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~ - 1 ]:ntroduction 1.1 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: DEFINITION AND EVOLVING RATIONALE Definition Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) are defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as "weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.''] Evolving Rationale General Considerations Non-lethal weapons technologies may augment, enhance, complement, and/ or substitute for political processes in the resolution of conflict. In certain situa- tions, they may act as a force multiplier. There is no single "silver bullet" non- lethal weapons technology because of the range of applications and environments for the use of NLWs. Candidates for employment must be available, affordable, reliable, and simple to use, and must minimize casualties among friends, foes, or 1 Department of Defense. 1996. Directive Subject: Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, DODD 3000.3, Washington, D.C., July 9, p. 2. 12

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INTRODUCTION 13 neutrals. Their use may lead to decisive action, such as the control of an area, while limiting collateral damage and the need for reconstruction. NLWs have appealing attributes for warfighters in current environments of peacekeeping support, regional conflict, and asymmetric threat. They create an option for controlled action, and may even keep lethal force from being the sole means of solving a crisis when diplomatic, economic, and sanction-based ap- proaches have failed. They can reinforce deterrence and credibility by providing a commander with a graduated response over a wide range of military activities. NLWs may also allow early, non-precipitous response to a conflict by providing a progressive, incremental, and measured response without lethal consequences. NLWs have utility across the spectrum of conflict and at all levels of com- mand. In some instances, their use may be publicly and politically attractive; it can buy time, with few or no casualties while diplomatic solutions are sought. When employed at operational and strategic levels, the use of NLWs can reduce the cost of rebuilding infrastructure and economies. Growing Support Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have been increasingly involved in operations other than war (OOTW), including peace- keeping, peace support, and humanitarian operations. The use-of-force con- straints placed on U.S. forces through the rules of engagement (ROE) have often required that any collateral casualties be held to a minimum. In 1995 the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) published the results of a study on NLWs and concluded that they would be valuable in future conflicts.2 The National Defense Authorization Act of 19963 required consolidation of non- lethal weapons responsibilities. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch re- sponded by directing DOD to become actively involved in planning for integra- tion of non-lethal weapons; this led to the formation of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) in May 1996. However, funding sources were not established until December of that year, and the first year of separately budgeted funds for the JNLWD was FY98, with $16.6 million in reprogrammed funds from the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy. In January 1997, a Joint Service 2Weiner, Malcolm H. 1995. Report of an Independent Task Force on Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications, Council on Foreign Relations, New York. 3Congress provided direction to DOD via the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106), in which it stated, "SECDEF shall assign centralized responsibility for development and [any other functional responsibility the Secretary considers appropriate] on non-lethal weapons tech- nology." On February 14, 1996, the Office of the Secretary of Defense published a memorandum stating, "We need to . . . (1) get a good understanding of the Department's NEW activities . . . (2) develop an NEW management approach for the Department, and (3) . . . decide on a level of expenditure in this area." 6

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14 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ~ 3.~.~. , If- -..- 3'+~-~-. I: and evaluation ~(ROT&~E)-~and ~pr~umment Memorandum of Agreement for support of the JNLWD was signed; it was up- dated in 1999 (see Box 1.1~. DOD created the JNLWD under the executive agency of the U.S. Marine Corps. Despite its relatively low funding, the JNLWD was highly visible to both Congress and DOD, and it was under pressure to focus on acquiring available technology that could be fielded as quickly as possible especially to provide NLWs to troops already located in the Balkans and on other peace support opera-

