~
Hi
l _ ~
1 ~ 1
Urban Region PnmEd
SecEd HiEd Child Loss SES Cash
Variable
83
Representative terms from entire chapter:
positive effect