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INTRODUCTION 15 lions. The directorate has been successful in fielding selected NLWs and kits of NLWs but now faces the need to develop more advanced and robust capabilities. Hard lessons were learned about the value arid limitations of NLWs in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Macedonia, and other places to which U.S. troops had been sent and where combatants and non-combatants mixed in close proximity. Senior commanders who deployed on these missions became vocal proponents of NLWs. LtGen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (now Gen (retired)), Commander of United Shield' the exf~ltration of United Nations forces from Somalia, asked for and received a quick response to his request for fielding of NLWs. Though of limited capability, the NLWs that were used received credit from General Zinni for contributing to the successful completion of the mission. He also noted that he "would never go on another peace support mission without them."4 Similarly, Gen John Sheehan, USMC (retired), former Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, became a strong advocate of NLWs when he sent troops to Haiti in Operation Uphold Democracy. Later, when speaking at the Non-Lethal Defense Conference II, he emphasized the necessity of those weapons becoming standard military issue.5 Expanding Roles for NLWs Non-lethal weapons capability has been viewed historically as an element of military operations other than war (MOOTW)most especially, for peace sup- port operations. In a recent study,6 however, the JNLWD concluded that NLWs can contribute in the full spectrum of conflict ranging from major theater wars (Mows), to small-scale contingencies (SSCs), to peacetime operations, and home- land defense. More importantly, these assertions were also noted in the FY01 defense planning guidance: NLWs have proven useful across the range of operations, including both conventional combat operations and the many categories of military operations other than war.... Current efforts to study and understand the use of NLWs from the strategic to the tactical levels must be integrated into all future military and interagency concepts and operations.7 Today non-lethal weapons capabilities are being considered for a variety of missions, such as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, law enforcement, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), truce monitoring, counterterrorism, drug interdiction, disaster response, and force protection. 4Lawson, Chris. 1995. "Zinni: Missions Allow MEUs to Shine," Army Times, Volume 55, No. 39,p.23. SSheehan, Gen John, USMC (Ret.) speaking at the Non-Lethal Defense Conference II, Washing- ton, D.C., March 7, 1996. 6American Systems Corporation. 1999. Joint Vision for Non-Lethals: Meeting the Demand of Future Military Operations, ASC, Dumfries, Va., December. 7Department of Defense. 2001. Defense Planning Guidance, Washington, D.C. s

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16 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY 1.2 ROLES OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS FOR NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES U.S. Navy Needs for NLWs A spectrum of missions, both defensive and offensive, that are unique to the Navy can employ NLWs. The defensive missions include force protection- particularly for vessels with heightened vulnerabilities, such as those in port, those transiting straits and other choke points, and those in military supply con- voys. The offensive missions include ship interdiction, blockades, and strikes. The next two subsections elaborate on these mission areas. Defensive Mission Needs Force Protection For force and vessel protection, the Navy should have non-lethal weapons that function in all three non-lethal capacities: counterpersonnel, countermateriel, and countercapability. These include means for crowd control, individual incapacita- tion, area and access denial, clearing of areas, stopping and disabling of vehicles and vessels, and protection against asymmetrical threats such as dispersal of chemical or biological agents. Protection of personnel and ships at anchor or in port, both pierside and outboard, is essential. A strategy emerging since the USS Cole incident in October 2000 is the enforcement of a layered defense with three zones around the perimeter of a vessel.8 The outer zone is designed to alert personnel and to warn an incoming platform or individual; the middle zone is intended for assessing or aff~rm- ing intent if the incoming platform or individual has not somehow acknowledged the warning given in the outer zone; the inner zone is focused on engaging the threat. Non-lethal options are desirable in such situations because assessed threats may involve unintended intrusion or non-combatants, and time lines for response may be too compressed to establish intent unambiguously or to isolate the threat from inno- cent people. (A more detailed discussion of the layered architecture is presented in Appendix A.) The layered strategy requires the ability to determine the presence and extent of potential threats on the surface, under water, and in the air and then to deal rapidly with them through a complement of responses. While surface threats have been the focus historically, underwater and airborne threats appear to be growing as a result of advances in and increasing access to diving equipment, small submarines, and unmanned undersea and airborne vehicles. . 8Arminio, CAPT Thomas, USN, "SECNAV AT/FP Task Force," briefing to the committee on March 7, 2001, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N3/NSB2, Washington, D.C.

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INTRODUCTION -7 1, Establishing zones around the perimeter of a ship requires delineating the zones with barriers that have visible markings and warning devices, such as flashing lights and lasers, or with "smart" buoys with day/night/all- weather sensors and sound emitters. Once the outer barrier is penetrated, assessment of intent and tactics to delay or deter the threat are required. If a potential threat crosses into the middle zone, the option is open for deliver- ing a warning with a non-lethal deterrent such as "flash bangs" or electronic vessel stoppers. Entry into the inner zone requires the use of tools that engage the threat directly through either lethal or non-lethal means. The options selected must be effective on a time scale that allows the employ- ment of lethal means if the NEW fails to deter the threat. Increasing situ- ational awareness both aboard ship and at nearby shore and harbor facilities through the use of increasingly sophisticated surveillance assets, such as imaging sensors on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or remotely piloted surface craft, and/or underwater sensors, will not only contribute to under- standing intent, but it will also maximize the time available for response. This layered strategy is challenging to implement, given both the physical and political realities of today's world. U.S. ships in foreign ports are in close proximity to other vessels of all sizes. Armed patrol boats may not be accept- able to host nations. Enforcing specified zones of protection for U.S. ships in international harbors must rely on diplomatic negotiation, not just on the techno- logical ability to distinguish a legitimate threat from many benign activities. Having non-lethal weapons options available could support such negotiations. ., Other Defensive Needs While the need for protection of ships in port is an all-too-familiar ex- ample following the attack on the USS Cole, other types of defensive mis- sion needs can also be facilitated by NLWs. Ships passing through choke points or operating in the littorals are vulnerable to attack from hostile crowds on shore, to suicide vessels, and to terrorists on land, in the water, or in the air. Military supply convoys have limited weapons onboard. Base security requires capabilities for crowd control, individual incapacitation, area and access denial, and the ability to clear facilities. In all of these diverse environments, threats can be ambiguous and involvement of non- combatants possible. Offensive Mission Needs Sea Strike Concept The previous Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Jay L. Johnson, USN, expressed his vision for the Navy in a paper entitled "Anytime, Anywhere:

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18 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY A Navy for the 21st Century,"9 in which he envisions a Navy, with its sister Services, that "can and will shape the strategic environment and have a decisive impact from the sea on the crises and conflicts of the future; that [the Navy] can and will fight tits] way through any opposition at sea or in the air; and that [it] can project and sustain enough power ashorecarrier air, gunfire, missiles, and Ma- rines to deter a conflict, to stop an aggressor, or to pave the way for heavier joint forces." The CNO's vision paper summed up his outlook in one succinct sentence: "The purpose of the U.S. Navy is to influence, directly and decisively, events ashore from the sea anytime, anywhere." The CNO clearly envisioned the future operating environment of naval forces to be increasingly characterized by continuous combined arms operations designed to dominate a battlespace and bring about the rapid defeat of an enemy. In October 1998, the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) XVIII examined the nature of future opponents and the Navy's future capabilities for detecting, iden- tifying, and rapidly targeting all types of land targets. SSG XVIII developed the revolutionary operational concept named "Sea Strike Attacking Land Targets from the Sea.''l The concept combines high-volume striking power from naval aircraft, missiles, and guns with maneuver forces, very high rates of fire, and fully networked sensors, all designed to maneuver directly and decisively ashore to shock, destroy, and rapidly defeat the enemy. A critical aspect of the concept is that the commander has available the "full-spectrum effects" enabled by "ef- fects-based weaponeering." As described by SSG XVIII: . - Full-spectrum elects allow the commander to accomplish any mission while complying with a dynamic range of rules of engagement. The commander is not faced with choosing between doing nothing and taking action that would involve unacceptable collateral damage. It is imperative that the commander has a wide variety of tools and methods that can be tailored to the operational situa- tion, thereby enabling a full spectrum of effects. Effects-based weaponeering is the process of rapidly pairing affordable, precise weapons with each target to achieve exactly the desired effect. An auto- mated manual on future joint munitions effectiveness would be created to address the following: coordinated weapons and non-weapons effects such as command and control warfare; complementary lethal and non-lethal munitions; integrated landing force, coalition, and supporting joint weapons; and damage preclusion guidance for the commander. This broader approach to weaponeering allows the commander to combine all forms of military and non-military power into an integrated package. 9Johnson, ADM Jay L., USN, Chief of Naval Operations. 1997. "Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century," Proceedings, Volume 123/11/1,137, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., November, pp. 48-50. 10Bill Glenny, Deputy Director, CNO Strategic Studies Group XVIII, private communication, November 8, 2001.

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~~ - INTRODUCTION Sea Strike in a Major Theater of War 19 During all five phases of a strike campaign ( 1 ) close and shape, (2) halt the attack, (3) prepare the battlespace, (4) support maneuver forces ashore, and (5) transition to the postconflict phase non-lethal weapons provide capabilities for counterpersonnel, materiel, and functional nodes. Specifically, they would en- able the commander to accomplish the following: Control crowds, incapacitating individuals and/or groups; Deny access to areas by personnel, vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; Clear facilities, structures, and areas; Disable or neutralize facilities, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment; and Deny or disrupt the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Given the inherent capabilities of the Sea Strike land attack concept, operational NLWs offer the potential for enhancing the effectiveness of lethal forces by, for example, enabling the commander to engage early, immobilizing enemy equipment without permanent damage to roads or bridges, and turning moving targets into stationary targets. Non-lethal capabilities can also establish areas of denial and restrict an adversary's sea space and air space. Non-lethal means can deny an enemy the use of equipment and facilities. For instance, non-lethal directed-energy weap- ons can disrupt enemy air defenses and early warning detection sensors; they can also neutralize minefields. Non-lethal payloads can neutralize chemical and/or biological weapons and destroy or disable supporting infrastructure, such as com- mand and control, communications, and navigation systems. an. Sea Strike to Support MO UT and MOOTS In preparation for attack on an urban target, the commander must assess the value of engaging the target in light of the rules of engagement for collateral damage and non-combatants. Engagement of urban targets requires a variety of weapons and methods. A common challenge of urban combat is the mixing of non-combatants with military targets, either accidentally or intentionally. Opera- tional NLWs can help simplify this situation by enabling the commander to perform the functions listed above. SSG XVIII summarized that allocating adequate resources to the develop- ment of NLWs may ensure that future commanders are capable of utilizing the concept to deliver optimal effects on specific targets across the full spectrum of conflict. Maritime Interdiction Maritime interdiction is carried out by the U.S. Navy for a variety of reasons, such as enforcement of UN sanctions (e.g., in the Persian Gulf) and enforcement

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20 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY of U.S. treaties. It is a mission area made broader by virtue of the fact that the U.S. Coast Guard often uses Navy assets when carrying out its own law enforce- ment responsibilities, particularly drug interdiction and fisheries enforcement. Ship interdiction requires the ability to detect, as well as to delay, stop, or tempo- rarily disable, vessels of various types, sizes, and speeds. Ramming or collision is a high-risk action and is usually unacceptable. Intercepted vessels must be boarded, usually in difficult conditions, and this requires the means to subdue potentially hostile individuals or entire crews at close range in confined areas. All aspects of such a mission would be significantly enhanced with the availabil- ity of non-lethal weapons options. Blockade Needs similar to those in maritime interdiction can arise from the Navy's blockade mission (and its peacetime equivalent of quarantine): that is, denying an adversary's use of the seas involves preventing resupply and reinforcements or keeping an adversary's vessels in port. Non-lethal weapons options are required to delay and stop vessels, including large ships in deep waters, and to apprehend crew members and their cargoes while minimizing risk to U.S. personnel. U.S. Marine Corps Needs for NLWs 1 The U.S. Marine Corps has operational non-lethal weapons capabilities to- day. The Marines expressed their requirements in 1996 through the formal mission needs statement (MNS) process in order to support military operations other than war. As a result, they deploy a basic capability set of NLWs that includes counterpersonnel and countermateriel core capabilities for use at the tactical level by individual Marines. These capabilities are designed to control, stun, incapacitate, or hinder the movement of individuals or crowds; to disable without destroying equipment; and to augment the protective equipment that the individual Marine carries or wears in the field. The U.S. Marine Corps has modified its previously held view that non-lethal weapons capabilities are applicable primarily to MOOTW. In fact, Marine Corps plans now include NLWs as essential capabilities for military operations in urban terrain. MOUT involves joint combat across the full spectrum of conflict and is often conducted in a complex environment where intent is ambiguous and com- batants and non-combatants operate in close proximity. That situation requires non-combatant personnel and materiel protection (often necessitating that non- combatants be recognized as such and then be separated from combatants) as well as the preservation of many structures. To deal with the complexity of such environments, commanders need more options that can include non-lethal weap- ons capabilities.

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INTRODUCTION 21 The Marine Corps is leading efforts to develop two operational requirements documents (ORDs) one for clearing facilities and the other for incapacitating personnel. At the same time, through two concept exploration programs (CEPs), it is determining which non-lethal weapons technologies can be effective at close and standoff ranges. The first CEP is focused on augmenting surveillance and sensing capabilities that can be used at standoff ranges, clearing compartments and rooms by causing occupants to leave, and providing the means to deny access to a cleared area, for example, by inhibiting mobility. The second CEP is inves- tigating non-lethal weapons technologies such as kinetic energy, directed energy, or sensory overload systems for controlling individuals or groups through tempo- rary disablement, distraction, or disorientation. 1.3 DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS FOR NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES ,. Coupling the general background and rationale for NLWs with naval war- fighting considerations as presented in the previous two sections, the committee agreed on the set of characteristics and generic missions listed in Boxes 1.2 and 1.3. The items in Box 1.2 are the criteria against which technologies recom- mended for further development were screened by the committee. The mission list in Box 1.3 is not presented in any priority. However, the technical characteristics listed in Box 1.2 are ordered in two groups: the first characteristic, effects on target, takes priority over all the others as the essential criterion for any NLW. NLWs must provide enhanced operations for the military commander. This implies technologies that are reliable and cost-effective and that provide significant effects at standoff ranges sufficient to allow a transition to greater force if necessary. Effects demonstrated as repeatable and significant when used in a specific scenario are key. Commanders will be reluctant to employ NLWs if there is uncertainty about the effects of their use or if the lack of a consistent effect exposes sailors or Marines to additional risk. This criterion is more significant in context: by their nature, non-lethal weapons technologies often exhibit a wider range of effects and less clear-cut effectiveness when com- pared with lethal counterparts. Once acceptable effects on target are established, then the other characteris- tics listed in Box 1.2 come into play. Other technical characteristics are not unlike those for lethal weapons, but because NLWs are to be employed as an added capability not as a replacement these characteristics have to be more rigorously considered. For example, commanders will not support deployment of NLWs if it means replacing a significant fraction of their lethal capability to accommodate the logistical burden of NLWs. In fact, the ideal NLW would have a "dial-an-effect" capability that could push it into the lethal range as the situation demanded. NLWs should also integrate seamlessly into existing force structures in terms of organization and training.

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22 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY . Currently employed NLWs are typically used from close contact out to tens of meters from potential adversaries. There is a common requirement across many of the non-lethal mission areas to extend the range of NLWs to hundreds of meters or kilometers. Non-lethal weapons technologies should be adaptable across a range of military operations and should provide significant benefit in a variety of non-lethal application scenarios. "Expeditionary" implies rapid response, mobility, endurance, and sustainability in austere environments. Weight and volume are significant constraints for both airlift and shipboard deployment of naval expeditionary forces. The expeditionary environment generally requires that any weapon system be highly mobile and portable by individual troops or existing vehicles. l 1 Director, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate. 1998. Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weap- ons, Quantico, Va.